Palgrave Studies in Populisms

Series Editor

Ihsan Yilmaz

Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University, Burwood, Australia

This Palgrave Macmillan book series addresses the phenomenon of populism which has become part of mainstream politics. Its contested meanings and various shapes inform many aspects of political and social life across the world. In some cases, it emerges in the form of an individual leader; in others, in the form of a social movement or a political party. It is thus important that we understand not merely its defining features and causes, but also its relationship with other social phenomena. While populism’s relationships with globalisation, nationalism, and race are regularly discussed in scholarly literature, there is still need and also great interest in studies that look at different manifestations of populism in different parts of the world and in relation to a rich variety of contexts, polities, religions, and movements. This series includes works on political science, political psychology, sociology, anthropology, political economy and theology. It makes a significant contribution to populism studies and literature from different angles. There is an enormous interest among the scholars from different backgrounds in studying populism and this books series is an important avenue of publication for their studies.

Eric Montigny

Populism in Canada

A New Surge

Eric Montigny

Political Science, Université Laval, Québec, QC, Canada

ISSN 2731-3069e-ISSN 2731-3077

Palgrave Studies in Populisms

ISBN 978-3-031-89133-5e-ISBN 978-3-031-89134-2

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-89134-2

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2025

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Introduction

Justin Trudeau was elected in 2015, promising the return of the “sunny ways.” For him, Canada had become the world's first “post-national state.” Internationally, he was seen as a breath of fresh air, an inspiration to those claiming to be progressive. “Canada is back” claimed Trudeau. Almost 10 years later, unpopular and criticized, he was forced to resign as revolt mounted within his own party. He left in the wake of Donald Trump's election in the United States and his tariff threats against Canada.

How can such a downfall be explained? It goes far beyond the normal weakening of power that every government inevitably suffers. It was precipitated by the surge of a new populist discourse adapted to the Canadian context. This book will help us better understand the inner workings of this discourse. A discourse that will force all political players to reposition themselves. We will also explain how this populism differs from that observed south of the border.

In September 2022, Pierre Poilievre was elected leader of the Conservative Party of Canada. His arrival shook things up and profoundly changed the dynamics of Canadian politics. He rapidly took the lead in the polls. His anti-system style and his attacks on the elites were harsh, in stark contrast to the usual decorum of the House of Commons. He fiercely denounced inflation and the carbon tax introduced by Justin Trudeau's Liberal government to combat the climate crisis. By hammering a message aimed specifically at the working class, he provoked a populist spiral in Canada.

Feeling threatened, the leader of the main left-wing party, the New Democratic Party, also chose to adopt a more populist discourse. In the fall of 2024, we witnessed two spectacular reversals on the left. Jagmeet Singh put an end to the parliamentary coalition which, with the support of the NDP, allowed the Liberals to govern without the threat of losing the confidence of the House. He also withdrew his support for the Liberal carbon tax.

The uproar has also taken hold of the Liberals. Justin Trudeau's departure in early 2025 was provoked by his Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Chrystia Freeland. She dealt him the “coup de grâce” by resigning a few days before Christmas. She justified her action by objecting to the Prime Minister's surprise announcement of a new policy with “populist overtones” aimed at distributing 250$ directly to everyone who earns less than $150,000 a year...

The reality is more complex. She did not accept an upcoming cabinet reshuffle where she would lose her position to former Canadian and England bank governor Mark Carney. Justin Trudeau wanted to give her the mandate of being in charge of the upcoming free trade negotiations with the United States. However, the planned reshuffle never took place. Instead, in the race to succeed Justin Trudeau as leader of the Liberal Party, both Chrystia Freeland and Mark Carney were facing off. Ironically, one of their first commitments was to abolish the Liberal carbon tax they had been defending just a few months earlier. Mark Carney's first act after succeeding Justin Trudeau as Prime minister was to publicly sign a decree, in the style of Donald Trump, abolishing this green tax. 

For years, many thought Canada was living under a bubble. The populism surge spreading through many Western democracies was never going to be strong enough to govern the country. At the opening of the 2018 Congress of the International Political Science Association in Brisbane, Australia, renowned political scientist Pippa Norris even spoke of the Canadian exception. If anything, Ontario's then new Conservative premier, Doug Ford, could be suspected. After all, didn't he get elected by promising to reduce the price of beer?

In Europe and the United States, the migrant crisis, coupled with the economic crisis of 2008, had the effect of encouraging a surge in populist discourse. This was not the case in Canada. In short, Canada seemed immune to the rise of populism. Canada had certainly experienced populist episodes in its history. This was particularly the case in the West, where populist parties even managed, at various times in the twentieth century, to take power in Alberta, in Saskatchewan or in British Columbia. But never before a populist party had a real chance to win an election at the federal level. At best, far behind the ruling party in terms of seats, Preston Manning's Reform Party had achieved official opposition status in 1997.

The COVID-19 Mobilizing effect

Many Canadians watched the populist political evolution of the United States with incomprehension and a certain incredulity. They thought they understood their neighbor but found it hard to explain Donald Trump's political rise.

Since Ronald Reagan presidency, the two countries’ economies were highly integrated. In the blink of the 2016 US election, Canada’s main economic partner was transformed. Overnight, free trade was called into question, a deal the Republican Party had put in place. Trump’s first election even caused an influx of refugees north of the border. For a while, the Quebec authorities had to hastily open the Montreal Olympic Stadium to lodge them.

Many Canadians also watched with astonishment what was happening across the Atlantic. The British chose the road to Brexit. Following a referendum characterized by isolationist and Anglo-centric rhetoric, they left the European Union. On the contrary, under liberal or conservative governments, Canada’s policy was to multiply free trade agreements and open markets with Asia, Latin America, or Europe.

With a shrug, Canadians also watched what was happening in France, with the “Gilets jaunes” demonstrations. After all, protesting was a very French habit. Particularly in Quebec, which share privileged ties with France, political leaders also wondered how to behave with the gradual institutionalization of Marine LePen's party. Not wanting to be associated with the extreme right, Quebec nationalists did everything in their power to dissociate themselves from it and stay away from its representatives.

For a long time, the rise of populism seen in many democracies seemed to escape Canadian politics. Then, something changed. The 2021 federal election was characterized by a small decomplex populist breakthrough. From 1,6% in 2019 to almost 5% in 2021 in the polls, the People's Party of Canada was not able to translate these votes into seats in the House of Commons. This new party was founded by Maxime Bernier, a conservative dissident. From 1% in 2018 election to 13%, the Quebec 2022 election was also marked by the rise of a new Conservative Party with populist undertones. The same phenomenon occurred in Alberta. There, in 2023, Danielle Smith won the provincial election. At the same time, the federal Conservative Party chose Pierre Poilievre as its leader. He won using a populist rhetoric against elites.

How can we explain this new made-in-Canada populism? COVID-19 had a mobilizing effect. The truckers' convoy and the siege of Parliament in winter 2022 mobilized people who had a grudge against the government and sanitary measures. This period freed up an anti-system discourse on social media, and in parliament. The inflationary crisis that coincided with the end of COVID-19 measures, paired with the start of the war in Ukraine did the rest. Anger increased toward governments. At stake were rising living costs, particularly for housing, food, and energy. And on this front, an ideological war was being waged between Canadian oil production and the climate change crisis. But in the words of a political scientist from Luxembourg, Philippe Poirier, a growing segment of the electorate seems now more concerned about the end of the month than the end of the world.

Pierre Poilievre: Shaking up Canadian Political Discourse

Although he was a member of Parliament for the Ottawa region, Pierre Poilievre had publicly supported the Truckers' Convoy cause, insisting on their rights for freedom. In his speeches, he associated the rising cost of living with Justin Trudeau's policies, using the term “Justinflation.” He repeated his intention to axe the carbon tax introduced by Justin Trudeau to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, he wanted to increase the country's oil production and reduce energy costs.

Poilievre won the Conservative leadership race hands down. A few months earlier, the previous leader, Erin O'Toole was forced to resign following his 2021 election defeat. Although winning the popular vote, the Conservatives lost in the number of seats in Parliament. O'Toole had tried to refocus the party's message to the center to make gains in eastern and central Canada. He failed.

In the Fall of 2023, the new Conservative Party leader, Pierre Poilievre, caught the attention of the American right when a video went viral on social medias.¹ You see him in a field, calmly answering a reporter's questions while munching an apple. Here's the excerpt:

“You seem to be taking a decidedly populist approach,” said the journalist in the short two-minute clip.

“What do you mean?” replied Mr. Poilievre.

The journalist seemed taken aback by the Conservative leader's question.

“You seem to want to use people's emotions, I think,” he said.

“But what does that mean? Give me an example,” retorted Pierre Poilievre, his mouth full.

“You use strong language, ideologically speaking,” asserted the interviewer.

“Like what?” the politician continued, causing his interviewer to stammer.

“Er, bah the left, the right, that kind of ideological stuff,” he pleaded.

“I never talk about those things. I don't believe in that,” huffed the conservative, apple still in hand.

The interviewer tried a new approach, asserting:

“Many people say you take your inspiration from Donald Trump's playbook”.

“What kind of person says that?” questioned Poilievre.

“I'm sure there are several Canadians...” the journalist advanced before being interrupted by Poilievre.

“Like who?” he replied.

“I don't know”, confessed the interviewer.

“You're the one asking the questions, you should know”, said Poilievre.

Within hours, the video had been seen by 2.5 million people. In so doing, Pierre Poilievre rejected the label of populist, while reinforcing his critical stance toward the traditional media.

Clearly, the journalist hadn't done his homework. It’s true that for many, populism is a catch-all concept that we regularly forget to define properly.

Is populism an ideology? In other words, a genuine system of general ideas which, when grouped together, form a philosophical or political doctrine that then guides behavior on both an individual and collective basis. Or is populism a discursive strategy? A discourse is a form of communication aimed at a specific audience. It can be expressed both orally and in writing. It’s then possible to study its style, the content of its argumentation, and its framing. A populist discourse has its own rhetoric against elites, adapting to changing circumstances. In this book, it is the evolution of political communication in Canada that interests us most. Pierre Poilievre's populism will show to be a discursive strategy more than a strong ideological stance.

Harper’s Playbook

Stephen Harper governed Canada for nearly 10 years between 2006 and 2015. The former Prime Minister is perceived to be Pierre Poilievre’s spiritual father and political mentor. In his cabinet, Pierre Poilievre was seen as one of his most partisan ministers.

Three years after retiring from politics, Harper wrote a book on populism and conservatism. It was not so much a surprise to see the former Prime Minister write a book. After all, he had even written a book about hockey while in office. It was rather the theme of his book that was surprising. It was about the rise of populism and the challenges it poses for Conservatives (Harper, 2018). He may have anticipated that the rise of populism in the United States would eventually make its way north of the border.

Harper defines populism in a simple and harmless way: any political movement that defends the interests of ordinary people against the interests of the privileged. According to his own theory of populism, Canadian conservatives are faced with three options: (1) they can cling to a doctrinaire vision of conservatism where the economic law of supply and demand predominates, (2) they can ride populism in its most unbridled form like in the United States, or (3) they could reform conservatism to adapt it to the populist current. This option must then be translated into policy proposals that respond to practical concerns, to the interests of workers and middle-class voters.

It is in this perspective that he supported Pierre Poilievre during the 2023 Conservative leadership race. And it's not Donald Trump's playbook that Pierre Poilievre sets out to use. It is Stephen Harper's. The Conservative party is since then busy courting the working class. Like never before, the party has set its sights on the traditional electorate of the New Democratic Party. So much so, that the Conservatives, traditionally associated with the business world, voted in favor of Canada's first federal anti-scab law.

This represents both a discursive and a strategic shift. Previously, the Conservatives wanted a strong New Democratic Party to undermine and hopefully weaken the Liberal Party and take power. Now, they are hunting on the left, on the NDP's turf. And the parliamentary coalition the NDP has been forming in support of Justin Trudeau's minority Liberal government for several months until September 2024 enabled Poilievre to attack both the Liberals and the NDP by lumping them together. This strategy proved disastrous for the NDP. Following the snap election of spring 2025, the left-wing party lost a significant number of it's MPs and its recognized party status in the legislature. Its leader was defeated and chose to leave politics. But by provoking Justin Trudeau's hasty departure, this strategy also failed to enable Pierre Poilievre to take power. With a new leader, the liberals were reelected to head a minority government. It was a close call. In fact, the Conservatives achieved there best results in percentage of the vote since 1988. Beyond the novelty effect, what was Mark Carney's advantage? He was perceived by a significant portion of the electorate as the antithesis of Donald Trump. As a figure of stability in the face of threats made against Canada by the US President. At the same time, he did not hesitate to copy some conservatives policies, reminding us that the Liberal Party of Canada remains a catch-all party, able to change positions in order to remain in power.  

Book Structure

Too little has been written about this new surge of populism in Canada. It is true that, at the federal level, the possibility of a populist leader becoming Prime minister is relatively new. On the other hand, Canada is not monolithic. In both its geographic, linguistic and demographic composition, it is a diverse country. While there is a strong populist tradition in the West, this is not as much the case in the East. And, with the presence of the Bloc Québécois, Quebec has its own partisan sub-system. This party advocates Quebec independence in the Canadian Parliament since the failure in 1990 of the agreement that aimed to integrate Quebec into the Canadian constitution.

But we are currently witnessing the rise of a type of populism, with no real nativist component. How does this new Canadian populism differ from what's happening elsewhere in the West? It is mainly based on economic rhetoric about the cost of living, rather than immigration issues. From a global perspective, what lessons can we draw from it?

To study this phenomenon, we will use a variety of data. Some will come from content analysis of political manifestos and media. Data will also come from publications of federal populist leaders on X (formerly Twitter). This analysis will show that the emergence of right-wing populism was initially fueled by public health measures linked to the COVID crisis. We will also use Canadian data from wave 7 of the World values survey (WVS) to identify the evolution of values in Canadian society. For voting intentions, we will use data from various firms, including Abacus, Léger, and the Angus Reid Institute.

The first chapter of the book is more theoretical. It will enable the reader to answer the question Poilievre asked to a journalist as he bit into his apple. What do we mean when we talk about populism? In addition to providing us with a conceptual framework and a definition of populism, the aim of this chapter is to understand how populism in Canada should be analyzed. To this end, we will draw on a brief review of the literature about populism in Canada. To avoid confusion, we will discuss what does and does not constitute populism. It will also enable us to move beyond Stephen Harper's definition of populism as a simple opposition between the people and their elites.

Chapter 2 of the book will explain the thesis developed by many that Canada was an exception to the rise of populism. To do this, we need to retrace the evolution of populism in Canada. As we shall see, populism has manifested itself at different times, both on the right and the left of the political spectrum. Its electoral success has varied from region to region. In this sense, it's not a new phenomenon. Historically, however, it has had difficulty percolating and taking root across the country, from coast to coast.

Chapter 3 will provide the reader with an overview of the main leaders who embody populism, at both federal and provincial levels. It will also present their different backgrounds and identify the electorate they draw on. We will see that their successes differ. Contrary to Maxime Bernier, one of the keys to Pierre Poilievre's rise lies in his ability to avoid the posture of complete populism.

The next chapter looks at the impact of the health crisis caused by COVID-19 on the evolution of public discourse. By calling a snap election in 2021, Justin Trudeau has attempted to capitalize on the issue of mandatory vaccination. He even made it a political wedge. The occupation of the Canada's capital by truckers the following winter went viral. What went wrong in a country that was normally perceived as quiet and peaceful? The crisis served as a catalyst not only on the streets, but also online. We will see how it unleashed and encouraged an assertive anti-system discourse. This social mobilization went far beyond truckers. Politically, it was taken up by the right.

Chapter 5 will focus on analyzing the discourse of populist leaders in relation to the changing economy, but also in the Conservatives' new quest to win over working-class voters. We will be looking at the factors behind this shift, and how the Conservatives' economic discourse has evolved from a pro-big business to one that aims to protect wage earners. Is this shift credible? We'll see that Pierre Poilievre has succeeded in repositioning his party, notably by attacking economic elites and lobbyists. In addition, he has succeeded in threatening an electoral base once loyal to the NDP.

In the sixth chapter, we will see how the environmental divide is playing an increasingly important role in public debate. We will see how this new cleavage was successfully mobilized by Pierre Poilievre. We will analyze the Conservatives' positioning on the environment in relation to inflation, to see how it fits into a populist positioning, without lapsing into climate skepticism. The People's Party of Canada has tended to side with the climate skeptics, without success. Instead, Poilievre succeeded in putting the Trudeau government on the defensive by associating the new carbon tax with the rising cost of living. This message resonated with the electorate, making climate change a wedge issue. And in a more difficult economic context, this seemed to be paying off electorally. So much so that the left-wing NDP retreated, and Justin Trudeau's successors disavowed his carbon tax.

Canada has incorporated into its Constitution a vision of living together based on multiculturalism. Justin Trudeau even declared that Canada would be the world's first post-national state. As the only francophone state in North America, Quebec, on the other hand, has made interculturalism its model of integration. In Chapter 7, we will see that immigration is not at the core of the dominant populist discourse. Only the People's Party tackles it head-on, employing overtly nativist rhetoric. The Conservative leader instead uses the angle of saturated public services and outnumbered housing capacity. Poilievre even insists on introducing his wife as the daughter of an immigrant Latin American family who chose Quebec as their new home.

The final chapter of the book looks at the cultural clash on gender theories and moral issues. Imported from the United States, this clash is particularly important in English Canada. The Liberals have integrated many elements of inclusion, equity, and diversity into public policy. We will look at the dividing lines on this issue, the links with religiosity and Quebec's difference in terms of the secular nature of the state. This will enable us to see how this discourse is politically recuperated at the federal level, but also in some provinces. We will also examine the extent to which “wokeism” mobilizes voters. In practice, the term “woke” remains generally misunderstood by a large segment of the population. That didn't stop Pierre Poilievre from calling Justin Trudeau a “woke Prime Minister.” The conservative leader plays a balancing act, defending certain rights while promising to put an end to “woke” federal programs.

For the first time in modern history, a populist leader has taken the helm of one of Canada's two governing parties. The election of Pierre Poilievre as leader of the Conservative Party marked a turning point. Many thought that Canada was safe, immune from populism. Yet, a few months after his nomination, the new Conservative leader was able to dominate the polls nationwide, except for in Quebec. Even if he failed to win the 2025 federal snap election, this unexpected surge has normalized a certain populist discourse among a large part of the electorate. The aim of this book is to better understand this new surge.

Footnotes

1

Tunney, C., Poilievre gets international attention for apple-eating viral moment, CBC, October 21, 2023. (https://​www.​cbc.​ca/​news/​politics/​poilievre-apple-video-1.​7003024).

List of Figures

Fig.​ 1.​1 For Canadians a good thing for a political system…(Very good + Fairly good)13

Fig.​ 1.​2 Level of confidence of Canadians in Election - 202014

Fig.​ 1.​3 Votes Are Counted Fairly in Canada -202015

Fig.​ 1.​4 Negative level of confidence of Canadians toward…15

Fig.​ 1.​5 Journalists Provide Fair Coverage of Elections - 202016

Fig.​ 1.​6 TV News Favors the Governing Party -202017

Fig.​ 1.​7 Corruption of media and journalists in Canada - 202018

Fig.​ 1.​8 Corruption of media and journalists in USA - 201719

Fig.​ 1.​9 Left-right polarization in Canada20

Fig. 5.1 Evolution of the Gini Index Canada-USA (1970–2019). Source World Bank (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?_gl=1%2Auy8iln%2A_gcl_au%2AODcxOTY2NDA3LjE3MjQ3MDIxOTk.&contextual=region&locations=CA)91

Fig.​ 5.​2 Financial satisfaction92

Fig.​ 5.​3 Which one of these things would you say is most important?​93

Fig. 5.4 Canadian annual inflation rate and Bank of Canada’s interest rate: before and after the pandemic (until January 2024). Source https://ici.radio-canada.ca/rci/en/news/2044169/no-change-on-interest-rate-as-bank-of-canada-sticks-to-594

Fig. 6.1 Greenhouse gas emissions by provinces and territory, Canada, 1990, 2005, and 2022. Sources Government of Canada, https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/environmental-indicators/greenhouse-gas-emissions.html119

Fig.​ 6.​2 Environment and economy as top priority131

Fig.​ 7.​1 Evolution of % of People who would not like Immigrant/​Foreign Workers has neighbors in Canada WVS (1990–2020)149

Fig.​ 7.​2 When Jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to Canadian over Immigrants - WVS (1990–2020)150

Fig.​ 7.​3 What are the effects of immigrants on… (2020)151

Fig. C.1 Most important value between freedom and equality for Canadians. Source WVS (2020)193

Graph 3.1 Evolution of voting intentions in Canada 2021–2024 according to Léger. Source https://leger360.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Leger-X-National-Post_Politics-August-26th-2024-002.pdf61

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2025

E. MontignyPopulism in CanadaPalgrave Studies in Populismshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-89134-2_1

1. Understanding Canadian Populism

Eric Montigny1  

(1)

Political Science, Université Laval, Québec, QC, Canada

Eric Montigny

Email: eric.montigny@pol.ulaval.ca

Abstract

In this chapter, we seek to explain the theoretical foundations of Canadian populism. Is it the result of American influence, or the emergence of a new type of populism? Is there a uniquely Canadian definition of populism? This chapter clarifies the different approaches to populism. It also offers a review of the main recent studies on populism in Canada, particularly those focusing on Canadians’ populist attitudes and the potential for growth of a populist party among the electorate. We also analyze data from the World Value Survey on trust in the electoral process, the media, and left-right polarization. At first glance, given the country’s diversity, achieving nationwide success with a populist platform appears to be a real challenge. However, there are votes to be won on the left. This is exactly what Pierre Poilievre has attempted to do.

Keywords

PopulismCanadaDemocracyPolitical trustPolarization

The University of Alberta political scientist Frédéric Boily has been studying populism in Canada for years. In a recent book on rightism and populism (Boily, 2020), he attempts to highlight the misperception that many foreign observers have of Canadian populism. He points out that Canada is often perceived as a haven of democratic peace, well protected from the “populist contagion” spreading elsewhere. In his view, this is a misconception that stems from a vision of populism that associates it exclusively with radicalism and racism (Boily, 2020: 89).

First and foremost, Boily defines populism as a political style, rather than an ideology (Boily, 2020: 91–92). With this perspective in mind, he notes that former Progressive Conservative Prime Minister John Diefenbaker (1895–1979), Social Credit leader Réal Caouette (1917–1976) and Reform Party leader Preston Manning (1942–) have in turn embodied populism in Ottawa. He also notes that the populist style is still very present in contemporary federal politics, whether in the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party or the New Democratic Party (Boily, 2020: 108–110). But by basing our analysis essentially on a political style, aren’t we running the risk of seeing populism everywhere? Despite this, Boily is right to insist on Canadian populism distinctiveness. On the right, we must note the marginal character of its nativist component. On the left, Canadian populism is historically less radical in its questioning of the capitalist system.

In this chapter, we seek to explain the theoretical foundations of Canadian populism. Is it the result of American influence, or the emergence of a new type of populism? Is there a uniquely Canadian definition of populism? Before embarking on this quest, it is important to clearly understand the theoretical debates surrounding the concept of populism.

To be populist, is it enough to adopt a certain style of language to be understood by the people? Should we condemn the politician who tries to popularize his message so that as many voters as possible are able to understand? This question is even more important in the age of social media and the permanent campaign strategies developed by parties (Marland et al., 2018).

Some people refer to populism as the defense of simple, even simplistic, ideas. Populists are therefore associated with people who develop easy and often unrealistic answers to complex problems. Aren’t we talking about demagogy here? But in fact, it is quite possible to be demagogic without being populist.

In the same way, is it enough to make a popular commitment or to take popular decisions to be populist? Doesn’t it make sense for political leaders to seek the support of as many citizens as possible? As Müller (2016) points out, in societies where the weight of opinion polls in public debate is greater than ever, can we blame politicians who wish to respond to the concerns of the population? We must be careful not to mix up the concepts of populism and electoralism (Jacques, 2022).

For many (Jamin, 2008), populism is seen as hostile to democracy or opposed to some of its fundamental principles. This is particularly true for fundamental rights. But, if we limit ourselves to this angle, we risk confusing populism with authoritarianism. Populism is also associated by many to criticism of immigration and otherness. But it is possible to be a populist without including a nativist component in one’s discourse. And it is also possible to be critical of immigration policies without being populist.

Since they are not just a part of the vocabulary of the scientific community, words such as “populism,” “national-populism,” “radical right,” and “extreme right” are open to many interpretations. These words also have become political weapons, a conceptual struggle to legitimize or condemn parties. This phenomenon is important for democracy, especially because the emergence and eventual success of political parties associated with these labels are accompanied by significant ideological polarization (Mazzoleni, 2003).

To analyze the drifts, we need to understand what the concept of “populism” actually means. This is even more important as populism is highly charged in normative terms.

Several Competing Approaches

In the scientific community, despite the growing body of research on the subject, there is unfortunately no common definition for the concept of populism. Is it an ideology or a discourse (Aslanidis, 2016)? Is it more of a soft ideology (Mudde, 2007) or a political style (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014)? Or rather a mix of ideology, tactics, and strategy (Rode & Revuelta, 2015)? This conceptual debate partly explains the confusion and politicization of the populist label.

According to the political style approach (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014), populists would be leaders who multiply appeals to the people, seeing themselves as an arbiter in favour of the common sense. They would also insist on threats (external or internal), amplifying the sense of crisis, while adopting irreverent behavior or language.

For proponents of populism seen as a thin-centered ideology, society is ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite.” They also argue that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people (Mudde, 2007: 23). Freeden (1998: 750) describes the concept of thin-center ideology as one that arbitrarily separates itself from wider ideological contexts. Populism’s malleability enables it to attach itself to other “thick” or “thin” host ideologies such as liberalism, socialism, environmentalism, and nationalism (Mudde, 2004) (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012).

In contrast, the politico-strategic approach (PSA) is said to be one of the most widely used frameworks in the methodologically heterogeneous subfield of populism studies. Over the past two decades, it has contributed to the analysis of populism in Latin America, the United States and, more recently, Western and Eastern Europe (Rueda, 2021). This approach assumes that a “personalist leader” seeks to exercise political power by connecting with his or her supporters in a direct, unmediated way. PSA identifies the core of populism, emphasizing the central role of personalist leaders who tend to act opportunistically, rather than systematically pursuing programmatic or ideological orientations (Weyland, 2021).

For its proponents, PSA would be particularly useful today, when scholars’ most urgent task is to elucidate the political strategies of populist leaders and their problematic repercussions, in particular the threat that populism poses to democracy. But, for its critics, this approach has major limitations, such as selective rationalism (which assumes that the populist leader is rationally seeking power), leader-centeredness, which overlooks the possible institutionalization of his party, and a normative bias which generally sees populism as a threat to democracy (Rueda, 2021).

Instead, De Vreese et al. (2018) conceive populism as a phenomenon of communication. As such, populist ideas need to be communicated discursively to achieve the communicator’s goals and intended effects on their audience. This approach combines Mudde’s (2004) ideology-centered understanding of populism with Hawkin’s (2010) discourse-centered understanding. In this vein, populism would be a discursive manifestation of a thin-centered ideology that focuses not only on a “set of basic assumptions about the world” but on “the language that unwittingly expresses them” (Hawkins et al., 2012: 3).

In other words, the communication tools used to disseminate populist ideas are just as essential as the populist ideas themselves. Populism is thus seen as a characteristic of political communication rather than a characteristic of the actor sending the message. It then becomes possible to determine degrees of populism. It is thus a gradual concept, in which the question of who is or not a populist would be resolved by empirical measures of an actor’s communicative output. This book adopts this approach.

Common Criteria

Beyond these conceptual debates, various researchers agree that to define populism, it is important to bring together very specific criteria. Many of these criteria overlap.

Mobilizing the critique of elites, Müller (2016) insists on the fundamental incompatibility between left-wing and right-wing populism and liberal democracy. Whether on the right or left, populism is said to be based on three behaviors, which are deployed concurrently: (1) a populist leader claims to be the embodiment of the people, thus opposing the pluralist conception of liberal democracy; (2) a populist leader also claims to be anti-system, and proposes to gradually deconstruct the representative institutions in place; (3) a populist leader attacks the checks and balances in order to undermine their credibility, which generally translates into repeated criticism of the media or the judiciary.

Inglehart and Norris (2019) also identify three characteristics associated with populism. The first is the development of anti-elite sentiment, opposing the virtue of ordinary people with the corruption of elites. These elites can be financial, multinational, political, or intellectual. The second characteristic hinges on the valorization of authoritarian reflexes. This is expressed by strong charismatic leaders and a direct appeal to the people. It is also accompanied by a critique of liberal democracy, its checks and balances, and the rights of minorities. On the right, a third characteristic is added: nativism. This is reflected through a distinction between “the them” and “the us,” a desire to protect traditional values, therefore a return to isolationism and national interests.

From another perspective, Ivaldi (2018) identifies three central concepts for a populist discourse: the use of the people, the elite, and the popular will. Thus, populist politicians must appeal to the people as a pure and homogeneous imagined community. They must pit this people against a dominant and distant elite, often using a rhetoric of good versus evil. They must also consider the sovereign people as the sole repository of power.

Finally, as summarized by De Vreese et al. (2018: 427), three elements would be necessary to qualify for a populist discourse: (1) reference to “the people,” (2) a battle against the “corrupt” elite, and with a possible extension of (3) identification of an outside group. These defining elements have been emphasized by several populism specialists (Aalberg & de Vreese, 2017; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Kriesi, 2014; Mudde, 2004).

Different Types of Populism

A typology developed by De Vreese et al. (2018) defines four forms of populism. First, Complete populism includes reference to and appeal to the people, anti-elitism, and exclusion of marginal groups. Excluding populism only rests on references and appeals to the people and the exclusion of out-groups, while Anti-elitist populism includes references and appeals to the people and anti-elitism. Finally, Empty populism includes only references and appeals to the people. They also establish a grid of the different actors who communicate and shape populism: political actors, the media, and citizens. They argue that to fully understand populism, research must integrate these three perspectives (Table 1.1).

Table 1.1

Foci of populist communication research

Actor

Foci

Political

actors

References to the people, anti-elitism, and out-groups

Communication aimed at the media (indirect) or supporters (direct) via speeches, advertising, manifestos, or social media

Media

Populism by the media (as “activist” organizations) and through the media (as platforms for populist actors)

Citizens

Selection of populist media contents, expressions of populist attitudes, targets of populist messages

Source De Vreese et al., 2018: 431

Sorensen (2023) goes one step further. She identifies the disruptive communication practices developed by modern populist politicians. Further developing this idea, Blumler (2016) believes this leads to a fourth age of political communication dominated by digital media. He identifies three aspects of modern populist communication that erodes institutional communication through oppositional positioning. It is: (1) Populist pragmatics (the performance of disruption), (2) Populist ontology (the lie of political reality and the embodiment of the people), and (3) Populist epistemology (A challenge to expertise and claim to authenticity).

Regarding the first aspect, the politician will adopt anti-system messages and behaviors that seek to destabilize the usual functioning of institutions and push back the limits of social acceptability. For example, he may leave the legislative assembly in protest. The second aspect is seen when a politician constructs an alternative reality by playing on perceptions and beliefs. Honesty is then presented as the only way to bridge the gap between appearance and reality in politics. Finally, the third aspect replaces expertise with authenticity. The aim is to delegitimize the creators of established knowledge. The focus then shifts from the real truth of an assertion (its factuality) to the veracity of the actor (its authenticity).

The Sources of Populism

Unlike previous episodes of populist success, the current wave has not been discriminatory and has encompassed developed as well as other developing economies alike (Devinney & Hartwell, 2020). According to Inglehart and Norris (2019), electoral support for European populist political parties has more than doubled since the 1960s, while their number of parliamentary seats has tripled at the expense of center parties. The average share of votes for “populist right” parties has doubled, from less than 7% in the 1960s to almost 14% in the 2010s. On the left, support for populist parties rose from less than 3% to almost 13% over the same period (Inglehart & Norris, 2017: 23).

While the increase in support for populism is unequivocal, the reasons for this phenomenon are complex (de Vreese et al., 2018). Two widespread interpretations point to economic insecurity on the one hand, and cultural cleavages on the other (see also Mudde, 2007; van Hauwaert & van Kessel, 2018). These phenomena are said to have been exacerbated by various overlapping crises. In 2008, many countries were hit by the longest recession and economic crisis in a century. At the same time, an unprecedented transnational migratory flow from the South to the North occurred. The result is growing income inequality, both within and between countries (see also Fraser Institute, 2017; Laclau, 2005).

This rise in populism would therefore be attributable to two main factors: (1) economic changes that have led to people being left behind in declining sectors, and (2) a violent cultural reaction (backlash) to the rise in values among younger, better-educated cohorts since the 1970s who are said to be more “cosmopolitan” (in terms of sexuality, diversity, lifestyles…) (Inglehart & Norris, 2019). These social changes are said to provoke fears, a loss of reference points and social markers among voters with more traditional views on family, religion, and nationalism.

Good or Bad for Democracy?

Do we see populism as positive force for change, or as a threat to democracy? To answer this question, there are two opposing currents. As demonstrated, the term is politically charged. In this sense, it is becoming an unflattering label. The caricature of the concept is presented as follows: unscrupulous politicians with authoritarian aims who manipulate a less-educated segment of the population. And even if this were empirically true, what right do we have to oppose and ridicule the democratic expression and the will of an increasingly important segment of the population?

This dilemma, according to Rueda (2021), is also present in the study of the phenomenon. In fact, the current field of populism studies can be roughly divided into two camps. For one, populism is seen as a potential threat to liberal democracy (Kaltwasser, 2011; Müller, 2016; Urbinati, 1998). For the other, populism is seen as either a possible revitalization of democracy or a legitimate political strategy (Knott & Eklundh, 2020; Laclau, 2005; Mouffe, 2018). That said, both the former and the latter often display a nuanced view according to which populism is seen as an ambiguous phenomenon, since they tend to recognize that it can be either a threat to or a remedy for contemporary democracies (Rueda, 2021).

On the one hand, for the most optimistic, populism is seen as legitimate democratic expression. For the more worried, it represents a frontal attack on liberal democracy, which rests notably on political pluralism, representative democracy, freedom of the press, and minority rights. De Vreese et al. (2018: 424) summarize the arguments of both camps as follows.

Among the more optimistic, it is believed that populism could increase representation and give a voice to groups of citizens who do not feel heard by the current political elite. Populism could draw attention to issues that are not widely publicized. In so doing, it could mobilize groups of people who feel on the margins of the political system. Populism could then improve the responsiveness of the political system by encouraging actors and parties to align their policies more closely with the “wishes of the people.” By doing so, populism could be a refreshing wake-up call for those in power, prompting them to reflect periodically on their conduct and elitism.

For the more worried, populism challenges liberal democracy or has downright negative consequences for it (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). Populism can thus restrict the rights of minorities. Populism can also use an electoral mandate to erode independent institutions that are considered cornerstones of liberal democracies, such as courts or free media. In an age marked by post-truth, populism leads people and political actors to shut themselves further into their own echo chambers, which impedes civil discourse and discourages political compromise.

Consequently, Müller (2016) argues that populism is characterized by anti-pluralism. Thus, populists claim that they, and only they, have the ability to represent and speak for and on behalf of the people. This conception of political life involves discrediting the legitimacy of political opponents. To do this, populists articulate a discourse based on “their moral superiority.” Yet democracy presupposes freedom of expression. It relies on the ability of citizens, political parties, and civil society organizations to debate distinct and sometimes conflicting visions of state orientations. While claiming to represent the collective interest, these different players accept the rules of the game and certain political codes. They also respect the legitimacy of divergent points of view. Populism, on the other hand, arrogates to itself a single vision of what the common good should be. The populist, whether on the left or the right, sees himself as the only possible repository of the popular will.

However, to echo the findings of De Vreese et al. (2018: 424), it is important to note that most researchers refrain from condemning or celebrating populism in an absolute way. Instead, they choose to dissect the various elements and expressions of populism, while placing them in an appropriate context. They explain that in countries with polarized majoritarian voting systems, weak institutions of checks and balances, and a weak press (subject to attempts at instrumentalization and other attacks on its independence), populism is more likely to become an existential threat to democracy. On the other hand, in countries with a consensual parliamentary system, solid institutions of checks and balances, and a strong, autonomous press respected by the public, populism is far less likely to undermine liberal democracy. This would be the case in Canada.

Populism in Canada

Not so long ago, some, such as Béland (2017), questioned the causes that would explain populism’s limited influence on Canadian politics. According to Adams (2017), the social factors that have encouraged the rise of populism in other countries are not present here. Then, how come an uninhibited anti-elite discourse emerged from specific segments of the electorate? Why would the new conservative leader Pierre Poilievre successfully use the conspiracy term “gate keeper” to blast the media elites? Journalists are thus defined as professionals being biased intermediaries, between him and the people, managing access to information.

Medeiros (2021) explored the populist attitudes of Canadians during the 2015 federal election. To this end, he developed a multi-item variable made up of three items measuring voters’ perceptions, namely, (1) politicians’ willingness to lie, (2) parliamentarians’ disconnection from the people, and (3) the government doesn’t care what the people think. He concludes that, even if the election that brought Justin Trudeau to power lacked a populist political offer, there was still a populist demand among the population. Even then, Meideros finds that populism influenced the vote: those with populist attitudes were more likely to be found in the electoral base of the main left-wing party, the New Democratic Party, more than the Conservative Party. On the contrary, traditionally associated with the ruling elite, the Liberal Party of Canada would have a repulsive effect on voters with populist attitudes. While Canada may appear exceptional at a time when populism seems to be on the rise, it would be a mistake to conclude that all Canadians don’t have populist attitudes. However, in general, when these attitudes were expressed, they were not associated with nativist attitudes.

Analyzing 2021 electoral Canadian Studies data, LeDuc, Pammet, and Clarke also find that “core elements of populism do exist in the attitude structure of a significant number of Canadians, but nativist attitudes continue to be rather weak.” (2023: 4). They demonstrate (1) that a significant proportion of the electorate despise politicians and the mainstream news media, (2) that “corruption” is a potential political theme, and (3) that a third of Canadians are in favor of a strong government capable of bending the rules. They conclude that the latent potential of populism was tested during the COVID-19 pandemic, but that a large proportion of the population was in favor of the draconian health measures imposed by the governments and public health authorities of the various jurisdictions. They state that, with the low level of support for the 2022 trucker protests, the overall likelihood of a successful populist movement in Canada was low. They were concerned, however, that this balance could tip with rising immigration levels in recent years and their link to other issues such as rising housing costs or the availability of healthcare. At the time, they did not, however, see emerging a political leader capable of mobilizing an anti-elite sentiment.

Not So Simple for Populism on a Canadian Scale

Moreover, unlike the United States, it would be difficult to say that Canadian society is a polarized society. Overall, elections are still won in the center according to the latest World value survey data. Confidence in the integrity of the electoral system also remains high. Support for experts was even on the rise. The unease with journalists is more evident, but much less so than south of the border. But there are significant regional divides in the composition of the House of Commons. In that regard, the multiparty system expressed in Parliament illustrates the diversity of the electoral spectrum and its various cleavages.

The results of the 2019, 2021 and 2025 federal elections demonstrated that Canada is a politically divided country. There are different blocs of voters depending on the region. The Liberals dominated the Atlantic provinces. In Quebec, it was the Bloc Québécois and the Liberals who were fighting each other. Originally from Quebec, Maxime Bernier was defeated there three times , and his party garnered even lower support than in Ontario. Here, the Liberals dominated but faced the Conservatives in more rural ridings and the NDP in central urban areas. The prairie provinces were strongly conservative while British Columbia was divided between the Conservatives and the NDP. Traditionally, populism has been struggling to make gains outside the prairies. This trend seems to have change within the Conservative Party. Even in Quebec, Pierre Poilievre obtained a majority among party members when he was elected leader in 2023. But in the 2025 election, he failed to gain more seat there. 

So, can Canada be a fertile ground for populism to prevail? It is true that the pandemic has allowed some voices to be heard. An uninhibited anti-elite discourse emerged from certain categories of voters. Beyond the snapshot of an election survey, is there a trend toward populist attitudes? Using 2020 Canadian data from the World Value Survey,¹ it is appropriate to examine the evolution of Canadians’ values in relation to themes that could be linked to populism. In the next pages, we will analyze data related to trust in democracy medias and expert. We will also look the evolution of political cleavages in connection with polarization.

Political Trust

In Fig. 1.1, we see that support for democracy has been on the rise since 2000 among Canadian citizens. This is also the case for trust in experts, which has increased by nearly 20% since 2006. Is it an effect of the pandemic where science was put forward to explain the decisions of governments? Regardless, support for a strong leader remains relatively stable between 2000 and 2020. 21% to 24% does not demonstrate any major change. However, populism underlies the presence of a strong leader who undermines checks and balances. Polled for the first time in 2020, it is noted that support for a religious leader stands at a surprising 15%.

Fig. 1.1

For Canadians a good thing for a political system…(Very good + Fairly good)

In connection with populism, it could be argued that support for a democratic system is not contradictory. It all depends on the very understanding of democracy. In this vein, trust in institutions itself needs to be examined.

Figures 1.2 and 1.3 show us that the level of trust in elections, and therefore in representative democracy, is only at 58%. It should be noted that the turnout in the 2021 federal election was just over 62%.² However, the level of trust in the election administration is much higher with 89% of respondents who believe votes are counted fairly.

Fig. 1.2

Level of confidence of Canadians in Election - 2020

Fig. 1.3

Votes Are Counted Fairly in Canada -2020

Fig. 1.4

Negative level of confidence of Canadians toward…

Figure 1.4 measures the evolution in confidence, in negative terms, toward the federal government, the federal parliament, political parties, and the press. In 15 years, only political parties have seen their situation deteriorate, from 73 to 76% of negative opinions. While 56% have a negative perception of it, we rather see a certain stability toward confidence over the parliament since the year 2000. The same trend is observed for the government. For the press, things are improving a little since the non-confidence would have gone from 65 to 55%.

As for the perception of journalists’ election coverage, Fig. 1.5 shows that 70% of respondents had a positive perception of their work, judging that they are generally fair. But Fig. 1.6 shows that for 51% of respondents think TV news favor the ruling party in their coverage. This perception helps to better understand why Pierre Poilievre repeatedly targets the Canadian public broadcaster CBC.

Fig. 1.5

Journalists Provide Fair Coverage of Elections - 2020 

Fig. 1.6

 TV News Favors the Governing Party -2020

When asked more about the level of corruption of Canadian journalists, 25% of respondents believe most or all are (Fig. 1.7). This is much less than the 40% observed in the 2017 United States World value survey (Fig. 1.8).³

Fig. 1.7

Corruption of media and journalists in Canada - 2020 

Fig. 1.8

Corruption of media and journalists  in USA - 2017

According to this WVS data, there is certainly a large level of disenchantment with Canadian political institutions. Is this enough to contribute to the election of a populist leader as head of government? There has been little variation over the past 20 years and confidence in the electoral process remains relatively strong. There is even more respect for experts since the pandemic. But there is also a significant proportion of people who have dropped out of traditional media.

Polarization and Political Cleavage

This leads us to study the level of polarization present in a society. A more polarized society, as it is the case in the United States, makes political dialogue more difficult and encourages a certain radicalization of political parties. Thus, there is a more fertile ground for populist discourses.

We will examine the traditional divide between left and right. Figure 1.9 shows an evolution since 1990 in the identification of respondents as centrist, right-wing or left-wing voters. The base of voters defining themselves on the right remains relatively stable over time, between 22 and 25% of respondents. On the other side of the spectrum, the left makes gains by reaching nearly 30% in between 2006 and 2020. That said, elections were still won in the center where, after a decline in 2006, nearly half of the respondents were centrists in 2020.

Fig. 1.9

Left-right polarization in Canada

Overall, based on the WVS data, it would be difficult to say that the Canadian society is a polarized society. Elections were still won in the center in 2020. In that regard, the multiparty system expressed in the House of Commons illustrates the diversity of the electoral spectrum and its various cleavages. There are significant regional divides in the composition of the House of Commons. There are also some divisive issues. We will see in Chapter 6 that climate change policies have become one of them.

***

If indicators of confidence in the political system and for experts remain relatively strong, how can we explain the success of the conservatives in the polls since Pierre Poilievre became leader? There is of course the electoral fatigue toward a Trudeau government which has governed for almost 10 years. But that’s not all.

For the Conservative Party, populism can be seen as a certain return to the basics with a style associated with one of its original factions, the Reform Party. We will describe these roots in the next chapter. But above all, Poilievre discourse translates into a new strategic approach. To take power and beat the Liberals, Stephen Harper had to rely on a strong NDP who would take away votes from the Liberals. Moreover, he formed a majority government in 2011 when the NDP managed to overtake the Liberals to form the official opposition.

More than a decade later, to beat the Liberals, Poilievre’s conservatives are going after the working-class NDP electorate. According to a compilation of events on his agenda:

« Since Poilievre became leader of the Conservative Party two years ago, he has met with more than 60 unions and visited over 200 traditional blue-collar workplaces, such as factories, plants and mills in eight provinces, claiming that the other federal parties have abandoned them.»⁴

As we will explore in Chapter 5, the party adapted its message. Positioning itself even in rupture with the conservatives’ traditional positions toward unions.

In this optic, there is confirmation for what Medeiros (2021) noticed, namely a pool of electors to obtain with populist attitudes among the NDP. And, to court traditionally left-wing anti-system voters, Jagmeet Singh’s parliamentary coalition with Justin Trudeau made Poilievre’s job even easier. On economic issues, the conservative leader was able to associate the Liberal record with the NDP and therefor say that the coalition was part of the political elite. However, it is difficult to predict whether this new positioning will stand the test of time.

Footnotes

1

These data were collected in October 2020 by Léger, an established polling firm, a few months after the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. We will also use other WVS data from previous waves, the target population was identified as Canadian citizens and permanent residents aged 18 + . No upper age limit was applied. Only people residing in private households (non-institutionalized population) have been included into the sample. The target sample size was N = 4000. For the sampling plan, the country was divided in six regions (Atlantic provinces, Québec, Ontario, Western provinces, British-Columbia and Northern Territories). https://​www.​worldvaluessurve​y.​org/​WVSDocumentation​WV7.​jsp.

2

https://​www.​elections.​ca/​content.​aspx?​section=​ele&​dir=​turn&​document=​index&​lang=​f

3

https://​www.​worldvaluessurve​y.​org/​WVSDocumentation​WV7.​jsp.

4

Djuric, M., Le NPD et LE PCC courtisent les travailleurs dans leurs nouvelles publicités, La Presse, September 2, 2024. (https://​www.​lapresse.​ca/​actualites/​politique/​2024-09-02/​le-npd-et-le-pcc-courtisent-les-travailleurs-dans-de-nouvelles-publicites.​php?​sharing=​true).

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2025

E. MontignyPopulism in CanadaPalgrave Studies in Populismshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-89134-2_2

2. The End of Canadian Exceptionalism? A Brief History of Canadian Populism

Eric Montigny1  

(1)

Political Science, Université Laval, Québec, QC, Canada

Eric Montigny

Email: eric.montigny@pol.ulaval.ca

Abstract

In this chapter, we trace the history of the main political parties associated with populism, whether at the federal or provincial level. We begin this task by going back to the roots of this movement to analyze its first seeds. This includes the United Farmers, the Social Credit, and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. The creation of the CCF and Social Credit should be analyzed as a populist reaction to the type of industrial capitalism that developed in Canada at that time. The Canadian West was then undergoing a period of great change, with the massive arrival of immigrants from Europe and the United States. Many brought with them new radical ideologies. We will also present more contemporary parties that could have been seen at different level, as populists, such as the NDP and left-wing populism, the Reform Party and the People’s Party for right-wing populism. We also question the stance of the Conservatives under Steven Harper. It can be summed up as follows: to be or not to be populist? One thing is clear, unifying the Canadian right has always been a real headache, due to rural–urban and linguistic divides.

Keywords

PopulismCanadaExceptionalismSocial creditNDPReform partyStephen Harper

These days, we regularly hear that rising populism in Canada stems directly from Donald Trump. In fact, populism is not a new phenomenon in Canada. In this chapter, we will return to the roots of Canadian populism and its historical importance. In Western Canada, particularly in provincial politics, populist parties have been dominant for most of the twenty-first century. In the Prairies and British Colombia, the history of these parties date almost 100 years.

In the 1970s, Conway (1979) identified a major paradox in the study of Canadian populist parties. To grasp the theoretical nature of populism, it was necessary to look to the work of European and US scholars, rather than Canadian. He found this rather surprising, given that populist movements in Europe and the United States were, at the time, considered largely ephemeral and relatively unsuccessful. In Canada, by contrast, these movements not only won elections at the provincial level, but many of them also survived the long haul, and proved to be effective in influencing public policy and the Canadian economy. Of course, this lack of Canadian historiography on such parties is not total, since most works on Social Credit and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) at least implicitly acknowledge their populist roots. Conway felt, however, that few captured the theoretical essence of populism.

Since then, several Canadian researchers have focused on populism on Canadian soil. In the following pages, based on their work, we will trace the history of the main political parties associated with populism, whether at the federal or provincial level. We begin this task by going back to the roots of this movement. We will then present the various parties that have been involved. These include the NDP and left-wing populism, the Reform Party, the Conservatives under Steven Harper and the People’s Party.

The First Seeds of Populism

The emergence of farmers’ movements, their irruption onto the political scene, the rise and fall of the Progressive Party, and the subsequent birth of the Social Credit League in Alberta and the CCF in Saskatchewan, have been among the most studied phenomena in Canadian political science. But according to Conway (1979), the creation of the CCF and Social Credit should be analyzed as a populist reaction to the type of industrial capitalism that developed in Canada at that time. The Canadian West was then undergoing a period of great change, with the massive arrival of immigrants from Europe and the United States. Many brought with them new radical ideologies.

First, the United Farmers were in power in the province of Alberta from 1921 to 1935 (Rennie, 2000). As its name suggests, its origins were agrarian. This party was based on a farmers’ association founded in 1909 to influence public policy. This lobby still exists today and has been supplying goods and services to Alberta farmers on a cooperative basis since 1935. Feeling poorly represented politically, the organization chose to dive into the electoral arena in 1919 and won its first seat in the Alberta Legislative Assembly. Winning the provincial election in 1921 and its first seat in Ottawa the same year, it quickly became a success.

This agrarian movement also spread to other provinces, notably Saskatchewan, Ontario, and Manitoba. The United Farmers of Ontario even formed a government at Queens Park from 1919 to 1923. Under the Progressive banner, the movement became pan-Canadian, winning the second-largest number of seats in the House of Commons in the 1921 federal election with 65 members.¹ However, as a decentralized organization, it refused to form the Official opposition and left this role to the Conservatives. The party split a few years later. But for the first time, the emergence of this new player shook up the Canadian two-party system associated with the British electoral system. Its most radical supporters later split into the Social Credit on the right and the CCF on the left.²

The Social Credit

Adopting a right-wing populist discourse, the Alberta Social Credit Party rose from the ashes of the United Farmers of Alberta and the Progressive Party (Frinkel, 1984). Founded in 1934, it was initially based on a conservative religious vision and came to power in Alberta in 1935. According to Macpherson (1962), the Social Credit party mixed elements of populism and corporatism. Above all, it was a movement of independent farmers and the “petit-bourgeois.” Stemming from popular dissatisfaction during the Great Depression, it advocated a far-reaching reform of the monetary system:

«Social Credit theory proclaimed that the general will of the people must be realized, and this could be done through the inspired leadership of William Aberhart. The Social Credit League was to represent the will of all the people in one organization, which would be morally superior to the corrupt and socially divisive parties of the old political system. » (Sinclair, 1975: 3)

The wealth generated by the discovery of oil in the 40 s enabled the party to modify its discourse, which became more associated with classical conservatism. Therefore:

« the Social Credit Party took on a right-wing cast under the leadership of William Aberhart and Ernest Manning, who preached a doctrine of religious fundamentalism and economic free enterprise, the latter position reinforced by the oil boom that hit Alberta in the 1940s.  » (Mayer et al., 2000: 84)

From 1935 to 1971, the party governed the province of Alberta without interruption. Manning was premier for more than 25 years. Unelected from 1971 onward, the party officially disappeared in 2015.

Social Credit was also successful elsewhere in the West, particularly in British Columbia (Hak, 2004). A sister party to its Alberta counterpart, it first took part in the 1937 provincial election but had to wait until 1952 for its first success, then 1953 for a majority mandate. The party governed the province from 1952 to 1991, with only a three-year break between 1972 and 1975. Afflicted by scandals and division, the party declined and officially disappeared in 2023.

From its earliest years, Social Credit was associated with anti-Semitism and conspiracy theories about international finance. Stingel (2001: 4) recalls that:

« After 1943, Social Credit’s anti-Semitic propaganda would become more daring and vocal, while Social Credit leaders like national party leader Solon Low and even Premier Ernest Manning would deny that their party was anti-Semitic.»

Sinclair specifies that:

« The thrust of Social Credit was against financial institutions, leading in its most extreme development to a theory that there was a world Jewish conspiracy to dominate the common people. (This minority group was disowned by the Social Credit leadership). » (Sinclair, 1975: 4)

At the federal level, the Social Credit party made its first entry at the House of Commons in 1935, but only ran candidates in western provinces. Its electoral base was mainly concentrated in Alberta. The Social Credit Party was seen as the first or second political force in the rural West until 1958. With the decisive victory of Saskatchewan Conservative John Diefenbaker, the party then went into decline.³ Federal party leaders criticized the ruling provincial Social Credit parties in the West for failing to provide adequate support.

The party also experienced serious tensions between Francophones and Anglophones. In the 1962 federal election, 26 MPs were surprisingly elected in Quebec, compared to only 4 elsewhere in Canada (Pinard & Lemieux, 1966). Following a leadership crisis, when Réal Caouette was denied the title of leader under unclear circumstances, the party split in two. After several divisions, the party declined. The last MPs were elected in 1979.

In Quebec, the Créditiste movement appeared as early as 1940 under the name of Union des électeurs but was met with no success. It wasn’t until 1970 that a new party, the Ralliement créditiste, elected candidates, taking advantage of the decline of the Union nationale, which had dominated Quebec politics since the end of the Second World War. It was swept away by the growing polarization on the question of Quebec independence, which coincided with the Parti Québécois coming to power. Its last Member of the National Assembly (MNA) ran for the Quebec Liberal Party in 1981. As for Alberta and British Colombia, LeDuc, Pammet and Clarke (2023: 2) reminds us that: “In both provincial examples however, Social Credit eventually shed much of its populist character, morphing into politically conservative provincial administrations that simply displaced one or both of the major parties”.

The NDP’s Origins and Left-Wing Populism

The Great Depression also fostered the birth of another populist movement, this time on the left. The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) was first founded in Calgary, Alberta in 1932. Its first program, the Regina Manifesto, was adopted in Saskatchewan’s capital the following year. It brought together farmers, socialists, members of cooperative movements, and trade unions who sought the nationalization of certain means of production. In his now classic book Agrarian socialism, Seymour Martin Lipset explains the rise of this radicalism in Western Canada (Lipset, 1971). He observed that in the United States, the New Deal supported farmers during the Depression and curbed socialist movements. In contrast, Saskatchewan, the hardest-hit Canadian region, had no similar aid program, which encouraged radicalism on the Prairies. However, the radical leaders of this region were not Soviet socialists, but figures advocating a radicalism specific to the realities of Western Canada, notably by integrating the protection of private property rights and a Christian dimension.

CCF MPs were elected to the House of Commons as early as 1935. In 1944, the first CCF government was elected in Saskatchewan and Tommy Douglas became the first socialist leader to head a government in North America. But it was his predecessor, socialist agrarian populist George Williams, who paved the way for him (Conway, 2018). Traditionally, Canadian elections are won in the center. Yet left or right-wing populism has never been far away. On the left, the CCF was transformed in 1961 into what is now the New Democratic Party. Today, this party still exists but has never formed the government. With the vote of Quebec, it reached the threshold of the official opposition only once, in 2011.

Historically, the party has been much more successful at the provincial level. For example:

«The CCF-NDP has successfully formed government in all four western provinces, even as it faces a very different combination of parties in each. In Alberta, the NDP first formed government in 2015, an astounding seventy-five years after its first election in the province.» (Molineaux, 2021: ii).

It also governed in Ontario for one term from 1990 to 1995. According to Molineaux’s thesis, the CCF-NDP managed to survive over time, despite hard times, thanks to his mobilized electoral base.

But there is some debate in the literature about the populist nature of the New Democratic Party.

« Few deny the populist nature of early agrarian movements like the CCF. However, the CCF-NDP is not completely populist. Populist parties trust and defer to the common people and have faith in democracy. Yet, tension exists between the CCF-NDP’s education and central planning and these aspects of populism. As well, populist parties detest power blocs. The NDP has joined several with constitutional links, even though it is not dominated by them. This misperception is due to the ambiguity of the definition of power bloc, and to the successful rhetoric of competing parties.» (Morris, 1997: 39).

For his part, Naylor (2013: 107), based on a study of the British Columbia CCF, argues that the CCF never wanted to break with the liberal-democratic model. Rather, he sees it as a socialist, working-class movement. McDonald disagrees, explaining instead that: “that the emergence of the political left as a province-wide phenomenon across BC in the 1933 election constituted an important populist moment in British Columbia history that preceded the rise of Social Credit in 1952.” (McDonald, 2013: 97).

Yet the populist character of the CCF is not doubted for most:

« Within the CCF there was also a close identification with the common people. For example, Tommy Douglas (1943) said: “It is more than a political movement, it is a people’s movement, a movement of men and women who have devoted their lives to making the brotherhood of man a living reality.” » (Sinclair, 1975: 3).

The CCF was even more populist than socialist, according to Sinclair:

« Being against capitalism in Saskatchewan meant being against monopolistic exploitation; it did not mean being against small private enterprise, because that would have meant calling into question the whole way of life of prairie farmers.» (1975: 6).

Similarly, like Social Credit, the CCF attacked what it saw as a central Canadian elite located in Ontario and Quebec (Mayer et al., 2000: 84). In so doing, they echo what Sinclair had already written years earlier:

« In their frustration, supporters of Social Credit and the CCF turned against the "big interests" of the metropolitan East and their representatives in the West. In attacking Eastern-controlled corporations, they continued a long tradition of protest by Western Canadian farmers. In the CCF, it was certainly recognized that monopoly capitalism was at the root of the farmers’ problem, and that the Saskatchewan party was defending the West against the East.» (Sinclair, 1975: 4).

However, it is important to remember that in the early years of the movement, the CCF enjoyed some success in the Maritimes.⁴ A first CCF MP was elected in Cape Breton in 1935. Lewey (2012) explains that in New Brunswick, “the failure of the movement to gain permanent traction was attributable to several factors.” He points to the organizational strength of the Liberal Party, media opposition to the CCF, social and economic factors, and the divide between Francophone and Anglophone political agendas.

This linguistic divide was also present with Quebec. There, the first members of the CCF were not workers or farmers as in the West, but rather intellectuals. Until 1950, the party was denounced by the clergy. For the catholic church, socialism was associated with communism. “Socialism is no more than later communism,” even said the founder of Université Laval’s Faculty of Social Sciences, Father Georges-Henri Lévesque (Sarra-Bournet, 1986: 10). In the context of the Cold War with the Soviet bloc, the CCF was not only suspected of communism in Quebec…

Given its electoral failure across Canada, the CCF needed to refocus and rebrand. The first step was to replace the Regina Manifesto with the Winnipeg Declaration in 1956. The aim was to turn the page on socialism and adopt a social democratic stance in line with a more Keneysian economic model. Instead of insisting on nationalization of the economy, the mixed role of the private, cooperative and public sectors was touted. But that was not enough. Following the creation of an alliance with the Canadian Labour of Congress, the largest union, it changed its name to the New Party. It would not adopt the name we know today, the New Democratic Party, until 1961.

What is the current state of left-wing populism in Canada? How can we explain the fact that populist discourse among the working class is being recuperated by the right? Tufts and Thomas (2014: 77) judge that “Populist unionism is currently an incomplete and incoherent project in Canada.” They add that: “Labor is reduced to populism when it no longer exercises significant power in everyday economic and political life and is forced to search for a coherent voice to represent the working class.” According to them, unions have moved away from populist discourse over time as it gained institutional influence. Other avenues to explore, which we will do in next chapters, are based on the cultural backlash that is also affecting other left-wing political parties in the West in relation to diversity and social issues.

The Reform Party

In 1984 and 1988, the leader of the Progressive Conservative Party succeeded in sweeping the Liberals from power with landslide majorities. To do so, Brian Mulroney brought together fiscal, social, and populist conservatives from the West, Quebec nationalists and traditional Tories from Ontario and the Maritimes. The coalition was broad-based. It was also very fragile. In the 1993 election, it collapsed. The pro-independence Bloc Québécois became the official opposition with 54 seats, followed by the Reform Party with 52. With a new leader, the Conservatives went from 169 seats to 2. A historic defeat!

Let’s go back a few years… The Reform Party was founded in 1987 in the West by Preston Manning, particularly in reaction to the feeling of alienation experienced by Western Canada toward Central Canada. Accordingly, the new party was against Brian Mulroney’s policy of reconciliation toward Quebec. Son of the former premier of Alberta, Ernest Manning, and godson of William Aberhart, founder of the Social Credit, Manning adopted a populist and regionalist policy, criticizing the power of the “special interests» (his words for elites) mostly from the center of the country and opposing the recognition of any specificity for Quebec. We must recall that Quebec, the only French-speaking jurisdiction in North America, was excluded from signing the Canadian constitution in 1982.

One of the most interesting aspects of Western Canada is its ability to create new political parties, writes Tom Flanagan, a Calgary political scientist who worked closely with the Reform Party and Stephen Harper (2009). But what to think of the Reform Party’s populism? Is it the heir to the Social Credit? According to Clough (1994), Manning’s rhetoric was essentially anti-political, presenting himself not as a politician but as an opponent of career politicians. He also castigates federal policies on identity issues, such as bilingualism, multiculturalism or immigration. Harrison (1995) describes this posture, supported by some Reformers, as Anglo-Canadian nativism. He explains the creation of the party as a combination of Western political culture, regional economic interests, and a new ideology that translates into a politics of resentment and rejection.

This regional stance manifested itself as attacks on central institutions that are not considered sufficiently representative of Western Canada. The main example is the Senate, for which the party called for an American-style reform (triple E for elected, equal, and effective). This populist discourse also targets the Laurentian elites (Bricker et al., 2013), a label developed to define “Canada’s ruling classes.” This group of elites is said to live in the Montreal-Ottawa-Toronto triangle and to have excessive influence, in addition to benefiting unfairly from the West’s energy resources.

The Reform Party’s positioning was also accompanied by advocacy in favor of direct democracy, new models of representation, and constitutional reforms aimed at further democratizing Canadian political life (Laylock, 1994). These propositions were part of a critique of central institutions, but also aimed to denounce the collusion between vested interests, parties, and governments in the federal system. This approach to direct democracy, “plebiscitarianism,” complemented the party position in favor of shrinking the welfare state (Barney & Laylock, 1999).

Preston Manning, even though he had studied Canadian populism in depth, reluctantly had to accept proposals such as a recall of elected officials because of the party’s activists. Thus:

«The media portrayed Reform as an ideologically conservative party, and it certainly was that. However, the energy of its most active members and workers came not so much from conservative ideology as from populist enthusiasm.» (Flanagan, 2009: 629).

In 1991, in the political turmoil caused by the failure of the Meech Lake Accord and the ensuing rise in support for Independence in Quebec, the Reform Party adopted a new pan-Canadian strategy (Flanagan, 2009). It opposed the Charlottetown Constitutional Accord in the 1992 referendum, helping to defeat it in English Canada. The latter was also defeated in Quebec, where it was deemed insufficient to decentralize the federation.

Flanagan (2009) believes that it was this new strategy that enabled Reform to achieve its first success at the ballot box in 1993. It’s true that this was a major strategic change. As the party’s desire to become a pan-Canadian political force, it meant it was leaving behind its regionalist roots and positioning itself has a pan-Canadian alternative. But we must remember that in addition to the Meech Lake constitutional crisis, the Reform Party’s growth took place in the context of an economic recession (Harrison, 1995).

Indeed, some researchers downplay the role played by populism in the party first electoral success. According to this perspective: “Reform benefited from the availability of information about its position on key issues: the appropriate role of government in society (reducing the deficit and scaling back the welfare state) and cultural accommodation (an antipathy toward minorities and an unwillingness to accommodate Quebec’s distinctiveness).” (Jenkins, 2002).

This new national strategy had a downside. By adopting a pan-Canadian posture, the Reform Party now had to demonstrate its ability to grow sufficiently outside the West. To be a party of government, an obligation that doesn’t have the Bloc québécois, this was necessary. The 1997 election saw the Reform Party win 60 seats, taking the official opposition status from the Bloc Québécois. However, a glass ceiling had been reached.

With Preston Manning at the helm, further growth seemed impossible. In the 1960s, when Thompson and Caouette had failed to make the Créditiste a dominant party, Manning and his father had written a book: Political Realignment. In it, they proposed a merger between the Progressive Conservative and Social Credit Parties (Flanagan, 2009: 635). This same idea was behind the creation in 2000 of a new party, the Canadian Alliance, which integrated the Reform Party. The old party became its dominant faction. Some Progressive Conservatives joined.

Soon, former Alberta Conservative cabinet minister Stockwell Day won the leadership race against Preston Manning. But the Progressive Conservative party remained a political force. Former Canadian Prime minister Joe Cark, then its leader, refused the merger. In the 2000 election, the new party struggled to improve its results. The Progressive Conservative party held its ground, while Jean Chrétien’s Liberals, in power since 1993, increased their number of seats, mostly the expense of the Bloc québécois.

With the Canadian Alliance unable to take power, the grand strategy (Flanagan, 2009: 636) of making Alberta the epicenter of a new coalition to govern Canada was not to be. And the defeat was bitter. Stockwell Day’s failure to make a real breakthrough in Ontario led to internal divisions. The first Reform MP elected in 1989, Deborah Grey, was one of those leading the charge. With a few colleagues, she left the caucus to work in the House with Conservative leader Joe Clark. This sparked a new race for the leadership of the Canadian Alliance.

Defeating Stockwell Day in 2002, following a new leadership race, Stephen Harper reunited the party. This paved the way for a merger with the Progressive Conservatives in 2003. This new union of the right, necessary to defeat the Liberals, would however involve a new discourse closer to classical conservatism, focusing on economic issues. At the same time, the new party had to address more positively the Quebec question. Harper developed what he called an “Open federalism” toward Quebec.

Stephen Harper: To Be or Not To Be Populist?

Stephen Harper is no Preston Manning. He was Prime Minister of Canada for almost 9 years, from 2006 to 2015. Born in Ontario before moving to Alberta, he is not from the same generation. Politically, he was not socialized by the Social Credit movement, but by Brian Mulroney’s Progressive Conservative Party, which he left for ideological reasons. This led him to become a founding member of the Reform Party, and then one of its first MPs. He resigned in 1997 to join the National Citizens Coalition (NCC), a pressure group campaigning for tax relief. He headed the organization until his return to politics in 2002.

Stephen Harper is no stranger to Canadian populism and its inability to tie itself to a strong ideology. After leaving politics, he wrote:

«The Reform Party shared the populist roots of a number of historic parties founded in Western Canada. These parties were right, left and center.» (Harper, 2018: 14).

In one of the biographies devoted to Harper, William Johnson (2005: 111) recalls the existence of major ideological and tactical differences between him and Manning on that issue. After the failure of the 1988 election, although he appeared to be the leader’s young protégé—Harper had the title of Chief Policy Officer at the time—they did not share the same vision for the party’s future (Flanagan, 2009).

Unlike Manning, Harper believed in the importance of the left–right divide. In fact, it was on this basis that he had left the Mulroney Conservatives, which he felt did not sufficiently distinguish itself from the Liberals. Another Harper biographer, Ibbitson (2015), points out that he thus opposed Manning’s populist vision, which would, according to the latter, make it possible to make gains throughout Canada, aside from outside the big cities. Manning wanted to place more emphasis on the geographic nature of his political project than on its ideological content. Instead, Harper believed that to succeed outside Western Canada, a party could not do without a more urban electorate. He also considered Manning’s notion that a populist party could transcend ideology to be ridiculous (Ibbitson, 2015: 79).

For several years, Stephen Harper had been pondering, with Tom Flanagan in particular, the recipe for reuniting the right (Flanagan & Harper, 1998). They wanted to repeat Brian Mulroney’s coalition, but this time with Alberta at the center of power. A window of opportunity opened when Joe Clark stepped down as leader of the Progressive Conservative Party. Harper was open to any compromise to make the Canadian Right electorally competitive again:

«As soon as Peter MacKay was elected PC leader in May 2003, Harper proposed that they start discussing cooperation of the two parties; and he pursued that project relentlessly until a merger was achieved late in 2003. Harper insisted on only one condition - that the merged party be named the Conservative Party, not the Progressive Conservative Party - while yielding on all other issues. »(Flanagan, 2011).

But Stephen Harper is more than just a shrewd political tactician and a career politician. As Frédéric Boily (2016: 11–12), another of his biographers reminds us, in reference to what can be described as the Calgary school, he was also a great conservative intellectual.⁵ Boily points out that, while his publications output is more heterogeneous than that of Pierre Elliot Trudeau, he does have an appreciable body of work. Harper didn’t come to politics just to be in power, but to change Canadian politics. At a very young age, he had developed a real vision of what Canada should be. Like his Liberal predecessor Pierre Elliot Trudeau, his political commitment was based on a vision, but also on a sense of purpose, a mission to be accomplished in Ottawa (Johnson, 2005: iX).

In a speech delivered in September 2008, Stephen Harper summed up his vision for transforming Canada in these words:

« My long-term goal is to make Conservatives the natural governing party of the country. And I’m a realist. You do that two ways... One thing you do is you pull conservatives, to pull the party, to the center of the political spectrum. But what you also have to do, if you’re really serious about making transformations, is you have to pull the center of the political spectrum toward conservatism.» (Behiels, 2010).

According to Laycock (2023), Harper “had always been suspicious of populist flirtations with popular democracy, however rhetorical and strategic they might be.” He was much more faithful to the economic approach of conservative thinker Friedrich Hayek. This philosophy advocated a smaller state, which should minimize its interventions in favor of social justice. From this perspective:

«Like Hayek, Harper seemed convinced that individuals and society could be free only if economic life were framed by minimal regulations. From this vantage point, interventionist modern governments inevitably were seen as restricting that freedom. Politics, in this construction, is a necessary evil for those wishing to practice or enable real freedom. » (Laycock, 2023).

In terms of his political style, this vision translated into a centralization of power in the PM’s office, a tense relationship with the press, and a view of parliament “as a strategic game of obstruction.” In his own words, in his book Right here Right Now, Harper defines his own populism quite clearly:

« My populism was, I suppose an outgrowth of a public-school, middle-class background. It took shape during my involvement in the Reform Party, of which I was the founding chief policy officer. That experience taught me the importance of making policy relevant for regular working families. However, it also left me leery of the chaotic decision making-structures and unreflective political reform proposals that often bedevil populists movements.» (Harper, 2018: 78).

But there is some debate about the populist legacy of the Harper years and the use of “market populist discourse” (Sawer & Laylock, 2009). As Kaczorowski (2000) points out: “Although a founding member of the Reform Party, former Prime Minister Stephen Harper carried little of the Reform Party legacy into his leadership of the federal Conservative Party.” His only legacy from its first years in power (2006–2008), would be the law on fixed election dates, which he did not even respect when he called for the dissolution of the House in an attempt to gain a majority in 2008. Then, a few months later, back to power but still without a majority, he prorogued parliament for a few months to avoid a vote of confidence, just long enough for the coalition the Liberals, NDP, and Bloc were trying to form to break up.

There is also a body of literature studying the concept of Penal Populism. Kelly and Puddister (2017) point out “more private member’s bills (PMBs) have become law during Harper’s time in government, compared with most previous parliaments.” Rather than focusing on local issues or specialized interests, “many Harpers era PMBs effect substantive legal change to national issues like criminal justice policy.” This seems paradoxical for a leader who controlled his caucus with an iron fist. But at the same time, the strategy of giving its backbench MPs a greater say on certain issues associated with human rights and law and order made it possible to please a part of the party’s base without being directly involved as the government.

In the reissue of his 1995 classic Waiting for the Wave: The Reform Party and Preston Manning, Tom Flanagan (2009) takes stock of Stephen Harper’s first years in power. While he doesn’t question that Stephen Harper’s Conservative Party is indeed the legitimate heir to the Reform Party, he does argue that it was “a bit more ideologically conservative than the old Progressive Conservatives” (Flanagan, 2009: 208), but not the populist kind that Manning envisioned, especially when it comes to popular democracy. Rather, he argues that the most direct legacy of the Reform party would come from the continued fight against the federal deficit, previously undertaken by Liberals Paul Martin and Jean Chrétien (Harrison, 2010).

However, the 2008–2009 economic crisis, coupled with the US financial institutions crisis, demonstrated that Stephen Harper was far more pragmatic about public spending than some had imagined. To save Ontario’s economic heartland, the auto industry, he did not hesitate to commit massive public funds. He justified his intervention as follows: “Conservatism is not, at its core, about markets. It’s about making an economy work.” (Harper, 2018: 90).

In terms of Quebec-Ottawa relations, unlike Manning, Harper was open to Quebec specificity. Recalling that French was the founding language of Canada, he always began his press conference in the official language of Quebecers. In 2006, he submitted a motion to the House of Commons recognizing Quebecers as a nation within a united Canada. In so doing, he recognized Quebec’s distinction, but without the constitutional entrenchment that would have been made possible by the success of the Constitutional Accords (Godbout, 2014: 44). Then, by allowing Quebec, as a federated state, to sit on the Canadian delegation to UNESCO, he enabled Quebec to have direct international relations with sovereign states within this international organization.

To the surprise of many, the election of Justin Trudeau in 2015 sounded the death for Stephen Harper’s dream of making the Conservative Party the natural party of government. With a message of “sunny ways” contrasting the conservatism of the Harper era, Justin Trudeau was elected. He overtook the NDP on his left by promising not to aim for a balanced budget. For the Conservative Party, the wear and tear of power had taken its toll. But for the New Democrats, the new reality was much worse. They were back with their third-party status after having tried to adopt a party-of-government discourse, while the Liberals were regaining their dominant position in the Canadian party system.

This was not without consequences. Having lost much of its Quebec contingent to its opposition to Quebec secularism during the French-language leaders’ debate, the NDP changed its leader to an elected member of the Ontario Legislative Assembly. Jagmeet Singh thus became the first racialized leader of a party represented in the House of commons.

Turbulence would also spread to the Conservatives. After Stephen Harper’s departure in 2016, three leaders succeeded one another, not counting interim leader Rona Ambrose. In 2017, Andrew Scheer succeeded Harper at the end of a leadership race that tore the party apart. The Saskatchewan MP was elected by elimination after 13 rounds of voting. With 50.95% of the vote to 49.05%, the former Speaker of the House defeated Maxime Bernier, a former foreign affairs minister under Stephen Harper. Bernier questioned the integrity of the voting process. A few months later, he left the Conservatives to launch a new, resolutely populist party: The People’s Party. Stephen Harper’s dream of unifying the Canadian right was shattered.

In the 2019 election, Scheer does not allow the Conservatives to unseat the Liberals. They were reelected, but as a minority government. In 2021, having succeeded to Andrew Scheer, a new leader faced the electorate. Erin O’Toole, an MP from Ontario, took a more centrist electoral stance. Once again, the conservatives failed to dislodge Justin Trudeau from power. O’Toole was quickly ousted from the party leadership. As a small consolation, like Scheer, he had succeeded in winning the popular vote, but the distortion caused by the first-past-the-post voting system prevented him from coming out on top in terms of number of seats. Faced with a mutiny, he also had to give up his seat. It is in this context that Pierre Poilievre follows the path to becoming Leader of the Official Opposition in 2022.

***

What can we learn from this overview of history and the evolution of populism in Canada? First, it is important to remember that populism has deep roots on both the Canadian left and the Canadian right. We also must recall that the seeds of populism found more fertile ground in the West. Moreover, we must also bear in mind that unifying the Canadian right has always been a real headache, due to rural–urban and linguistic divides. Finally, we shouldn’t be surprised to see Pierre Poilievre’s reappropriation of a populist discourse, while adapting it to today’s context. It allows him to reunite the right-wing electorate by taking the wind out of Maxime Bernier’s sails. It also allows him to hunt in the NDP’s older, working-class electoral ground.

For the Canadian conservatives, this could thus be seen as a kind of return to back-to-basics politics. As we will see in the next chapter, this new positioning has played a major role in ensuring that Pierre Poilievre was firmly in the saddle at the head of his party for the 2025 election.

Footnotes

1

The Canadian Encyclopedia, https://​www.​thecanadianencyc​lopedia.​ca/​en/​article/​progressive-party.

2

The Progressive Conservative label was then attached to the federal Conservative Party between 1942 and 2003, when a former Manitoba premier (1922–1943), John Bracken, associated with his province’s Progressive Party, made it a condition of becoming federal leader. The term Progressive disappeared at the federal level when the Progressive Conservative Party merged with Stephen Harper’s Canadian Alliance. However, the label has remained in several provincial parties.

3

For Newman (1963), cited by LeDuc et al. (2023), “The philosophy that has to be called ‘Diefenbakerism’ amounted, in essence, to a distrust of the great power groupings in Canada, and the belief that broadly based citizen participation, speaking through a strong political leader, can reconcile the opposing economic interests of individual citizens.”

4

It is on the right that populism has succeeded in electing more MLAs in New Brunswick. Against the province’s bilingual character, the provincial branch of the Confederation of Region Party was perceived as an anti-Francophone organization. It is the only place in Canada where this party has had any electoral success. Before disappearing due to internal divisions, it formed the official opposition between 1991 and 1995 (Martin, 1995). Created in 2010, the People’s Alliance Party of New Brunswick has taken over from this current. It succeeded in electing 3 MLAs in 2018.

5

A school of thought that brings together academics, researchers and alumni from the University of Calgary’s political science and history departments that clearly advocates a conservative view of politics, aims for lower taxes, less federal government intervention, and freer markets.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2025

E. MontignyPopulism in CanadaPalgrave Studies in Populismshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-89134-2_3

3. Contemporary Faces of Populism in Canadian Politics

Eric Montigny1  

(1)

Political Science, Université Laval, Québec, QC, Canada

Eric Montigny

Email: eric.montigny@pol.ulaval.ca

Abstract

The new surge of Canadian populism is being driven by new faces. This chapter aims to introduce them, while identifying the characteristics of their electorate at the federal level. At the Federal level, we analyze Pierre Poilievre and the Conservative Party of Canada, Maxime Bernier and the People’s Party of Canada, and Jagmeet Singh and the NDP. We also study populism in Ontario, Québec and Alberta. More precisely, we look at Ontario’s Ford Nation, the confusion between Quebec’s nationalism and populism and the strong comeback of populism in Alberta. We attempt to classify the different leaders according to the four categories of populism developed by De Vreese et al. (2018): complete populism, excluding populism, anti-elitist populism, empty populism. We also use Sorensen’s (2023) typology of disruptive communication practices. We finally discuss the evolution of Canadian public opinion and try to understand who the populist voter is.

Keywords

PopulismCanadaOntarioQuébecAlbertaPublic opinionPierre PoilievreMaxime BernierJagmeet SinghConservative Party of CanadaPeople’s Party of CanadaNDP

The previous chapter gave us a better understanding of the historical roots of populism in Canada and enabled us to distinguish its variations. But the new surge of Canadian populism is being driven by new faces. Furthermore, it's seeming to be a winning card over a large part the Canadian electorate. This chapter aims to introduce them, while identifying the characteristics of their electorate at the federal level.

On the right, the Canadian media largely associates populism with Maxime Bernier, leader of the People's Party of Canada,¹ and the new leader of the Conservative Party of Canada, Pierre Poilievre.² The same is true for Danielle Smith, Alberta's new premier (Laycock, 2023) and Quebec Conservative Party leader, Eric Duhaime.³ The case of Ontario Premier Doug Ford is more complex. Initially judged as a populist by observers, his governance turned out to be mostly classic.

On the left, the media regularly associated NDP former leader Jagmeet Singh with a form of populism, particularly when he attacks corporate executives and their profits.⁴ Others encouraged him to reconnect with his party's populist roots even more to avoid further losing part of his anti-system electoral base to the Poilievre conservatives.⁵ In Quebec, the most left-wing party on the political spectrum, Québec solidaire, is also associated with populism. One of its former MNAs, Catherine Dorion, even claimed to be a populist.⁶

In order to establish the portraits of various leaders, we will use the concepts identified in Chapter 1. We will attempt to classify the different leaders according to the four categories of populism developed by De Vreese et al. (2018). populism. These are:

(1)

Complete populism includes reference to and appeal to the people, anti-elitism and exclusion of marginal groups.

(2)

Excluding populism only rests on references and appeals to the people and the exclusion of out-groups.

(3)

Anti-elitist populism includes references and appeals to the people and anti-elitism.

(4)

Empty populism includes only references and appeals to the people.

The use of Sorensen's (2023) typology of practices of disruptive communication will also be useful to better differentiate them in terms of their type of communication.

At the Federal Level

At the federal level in Canada, the main pollsters generally present results for the six main political parties. Here they are, in order of seats in the House of Commons for the 44th Parliament just before the 2025 election: Justin Trudeau's Liberal Party of Canada (153), Pierre Poilievre’s Conservative Party of Canada (120), Yves-François Blanchet's Bloc Québécois (33), Jagmeet Singh's New Democratic Party (25), Elizabeth May's Green Party of Canada (2), and Maxime Bernier's People’s Party (0). The new surge of populism in Canada therefore concerns half of the six main parties. But above all, it concerns the Conservatives, the main opposition party that represent an alternative for governing.

Using the typology of De Vreese et al. (2018), we will argue in the following pages that Poilievre practices a more moderate form of populism, a form that is essentially anti-elite. It thus distinguishes itself from that of Maxime Bernier’s form of populism, which, as we will see, would by defined as being a more radical populism (Complete populism). As for Singh, his populism is also anti-elite. More specifically, it mostly focuses on economic elites.

Pierre Poilievre and the Conservative Party of Canada

Pierre Poilievre presents himself on his party's website as following: “a life-long conservative, champion of a free market, and fighter for people taking ownership of and responsibility for their own futures.”⁷ Poilievre hails from Alberta. A member of the X Generation, he was born in Calgary in the late 1970s. Placed for adoption at birth, while his biological mother was a teenager, his adoptive parents were both teachers. “Poilievre would later confide that being adopted was one of the foundations of his conservative values, as he saw it as a demonstration that it is ‘benevolent generosity’ that is at the heart of communities, rather than government interventionism in people's lives.”⁸ At a very young age, he discovered a passion for politics and became active in the Reform Party. He then studied international relations at the University of Calgary. This brought him into contact with the thinking of the Calgary School.

The Canadian Encyclopedia notes that he was one of 10 finalists of the essay contest “As Prime Minister”:

“His 2,500-word essay is entitled ‘Building Canada through Freedom’. He argues, as he will continue to do throughout his future political career, that freedom is the foundation of personal prosperity for Canadians and of democracy in this country. The ideas expressed in the text reflect his reading of Milton Friedman's Capitalism and Freedom, a book that Pierre Poilievre would later say played a seminal role in his political thinking.”⁹

Elected Conservative MP for the Ottawa region in 2004 at 25, he became the youngest member of the House of Commons. In other words, most of his professional life is based on his experience as an MP.

“One could say Pierre Poilievre has grown up on Parliament Hill. Elected as a member of Parliament at just 25, he quickly earned a reputation for being a political pit bull with his ideologically-driven, combative performances in debates. He is deeply popular among the Conservatives' grassroots and over the years has amassed one of the largest social media followings of any Canadian politician.”¹⁰

He also served as a cabinet minister in Stephen Harper's government, first as Minister for Democratic Reform, then as Minister of Employment and Social Development.

In 2015 and among the official opposition, he made a name for himself with his virulent and often personal attacks on Justin Trudeau. Another portrait of him states: “In Parliament, the high-energy, baby-faced MP earned the nickname ‘Skippy’ and showed his prowess for debate and a penchant for coining catchy phrases (…).”¹¹

In the winter of 2021, he was also one of the Conservative MPs who supported the truckers’ anti-Covid protests and the occupation of Ottawa. This has led political analysts to say that:

“During his leadership bid, he adopted a populist tone intended to attract disaffected, working-class voters. He supported the “Freedom Convoy” protest that occupied downtown Ottawa for weeks last winter in opposition to the government's vaccine mandates.”¹²

And regarding the economy:

“He has flirted with conspiracy theories by telling cheering crowds his ministers would not be allowed to attend the World Economic Forum in Davos. He has also taken aim at non-partisan institutions like the Bank of Canada, promising to fire the central bank governor over surging inflation.”¹³

In addition, regarding his call to buy cryptocurrency, an analyst said that “Poilievre’s pitch sounds like a distorted echo of the Social Credit promise to set things right through ‘funny money.’” (Laycock, 2023).

More than a year later, he was elected CPC leader on the first ballot with over 68% of the vote, ahead of his closest rival, Jean Charest, former Progressive Conservative leader and former liberal Premier of Quebec. In this race, “he railed against ‘elites,’ ‘gatekeepers’ and ‘woke culture.’”.¹⁴

Since then, Mr. Poilievre has been Leader of the Official Opposition in Ottawa. In some respects, he has toned down his rhetoric. This has not prevented him from periodically pulling off several stunts. Or even using dog whistle politics.

Poilievre regularly adopts, in line with the work of Sorensen (2023), the disruptive communication practices developed by modern populist politicians. Its primary communication is based on social media. He presents himself as authentic without any tongue in cheek. A disciple of disruption, he does not hesitate to break the social norms. On the issues of housing and public transport, for example, he called the mayors of large cities as incompetent. By calling Prime Minister Trudeau crazy and an extremist, he was expelled from the House of Commons. All his MPs followed him in protest.

This kind of irreverent behavior or language is also one of the criteria identified by Moffitt and Tormey (2014). Poilievre defines himself in all his speeches, by appealing to the people as the depositary of common sense. He emphasizes the economic crisis and inflation that is hitting ordinary people in opposition to privileged individuals like Justin Trudeau.

That said, as his mentor Stephen Harper put it in his book (2018), he was able to embody a more moderate populism than that observed south of the border. He left this role to Maxime Bernier. Moreover, as we will see in Chapter 7, Bernier is the only leader to use nativist rhetoric. Poilievre only talks about immigration in relation to the housing crisis and the pressure on public services.¹⁵ In fact, he repeats his openness to multiculturalism and the journey of his wife, born in Quebec in an immigrant family from Venezuela. And “on social issues, he has very much continued the tradition of non-engagement that frustrated social conservatives during the Harper era.”¹⁶

His positioning allows him to court the working classes, without losing part of its more traditional electorate. In context of a more difficult economic climate, he also capitalized on the problems of the Trudeau government. Strategically, Poilievre tries to be in tune with public opinion on many issues. As for his disruptive positioning, he plays the balancing act between outbursts to mobilize more anti-system voters and more prime ministerial appearances to smooth out the angles.

Maxime Bernier and the People’s Party of Canada

Maxime Bernier defines himself on his political party's website as an individual: “known as a dependable politician who speaks his mind.” He also considers himself “A man of ideas, [and that] his belief in personal responsibility and freedom is at the heart of his political vision.”¹⁷ Although he presents himself as authentic, his political career was not straightforward.

Born in the early 60 s in Saint-Georges de Beauce, a manufacturing town in rural Quebec bordering the United States, he belongs to the baby boom generation. His father served three terms as the region's Member of Parliament, so he comes from a political family. Gilles Bernier was first elected under the Conservative banner in 1984. In 1997, he was elected as an independent, following a scandal involving fictitious employment involving his son. He was later acquitted of this charge. Appointed by the Liberals as Canada's ambassador to Haiti, he did not stand for reelection.

Maxime Bernier first studied administration at the Université du Québec à Montréal, then law at the University of Ottawa. The lawyer joined the Parti Québécois and the office of Bernard Landry, then Quebec Finance Minister and future PQ premier. Bernier will confess to voting Yes in the 1995 referendum on Quebec sovereignty.¹⁸

Elected MP for Beauce in 2006 under the Conservative banner, he quickly became a key minister in Stephen Harper's government. He first served as Minister of Industry from 2006 to 2007, Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2007 to 2008, then Minister of State for Small Business and Tourism from 2011 to 2015.¹⁹

The man is ambitious. As early as 2007, he publicly aspired to be Stephen Harper's successor as party leader and presented himself as “the Albertan of Quebec.”²⁰ However, another controversy put the brakes on his momentum. He was demoted and forced to leave the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after it was revealed that he had left sensitive documents at the home of his then-girlfriend, a woman who had previously a relationship with a man said to be close to organized crime.²¹

As mentioned in the previous chapter, in 2016, he tried to succeed Stephen Harper as head of the CPC. He came an inch away from winning his attempt to replace Harper as leader. After a divisive campaign, and after several rounds of voting, he came second with 49.05% of the vote. While questioning the integrity of the vote, he left the Conservative Party in 2018 and founded the People's Party of Canada.

Now leader of his new party, Bernier defines his stance as the bearer of “intelligent populism”.²² But what does that mean? It would be a populism “based on principles, not emotions.”²³ In a paper written in 2019, he clarified his thinking:

“Populism does not simply express anger at the current government. It's a symptom of a deeper disconnect. It's a reaction from disenfranchised citizens who have lost faith in our institutions' capacity to reflect their concerns. And who feel that even their right to voice these concerns is being negated by the elites' disdain and a curtailment of their free speech. The People's Party is populist because it proposes solutions to Canada's problems that radically differ from those of all the establishment parties.”²⁴

Turcotte, Celletto, and Vodrey have studied the 2021 campaign of the People's Party of Canada. On the contrary, they conclude that Maxime Bernier was more successful in mobilizing voters with negative emotions, and to “tap into their anger” (2023: 108). This stance did not prevent Bernier from being defeated in his riding in Beauce in both the 2019 and the 2021 general elections.

Over time, Bernier seems to have radicalized his approach. Not only did Bernier support the anti-Covid protesters and the occupation of Ottawa, but he also went further than Poilievre and was arrested in 2021 for failing to comply with Manitoba's anti-Covid regulations. The arrest was widely publicized.²⁵ Moreover, he doesn't hesitate to feed conspiracy theories: when Canada experienced a major forest fire crisis in 2023, he blamed it on “green terrorists.”²⁶

His party still without a member in the House of Commons, Bernier tried his luck again in a 2023 by-election in Manitoba in the riding of Portage-Lisgar, a conservative stronghold. Bernier attacked his opponent defining him as a “fake conservative.”²⁷ He obtained 17% of the vote, less than the 21% of his 2021 candidate. With 65% of the vote, Pierre Poilievre's candidate increased his lead, while the NDP’s vote in percent, dropped by half.

Beer-Beauchamp analyzed the People’s Party leader's social media discourse during the 2019 campaign. She concludes that “his tweets indicate he is a populist since he ultimately sees society to be divided into two ‘homogenous and antagonistic groups’ and that ‘politics should be an expression of the general will of the people.’”(2020: 35).

In fact, Maxime Bernier does not hesitate to ride Donald Trump's coattails. For example, he wants to “Make Canada great again”.²⁸ He also takes a radical approach to the issues surrounding mass immigration. As Budd and Small (2022: 143) remind us:

“In August 2018, Maxime Bernier, then a Member of Parliament (MP) for the Conservative Party of Canada, launched a Twitter diatribe against “extreme multiculturalism.” In the series of five tweets, he wrote: «extreme multiculturalism and cult of diversity will divide us into little tribes that have less and less in common, apart from their dependence on government in Ottawa. These tribes become political clienteles to be bought with taxpayers $ and special privileges.» Bernier's tweets caused a political brouhaha. Multiculturalism is a no-go zone in Canadian politics.”

This was a few months before the formation of his new party. As we shall see in Chapter 7, he will use a similar stance in his platform and for election ads (Erl, 2021). So much so that “the PPC increasingly looked to capitalize on the far-right window of opportunity created by the Conservatives in the Canadian party system, positioning itself as the authentic representation of xenophobic and nativist anxieties.” (Budd, 2021: 170).

Maxime Bernier practices Complete populism. He multiplies appeals to the people. Even the name of his party is unambiguous. He uses anti-elitist rhetoric and doesn't hesitate to talk against immigration and exclusion. In terms of communication, according to Sorensen’s typology, he practices a performance of disruption. For him, his high-profile arrest was staged as a symbolic act of resistance against the system. He also defines himself as authentic and does not hesitate to define a parallel reality fueling conspiracies theories, particularly in relation to vaccines and climate change. This will be further explored in more detail in Chapters 4 and 6.

Jagmeet Singh and the NDP

On the NDP website, Jagmeet Singh described himself as “a lawyer, a human rights activist and the Leader of Canada's New Democratic Party.”²⁹ Interestingly, before being an elected official or party leader, the former leader positioned himself as a human rights activist. This sent out the message that his political commitment was not just institutional or parliamentary. His presentation page emphasized his family background. From his immigrant parents to the realities of being a racialized or minority person, he insisted on his fight against inequality.

Born in 1979 in a Toronto suburb, he is the same age and from the same generation as Pierre Poilievre. Son of a psychiatrist and a teacher, he grew up in Windsor, close to the American border. In terms of his schooling, he attended a private school in Michigan for his secondary education. After studying biology, he switched to law, which he studied at York University.

He is known for his well-groomed image. In a portrait devoted to him for the 2021 election, Singh explained his interest in fashion:

“The GQ-esque esthetics - from the 2017 spread in said magazine to the Rolex watches and urban bicycles - might seem at odds with the working-class voters traditionally courted by the NDP. But he's described his sharp fashion sense as a kind of armour against racial prejudice, a form of cladding that dates back to his time as a criminal defence lawyer in the mid-2000s when he was one of the few racialized, turbaned attorneys at the courthouse in Brampton, Ont.”³⁰

Singh began his political career with the NDP in 2011, but was fist defeated at the federal level. That same year, he tried again, this time with the Ontario NDP, and was elected to the Legislative Assembly in one of Canada's most multicultural ridings. He became the first turban-wearing MPP at Queen's Park. He remained in Ontario’s Legislative Assembly until 2017, when he runs for the leadership of the federal NDP. At this point in time, he was deputy leader of the provincial party. From the very first pages of his autobiography, he points out that few people anticipated his victory, and that columnists and analysts wondered how, “with his turban and beard” and “highly visible” minority status, he would be able to connect with voters across the country (Singh, 2019).

Yet he won the NDP leadership in the first round with 53% of the vote, beating his three opponents. Since then, his rhetoric has been based essentially “on affordability, universal pharmacare and a tax-the-rich populism.”³¹ These would be the key elements he would later target to support Justin Trudeau's minority government through a formal parliamentary alliance. But, in becoming leader, Singh inherited a party in difficulty.

A few years earlier, the party had experienced spectacular growth, and an orange wave in Quebec had enabled its leader Jack Layton to obtain, for the first time, the status of Official Opposition for the NDP, all while relegating the Liberals to third place. After suffering from cancer, Layton died suddenly, to be replaced by Quebec's Thomas Mulcair. The moderation and professionalization of the party in conjunction with political marketing had enabled the NDP to aspire to power by becoming a more “Marked-oriented” party rather than a niche party (McGrane, 2019). But in the 2015 election, Justin Trudeau’s Liberals overtook the NPD on the left, and, once again, it went back to its traditional third-party status.

To this point, has Singh maintained a political marketing approach? During the 2019 campaign, Singh’s effectiveness on social media helped keep NDP’s support outside Quebec (McLean, 2020). In the 2021 election, the NDP certainly tried to exploit the left-wing populist political market, but not to its full potential. Not enough to significantly improve the party’s electoral results (Turcotte & Raynauld, 2023).

In the context of permanent campaigning, Moir (2023) explored how Singh uses TikTok’s features to establish his brand of left-wing populism. Advocating against systematic social inequality, Singh’s use of TikTok strategically tries to reach a youthful demographic. To convince voters, the NDP leader insists on his authenticity but also on a clear message: “Singh's TikTok promotes his brand identity embracing left-wing populism, defined as a compassionate, people-centric discursive articulation aiming to challenge the emotionless elitism of the hegemonic structure by prioritizing social justice and community action.” (Moir, 2023: 5). Moir continues his analysis: “His TikTok videos engage with left-wing sound Bites like ‘fight for people’ and ‘tax the rich’ evoking a social democratic political platform associated with other leftist populist movements and politicians on social media.” (Moir, 2023: 5).

For her part, Beer-Beauchamp analyzed the NDP leader's tweeter feed. She also found a populist discourse in which society is separated into two:

“homogenous and antagonistic groups: hard-working Canadians and those who work for the ultra-rich elite. Singh also proposes policies described as the expression of the will of the people, such as universal pharmacare, dental care and policies to combat climate change. Finally, his tweets displayed more cult-of-personality characteristics than those of the other federal leaders” (Beer-Beauchamp, 2020: 48).

Like Pierre Poilievre, Jagmeet Sing practiced anti-elitist populism. His discourse, particularly on social media, included references and appeals to the people and anti-elitism in relation to the economically privileged classes. However, his positioning on cultural and identity issues, as we will see in Chapter 8, differs of that of the Conservative leader. Does this prevented him from appealing more to working-class voters? One this is certain, his former coalition association with Justin Trudeau  was a real problem. It may indeed seem difficult to attack the elites with credibility when your party helped the government to remain in power. But one of the keys to Jack Layton's historic 59-seat breakthrough in Quebec was his commitment toward its national autonomy. Jagmeet Singh did not continue this commitment. Instead, he has returned to his party's centralist approach based on the creation of new federal social programs.³² Ever since, maintaining the one seat his party holds in Quebec has seemed precarious.

Populism in Ontario, Québec, and Alberta

Provinces have a significant role and large constitutional powers in social and economic matters. Canada is also a culturally and politically diverse country. Parties are legally distinct at both levels of government. Quebec is the only majority French-speaking jurisdiction in North America and as such, has an important role to play in preserving its culture and language. Therefore, any analysis of Canadian politics would be incomplete without considering its federal character. The following pages have the objective of examining populist issues in Ontario, Quebec, and Alberta. These three jurisdictions account for 73% of the Canadian population.

Ontario’s Ford Nation

“Put simply: both Donald Trump and Doug Ford are populists”,³³ concluded an analysis published by the CBC to define Ontario's, then aspiring, premier. “But what kind of populist is he?” added the public funded media article. In the wake of Donald Trump's election in 2016, the first debate bearing on the emergence of populism north of the border took place in Ontario with the election of Doug Ford as leader of the province's Progressive Conservative party in 2018.

Ford comes from a family with a rich political history. His father was a member of the Legislative assembly of Ontario. Ford himself was a city councilor. His brother Rob was a controversial mayor of Toronto, known for his antics and crack addiction. To achieve all these successes, the Ford clan had mobilized a large electoral base, dubbed the Ford Nation, concentrated in Toronto's suburban belt (Erl, 2021).

His arrival on the provincial scene was marked by his public appraisals of Donald Trump. Likewise, he didn't hesitate to mobilize voters angry at traditional politicians. And “Part of this appeal was an attack against political ‘elites,’ who were never clearly defined, but at times were more narrowly referred to as “downtown Toronto elites.” (Perrella, Kiss and Kay, 2020: 122).

But compared to the 45th and 47th US President, “Doug Ford is challenging conventional wisdom by utilizing a more inclusive and malleable brand of populism.”³⁴ In contrast to Trump's populism, the type of populism practiced by Ford during his election campaigns should be understood as part of the “tradition of Canadian populism defined by an overarching ideological commitment to neoliberalism.” (Budd, 2020: 171). This tradition also involves avoiding the nativist and xenophobic rhetoric, while having “a conception of ‘the people’ using an economic and anti-cosmopolitan discourse centered upon middle class taxpayers.” (Budd, 2020: 171).

Elected Premier of Ontario for a first time in 2018, there has been a certain evolution in his discourse. Thus:

“Throughout its tenure, the PC government has undergone significant changes in policy, appearance and general tone. A 2018 populist movement has seemingly shifted to the moderate PC coalition of old.”³⁵

Once in power, one of his first acts was to withdraw Ontario from the carbon market (emissions trading scheme) set up a few years earlier with Quebec and California to put a price on greenhouse gas emissions. However, his rhetoric against the elites has gradually disappeared. While his first term was marked by his handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, his government chose to rigorously apply the recommendations of public health experts.

Doug Ford did not govern like Donald Trump. Instead, the Ontario premier has tried to stay in touch with a more moderate electorate. Indeed, his election in 2018 may have been more the result of voters’ antipathy toward the outgoing Liberal government than of strong populist sentiment in the population (Perrella et al., 2020: 142). In response to Donald Trump’s tariff measures, he called a snap election in Ontario just before the 2025 federal election. With the slogan “Canada is not for sale”, he was overwhelmingly re-elected on a confrontational stance with Trump. During the federal election that followed, tensions within the Conservative movement between Ford and Poilievre were widely reported in the media. In fact, relations between the two political leaders have never been good.

In Québec: Don't Confuse Populism with Quebec’s Nationalism

Political life in Quebec differs from that elsewhere in Canada. Political debates must be interpreted through the prism of cultural and economic development, and the defense of the only predominantly French-speaking nation on the North American continent. Since the end of the Second World War, the national question has structured political life. At different times, Quebec nationalism has taken the form of autonomism within the Canadian federation, or the form of a Yes–No divide for Quebec independence. As we saw in Chapter 2 with the Ralliement créditiste, the populist current has historically had difficulty establishing itself in the Quebec National Assembly.

Analyzing the evolution of Quebec nationalism is a complex enterprise. This analysis becomes even more so when we attempt to study this phenomenon in relation to the conceptual spectrum of populism. Blanchet and Meideros (2019) empirically found that authoritarianism had a negative influence on support for Quebec independence and independentist parties, and very weak effects for nativism and populism. They conclude that Quebec nationalism does not seem to correlate with the right-wing populist movement spreading in many Western societies. In their view, Quebec nationalism has proved to be a distinct form of nationalism.

In the past, some studies viewed Quebec as a case of internal colonialism in Canada, where the economy was mainly dominated by an Anglo-Saxon elite before the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s (Hetcher, 1975; Hind, 1984; Hugues, 1943; McRoberts, 1979). Didn't former premier René Lévesque once refer to the wealthy Anglophones who looked down on the conquered tribe camped at their feet as the “Rhodesians of Westmount”?³⁶ However, more than half a century later, the struggle against an English-speaking elite was no longer a driving force behind Quebec nationalism (Montigny, 2022a).

That said, a national liberation rhetoric fueled the birth of the Parti Québécois. On the left, one of the first political parties to campaign for Quebec independence, le Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale (RIN), was led by Pierre Bourgault whose objective was to become the party of workers and the underprivileged. Bourgault was a great orator, mastering a left-wing populist discourse (Provost, 2004: 204). When René Lévesque, a former journalist and Liberal minister, founded the PQ in 1968, he had no luck with Bourgault's radicalism. Instead, the RIN leader dissolved his party and invited its members to join the PQ. Instead, it was to the right, with the Ralliement national (RN), that René Lévesque agreed to merge his Mouvement souveraineté-association, essentially made up of Liberal dissidents. The RN was instead made up of ex-Créditistes from peripherical regions.

René Lévesque was a democrat. For him, independence was first and foremost a democratic and pacifist project. He firmly opposed the use of violence and the activities of the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ), a left-wing terrorist group that led to the October Crisis of 1970. This crisis began with the kidnapping of a British diplomat and was marked by the assassination of a Quebec government minister. Lévesque even considered that this crisis had benefited his political opponents, while the federal government suspended fundamental freedoms and deployed the Canadian army in Quebec.

The PQ was originally a coalition of people from different ideological backgrounds united for independence. As it became institutionalized, over the years it quickly became a governing party with an office-seeking partisan objective (Montigny, 2018). With its theme of good government, its first seizure of power in 1976 was far from anti-system. Only two leaders have truly prioritized the achievement of independence. Jacques Parizeau (1987–1995) and Paul St-Pierre Plamondon elected in 2020.

As for the Bloc Québécois, the federal party was born in 1990 in the wake of the death of Meech Lake Acord. Founded by Lucien Bouchard, a former Conservative minister under Brian Mulroney and PQ premier, its primary aim was to pave the way for Quebec's future independence and avoid, as in the 1980 referendum, giving federalist MPs the opportunity to claim legitimacy to speak for Quebec (Montigny, 2017). With time and its institutionalization, it has become a safe bet for many Quebec voters (Montigny, 2022b). Moreover, in the course of its history, it has generally preferred to play the game of institutions, even becoming Her Majesty's loyal official opposition in 1993, rather than that of being anti-system. In the crisis that shook Canada with the arrival of Donald Trump to power, its leader Yves-François Blanchet, head of the Bloc Québécois, did not hesitate to support collaboration between Canadian provinces to defend common interests against the American president.³⁷ Only two of this party’s previous leaders have adopted more anti-system positions against federal institutions: Martine Ouellet and Mario Beaulieu. In both cases, they faced a rebellion from their MPs and survived only a few months at the head of their party.

Now, let's look at the three parties somewhat associate with different forms of populism in contemporary Quebec (Meideros & Gravelle, 2023a). Since the Coalition avenir Québec came to power in 2018, a party that can be defined as center-right catch-all party, the autonomist stance of Quebec nationalism dominates. The party is led by François Legault, an accountant with a business background and former Parti Québécois minister. The party is also the result of a merger with the Action démocratique du Québec, which achieved official opposition status in 2007 in Quebec under the leadership of Mario Dumont. However, there is no academic consensus on whether the Coalition avenir Québec should be characterized as populist or as a classical office-seeking party. One of its major policies, the Act Respecting the Laicity of the State, regulates the religious symbols of some public officials in authority. It stems from the historical perspective of secularization in Quebec and a level of religiosity that is well below the one observed in Canada (Dufresne & Gagné, 2021). On climate change, the Coalition avenir Québec also initiated a law banning petroleum development in Québec and the party has committed to a green energy transition.

Is Québec solidaire, the most left-wing party on the political spectrum of Quebec, a populist party? There is also no clear answer to this question. Born out of citizens’ movements (Dufour, 2009), it seems to mix different currents, some of which are more populist. In the past, its leaders did not hesitate to compare QS with left-wing populist Jean-Luc Melanchon’s France insoumise. However, there seems to be a real internal tension between party institutionalization and a decomplex populism posture. Some of the party's members claim to embody the will of the people against the elite, to act as an anti-system movement and to not hesitate to attack the checks and balances of institutions (Montigny, 2019). On the other hand, in order to grow within the National Assembly, its main spokesman, former student movement leader Gabriel Nadeau Dubois, intends to position Quebec Solidaire as a party of government.³⁸

The pandemic has, however, clearly given rise to a right-wing populist party. In fact, the Quebec Conservative Party is the only party that is not afraid to be labeled as populist. A friend close to leader Eric Duhaime even saw populism as a way of protecting democracy.³⁹ For years, Duhaime has been close to Pierre Poilievre.⁴⁰ When he became leader, the party could claim to have, at best, 1,5% in the polls. A radio host well known for his libertarian stance (Laberge, 2021), Duhaime had previously been active in the Parti québécois, the Bloc Québécois, the Canadian Alliance, and then the Action démocratique du Québec. Duhaime achieved unexpected electoral success with 13% of the vote but ultimately failed to win any seats in the National Assembly.

A content analysis of messages posted on Facebook and X by the party and by Eric Duhaime highlights the populist elements of their publications (Drouin & Giasson, 2023). The Conservative party employed a populist, anti-elitist discourse in order to exploit a discontent with the pandemic present in Quebec. The party thus used the mobilization functions offered by digital media to build a new coalition of voters. While no other party occupied this terrain, it was able to find an electoral niche and respond to a political demand (Villeneuve-Siconnelly & Dubois, 2021). At a time when the pandemic is no longer structuring the political debate, can the party maintain its position and mobilize? This seems to be its biggest challenge.

In Alberta: When Populism Is Back

As we saw in Chapter 2, Alberta was the cradle of populism in Canada. The country's new surge of populism is no exception. And this surge is epitomized by Premier Danielle Smith. She led the Wild Rose Party from 2009 and became leader of the official opposition in the Legislative Assembly from 2012 to 2014. She then crossed the assembly floor to join the Progressive Conservatives.

Born in 1971, the former journalist, trained in economics at the University of Calgary, defines her political commitment as following:

“I'm running because I love Alberta. This is my home and I feel passionately that the people of this province are not being treated fairly by Ottawa. We need to push back, regain our pride, and have autonomy over our decisions. Together, let's put Alberta First and as Premier, that is exactly what I will do.”⁴¹

Several factors contributed to her rise. In 2015, the NDP ended the Conservative domination that had prevailed since 1971. It was a real political earthquake:

“The 2015 Alberta election produced a shocking result: after forty-four years, the Progressive Conservative Party (PC) was defeated by Rachel Notley and the New Democrats. Two years later, the PCs voted to accept a merger with the Wildrose Party, and the United Conservative Party was born.” (Bratt & Foster, 2020).

The creation of Wild Rose a few years earlier had divided the right-wing vote. To regain power, Jason Kenney, a minister loyal to Stephen Harper, succeeded in reuniting the Alberta right and by becoming premier in 2019. The pandemic, however, proved to be the undoing of his government, which found itself caught between the two sides of its electorate.

“Many on the right of the party were unhappy with the implementation of any kind of vaccine mandate, while others blamed him for taking too long to respond to the emergence of a fourth COVID-19 wave in the late summer of 2021, and, indeed for putting in place policies that might have increased the severity of that wave. There was certainly no debating the fact that Alberta was leading the country in cases and hospitalizations.” (Stewart & Sayers, 2023).

In Kenney’s 2022 succession leadership race, Danielle Smith soon became associated to a populist discourse. Lee Richardson, a former MP and Conservative strategist, explains the Alberta premier's strategy as follows: “In a provincial adaptation of Pierre Poilievre's path to power, Danielle Smith has repurposed the populist playbook for an Alberta divided by pandemic propaganda, economic uncertainty and old-fashioned anti-Ottawa sentiment.”⁴² She won the United Conservative Party leadership on the sixth ballot, and was accused to act as a new “disruptive force” in Canadian politics. She positioned herself as an outsider, sided with protesters angry about COVID-19 restrictions and vaccination mandates, and promised that she would put “Alberta first” and fight Ottawa with her sovereignty act. In her victory speech, the new premier declared: “No longer will Alberta ask permission from Ottawa to be prosperous and free.” (Young, 2022). She won the 2023 general election.

Regarding the federal government's climate change policies, Smith believes that “As premier, I cannot under any circumstances allow these contemplated federal policies to be inflicted upon Albertans.”⁴³ Alberta, with its strong oil industry, is the jurisdiction with the highest greenhouse gas emissions in the country (28 percent of Canada's total greenhouse gas emissions in 2021). As one author puts, Alberta

“is also the province that, with the exception of Quebec, has been the most alienated from and suspicious of the federal government. Indeed, Alberta's politics have been defined in no small way by a series of dramatic and painful battles for control over its natural resources and how they would be used.” (Taras, 2019).

This long-standing dispute with Ottawa adds to the frustration and feeling of alienation. And this frustration feeds the same rhetoric against central Canada's elites that prevailed before Stephen Harper's election victories.

Meanwhile in Canadian Public Opinion…

The arrival of Pierre Poilievre as leader of the Conservatives in the fall of 2022 profoundly changed the political dynamic in Canada. In the months following his election, a gap gradually developed in voting intentions between his party and the Liberals. Between the summer of 2023 and the resignation of Justin Trudeau in 2025, regardless of the polling firm, a trend has been emerging (see Graph 3.1). Poilievre's party dominated voting intentions, consistently outpacing the Liberals by 10 to 15 points,⁴⁴ and even by as much as 20%.⁴⁵ The Liberals were falling and the NDP was stuck under the 20% barrier.

Graph 3.1

Evolution of voting intentions in Canada 2021–2024 according to Léger. Source https://​leger360.​com/​wp-content/​uploads/​2024/​08/​Leger-X-National-Post_​Politics-August-26th-2024-002.​pdf

In theory, if elections had been held at that time, this Canada-wide lead would have translated into a significant majority of seats in Parliament. In practice, this new dynamic led to an unexpected by-election Conservative victory in a Liberal stronghold of Toronto-St-Paul’s in the summer of 2024. The Conservatives’ popularity then reached the heart of Ontario, even in urban areas. Throughout the various polls, only Quebec seemed to resist the Conservative leader's appeal, due to the popularity of the Bloc Québécois.⁴⁶ Poor polls for the Liberal party contributed to Justin Trudeau's departure in early 2025. Poilievre lost his favorite target. A few weeks later, with the prospect of a new leader, the Liberals were more competitive again. Looking at the results of the 2025 election, we see stability in the Conservative vote, which remained above 40%, as predicted by the previous year’s polls. The Liberal comeback is more attributable to a decline in the Bloc vote and a collapse of the NDP vote. 

As for Maxime Bernier's party, after reaching as high as 12% in the polls,⁴⁷ its support was stagnating at 2 or 3%. It must be said that Maxime Bernier's success at the ballot box has so far been very limited, despite the media exposure he has enjoyed, notably by taking part in the 2019 leaders’ debates. At that time, he received only 1.9% of the vote. In the pandemic context of the 2021 election, he performed better with 5% of the vote. His best results were in southern Manitoba, where his party averaged 10%. In May 2023, it was in this region that he chose to run in a by-election and lost. There, it seems that Pierre Poilievre's populism enabled the Conservatives to recapture some of Maxime Bernier's electorate and grab some of the NDP vote in the process.

Profiling the Canadian Populist Voter?

In Chapter 1, we have seen some values that are associated with populist predisposition. Is there a typical profile for Canadian voters who support parties more associated with populist discourse?

In his studies, Pruysers (2021) focused on the psychological attributes of voters and the relationship between character traits and populist attitudes in Canada. Even when controlling for a variety of factors such as age, gender, income, education, labor market status and a number of others, his results reveal an effect associated with personality. He found a significant relationship between populist attitudes and three traits: honesty-humility, emotionality, and conscientiousness. Regarding dark traits, he concludes that narcissism is significantly and negatively linked to a populist attitude.

Turcotte et al. (2023: 103) identified the main characteristics for the People’s Party 2021 electorate. They were more likely to be male, younger, and born in Canada (but race was a nonsignificant factor). They were also less likely to have a university degree and generally had fewer children than the rest of the electorate. Finally, Maxime Bernier’s party was much more popular among the non-vaccinated.

A poll conducted by Léger in June 2024 also gives us a portrait of this electorate.⁴⁸ Geographically, significant differences can be observed by jurisdiction, but not locally. Voters of populist parties are less likely to be Quebecers and more likely to be Albertans. At 23%, Quebec has the lowest level of support for the Conservatives, while Alberta has the highest at 52%. Surprisingly, there was no significant difference between urban, suburban, and rural voters.

Like Maxime Bernier, Pierre Poilievre is more popular among men than women. Similarly, Bernier is twice as popular with 34–55-year-olds (4%) as with older voters (2%). Almost the same phenomenon can be observed with Pierre Poilievre. His support is 46% among 35–54-year-olds and 40% among 18–34-year-olds, compared to 37% among voters aged 55 and over.

More specifically, Angus Reid had estimated support for the leaders by generation. Thus: “Gen Z adults were more likely to say Poilievre (25%), Singh (23%) and none of them (21%) were the best choice for prime minister than Trudeau (10%), while Millennials believe Poilievre was the best choice at a plurality level.”⁴⁹

The June 2024 Léger survey also allows us to assess the level of confidence in Canadian election results by party. Overall, 68% of respondents were generally confident, compared to 19% who were generally not confident in election results. However, when the results are segmented according to respondents’ age, significant differences emerge. The younger the respondent, the less generally confident he or she is. 28% of respondents aged between 18 and 34 were generally not confident, compared with just 9% of those aged 55 and over. There was also a significant difference among party voters. Thus, 58% of People’s Party voters generally had no confidence in the election results. This is the case for 24% of Conservative voters, 18% of NDP voters, and only 6% of Liberals and 7% of Bloc Québécois voters.

In the wake of revelations about the Canadian security intelligence service, a commission of inquiry was set up in 2024 into interference by foreign powers such as China during the last federal election.⁵⁰ In this context, People’s Party (58%) and Conservative (46%) voters were the most likely to believe that the potential interference of foreign agent in the Canadian electoral process is so important that it greatly compromises the legitimacy of the results of the election. This was the case for only 1 in 5 Liberal voters. It can therefore be concluded that the more populist the party you vote for, the less confidence you have in the electoral process.

***

In this chapter, we have been able to paint a portrait of the various contemporary leaders associated with populism in Canada. As demonstrated, these leaders can be found on both the left and right of the political spectrum. Using De Vreese et al. (2018) typology, only Maxime Bernier has truly adopted a Trump-style Complete populism. And its success at the ballot box has proved to be weak. In this chapter, we saw that anti-elite populists are the most successful with the electorate. The populist discourse of Poilievre, Smith, and Singh are mostly in line with the historical trend of Canadian populism, a populism essentially associated with economic issues, with no nativist component. But Poilievre, to take up the attributes developed by Sorensen (2023), doesn't hesitate to use the disruptive communication practices developed by modern populist politicians. With social media as his primary communication tool, his outspokenness and occasional anti-system behavior, he likes to provoke and assert his authenticity.

When we carry out the same exercise with the major party leaders in the last provincial election, both Doug Ford and François Legault would be more associated with catch-all party politics, that adapt to the evolution of their electorate, than populism. It would be very difficult to pin an anti-elite rhetoric on them. In the specific case of Quebec nationalism, it would also be wrong to associate this movement with populism. Its dynamic is different.

However, two provincial party leaders could clearly claim to be populists: Danielle Smith in Alberta and Eric Duhaime in Quebec. Here again, it is difficult to associate them with a complete populism as practiced by Maxime Bernier. Even if their level of success is not the same with their respective electorates, we should not be surprised to see them fraternizing with each other. Before a meeting with Danielle Smith in Alberta, Eric Duhaime even said that she was a source of inspiration for him.⁵¹ Another point in common: they both politically benefited from the pandemic.

As we will see in the next chapter, the pandemic, and its aftermath, turned out to be a pivotal moment. It contributed to shake up the Canadian political scene. It has enabled a discourse on freedom to resonate, and leaders to emerge. It clarified the position of others. It has also influenced the civility of political debates, not always for the better.

Footnotes

1

CBC, ‘The nastier side of populism’: Why founding organizers are quitting Maxime Bernier's new party, May 24, 2019. (https://​www.​cbc.​ca/​radio/​day6/​abandoning-the-people-s-party-drake-gets-dragged-postmedia-s-politics-milkshaking-high-cuisine-and-more-1.​5147118/​the-nastier-side-of-populism-why-founding-organizers-are-quitting-maxime-bernier-s-new-party-1.​5147163a).

2

Thomson S. How Pierre Poilievre's ‘soft populism’ is riding a global wave of voter frustration, National Post, December 2, 2023. (https://​nationalpost.​com/​news/​politics/​how-pierre-poilievres-soft-populism-is-riding-a-global-wave-of-voter-frustration).

3

Béland, G. Le polémiste de la «droite décomplexée», La Presse, April 12, 2022. (https://​www.​lapresse.​ca/​actualites/​politique/​2022-04-18/​portrait-d-eric-duhaime/​le-polemiste-de-la-droite-decomplexee.​php).

4

Maddeaux, S. Jagmeet Singh keeps failing to out-populist Pierre Poilievre, National Post, April 11, 2023. (https://​nationalpost.​com/​opinion/​sabrina-maddeaux-jagmeet-singh-keeps-failing-to-out-populist-pierre-poilievre).

5

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6

Cassivi, M. Journalisme et populisme selon Catherine Dorion, La Presse. February 20, 2019. (https://​www.​lapresse.​ca/​arts/​medias/​201902/​20/​01-5215475-journalisme-et-populisme-selon-catherine-dorion.​php).

7

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8

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9

Idem.

10

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11

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12

Forrest, M. The quick take on Canada’s new Conservative leader, Politico, December 9, 2022. (https://​www.​politico.​com/​news/​2022/​09/​12/​canada-conservative-leader-poilievre-00056205).

13

Idem.

14

Idem.

15

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16

Lawton, A. Who Is the Real Pierre Poilievre?, The Wallrus, July 2, 2024. (https://​thewalrus.​ca/​who-is-the-real-pierre-poilievre/​).

17

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18

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19

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20

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21

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22

Radio-Canada, Parti populaire du Canada: le «populisme intelligent» de Maxime Bernier.

December 27, 2018. (https://​ici.​radio-canada.​ca/​ohdio/​premiere/​emissions/​gravel-le-matin/​segments/​entrevue/​100172/​politique-federale-canada-maxime-bernier-parti-populaire-beauce).

23

La Presse canadienne, Maxime Bernier veut offrir un populisme intelligent, La Presse, September 11, 2019. ( https://​www.​lapresse.​ca/​elections-federales/​2019-09-11/​maxime-bernier-veut-offrir-un-populisme-intelligent).

24

Bernier, M., Choosing smart populism with the People’s Party, Toronto Sun, September 25, 2019.(https://​torontosun.​com/​news/​national/​election-2019/​maxime-bernier-choosing-smart-populism-with-the-peoples-party).

25

Bernhardt D. and Kives, B. Maxime Bernier admits to breaking COVID-19 public health orders in Manitoba, CBC, May 16, 2023. (https://​www.​cbc.​ca/​news/​canada/​manitoba/​maxime-bernier-pleads-guilty-covid19-public-health-charges-1.​6844932).

26

Pirro, R. Les feux de forêt, la faute des «terroristes verts», selon Maxime Bernier, Journal de Montréal, June 6, 2023. (https://​www.​journaldemontrea​l.​com/​2023/​06/​06/​les-feux-de-foret-la-faute-des-terroristes-verts-selon-maxime-bernier).

27

The Canadian Presse, Maxime Bernier says race for Portage-Lisgar byelection is between him and fake conservative, CBC, May 19, 2023. (https://​www.​cbc.​ca/​news/​canada/​manitoba/​maxime-bernier-portage-lisgar-byelection-conservative-party-of-canada-1.​6841628).

28

McSheffrey, E. Maxime Bernier tells Halifax he wants to ‘make Canada great again’, Global News, January 21, 2019. (https://​globalnews.​ca/​news/​4864722/​maxime-bernier-halifax/​).

29

New Democratic Party, https://​www.​ndp.​ca/​jagmeet.

30

Reynolds, C., Who is Jagmeet Singh? A look at how the NDP leader’s past has shaped his campaign, Global News, August 29, 2021. (https://​globalnews.​ca/​news/​8149878/​who-is-jagmeet-singh-ndp/​).

31

The Globe and Mail, Jagmeet Singh | New Democratic Party leader Biography, January 28, 2025. (https://​www.​theglobeandmail.​com/​topics/​jagmeet-singh).

32

Crête, M., Les libéraux, champions des promesses de compétence provinciales, Le Devoir, September 18, 2021. (https://​www.​ledevoir.​com/​politique/​633417/​elections-federales-les-liberaux-champions-des-promesses-de-competence-provinciale).

33

Wherry, A. Doug Ford is a populist, but it's not yet clear what kind, CBC, May 19, 2018. (https://​www.​cbc.​ca/​news/​politics/​doug-ford-trump-populist-analysis-wherry-1.​4663465).

34

Lewsen, S., Populism Isn’t Always Xenophobic. Just Ask Ontario’s Premier, Foreign Policy, July 14, 2020. (https://​foreignpolicy.​com/​2020/​07/​14/​canada-ontario-populism-doug-ford/​).

35

Routley, S., What Doug Ford’s shift to the centre says about the longevity of populism, The Conversation, May 10, 2022. (https://​theconversation.​com/​what-doug-fords-shift-to-the-centre-says-about-the-longevity-of-populism-182371).

36

David, M,. Les Rodhésiens Le Devoir, November 6, 2021. (https://​www.​ledevoir.​com/​opinion/​chroniques/​645543/​les-rhodesiens).

37

Proulx, B. Yves-François Blanchet: souverainiste mais allié du Canada face à Trump, Le Devoir, January 22, 2025. (https://​www.​ledevoir.​com/​politique/​835075/​yves-francois-blanchet-souverainiste-mais-allie-canada-face-trump).

38

Carabin, F. Appuyé par son caucus, GND plaide pour faire de QS un «parti de gouvernement», Le Devoir, May 1, 2024. (https://​www.​ledevoir.​com/​politique/​quebec/​812010/​toutes-possibilites-sont-table-quebec-solidaire).

39

De la Sablonnière, l. Le populisme à la rescousse du de la démocratie, La Presse, March 31, 2021. (https://​www.​lapresse.​ca/​debats/​opinions/​2021-03-31/​replique/​le-populisme-a-la-rescousse-de-la-democratie.​php).

40

Lévesque, C., A ‘meeting of minds’ between Poilievre and Duhaime’s populism in Quebec, National Post, April 16, 2022. (https://​nationalpost.​com/​news/​politics/​a-meeting-of-minds-between-poilievre-and-duhaimes-populism-in-quebec).

41

United Conservative of Alberta, https://​www.​unitedconservati​ve.​ca/​danielle-smith/​

42

Richardson, L. Danielle Smith and the Alberta Version of Tactical Populism, Policy/Canadian Politics and Public Policy. (https://​www.​policymagazine.​ca/​danielle-smith-and-the-alberta-version-of-tactical-populism/​).

43

Wherry, A., Populist or not, Danielle Smith is another challenge to Liberal climate policy, CBC, May 31, 2023. https://​www.​cbc.​ca/​news/​politics/​danielle-smith-alberta-populism-climate-change-wherry-1.​6859691.

44

Nanos, https://​nanos.​co/​conservatives-lead-by-15-points-concern-about-housing-on-the-upswing-nanos/​

45

Abacus Data, https://​abacusdata.​ca/​conservatives-lead-by-20-post-rate-cut/​

46

St-Pierre, G Sondage Léger au Québec: Pierre Poilievre progresse… mais fait encore peur. Journal de Montréal, June 5, 2024. (https://​www.​journaldemontrea​l.​com/​2024/​06/​05/​poilievre-progresse-mais-fait-encore-peur#:​~:​text=​%C3%80%20​26%25%20​dans%20​les%20​intentions,L%C3%A9ger).

47

Buzzetti, H., D’où viennent les électeurs de Maxime Bernier ?, L’Actualité, September 21, 2021. https://​lactualite.​com/​politique/​dou-viennent-les-electeurs-de-maxime-bernier/​).

48

Leger, https://​leger360.​com/​federal-voting-intentions-june-2024/​.

49

Angus Reid, https://​angusreid.​org/​trudeau-budget-deficit-gen-z-millennials-poilievre-best-prime-minister/​

50

Foreign Interference Commission, https://​foreigninterfere​ncecommission.​ca/​

51

Boivert, E. Radio-Canada, Éric Duhaime en Alberta: «Je veux m’inspirer de ce qui se passe ici» February 15, 2024. (https://​ici.​radio-canada.​ca/​nouvelle/​2049685/​conservateur-federalisme-tournee-duhaime).

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2025

E. MontignyPopulism in CanadaPalgrave Studies in Populismshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-89134-2_4

4. Covid Crisis: A New Uninhibited Populist Rhetoric

Eric Montigny1  

(1)

Political Science, Université Laval, Québec, QC, Canada

Eric Montigny

Email: eric.montigny@pol.ulaval.ca

Abstract

In this chapter, we demonstrate how the Covid pandemic acted as a trigger for an uninhibited populist discourse. Maxime Bernier and Pierre Poilievre were already associated with a more libertarian current of Canadian conservatism. Since the Covid crisis, both men have flirted with conspiracy theories. Bernier assumes this completely, while Poilievre uses more “dog whistle techniques.” In so doing, both targeted the same, more anti-system segment of the electorate. Both have exploited the COVID-19 crisis to mobilize their base. To illustrate these observations, we analyze their rhetoric on social media. At the heart of this new era, we see the emergence of a new criticism of scientists, who are now perceived as the new elite. We also assess the effect of the truckers and understand how the Covid crisis enabled a populist offer to find its market. We finally reflect on the appeal of conspiracy theories and the effect of social media and what this means for the social fabric of Canadian society and political civility.

Keywords

PopulismCanadaCovid crisisExpertsOttawaFreedom convoyTruckersDiscourse

The news went around the world. Canada's capital, Ottawa, was besieged by truckers protesting the health measures imposed by the Canadian government in connection with the COVID-19 health crisis. What was happening in a country whose image is usually one of tranquility? This demonstration was the result of the convergence of several convoys, mainly coming from Western Canada. Arriving at the height of winter at the end of January 2022, they established a siege of the federal Parliament.

For some, this type of occupation came as a surprise and was perceived as unCanadian:

«there should be no doubting the harmful effects of the Ottawa protest and occupation has had on Canada’s standing in the world. It has altered perceptions from that of a stable, predictable even boring nation to one that is a deeply divided and polarized society »(Eisler & Lynch, 2022: 4).

Others have argued that this occupation was far from representing a break in Canadian political culture resulting from the influence of contemporary American culture. Rather, this type of protest action stems from long-standing cultural continuities mediated by religious Reformation tradition firmly established in Canada (Wolfart, 2024).

In any case, the mandatory vaccination of truckers wishing to cross the border with the United States set off a firestorm. The federal government's justification: the resurgence of Covid due to the omicron variant. The “Freedom convoy” paralyzed the capital for nearly a month. Occupiers were speaking out against health measures, but also against the system, against government elites. In a democracy, “What level of economic disruption, civil disobedience, property damage or violence elevates a protest from a protected activity to a threat to state security?” (West et al., 2022: 262). The Prime minister even had to invoke the Emergency Measures Act to evict them. This had not happened in Canada since 1970.¹

A few months earlier, Justin Trudeau had called a snap election to try to win a majority of seats in the House of Commons. A big gamble that he lost. To win this gamble, he had banked on a new factor: the polarization born out of the pandemic. On the one hand, a majority of the electorate supported stringent health measures to combat the virus, while on the other, there were far fewer opponents to mandatory vaccination.

To win a majority, he sought to politicize a public health issue: ask the people for a clear mandate to impose mandatory vaccination for Canadian government employees. From day one of the campaign, he made it a wedge issue, putting his Conservative opponent on the defensive at a time when its electorate was mostly backing the government on the issue. The liberal Prime minister:

«used his Day 1 words to shape the campaign's subtext. Canada's election, the Liberal leader suggested, could hinge on the philosophical clash between the vaccinated and the vaccine reluctant. “We chose to make sure that federal public servants and everyone boarding a train or a plane be vaccinated. Not everyone agrees. Not every political party agrees,"(...) said Trudeau».²

Long before the Freedom Convoy, the Covid crisis had brought together various non-institutional opponents to Trudeau’s approach. On the federal scene, Maxime Bernier was one of the first to speak out. Tensions were palpable within Jason Kenney's Alberta government. In Quebec, Eric Duhaime was poised to become leader of a Conservative party that, at that time would not trail 1%, but would become the sole opponent of health measures. The Freedom Convoy should be seen as the culmination of this polarization.

And Pierre Poilievre, months before becoming the Conservative leader, did not hesitate to support the truckers stationed in front of Parliament:

«The protest, Poilievre said, “was not just for truckers, but for the 60 per cent of Canadians who say they worry they can't afford food.” It was for “the 60-year-old small businessman who has spent his entire adult life building up an enterprise and watching it wiped out ... the depressed 14-year-old who's been locked out of school” and “the families that can't take it anymore. In Poilievre's telling, the convoy represents “the people who want to stand and speak for their freedoms” and “all those that our government and our media have insulted and left behind.” “Freedom, not fear,” Poilievre concluded. “Truckers, not Trudeau.”»³

His speech left a lasting impression. And it sparked debate. For the first time, an elected official of his stature clearly supported anti-vax protesters. Some observers interpreted this initiative as the unofficial launch of his campaign for the party leadership.

In this chapter, we will demonstrate how the Covid pandemic acted as a trigger for an uninhibited populist discourse. Maxime Bernier and Pierre Poilievre were already associated with a more libertarian current of Canadian conservatism. Since the Covid crisis, both men have flirted with conspiracy theories. Bernier assumes this completely, while Poilievre uses more “dog whistle techniques.” In so doing, both targeted the same, more anti-system segment of the electorate. Both have exploited the COVID-19 crisis to mobilize their base. Their rhetoric regularly takes the form of a defense of freedom, and they both advance that freedom of expression was threatened by Justin Trudeau.

To illustrate these observations, we will analyze their rhetoric on social media. Bernier regularly denounced the authoritarian nature of anti-Covid and vaccine measures. Poilievre took advantage of Covid's anger, and then focused on other themes, while maintaining a populist framework.

At the heart of this new era, we see the emergence of a new criticism of scientists, who are now perceived as the new elite. We will try to assess the effect of the truckers and understand how the Covid crisis enabled a populist offer to find its market. We will then reflect on the appeal of conspiracy theories and the effect of social media and what this means for the social fabric of Canadian society and political civility.

An Ideological Realignment Against Experts?

As we saw earlier, the roots of populism in Canada date back many years. They can be found on both the right and the left of the political spectrum. But how can we explain the new rise of populism in connection with COVID-19? For political scientist Eric Montpetit (2024), the COVID-19 crisis has amplified a phenomenon that was already underway: the rise of experts in the public arena. And these experts have become the new elite of the twenty-first century, replacing the economic elites of the twentieth century who were criticized mostly for their wealth.

Here is his reasoning. In Canada, the expert community was particularly visible during the COVID-19 pandemic. They had a daily presence on TV, radio, and in the newspapers. If they were already speaking out on current issues before this crisis, including the environment and immigration, they took up even more space during Covid. Intellectuals and workers were once allied under the left. But a new realignment is now pitting workers and intellectuals against each other. And this divide is even more striking among workers outside major city centers. In fact, the Covid crisis accelerated the emergence of an already emerging divide.

Statements collected from demonstrators by a journalist accompanying two activists, one of them a former trade unionist, on their way to join the Freedom Convoy point in this direction. They are reminiscent of a class struggle, but this time, against the educated. During the Covid crisis, these men claimed to be waging a social battle against elites who look down on “the ill-bred of their kind.” Therefore:

«We're a nuisance and we don't speak well like you,” says one. Another adds: “My worst nightmare,” he says, “is dying and waking up having to go back to school for eternity. I (swearword) hated that.»⁴

And in a twist of history, with its pro-immigration stance, its support for strong measures to combat global warming and its defense of strict health measures, this new intellectual left would become the elite that threatens the daily lives of working people. In this new alignment, the rivalry would be more moral than economic. Again, according to Montpetit, experts are criticized for lecturing, telling people and governments how to think and behave. This is received as arrogance.

In the first chapter of this book, we mentioned that during the height of the pandemic, a growing proportion of the electorate trusted the experts’ decisions. At first glance, these results may seem contradictory to the realignment thesis. But beyond the data, we need to look at how the opinions of those who are more skeptical of scientists are structured. And we can see that there was already a certain amount of space for populist discourse to take root at the expense of experts.

In a survey conducted in Canada in 2019, before the pandemic, more than four out of ten Canadians (44%) believed that scientists are “elitists.” Even so, this is less than the global average (58%) revealed by the same survey. One in three Canadians felt that scientists were influenced by the government's agenda. Another third of Canadians thought that science was influenced by corporate interests. And almost one in three Canadians (30%) said they only believe in science that suits their personal beliefs.⁵

A survey of young people aged 18–24 conducted for the Canada Foundation for Innovation⁶ in 2021 revealed that 59% of respondents fell into the “science-friendly” segment. At first sight, these results are rather reassuring for scientists. The survey did, however, reveal some points of concern:

Among those who question science, most follow their intuition when making personal health decisions, and believe that just because something is scientifically proven doesn't necessarily mean it is true;

People that say that they can ignore science are the most likely to follow a social media influencer expressing ideas contrary to science, and are less able than other groups to distinguish real news from fake;

Social media influencers with ideas contrary to science are numerous and very present as 73% of those surveyed reported following at least one such person expressing such opinions.

But what is the link between populism and conspiracism? At the heart of the conspiratorial discourse on COVID-19 lies an attack on the elites. As summarized by Morin, Bédard, Carignan and Daxhelet (2024), conspiracism can be defined as a form of thinking according to which most events can be explained by the existence of a conspiracy carried out in secret by an elite pursuing malevolent interest. In the case of COVID-19, the “conspiracy” implied by these “theories” can lead to the belief that elites have deliberately created the virus or led to the belief in its existence, disseminated it, or profited from it. We could also add that some even believe that political decision-makers took pleasure in misleading citizens, withholding information, and abusing their power.

In a study that does not focus on Canada, however, it was shown that trust in experts and science is lower among people who vote right than left (Altenmüller et al., 2024). If this same logic applies to Canada, we can understand that not basing his political orientations on sound experts may not be politically disadvantageous for Pierre Poilievre’s electoral tactics.

The Covid Crisis Has Created a New Market of Electors…

In Canada, the first signs of concern about the arrival of Covid in the country appeared at the end of January 2020, when the first cases of infection were reported. But it was not until March that more drastic measures were taken to impede the spread of the virus. It is important to understand that, with the division of powers within the Canadian federation, each level of government has a specific role to play.

Therefore, most health and public health measures are the responsibility of the provinces. While they talk to each other and cooperate, it is up to each province to establish and apply measures within their territory and jurisdictions. They did so in terms of managing health services, implementing vaccinations strategies, and selecting and enforcing containment rules. Consequently, the latter were not uniform across the country. Quebec, for example, chose to impose a curfew for a certain period. Doug Ford's Ontario did not see measures go that far but implemented the containment and distancing measures proposed by its public health experts. Across Canada, police officers were handing out fines to those who failed to comply with the new rules, particularly those regarding restricting gatherings.

For its part, the federal government had three main constitutional responsibilities: managing and closing international borders, supplying vaccines, and monitoring the international evolution of the pandemic. The border with the United States was closed on March 18, 2020. The army was also called in to reinforce various health care centers due to the lack of personnel becoming infected.

Vaccination began modestly in December 2020, accelerating in 2021. To speed up deconfinement, the various jurisdictions introduced a digital vaccine passport to identify immunized individuals. This system allowed verifying individuals’ vaccination levels and depending on the various measures put in place by the provinces, to give vaccinated people access to most indoor public places (religious services, restaurants, etc.). A few months later, in connection with the progressive reopening of the borders, the federal government introduced an application, ArriveCan, for travelers to prove their vaccination status.

As soon as the pandemic began, the Trudeau government quickly put in place a generous financial support program to help both individuals and businesses who had to cope with the loss of income because of the confinement and sanitary measures imposed across the country. Many economic sectors, including services, culture, and tourism, were particularly effected.

For months, media attention focused on the crisis. Provincial premiers adopted different communication strategies. Quebec was a special case. At the height of the crisis, a daily news briefing was set up, with over a million viewers tuning in each day to hear the François Legault and the Director of Public Health provide updates and clarify instructions 1 p.m. every day. Federal Prime Minister Justin Trudeau did the same on a regular basis in front of his official residence.

From the very first days of the crisis, citizens rallied behind the authorities. For example, the approval rate for Quebec Premier François Legault reached 90%. Approval of Justin Trudeau was also very high. Months later, however, vaccination would become a source of tension. While vaccination campaigns quickly proved to be a mass success, the most vaccine-averse found themselves marginalized as society gradually began to reopen.

Across the country, demonstrations were organized under the theme of individual freedom. New social media networks of anti-vax citizen rose in opposition to health measures. Those who did not want to be vaccinated were seen by the majority as people who were delaying the collective and the end of the pandemic. On the contrary, those who opposed vaccination saw those who did get vaccinated as “sheep” blinded by scientists to the risks of vaccines. In this sense, we were witnessing a veritable social divide linked to accessing public spaces. By the spring of 2021, political debates were raging over mandatory vaccination. In Quebec, the introduction of a special tax for non-vaccinated people to cover the costs of not vaccinating was even on the table.

In Ottawa, Justin Trudeau believed that he could capitalize on his popularity as a leader in time of crisis to regain the majority in the House of Commons that he lost in 2019. But he chose to go one step further by asking for a mandate to make vaccination mandatory for federal employees, on pain of dismissal. Vaccination in Canada had never been seen as a political issue before this moment. Until then, it has mostly been a public health debate for experts. By calling an early election, Justin Trudeau made the 2021 Canadian federal election a “pandemic election,” where the health crisis took center stage. The COVID-19 pandemic saw opponents of public health mandates deploy a range of populist, anti-elite arguments (Medeiros & Gravelle, 2023). The liberal campaign was marked by death threats and even violent demonstrations on the sidelines of Liberal rallies. In events, Trudeau even had to wear a bulletproof vest. Reelected with a minority government, Justin Trudeau's Liberals nonetheless imposed mandatory vaccination on federal employees. Vaccination thus became an electoral and political issue.

The debate then shifted to the role of the State. This debate would later have a structuring effect on political forces. The Freedom Convoy was in large part a reaction to this constraining use of the Canadian state. In sum:

«The truckers regard the state as their bona fide enemy. To them, the vaccine mandate represents a saber slash across their concept of freedom and the Trudeau government is wielding the sword. There is a concerted reluctance to see the need for vaccine mandates in any light other than they represent an abomination worthy of totalitarian states hell bent on total social control of the population.» (McLaren, 2022: 868).

The 2021 election was also a watershed moment for the People’s Party of Canada, which increased its electoral support by opposing public health restrictions linked to the pandemic. Although the party failed to win a seat, it managed to triple its share of the vote (from 1.6 to 4.9%). In the end, this was still marginal, but significant enough to worry the Conservatives. In fact, during the campaign, several polls credited Maxime Bernier's party with nearly 10% of the vote.

Upheavals are also taking place in certain provinces. In Quebec, in November 2020, Eric Duhaime took over the leadership of a political party that had previously achieved results of barely 1%. He multiplied anti-system gestures to mark his opposition to health measures. The Conservative leader was even expelled from a parliamentary committee dealing with the compulsory vaccination of healthcare workers against the COVID-19 virus.⁷ He criticized the vaccination passport, calling it the “passport of shame” and associated it with “segregationist health abuses.” He even stated:

«People are told: You can enter a business if and only if you're vaccinated, and you, if you don't have your 2nd dose, your QR code or if you've forgotten your cell phone, you're not allowed in. It's a form of segregation.»⁸

A few months later he asked for the complete end of sanitary measures:

«There's no fun in Quebec, there, we've abolished fun here for too long. It's time to put Quebec back on the road to normalcy.»⁹

Financially, his party benefited from a strong grassroots movement. Being the only party opposed to health measures in Quebec, it garnered over 13% of the vote in the 2022 election, but like Maxime Bernier, it failed to win a seat in the legislature. With a broad public support for the management of the pandemic, the incumbent government, a center-right party, was reelected with an even greater majority, winning 90 seats out of 125. But, in reaction to COVID-19, a new populist party managed to emerge to its right on the political spectrum. Possibly changing the political dynamic in the long run.

In the cradle of Canadian populism, the COVID-19 crisis will have even greater political repercussions. Conservative Premier Jason Kenny attempted to implement the health measures proposed by his government's public health experts. This contributed to divisions within his party, and to his departure from political life. When Danielle Smith succeeded him as Premier in October 2022, she had harsh words to say about the health measures and did not hesitate to defend the unvaccinated. “They're the most discriminated against group that I've ever witnessed in my lifetime.”¹⁰ she said.

Before becoming Premier, she had also argued that: “the 75 per cent of the public who received a vaccine fell for the “charms of a tyrant,” specifically referring to Adolf Hitler.”¹¹ But once elected, and when these words came back to haunt her, she apologized.

It is in this political context that Pierre Poilievre took the front stage in 2022. In his case, he did not hesitate to use populist rhetoric that resonates with non-vaccinists and sanitary measures opponents. A specialist in Canadian populism, Laycock (2023) explains his positioning:

«Poilievre grabbed public and media attention in early 2022 by celebrating the actions of the “freedom convoy” in Ottawa. His pandering to anti-vaxxers and conspiracy theorists led most Canadian media to label him a populist. Is he? Well, yes, since he fits the performative formula: he tells whoever will listen that “the people” want real freedom and this can only be achieved if state “elites” and their party sponsors get off their backs. For Poilievre, COVID prevention measures are just the most recent example of state interference in individual choice. By this account, the elites are not only those that enforce vaccine or mask mandates but also those that endorse any intrusion into the zone of sovereign individual choice. His solution is to represent the people's will to be free, by making Canada “the freest nation on Earth.”»

As leader of his party, Poilievre persisted. He introduces himself on his party's website as follows:

«He was also one of the first voices to speak up against unscientific mandates and unacceptable limits on the freedoms of Canadians during the COVID-19 pandemic. Pierre believes that freedom is critical for this country and has pressed the government to commit to ending its politicized and divisive response.»¹²

Aiming to win back the right-wing votes “lost to Maxime Bernier,” the Freedom Convoy gave Poilievre the opportunity to articulate his message on freedom and to put him in the spotlight. For Törnell (2023) “populism as a political force is being mainstreamed by Poilievre and the Conservative Party as a response towards changing social relations, argued detrimental to the working-class, which the Freedom Convoy was a manifestation of.” On many occasions, however, Poilievre was careful to keep a certain distance with this movement by repeating that he has no direct links with its organizers.

In June 2022, in anticipation of new demonstrations, he said: “I encourage everyone to continue demonstrating against the government's attack on our freedoms,” in a statement sent by his press attaché, calling vaccination requirements “unfair and unscientific intimidation.” He went on to say that, while “no one” from the Poilievre camp “has spoken to the organizers,” the Ottawa-area MP supports “all Canadians who are peacefully defending their rights by demonstrating against the Liberal government's vaccine vendetta.”¹³ A way of supporting the cause, while keeping his distance from the organizers and any potential slip-ups.

During his leadership race, the new leader explained his political agenda to an alternative radical right media. Two themes emerged: the struggle for freedom and the struggle to help the people grapple with an alarming rise in the cost of living. He accused Trudeau of taking advantage of the COVID-19 crisis to increase his power over the people.¹⁴ He also regularly repeats that he wants to defund the Canadian public television CBC.¹⁵ He accuses the public broadcaster of being in the payroll of Prime Minister Trudeau. He repeats that rather than asking for accounts from the government, the CBC participates in the cover-up of scandals affecting the government.

The Truckers Effect

But has the trucker occupation of Ottawa had any real effect on these political dynamics? It certainly left its mark on the collective imagination. It polarized opinion while channeling and legitimizing an aggressive uncensored political discourse, full of anger that depicted the frustration of a class of workers who had had enough of control measures.

On January 15, 2022, Justin Trudeau's government ended the quarantine exemption for truckers crossing the US border. Vaccination requirements for Canadians traveling south of the border were also implemented by the Americans. Although most truckers were already vaccinated, and only a small proportion had to cross the border, concerns were quickly raised, notably by Alberta's premier Jason Kenny, about the supply of goods from the United States. A movement began, with a core group of truckers, mainly from the West, converging on Ottawa. This movement succeeded in federating a motley amalgam of opponents to the public health measures, who united their voices to demand Justin Trudeau's resignation.

The Freedom Convoy managed to occupy Parliament Hill for almost a month, from January 29 to February 20. It was then becoming logistically difficult for the authorities to dislodge the steel behemoths parked just a stone's throw from Parliament. Counter-demonstrations also took place. Parliament Hill, in the center of the capital, was paralyzed. Anti-Covid demonstrators set up camp in a friendly atmosphere. Images of demonstrators in a hot tub in front of Parliament even made it around the world. Camps were springing up to cope with the rigors of winter.

Ottawa police were criticized for their inaction. Despite being responsible for public safety in Ontario, Doug Ford's government had remained relatively silent. So much so that the general perception was that this was essentially a federal crisis, aimed at Justin Trudeau and his government. Admittedly, there were several additional blocking events outside of the federal capital. This was notably the case at certain goods crossing points at the border with the United States, either in southern Alberta or between Windsor and Detroit. Essential to the Canada-US auto industry, traffic was quickly restored there. In Quebec City, truckers and opponents of public health measures also attempted to occupy Parliament Hill and lay siege to the National Assembly. But without success. The Quebec police would not let them establish camp.

Social media played an important role in this crisis, helping to normalize this more radical anti-system discourse. A study of 6.7 million digital traces on X/Twitter during the Freedom Convoy movement between January and February 2022 highlighted the ability of populist ideology to spread beyond international borders. It points out that: “Influencers on X/Twitter, primarily associated with the far-right movement, created and amplified content expressing distrust of elites (Boucher et al., 2024: 13). Another analysis of publications on this social media concluded that the opinion expressed toward the demonstrators was generally favorable (Huang et al., 2022). Hoechsmann and McKee (2023) even assert that the rise of right-wing populism in Canada is the result of multiple factors, not least the way in which the anti-vax and anti-mandate movement has served to radicalize newcomers into a position opposed to that of public health authorities and mainstream opinion. In this struggle, the role of algorithm-driven online media was important.

In fact, the effects of the pandemic were not evenly distributed across the population. For example, with the development of digital telecommuting, the pandemic was easier to manage for many white-collar workers than for many blue-collar workers. It is easier to use Zoom for people doing an office work than for those who work in factory, retail or in the field. So, it should come as no surprise that truckers, essential to North America's supply chain, have become the symbols of such a crisis. Particularly as many of them had to travel to the United States, where the pandemic was, in many Republican states, managed quite differently than north of the border. Whether in Florida or in the more libertarian states, few restrictive measures were in force.

In the same way, we should not be surprised to see this type of crisis being politically recuperated. This is particularly true in a context where the “personalization of political messages is evolving, political coalition-building, including through co-optation or focus on political protest messages, is likely to continue in Canada” (Gillies et al., 2023: 11). Moreover, support for this type of populist protest is strongly correlated with partisan lines and with support for different parties (Wells, 2022). On the right, conservatives are generally more supportive of anti-vaccine protests, while on the left, for example, they are more supportive of anti-pipeline protests. This is why: “In many ways, populist politics and populist political demonstrations are institutionalized, and Canada is no exception.” (Gillies et al., 2023: 11).

So much so, that the federal government chose to use the Emergency Measures Act to resolve the crisis. While the journalistic framing presented the truckers convoy more as an expression of populism, “The government sought to identify the demonstrators associatively by their links to racism and right-wing extremism, to portray them as conventional popular devils whose opinions and actions were dangerous and unacceptable, and who acted out of anger and rage” (Knight, 2024: 88).

In 2022, the use of the state of emergency, widely supported by a majority of the population, had the effect of suspending several fundamental freedoms, including the seizure of demonstrators’ bank accounts. It also gave law-and-order forces exceptional powers. Several arrests followed. Two years later, in January 2024, the Federal Court ruled that the use of the Emergency Measures Act was unreasonable.

But what were the political consequences? Most importantly, the Covid crisis and the Freedom convoy put the role of the State on the agenda. It also illustrated inequalities in society, inequalities based on people's lifestyles. Such critics also came from the liberals ranks. In the words of Liberal MP Joel Lightbond:

«I've heard people worried that some people seem to easily, even jovially, forget that we're not all equal when it comes to confinement. That not everyone can make a living on a MacBook at the cottage.»¹⁶

It has also contributed to a change in discourse among federal Conservatives. On Parliament Hill, the Conservative caucus appears divided on the stance to take on the Freedom Convoy. Traditionally, the Conservative party has been associated with a law-and-order stance. Yet, in front of Parliament, they were facing manifestants, mainly from the West, who would naturally be associated with their electoral base. And they were talking about freedom! A real dilemma. Most conservative Quebec MPs opposed truckers and took a hard line. Many Western MPs, on the other hand, went out of their way to greet them. It must be said that Maxime Bernier's presence in support of the truckers worried them.

The aftermath of the 2021 election was already difficult for the divided Conservatives. A change of leader was imminent. Poilievre represented a clear choice. On January 27 2022, when truckers were on their way to Ottawa, he came to their defense by attacking the mainstream media. In particular, he pointed out that while the CBC is generally not concerned about demonstrations in front of Parliament when it’s from the left, the public broadcaster was this time concerned about demonstrators because they were from the right of the political spectrum.¹⁷ He went to meet and greet them as soon as they arrived in the capital two days later on January 29. In a tweet, the then finance critic for his party added that their demonstration was peaceful and patriotic. He soon received the support of former party leader and Saskatchewan MP, Andrew Scheer.

Some would say that this gesture represents the party's first turn toward a populist stance. That it was his 18 Brumaire, the moment when Napoleon decided to take control of the new French Republic and assert his authority (Bernard, 2022). The metaphor is perhaps a little strong, but this new populist positioning provoked ruptures that would materialize after Poilievre’s election as party leader. One of Quebec's star MPs, Alain Rayes, who was associated with a more moderate current in the party, resigned to sit as an independent.

Bernier and Poilievre: The Same Discourse?

With the Covid issue, Poilievre seemed to be appropriating Maxime Bernier's discourse. But to what extent? To answer that question, let's look at the two leaders’ X feeds (formally Twitter) on the Covid issue. What do these men have in common? Both politicians are associated with a more libertarian strand of Canadian conservatism. The two men also flirt with conspiracy theories. Maxime Bernier has assumed it completely since the COVID-19 crisis. Pierre Poilievre uses more the “dog whistle technique” by using coded expressions dear to conspiracy theorists without the general population necessarily realizing it. The two men are thus attacking the same segment of the electorate, the one that is more anti-system. Both men have exploited the COVID-19 crisis to mobilize their base. Their discourse regularly takes the form of a defense of freedom. They both saw freedom of speech threatened by Justin Trudeau.

On his thread, Bernier regularly denounces the authoritarian nature of anti-Covid measures and vaccines. In the spring of 2024, months after the end of the pandemic, Maxime Bernier was still attacking health measures and vaccines, talking about the authoritarian nature of Covid measures and mocking vaccines and public health authorities.

Bernier remained constant in his attacks. He even accused Poilievre of changing his tune. On Pierre Poilievre’s thread, we effectively saw an evolution in the discourse.

Pierre Poilievre's positions at the start of the pandemic were different. In 2021, he criticized Justin Trudeau's delay in closing the borders and ensuring that the vaccine were available in Canada. But, in 2022, he took Bernier's approach and said that mandatory vaccination was unscientific and discriminatory. And he even attacked Justin Trudeau for wearing a mask.

Also in 2022, his party introduced Bill C-278, An Act to prevent the imposition by the federal government of vaccination mandates for employment and travel. Although it had no chance of being passed, it sent a clear message to his supporters.¹⁸

But from late 2022 onwards, Pierre Poilievre will again adjust his pandemic rhetoric to focus his attacks on government spending in its management of the pandemic. This adjustment has the advantage of appealing to opponents of the Covid measures, while refocusing on issues of government spending and the sound management of public funds, which are at the heart of conservative values. As we will see in Chapter 5, it will also shift the focus to a more economic discourse on post-pandemic inflation.

***

What can we learn from this Freedom Convoy episode? For Pierre Poilievre, it was a defining moment. He chose not to let Maxime Bernier take the field. This had an effect not only on his eventual positioning in the race for the Conservative leadership, but also on the positioning of his party. As we have seen, unlike Maxime Bernier, he was able to adapt his discourse so that it would remain relevant even when the pandemic was over.

As for Justin Trudeau, his desire to politicize vaccination has not had the desired effect. And it even provoked grumbling among his party. As for the NDP, they were relatively absent from these debates. The pandemic also highlighted certain disparities in lifestyle and allowed Pierre Poilievre to develop a new discourse targeting blue-collar workers. His favorite subject remained the cost of living and the economic stress imposed by the Trudeau government on ordinary citizens. He argued that ordinary people suffer, while the elites live comfortably despite the crisis.

But the COVID-19 crisis was also significant in terms of the ability of extremist groups to insert themselves into the national political debate. According to Stephanie Carvin, a former national security official in Canada who now teaches at Carleton University: “'The biggest misconception about this, even within Canada, is that extremists have infiltrated the movement,”’ adding that: “this was an extremist movement that got mainstream attention.”¹⁹

Are “The airing of populist grievances through coordinated acts of honking and idling” the expression of a lasting change that hides a broader extremist agenda? (Zaiontz, 2024). In a wide-ranging study of the various forms of far-right extremism in Canada, Leman-Langlois et al., (2024) debunked the perception propagated by most politicians that the phenomenon of far-right extremism is an imported activism financed elsewhere. They tried to understand its vast and urgent homegrown challenges. For them, “ events such as the Freedom Convoy are representative of where the far right is going, how it is recruiting, how it is communicating internally and with Canadians at large, and how it is progressing in the national political discourse.”²⁰

On a collective level, the COVID crisis has allowed a critical attitude toward political institutions and the media to spread and develop among a sizeable segment of the population (Nadeau & Geoffroy, 2022). The effect of the pandemic has also contributed to the transformation of social media, where conspiracy theories proliferated, while undermining the civility of the political debate. Canada was no exception. In 2023, Justin Trudeau even accused Pierre Poilievre and new Twitter owner (now X), Elon Musk, of collaborating to undermine confidence in CBC public television.²¹ A year and a few months later, he announced his resignation.

Footnotes

1

This law is the heir to the War Measures Act. Coincidentally, it was last used by Justin Trudeau's father during the October crisis of 1970, when, like we saw in Chapter 3, a small terrorist group, the Front de libération du Québec, kidnapped two dignitaries, a British consul and a Quebec government minister who died in captivity.

2

Blatchford, A. Trudeau injects vaccine hesitancy into spotlight of Canadian election, Politico, August 15, 2021. (https://​www.​politico.​com/​news/​2021/​08/​15/​trudeau-canada-election-vaccine-hesitancy-504938).

3

Wherry, A., Conservatives hitch their wagons to the convoy protest without knowing where it's going, CBC, February 1,2022. (https://​www.​cbc.​ca/​news/​politics/​poilievre-conservative-otoole-convoy-vaccine-mandate-1.​6335286).

4

Tanguay, S. À bord avec Big et Rambo vers le parlement, Le Devoir, February 4, 2022. (https://​www.​ledevoir.​com/​societe/​669810/​a-bord-avec-big-et-rambo).

5

Lapointe, P., Perte de confiance en la science: les racines du problème, Science Presse, October 1, 2019. (https://​www.​sciencepresse.​qc.​ca/​actualite/​2019/​10/​01/​perte-confiance-science-racines-probleme#:​~:​text=​Plus%20​de%20​quatre%20​Canadiens%20​sur,ordre%20​du%20​jour%20​du%20​gouvernement.).

6

Canada Foundation for Innovation, https://​www.​innovation.​ca/​fr/​nouvelles/​sondage-national-revele-que-plupart-jeunes-adultes-ont-confiance-science.

7

Radio-Canada, Le chef conservateur Éric Duhaime expulsé d'une commission parlementaire, August 26, 2021. (https://​ici.​radio-canada.​ca/​nouvelle/​1819521/​duhaime-expulsion-commission-vaccination-obligatoire).

8

TVA nouvelles, Entrée en vigueur du passeport vaccinal: Éric Duhaime annule sa tournée du Québec, Journal de Québec, August 31, 2022. (https://​www.​journaldequebec.​com/​2021/​08/​31/​eric-duhaime-annule-sa-tournee-du-quebec-1).

9

Lecavalier, C., Éric Duhaime demande la levée des restrictions sanitaires, La Presse, January, 19, 2022.

(https://​www.​lapresse.​ca/​actualites/​politique/​2022-01-19/​eric-duhaime-demande-la-levee-des-restrictions-sanitaires.​php).

10

Richardson, L. Danielle Smith and the Alberta Version of Tactical Populism, Policy/Canadian Politics and Public Policy. (https://​www.​policymagazine.​ca/​danielle-smith-and-the-alberta-version-of-tactical-populism/​).

11

Dryden, J., In resurfaced video, Danielle Smith said the vaccinated fell for ‘charms of a tyrant’ referencing Adolf Hitler, CBC, May,2023. (https://​www.​cbc.​ca/​news/​canada/​calgary/​danielle-smith-adolf-hitler-netflix-rachel-notley-1.​6836160).

12

Conservative Party of Canada, https://​www.​conservative.​ca/​pierre-poilievre/​.

13

Marquis, M. « Convoi de la fête du Canada « Pierre Poilievre se dissocie d’un convoi, mais pas de sa cause, La Presse, June 21, 2022. (https://​www.​lapresse.​ca/​actualites/​politique/​2022-06-21/​convoi-de-la-fete-du-canada/​pierre-poilievre-se-dissocie-d-un-convoi-mais-pas-de-sa-cause.​php).

14

Lawton, A., Pierre Poilievre says he’s running on cost of living and freedom, True North. March 11, 2022. (https://​tnc.​news/​2022/​03/​11/​pierre-poilievre-says-hes-running-on-cost-of-living-and-freedom/​).

15

Taylor, S, Poilievre's pitch to defund CBC, keep French services would require change in law, CBC, April 14, 2023. (https://​www.​cbc.​ca/​news/​politics/​poilievre-defund-cbc-change-law-1.​6810434).

16

TVA nouvelles, Le fédéral critiqué: 5 déclarations surprenantes de Joël Lightbound, Journal de Montréal, February 8, 2022 (https://​www.​journaldemontrea​l.​com/​2022/​02/​08/​le-federal-critique-5-declarations-surprenantes-de-joel-lightbound-1).

17

Dzsurdzsa, D., Poilievre tells reporters truckers “have kept all of you alive for the last two years”, True North, January 27, 2022. (https://​tnc.​news/​2022/​01/​27/​poilievre-tells-reporters-truckers-have-kept-all-of-you-alive-for-the-last-two-years/​).

18

House of Commons of Canada, https://​www.​parl.​ca/​legisinfo/​en/​bill/​44-1/​c-278?​view=​progress.

19

Fisher, M., Convoy Provides Moment for Canada's Far Right. New York Times, February 8, 2022. (https://​go.​gale.​com/​ps/​i.​do?​id=​GALE%7CA692360043&​sid=​googleScholar&​v=​2.​1&​it=​r&​linkaccess=​abs&​issn=​03624331&​p=​AONE&​sw=​w&​userGroupName=​anon%7Eb44550d3&​aty=​open-web-entry).

20

Leman-Langlois, S., A. Campana and S. Tanner, The Growth and Evolution of the Far Right in Canada, The Tyee, November 19, 2024. (https://​thetyee.​ca/​Analysis/​2024/​11/​19/​Growth-Evolution-Far-Right-Canada/​).

21

Scherer, S. Trudeau, Poilievre clash over Twitter tagging CBC as ‘government funded’, Global News, April 17, 2023 (https://​globalnews.​ca/​news/​9629663/​trudeau-poilievre-cbc-twitter/​).

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2025

E. MontignyPopulism in CanadaPalgrave Studies in Populismshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-89134-2_5

5. On Economy: A Quest for the Working-Class Electorate

Eric Montigny1  

(1)

Political Science, Université Laval, Québec, QC, Canada

Eric Montigny

Email: eric.montigny@pol.ulaval.ca

Abstract

In this chapter, after take stock of the evolution of the Canadian economy, we analyze Poilievre’s economic message. He attacks the financial and globalist elite. By suggesting that Justin Trudeau was not affected by a declining purchasing power, he also argued that the Prime minister was unlike ordinary people. Being a member of a privileged elite, Trudeau was said to have no problems paying his bills, like ordinary people do. During his leadership campaign, Poilievre also regularly promoted freedom for bitcoin users, another nod to conspiracy theorists. The Conservative leader exploited growing inflation, using a #Justinflation hashtag online and in the House of Commons to directly attack and define Justin Trudeau. By attacking the economical elites, Poilievre was also courting a unionized electorate and hunting on NDP turf. This marks a major shift in Conservative strategy. To take power under Stephen Harper, the Conservatives needed a strong NDP to split the progressive electorate with the Liberals. Instead, Pierre Poilievre wants to go after NDP votes to overtake the Liberals. Sensing such danger, it will be explained that the NDP tried to protect its base.

Keywords

PopulismCanadaThe working-classEconomyCrisisAnti-eliteAnti-globalistCost of livingJustin TrudeauConservativesNDP

“It's the economy stupid!” Jim Carville, an advisor to former US President Bill Clinton, popularized this phrase, which sums up the political dynamic that favors a change of government when the economic situation is more difficult for the electorate. When he was first elected in 2015, Justin Trudeau’s campaign was positive and optimistic. His victory was based on hope and in tune with the electorate. The economy was booming, but the wear and tear of the Harper government had taken its toll.

In 2024, Pierre Poilievre was hammering home a different message. From rally to rally, and in the House of Commons, he repeated that Canada was broken. According to one poll, this message had percolated through the electorate: 70% agreed that Canada was broken. In the last years, economic stress rose in the Canadian electorate. For pollster Darrel Bricker, Poilievre was:

«capturing a mood. It's not something that Pierre Poilievre has created. He adds that over the past 35 years, it's the worst outlook he's seen and that “people do not feel like they're succeeding in life these days, as they should be.” But younger Canadians ... they're the ones who are saying, ‘You know, it's not working for me’»¹

In a June 2024 exchange in the House of Commons between Trudeau and Poilievre on the Canadian economy, the Conservative leader harshly criticized his opponent's policies. Thus:

«Calling Trudeau's economic policies “wackonomics,” Poilievre lambasted Trudeau over the affordability crisis, adding Canadians are “living through hell.” “The middle class doesn't exist [anymore]” Poilievre added.»²

When it comes to the economy, public opinion seemed to agree with him. In the summer of 2024, Poilievre was becoming increasingly credible against Trudeau. In barely a year, he widened the gap with the Liberal leader, becoming the first choice of 30%, compared to 19% for Trudeau. The gap was just 3% a year earlier.³

In this chapter, we will try to understand how Poilievre's economic message is articulated. Poilievre attacks the financial and globalist elite. By suggesting that Justin Trudeau was not affected by a declining purchasing power, he argued that the Prime minister was unlike ordinary people. Being a member of a privileged elite, Trudeau was said to have no problems paying his bills, like ordinary people do. During his leadership campaign, Poilievre also regularly promoted freedom for bitcoin users, another nod to conspiracy theorists. The Conservative leader exploited growing inflation, using a #Justinflation hashtag online and in the House of Commons to directly attack and define Justin Trudeau.

By attacking the economical elites, Poilievre was also courting a unionized electorate and hunting on NDP turf. This marks a major shift in Conservative strategy. To take power under Stephen Harper, the Conservatives needed a strong NDP to split the progressive electorate with the Liberals. Instead, Pierre Poilievre wants to go after NDP votes to overtake the Liberals. Sensing such danger, it will be explained that the NDP tried to protect its base. But first, it is important to quickly take stock of the evolution of the Canadian economy.

A Slowing Economy

In political science, theories have been developed to understand and study the link between electoral behavior and economic conditions. The theory of the Economic vote is the most widely cited in this body of literature. The rise of populism is also linked to economic changes, largely in connection with the growth of inequality. Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz even criticized Barack Obama for having mismanaged the response to the crisis that devastated the American economy in 2008, at the very start of his presidency.⁴ Stiglitz also blamed Obama for indirectly paving the way for Donald Trump.

The Economic vote theory assumes that voters’ perception of the economy is linked to their electoral choice. Of course, there are many factors influencing the electorate's vote. Partisan identity is one of them, but depending on the context, the state of the economy, good or bad, would have an impact on an incumbent government's ability to win or lose reelection. For example, the effect of the economic vote on the outgoing government is much greater (Dassonneville & Lewis-Beck, 2014). Conversely, opposition parties will try to blacken the government's economic record as much as possible in order to rack up the most votes.

The rise of populism in the West can also be explained by growing inequalities, disadvantaging working-class people. These inequalities are claimed to have been fueled by the internationalization of trade and technological development, which have undermined the fabric of manufacturing industries, and the high-paying jobs associated with it in developed countries, while increasing the productivity of capital. Economist Robert Gold explains this phenomenon as follows:

«Over the past decades, the labor share in national income has continuously declined in developed economies. Thus, income inequalities between factor owners of labor and capital have increased. (...) Simultaneously, inequalities increased within the labor income group. Demand for high-skilled labor increased, while less-skilled workers suffered from job and wage losses.» (Gold, 2020).

In his book on populism, former Conservative leader Stephen Harper (2018) points out that the economic crisis of 2008 was far less severe than those experienced elsewhere in the world, in part because his government chose to invest massively to save the Canadian automotive sector. He also argues that unlike the United States, the Canadian banking system remained largely regulated. But Stephen Harper also insists on the success of conservative policies to internalize trade while admitting that this was done at the expense of many blue-collar workers. For him, the electoral key for the Conservatives to take power back relies on their ability to offer a new populist discourse to reach those workers. And to do this, it is necessary to have a discourse that resonates with people who have a local grounding: the “somewhere.” This means abandoning the discourse of globalization that appeals to those for whom borders hold no significance: the “anywhere.”

But when it comes to the growth of inequality in Canada, we are not experiencing the same phenomenon as in the United States. Figure 5.1 shows the evolution of the Gini index in Canada and the United States over the last fifty years. The closer the value is to zero, the more egalitarian the distribution of income. Conversely, the closer the value is to 100, the greater the income distribution. It shows that until the 1980s, the United States had relatively similar situations. Over time, however, a more unequal situation developed in the United States, while in Canada, the index remained stable or even improved. So much so, that by 2019, there would be a 10-percentage point gap in favor of Canada. The more marked growth in inequality may help to explain a stronger surge for populism south of the border.

Fig. 5.1

Evolution of the Gini Index Canada-USA (1970–2019).

Source World Bank (https://​data.​worldbank.​org/​indicator/​SI.​POV.​GINI?​_​gl=​1%2Auy8iln%2A_​gcl_​au%2AODcxOTY2NDA3Lj​E3MjQ3MDIxOTk.​&​contextual=​region&​locations=​CA)

However, voters’ concerns about the future of the Canadian economy were on the rise. An analysis of Canadian data from the World Value Survey shows that the indicators shifted in 2020, a first in several years. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 illustrate the rise in economic concerns. After years of stability, more people are dissatisfied with their personal financial situation. The number of dissatisfied reached 20% in 2020, doubling that of 2006. Is this an effect of the pandemic? At the same time, there has been an important rise in concern about the rising cost of living. In 2020, it appeared to be the priority of 3 out of 10 respondents, also doubling the rate observed in 2006. And this trend has certainly continued with the steady rise in inflation.

Fig. 5.2

Financial satisfaction

Fig. 5.3

Which one of these things would you say is most important?

While we await the results of the new WVS wave, let's examine some more recent survey data from Statistics Canada, which studied the situation of households in the wake of the pandemic. The federal agency observed a major effect of inflation on the cost of living, particularly when it comes to food and housing. Thus:

«While headline inflation eased in the second half of 2022, there were few signs that key sources of upward pressure on prices-primarily food and shelter-were losing steam. While home prices have fallen considerably from peak levels, housing affordability has deteriorated as mortgage interest costs have increased. Mortgage interest costs rose 18% in the 12-month period ending December 2022 and put strong pressure on the inflation rate in recent months.»⁵

A few months later, Canadians’ perceptions had not improved: “In spring 2024, nearly half (45%) of Canadians reported that rising prices were greatly affecting their ability to meet day-to-day expenses, 12 percentage points higher than what it was two years earlier (33%).”⁶ Another survey conducted in 2024 indicated that “71% of Canadian workers say rising cost of living is increasing faster than their income.”⁷

As Fig. 5.4 illustrates, the combination of inflation and the increase in interest rates set by the Bank of Canada to curb it have had a dual effect on the economic situation of many households.

Fig. 5.4

Canadian annual inflation rate and Bank of Canada’s interest rate: before and after the pandemic (until January 2024).

Source https://​ici.​radio-canada.​ca/​rci/​en/​news/​2044169/​no-change-on-interest-rate-as-bank-of-canada-sticks-to-5

To complete this picture, it is important to stress that, after several years of labor shortages in several sectors and full employment in many parts of the country, 2024 marked a return to a rising unemployment environment. Young people aged 15–24 were particularly hard hit. At 12.8%, they are twice as likely as their elders to be looking for work. Excluding the pandemic years of 2020 and 2021, we must go back to 2016 to see an unemployment rate this high.⁸ Unemployment among recent immigrants was also on the rise in 2024. At 12.6%, it was up 4 points on the previous year.⁹ As we will see in Chapter 7, this major change in the labor market has even forced the federal government to drastically reduce the number of temporary foreign workers allowed to come to Canada.¹⁰ For the Liberals, who are traditionally open to immigration, this was seen as an important policy shift.

At the same time, the federal government's financial situation has deteriorated. Justin Trudeau's Liberals had overtaken the NDP on the left in 2015 by not promising to balance the budget. The pandemic, however, has seen spending explode. Added to this were new social programs (dental and drugs insurance, affordable daycare), introduced in connection with the agreement signed with the NDP. As a result, the net debt has risen from around $700 billion in 2015 to $1.3 trillion in 2024. As a percentage of GDP, the federal debt has risen from 31 to 42%.¹¹

Anti-elite, Anti-globalist Rhetoric

Under Stephen Harper and Brian Mulroney, the Conservatives were great champions of open markets and free trade agreements. The free trade agreement with the United States was the main issue of the 1988 election campaign, which brought Brian Mulroney back to power with an increased majority in the face of Liberal and NDP opposition to the treaty. Later, it became NAFTA to include Mexico.

And that was only the beginning. Under Stephen Harper, market openness increased considerably, particularly with European Union countries. On the sidelines of the 2015 election campaign, Stephen Harper provides the following assessment:

«When we took office, we had free trade agreements with only 5 countries. Our government will have improved that record to 51 countries.»¹²

Among these agreements, one was a free trade agreement with Ukraine. Paradoxically, in 2023, the Conservatives led by Pierre Poilievre voted against its implementation, saying they were in favor of the principle of free trade but against this agreement's carbon tax terms. This position came as a surprise. Liberals were quick to challenge the Conservatives’ motives, saying it was just a pretext for courting opponents of Western military support for Ukraine, like some American Republicans.¹³

Officially, Conservatives support the Ukrainians in their war against Russia. Maxime Bernier, however, does not. On X, Bernier regularly associates Poilievre with Trudeau by defining them as two members of the globalizing elite. In those tweets, like many US populists, Bernier speaks out against support for Ukraine in its war against the Russian invader. For example, on tweets (now X) dating from June 2023, the leader of the People's party said he was defending Canada first! With images of Poilievre and Trudeau carrying the Ukrainian flag, he accused them of spending Canadians’ money on a foreign war.

In 2023, at the heart of his leadership campaign, Pierre Poilievre was not shy about attacking Ottawa's elites and promising to make them accountable for the harm they inflict on people in their daily lives. A rather surprising statement for a former Ottawa-area MP…

His rhetoric was based on the existence of two Canadas. One for elites like Justin Trudeau, who are doing just fine despite the crisis. A second for the other people who do the work and struggle to pay for housing, groceries, and gas. According to this logic, a certain elite was profiting from the crisis on the backs of a class of Canadians. This fits in a narrative to define Justin Trudeau, who was born into a wealthy, powerful family and has never had any financial worries. Even before Justin Trudeau's resignation, Pierre Poilievre had begun his attacks on his potential successor Mark Carney. A former director of the Bank of Canada, then the Bank of England, he has had no hesitation in defining him as a member of the global economic elite.

But Poilievre's criticisms of the time weren't just aimed at individuals. He also attacked globalizing or secretive elites. He thus stirred up conspiracy theorists about the economic international system, notably by criticizing the Davos summit. By attacking the Bank of Canada or promoting crypto currencies, it could be argued that he revived old Social credit’s theories (see Chap. 2) with a 2.0 twist. Afterwards, by attacking lobbies, it could also be argued that he was additionally attacking a shadow power… On Davos, his positions contrasted with his party's past. Stephen Harper, his mentor, used to attend such events. Nevertheless, Poilievre had some harsh words for the participants on X formally Twitter. For him, the Davos elites were the enemies of the working people…

In a 2022 press release, the leadership candidate praised cryptocurrency. Thus: “A Poilievre government would welcome this new, decentralized, bottom-up economy and allow people to take control of their money from bankers and politicians.”¹⁴ He used the issue to distance people from banks and monetary policy. He even held public events where he paid for services or made a charitable donation in bitcoin. This promotion of cryptocurrency was risky, however, as every fluctuation in the digital currency gave ammunition to his opponents. When he became leader, he stopped using this theme.

During the leadership race, Poilievre was also highly critical of the Bank of Canada. Canadian tradition dictates that the independence of the institution charged with ensuring the country's economic stability must be respected and its apolitical character maintained. Instead, Poilievre chooses to attack its governor directly. To the applause of conservative activists, he declared: “I would replace him with a new governor who would reinstate our low-inflation mandate, protect the purchasing power of our dollar, and honor the working people who earned those dollars.”¹⁵ In addition to threatening to fire the bank governor, he accused him of being a puppet of Justin Trudeau and the government's ATM.

A few months later, however, the new Conservative leader chose a new target. Since then, he has been attacking lobbyists, whom he considers useless. Against them, he presents himself as a defender of the people: “When I'm PM, if you want any of your policy agenda pushed forward, you're going to have to convince not just me but the people of Canada.”¹⁶ It should be noted that this did not prevent him from meeting them, notably at fundraising party events.¹⁷

On economic issues Poilievre chose to target his message directly against the elites. Those elite, whether political in Ottawa or economic at the national or international level, are said to be enriching themselves at the expense of hardworking people. In this way, he adopts a discourse more akin to that of a NDP politician. But as he moved closer to power, he shifted the focus of his attacks to lobbyists. What is his common thread? He stands on the side of the people against an elite that seeks to capture as many resources as possible at the expense of the working class. This is a far cry from the type of conservatism of previous leaders, who advocated the opening and liberalization of markets.

#Justinflation: Catalyzing Anger on the Rise of Cost of Living

Being able to define yourself and your opponent is one of the keys to success in politics. And if, in addition, you can ensure that the political debate takes place on an issue that you've identified as promising, you'll maximize your chances of winning. Regarding inflation and the cost of living, this is exactly what Pierre Poilievre has succeeded in doing.

Even before he entered the Conservative leadership race, as his party’s financial critics, Poilievre managed to impose a label on Justin Trudeau. Here's the essence of his argument:

«The more the government spends, the more Canadians pay. (...) That is why we have the highest inflation rate in 40 years. It is 'Justinflation.»¹⁸

Combining the Prime Minister's first name with the word inflation was a home run in both country’s official languages. Veteran political columnist Emmanuelle Latraverse summed up this instant success: “In the world of 30-s social media politics, the new Conservative leader's witticism has literally become a formidable weapon.”¹⁹

These excerpts from a press release by Pierre Poilievre are an example of the type of framing the Conservatives imposed in response to the Bank of Canada's interest rate hike:

«Today, thanks to JustinFlation, the Bank of Canada hiked interest rates another 0.5%. With this oversized hike, Canadians are paying thousands more for their mortgages, loans, and Justin Trudeau's debt. Many Canadians are just hanging on by a thread, this hike will push Canadians even further over the edge. People are borrowing more to eat, to heat their homes, to put gas in their cars, and to pay their mortgages. (...) “Our team has a plan to tackle JustinFlation. (...) It's time to bring “common cents” back to Ottawa.»²⁰

Note also the recurring allusion to common sense, this time with the pun “common cents.”

With this simple formula, Justin Trudeau became responsible for the rising cost of living. Justinflation has even become an established expression on Wiktionary. Its etymology is presented as a “blend of Justin + inflation” and the expression is defined as follows:“(Canada, politics, derogatory) Inflation attributed to the economic policies or spending of the government of Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau.”²¹ Even stickers have appeared on Amazon…

The Conservatives hammered the message on several platforms. A TV campaign was broadcasted.

«Who will pay for Trudeau's inflation? Yes, all of us. Trudeau: he's not worth the cost,” can be heard and read at the very end of the advert.»²²

Social media were also used extensively. On X (formerly twitter), the hashtag #Justinflation went viral. It was even a key element in Poilievre membership recruitment during his leadership race.

During 2022, in the space of a few months, the Conservatives had, according to a journalistic analysis of the transcripts of proceedings, hammered out the expression Justinflation more than a hundred times in the House of Commons.²³ So much so, in fact, that the Speaker of the House attempted to put an end to this ploy on the grounds that the Standing Orders prohibit a member from referring to another elected official by name. To continue, they would pause between syllables to make two words “just inflation.”

And a crisis within a crisis was exploited by the new Conservative leader: housing. Rising rent and mortgage costs linked to rising interest rates, rent shortages linked to population growth (which we will discuss in Chap. 7), all the ingredients were there for a perfect storm. A video in which Pierre Poilievre takes an educational tone to explain the reasons for the crisis and his “common sense” solutions quickly went viral.²⁴

In his speech, he blamed rising housing costs on Justin Trudeau: “This is happening because Justin Trudeau subsidizes government gatekeepers and red tape that prevents builders from getting shovels in the ground and our people into homes they can afford.”²⁵ This allowed him to take ownership of the issue and appeal to a more urban electorate.²⁶ Strategically, he has even succeeded in taking over the housing issue, an issue that has traditionally been associated with the left.

As the rise in inflation slowed down, the expression Justinflation was less used. But the damage was done. It succeeded in politically wounding a Prime minister by helping to define and associate him with a central concern of the electorate.

When the Conservatives Hunt on the NDP's Turf

As we saw in Chapter 1, the separation of society into two groups—people versus elites—is one of the key characteristics of a populist stance. Using Stephen Harper’s playbook with the precision of a clock, Pierre Poilievre systematically places himself on the side of the people in his communications. More specifically, these people are referred to as the “working-class.”

By referring to the working class in this Tweet, Poilievre implies that he is on their side, fighting elites who are also against them. Using the “dog whistle” technique, he also uses the conspiracy term “gatekeeper” to blast the media elites. Journalists are thus defined as professionals being biased intermediaries, between him and the people, managing access to information.

In another post on X, while defending the working class in the context of inflation, he was also careful to link the Liberal record to the NDP, insisting on their parliamentary alliance. By presenting himself as the standard-bearer of the working class, he appropriates a discourse historically carried to the left by the NDP. And this alliance made it even easier for him to attack the NDP. He could claim to be the only one defending the working class against an elite of politicians who have colluded to wield power. To use a hockey analogy, the NDP has left its net wide open. And Poilievre seized the opportunity.

Moreover, he is not shy about breaking ties with the classic Conservative pitch to the business community. For example, meeting the Vancouver Board of Trade, he repeated that, as Prime minister, his “daily obsession will be about what is good for the working-class people of this country.”²⁷

But what does this mean? Who is the working class? Several definitions are possible. In politics, like the concept of middle class used by Trudeau in 2015, it is an elastic term toward which many voters can relate. And as such, politicians have no interest in defining it precisely. Let's give it a try. The Cambridge dictionary offers this definition: “a social group that consists of people who earn little money, often being paid only for the hours or days that they work, and who usually do physical work.”

The definition of Kim Siever, a self-described left-leaning journalist from Alberta, is more encompassing. Here it is:

«The working class is pretty much all those who don't own the means of production, who don't own the land, labor, capital, and entrepreneurship that creates the goods and services. Often, they comprise the labour factor of production.»²⁸

From a socio-demographic point of view, it would be wrong to imagine that working-class people are just white men working in a factory. As the Canadian labor market evolved toward more and more service jobs, we can see the working class also include many women, immigrants, and those with lower wages. This made these workers even more vulnerable to inflation.²⁹

Regardless of the definition, it is easy for many individuals to identify with this umbrella concept. Even owners of small businesses or farmers could consider themselves as hardworking victims of inflation. To this end, this concept only seems to exclude wealthy big entrepreneurs, speculators, or a few rich and privileged families.

Choosing to target the NDP's electoral base by appropriating the label of defender of the working class did not go without risk for the Conservatives. It required adjustments in terms of public positions, particularly in the face of Poilievre’s past stances, which were seen as rather hostile by the labor movement. The turnaround was major. In the winter of 2024, against all odds, the Conservatives voted for the anti-scab bill. This new law prohibits the use of replacement workers in federally regulated industries. Passed unanimously on the initiative of the NDP, it was quickly denounced by the Canadian Chamber of Commerce.

But this new positioning seemed to be paying off. Polls conducted in 2024 indicated that “10 per cent of those who voted NDP in 2021 now support Poilievre's CPC.”³⁰ And analyses of the Conservatives’ pre-campaign strategy revealed two elements: “Conservative Leader Pierre Poilievre's path to power may be by prosecuting Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's past eight years in government, but his road to victory is painted NDP orange.”³¹

In addition to targeting his message at the working class, the Conservative leader multiplied his tours and activities in ridings historically held by the NDP. This was particularly true in industrial ridings, notably in Northern Ontario. To illustrate this change, and the reactions it provoked on the ground, a Radio-Canada journalist conducted interviews with workers traditionally associated with the NDP.³² To better understand the phenomenon, it is worth relaying them.

One of the workers pointed out that partisan loyalty to the NDP is declining:

«My father's whole family voted NDP (...) My grandfather, my father, his brothers, they were always blue-collar workers, union workers. It was normal for them to vote NDP. But now, that's changing.»

One worker also pointed to a generational renewal effect:

«Unions are still strong, but not as important as they were in the 1990s and 2000s. Work habits have changed, as have mentalities. The baby-boomers are retiring, and the young people are coming in.»

A young mechanic seduced by Poilievre's style of political communication, who doesn't usually go out to vote, explained:

«I watch Poilievre's videos against Trudeau on TikTok. It's hilarious! It's practically a comedy show. He's not shy about saying what he thinks of him. And Trudeau always has a silly answer to Poilievre's questions. In the next election, he'll probably vote for Poilievre.»

And what did he see in Poilievre?

«He's got potential. Anyway, it can't get any worse. The country's deep in debt. If nothing changes, something's going to give at some point!»

While shaking hands with workers, Poilievre repeats his message:

«The NDP has forgotten who it should be working for! It should be working for the world, for people.»

Simply put, he argues that the NDP is not there for you anymore. This strategy is no accident. It is the result of real thinking. Poilievre is methodically applying what Stephen Harper was already targeting in his 2018 book. In 2024, the new Conservative populism is transformed into a political offer as well as concrete and targeted proposals aimed at responding to real problems experienced by workers and middle-class voters. In practice, winning back enough electors to regain power is largely achieved by hunting down lands and circles traditionally favored by the NDP. In this context, stirring up the new rift between intellectuals and workers that is fracturing the left on many issues is not pointless.

The NPD Strikes Back

Jagmeet Singh could not let Poilievre rob him of a portion of his electorate without flinching. By signing a government agreement with Justin Trudeau to implement new pan-Canadian social programs, the NDP expected to reap the rewards of implementing these measures with a more left-leaning electorate. Yet reality was not so simple. Firstly, since these programs were not implemented quickly, the benefits perceived by voters were mixed. But also, since these new programs are being implemented with resistance from several provinces, who are opposed to the federal government encroaching on their areas of jurisdiction.

After Poilievre became the leader of the official opposition, the NDP was put on the defensive. It was quickly perceived as reacting to the new Conservative rhetoric, while Pierre Poilievre was positioning himself as a clear alternative to Justin Trudeau. This stance made it easier for Conservatives to unite those who wanted a change of government.

But on X (formerly twitter), Jagmeet Singh tried to undo Pierre Poilievre's new pro-worker image. Using a language associated with left-wing populism, he accused Poilievre of not opposing “corporate greed” and of not being a true “friend of workers.” Recalling past Conservative positions, he added that, unlike him, Poilievre never shows up on picket lines with workers.

The NDP leader also insisted on the Conservatives’ anti-union history. On this front, the left-wing party benefits from the help of some union leaders. “Poilievre is a ‘fraud’ for portraying himself as a friend of the working class.” said the president of the country's largest union, the Canadian Labour Congress. Before the October 2025 election, he added: “We must do everything in our power to expose Mr. Pierre Poilievre for the fraud that he is. (…) We must be under no illusions.”³³

Other NDP officials also tried to associate Pierre Poilievre with Justin Trudeau. For example, NDP MP Niki Ashton repeated that “while Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Poilievre have little in common, they are both ‘just in bed with their corporate buddies.’”³⁴ In short, Justin Trudeau and Pierre Poilievre may have had different styles, but in reality, they depend on the same economic elites.

On economic issues, NPD populist rhetoric went into overdrive. Rather than attacking Justin Trudeau as Poilievre did, Singh targeted the profits of big business. Thus: “NDP Leader Jagmeet Singh's recent political rhetoric, characterized by populist attacks on the “ultra-rich” and big corporations like grocery chains, particularly Loblaws, is indicative of a strategy meant to resonate with the economic frustrations of many Canadians.”³⁵

In connection with post-pandemic inflation and corporate profits, the NDP developed its own hashtag on social media: #greedflation. Despite this new spin, it has not made as much of an impression as the Conservatives’ #justinflation. The Observatory of populism in Canada has compiled the number of times “justinflation”/“#justinflation” and “greedflation”/ “#greedflation” were used on X (Twitter) by the party from October 2021 to July 2023. Empirically, it showed a lower weight of the NDP hashtag. (Krakoff & Vivès, 2024).

***

In the wake of the pandemic, the economic situation and the concerns of a large part of the electorate about their own personal finances changed dramatically. This change generated a great deal of concern and anger among a large part of the electorate. Channeling this anger toward Justin Trudeau created a space for Pierre Poilievre's ideas. This context also facilitated the transition of his party's discourse to a populist rhetoric, the strategy proposed by Stephen Harper long before the pandemic. Over the months, however, the new Conservative leader has been careful to tone down any statements that might be associated with conspiracy theories.

Nevertheless, by targeting a clientele once loyal to the NDP, the Conservatives were taking a risk. That of alienating their own electoral base. The rising cost of living and the housing crisis provided a favorable context for the Conservatives to reposition themselves. But this change has not prevented the party from maintaining its anti-federal spending rhetoric, associating a one of the main causes behind inflation. This new positioning created a new headache for the NDP. Now on the defensive, the party defended its strongholds. Furthermore, this may have triggered a populist spiral where, to counter Poilievre's populist rhetoric, the NDP used a more assertive populist rhetoric on economic issues.

To kick off the political hostilities of the fall of 2024, Poilievre decided to attack Jagmeet Singh even more directly. To provoke an election, he called him “Sellout @theJagmeetSingh” and accused him of upholding the NDP's deal with the Trudeau government “to secure his pension.” Proof that Poilievre’s hunt for NDP voters continues unabated. And this time, with #SelloutSingh, he even more clearly adopted a technique favored by Donald Trump: that of attaching an insult to his opponent's name.

A few days later, Jagmeeth Singh tore up his deal with the Liberals, saying that “the fight for the middle class” was beginning against the Conservative leader. The video explaining his change of heart takes on a populist tone. The title: It's the People's time.”

This populist tone also rung loudly on the left by attacking Justin Trudeau and portraying him as a puppet of big corporations and CEOs. A little less than a year before the scheduled end of the Liberal-NDP parliamentary coalition agreement, the Conservative attacks on the NDP paid off. The liberal government was back in the minority situation. The Conservative positioning has provoked populist one-upmanship from the NDP.

Paradoxically, it is another populist that threatens the Conservative’s narrative regarding the economy. The reelection of Donald Trump has turned Canadian political dynamics on its head. Just when the path to power seemed clear, the imposition of US tariffs on Canadian products, coupled with the populist president's declarations that Canada should become the 51st US state, made life difficult for the Conservative leader. At a time when the Canadian and American economies are highly integrated, Donald Trump's economic nationalism risks provoking another major and prolonged recession. In the public arena, the big bad threatening Canadians’ wallets would no longer be the Liberal government, but the American president. Faced with an erratic and unpredictable Donald Trump, fear replaced anger in the electorate.

One might also conclude that Pierre Poilievre is a victim of his own success. By hitting the target, the Conservatives succeeded in bringing down Justin Trudeau just a few months before the election, depriving him of an electoral duel with Poilievre. This enabled the Liberals to embody a message of change with a new leader at the helm.

Footnotes

1

Izri, T., 7 in 10 Canadians say they feel the country is ‘broken’: Ipsos poll, Global News, June 2, 2024. (https://​globalnews.​ca/​news/​10592359/​ipsos-polling-canada-broken/​).

2

Global News, Youtube, https://​www.​youtube.​com/​watch?​v=​5eLtdDYzF3w.

3

Hertzberg, E., Poilievre extends lead over Trudeau as best economic manager for Canada, poll finds, Financial Times, July 9, 2024. (https://​financialpost.​com/​news/​economy/​tory-leader-widens-gap-over-trudeau-on-economy-in-canada-poll).

4

Gruda, A, Les inégalités ont nourri le populisme, croit le Prix Nobel d’économie, La Presse, April 30, 2019. (https://​www.​lapresse.​ca/​international/​etats-unis/​2019-04-30/​les-inegalites-ont-nourri-le-populisme-croit-le-prix-nobel-d-economie).

5

Statistics Canada, https://​www.​statcan.​gc.​ca/​o1/​en/​plus/​3216-look-canadas-economy-and-society-three-years-after-start-pandemic.

6

Statistics Canada, https://​www150.​statcan.​gc.​ca/​n1/​daily-quotidien/​240815/​dq240815b-eng.​htm.

7

Benefits Canada, 71% of Canadian workers say rising cost of living is increasing faster than their income: survey, February 8, 2024. (https://​www.​benefitscanada.​com/​news/​bencan/​71-of-canadian-workers-say-rising-cost-of-living-is-increasing-faster-than-their-income-survey/​#:​~:​text=​their%20​income%3A%20​survey-,71%25%20​of%20​Canadian%20​workers%20​say%20​rising%20​cost%20​of%20​living%20​is,faster%20​than%20​their%20​income%3A%20​survey&​text=​Nearly%20​three%2Dquarters%20​(71%20​per,to%20​a%20​survey%20​by%20​Scotiabank).

8

Statistics Canada, https://​www.​statcan.​gc.​ca/​o1/​en/​plus/​6351-snapshot-employment-among-youth-canada.

9

Lundy, M., Recent immigrants suffer in Canada’s weakening job market, The Globe and Mail, July 11, 2024. (https://​www.​theglobeandmail.​com/​business/​article-recent-immigrants-suffer-in-canadas-weakening-job-market/​#:​~:​text=​The%20​unemployment%20​rate%20​for%20​recent,averages%2C%20​unadjusted%20​for%20​seasonality).

10

Employment and Social Development Canada, https://​www.​canada.​ca/​en/​employment-social-development/​news/​2024/​08/​minister-boissonnault-reducing-the-number-of-temporary-foreign-workers-in-canada.​html.

11

Fillion, G., Le gouvernement Trudeau a-t-il perdu le contrôle de la dette?, Radio-Canada, February 17, 2024. (https://​ici.​radio-canada.​ca/​nouvelle/​2049975/​gouvernement-trudeau-controle-dette).

12

Chabot, D-M, Stephen Harper est-il le champion du libre-échange? L'épreuve des faits, Radio-Canada, October 6, 2015. (https://​ici.​radio-canada.​ca/​nouvelle/​742606/​epreuve-faits-partenariat-transpacifique-harper-nombre-pays-libre-echange).

13

Wherry, A. What was behind that Conservative vote against the Ukraine trade deal?, CBC, November 24, 2023. (https://​www.​cbc.​ca/​news/​politics/​conservative-ukraine-poilievre-free-trade-carbon-tax-1.​7038249).

14

McGregor, G., Poilievre personally holds investment in Bitcoin as he promotes crypto to Canadians, CTV News, May 17, 2022. (https://​www.​ctvnews.​ca/​politics/​poilievre-personally-holds-investment-in-bitcoin-as-he-promotes-crypto-to-canadians-1.​5907615).

15

Platt, B., Pierre Poilievre says he would fire the Bank of Canada governor if elected prime minister, Financial Times, May 12, 2022. (https://​financialpost.​com/​news/​economy/​trudeaus-tory-rival-says-hed-fire-bank-of-canada-governor).

16

Lévesque, C., Pierre Poilievre slams ‘useless’ corporate lobbyists in Ottawa who should expect no favours from him, National Post, March 8, 2024. (https://​nationalpost.​com/​news/​politics/​pierre-poilievre-slams-useless-corporate-lobbyists-in-ottawa).

17

Burke, A., McKenna, K. and Ryan, A. Pierre Poilievre called lobbyists ‘utterly useless,’ but they're still attending his fundraisers, CBC, May 7, 2024. (https://​www.​cbc.​ca/​news/​politics/​poilievre-fundraiser-lobbyists-1.​7196143).

18

Al Mallees, N., ‘Justinflation’ or ‘greedflation’? A look at why food prices are soaring in Canada, Global News, December 17, 2022. (https://​globalnews.​ca/​news/​9356259/​justinflation-greedflation-real-reason-behind-soaring-prices/​).

19

Latraverse, E., La «Justinflation» au milieu d’une guerre de mots, Journal de Montréal, October 4, 2022. https://​www.​journaldemontrea​l.​com/​2022/​10/​04/​la-justinflation-au-milieu-dune-guerre-de-mots.

20

Conservative Party of Canada, https://​www.​conservative.​ca/​justinflation-pushing-canadians-further-over-the-edge/​.

21

Wiktionary, https://​en.​wiktionary.​org/​wiki/​Justinflation.

22

TVA Nouvelles, Une publicité conservatrice dénonce la «JustinFlation», September 17, 2023. (https://​www.​tvanouvelles.​ca/​2023/​09/​17/​primeur--une-publicite-conservatrice-denonce-la-justinflation).

23

Smith, M-D, ‘Justinflation’: How MPs are getting around rules against the phrase in parliament, Global News, September 30, 2022. (https://​globalnews.​ca/​news/​9167348/​justinflation-justin-trudeau-pierre-poilievre/​).

24

Poilievre, P., Youtube, https://​www.​youtube.​com/​watch?​v=​RxKI9zKhDNE.

25

Conservative Party of Canada, https://​www.​conservative.​ca/​building-homes-not-bureaucracy/​.

26

Ibbitson, J. With one video, Pierre Poilievre has taken control of the housing debate, The Globe and Mail, December 6, 2023. https://​www.​theglobeandmail.​com/​politics/​article-with-one-video-pierre-poilievre-has-taken-control-of-the-housing/​.

27

Nauta, R. and Speer, S., Poilievre personally holds investment in Bitcoin as he promotes crypto to Canadians, The Hub, March 20, 2024. (https://​thehub.​ca/​2024/​03/​20/​renze-nauta-and-sean-speer-poilievres-working-class-conservatism/​).

28

Siever, K., Who is working class? Alberta Worker, 23 November, 2023. (https://​albertaworker.​ca/​politics/​who-is-working-class/​#:​~:​text=​The%20​working%20​class%20​is%20​pretty,the%20​labour%20​factor%20​of%20​production).

29

Nauta, R. and Speer, S., Poilievre personally holds investment in Bitcoin as he promotes crypto to Canadians, The Hub, March 20, 2024. (https://​thehub.​ca/​2024/​03/​20/​renze-nauta-and-sean-speer-poilievres-working-class-conservatism/​).

30

Fawcett, Max, The NDP is getting outflanked—again, National Observer, May 14, 2024. (https://​www.​nationalobserver​.​com/​2024/​05/​14/​opinion/​ndp-getting-outflanked-again#:​~:​text=​According%20​to%20​recent%20​numbers%20​from,2021%20​now%20​support%20​Poilievre's%20​CPC).

31

Taylor, S., Why the Conservatives and NDP are headed for a clash over Canada's working-class votes, CBC, April 7, 2024. (https://​www.​cbc.​ca/​news/​politics/​cpc-ndp-working-class-votes-canada-1.​7166294).

32

Noël, C., Pierre Poilievre, la voix des cols bleus?, Radio-Canada, May 9, 2024. (https://​ici.​radio-canada.​ca/​info/​long-format/​2069407/​pierre-poilievre-travailleurs-timmins-npd).

33

Taylor, S., Labour leader urges unions to expose Poilievre’s working-class overtures as ‘fraud’, Toronto Star, April 1, 2024. (https://​www.​thestar.​com/​politics/​federal/​labour-leader-urges-unions-to-expose-poilievres-working-class-overtures-as-fraud/​article_​54283b20-55fe-5b1f-8a66-ce614a11bed9.​html).

34

Smith, M-D, ‘Justinflation’: How MPs are getting around rules against the phrase in parliament, Global News, September 30, 2022. (https://​globalnews.​ca/​news/​9167348/​justinflation-justin-trudeau-pierre-poilievre/​).

35

Tulsiani, R. Jagmeet Singh’s Embrace of Populist Rhetoric: Connecting or Alienating Voters?, Medium, May 11, 2024. (https://​medium.​com/​@ravindertulsiani​/​jagmeet-singhs-embrace-of-populist-rhetoric-connecting-or-alienating-voters-5d07890bff66).

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2025

E. MontignyPopulism in CanadaPalgrave Studies in Populismshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-89134-2_6

6. Climate Change as a Wedge Issue

Eric Montigny1  

(1)

Political Science, Université Laval, Québec, QC, Canada

Eric Montigny

Email: eric.montigny@pol.ulaval.ca

Abstract

In this chapter, we first consider how populism fits into the climate change debate and provide a brief overview of the environmental situation in Canada. We discuss the emergence of a new political divide in relation to climate change. We analyze the positioning of the main parties and the carbon tax as a partisan issue. Lastly, we look at the Canadian public opinion toward environmental issues. Green taxation and energy are used as wedged issues. They are also sparking a debate about individual lifestyles. What habits do we need to question? What individual and collective behaviors do we need to change? Who should pay for the transition to a low-carbon society? At what pace should these changes take place? With climate change, the environment has become an increasingly divisive subject in Canadian politics. The Trudeau government’s introduction of a carbon tax was successfully criticized by Pierre Poilievre, so much so that it led to the resignation of the Liberal leader. This policy was then abandoned by his successor, Mark Carney. This tax, seen as a coercive measure to combat climate change, became the first victim of the populist surge.

Keywords

PopulismCanadaClimate changeWedge issueEnvironmentGlobal warmingEnvironmental divideCarbon tax

With the arrival of a heightened discussion about climate change, the environment is becoming an increasingly divisive subject in partisan politics. Green taxation and energy are used as wedged issues. It is also sparking a debate about individual lifestyles. What habits do we need to question? What individual and collective behaviors do we need to change? Who should pay for the transition to a low-carbon society? At what pace should these changes take place?

The debates about what action is required creates additional tension. After all, there are usually winners and losers in said actions. About winners and losers, the fact that Canada is a major oil producer cannot be ignored. CO₂ reduction targets do not affect all regions of the country equally. The same is true for workers whose livelihoods depend on more energy-intensive industries. Access to public transportation, is not available everywhere in a country as vast and diverse as Canada. When it comes to action regarding climate change, there are winners and losers.

The issue of climate change also raises democratic debates about the ability of our political institutions to address the problem. On one hand, some say that we must respect people's pace and ability to pay, or social crises will ensue. The example of the “gilets jaunes” movement in France is instructive. On the other hand, elected representatives are criticized for not taking sufficient note of the urgent need to act to save the planet, thereby criticizing the inefficiency of democracy. In terms of voters’ beliefs, there exists a range of opinions from climate skeptics to those who are eco anxious.

Therefore, climate change is a fertile ground for populists. On the left, we can imagine that greedy corporations are to blame. Green taxation could be seen as the solution. On the right, we can also easily imagine that there is a narrative in favor of freedom, cars, oil, and gas. That being said, is it really that simple?

One thing is certain, Canadian society is sharply divided between protecting the environment and economic growth. For months Pierre Poilievre targeted his message against Justin Trudeau's carbon tax. “Axe the tax” was his mantra. He wants to build more pipelines and reduce gasoline prices. His position is in line with the oil industry of the West but allows him to make gains in the East due to inflation and rising energy costs. For is part, Maxime Bernier is a clear climate sceptic and, as we have seen, even talks about “Green terrorism.”

In this chapter, we will provide a brief overview of the environmental situation in Canada. We will discuss the emergence of a new political divide in relation to climate change. We will then analyze the positioning of the main parties and the carbon tax as a partisan issue. Lastly, we will look at the Canadian public opinion toward environmental issues. But first, it is important to consider how populism fits into this debate.

Populism and Environment

Like the Covid crisis discussed in Chap. 4, issues such as climate change and biodiversity protection are intimately linked to scientific expertise. In the media, experts are regularly called upon to present increasingly alarming data and findings. Many intervene to call for changes in behavior to meet greenhouse gas reduction targets or for measures to protect the habitats of endangered species. Afterward, these calls are generally taken up, even amplified, by various citizens’ movements or environmental pressure groups to influence public policies.

Following this, can we say that the climate change issue contributes to widening the gap between experts seen as elites and citizens seen as ordinary individuals? After all, one could argue that most experts are privileged academic elites earning good salaries with guaranteed employment, mostly living in an urban environment. Elites that won't suffer as much as the working-class people from the behavioral changes they ask for… And what about companies obsessed primarily with short-term performance and profitability? Doesn't this race for profit come at the expense of the environment and workers? On climate change, beyond the scientific evidence, there is plenty of fuel for both left and right populist rhetoric.

Elected officials prefer to talk about investing in subsidies for economic transformation, notably for the development of green technologies and adaptation to climate change. In Canada, as in many other countries, governments first implemented incentive and educational policies to fight climate change. They then increase regulations effecting industries. Yet, according to many experts, taxing pollution costs is one of the most effective ways to help change behaviors. But, to cope with the crisis, more coercive measures are generally hard to implement. When it comes to transferring the cost of climate change to taxpayers—and therefore to voters—there is usually a political cost involved.

Faced with this reality, many people, especially among young citizens, feel that representative democracy is failing to impose strict measures to limit climate change. This undermines their confidence in the ability of democratic processes to implement radical solutions. At the other end of the spectrum, other actors stand in the way of climate action by evoking the “will of the people” and the price that would be paid by ordinary citizens as opposed to privileged elites. At this end of the spectrum, many also assert that international forums, like the Conference of the Parties on climate (COP), decide without consulting “the people.”

When it comes to the environment, these populist criticisms are usually accompanied by critiques of science (Mede, 2023), misinformation on social media, and conspiracy theories (Bergmann, 2018). Given the growing seriousness of the climate crisis, these populist/conspiratorial tendencies, which undermine trust in democracy, are likely to become even more pronounced. In some countries, they may even supplant other issues like immigration or identity. After all, populist parties, like traditional ones, know how to adapt to the changing political cleavages that shape the societies in which they operate.

When it comes to science and the environment, trust varies depending on whether you are on the left or the right, in line with your political preferences. For example, if you are on the left of the political spectrum, you will have less confidence in nuclear energy experts, while if you are on the right, you would tend to be more skeptical of climate change experts (Nisbet et al., 2015). Similarly, McCright et al. (2013) and Pechar et al. (2018) found that perceptions about the economic system, government, and business matter. Thus, the more favorable one's opinion is toward business, the more likely one is to have confidence in the science of GMOs, while the more confidence one has in government, the more likely this person will have confidence in the science of climate change (Pechar et al., 2018).

In the United States, the systematic obstructionist strategies of right-wing political actors are well documented. Likewise, a growing number of studies of European right-wing populist (RWP) parties and individuals also point in the same direction. Other studies have also shown that the presence of right-wing populist parties in government coalitions has a negative effect on the reduction of CO₂ emissions (Ekberg et al., 2022; Jahn, 2021).

On the right, then, it should come as no surprise that populist attitudes are seen as part of the obstruction of climate action (Lockwood, 2018). Indeed, Huber et al. (2022) found that citizens with populist appeal tended to be more skeptical of climate change science and more critical of political institutions. However, it would be a mistake to believe that these voters constitute a monolithic bloc. They are not all deniers of the effect that human actions have on global warming. Some may, for example, subscribe to a more fatalistic view that it is too late to act and have an impact.

There are far fewer studies analyzing the effects of populism on the environment within left-wing parties (see Buzogány & Mohamad-Klotzbac, 2021; Chaze & Dain, 2023). Whether in connection with the People's Climate March or the activism of Greta Thunberg, it is also important to highlight the discourse analysis work linked to the political mobilization of citizens (Bosworth, 2020; Zulianello & Ceccobelli, 2020), particularly in relation to the behaviors and attitudes of new generations toward democracy. Young people, it should be remembered, have been more politically socialized by environmental issues than their elders (Montigny & Cardinal, 2019).

Global Warming and Canada

The effects of global warming are already being felt in Canada. Between 1948 and 2016, the average annual temperature rose by 1.7%, and by 2.3% in the northern territories.¹ According to climate scientists, the rise in temperatures in the country is even more marked than in many places on the planet. For example: “Since Canada has a large land mass, much of which is located at high northern latitudes, warming across Canada has been about twice the global average and in the Canadian Arctic, the warming has been about three times higher.”²

In their daily lives, Canadians experience more extreme weather events. Increased periods of heatwave favoring forest fires, more frequent flooding and riverbank erosion are just some of the manifestations. These new phenomena are not without security risk for the population, economical, and infrastructures costs. For example, there is an impact for the far north permafrost. There is also an impact on flora and fauna. Some species are in decline, while others are migrating north. Think of the opossum or the Lyme disease-carrying tick, which were once virtually non-existent north of the 45th parallel. In geopolitical terms, the opening of the Arctic to shipping is a source of envy, as will undoubtedly be the country's large reserves of drinking water as the planet dries out further.

In Canada, the politicization of environmental issues is nothing new. In the 1980s and 1990s, it was air pollution that monopolized the attention. This was linked to the fight against acid rain, which emanated mainly from winds blowing in from the United States. The fight against the depletion of the ozone layer was also on the agenda. On these issues, Conservatives and Liberals essentially shared the same vision of the measures to be taken and the international treaties to be signed.

Even so, the 1970s were marked by major debates on energy and the costs of each mode of production. For years, Alberta had been counting on the presence of fossil fuels on its territory to develop its wealth (as seen in Chap. 2). To a lesser extent, Saskatchewan adopted the same strategy. Ontario and New Brunswick relied on nuclear power, meanwhile Quebec, Manitoba, and Newfoundland could benefit from large-scale hydroelectric projects. Depending on their resources and geography, the various members of the federation had their own energy strategies and interests.

The international oil crisis of 1979 led to a sharp rise in inflation as prices soared. With the imposition of a federal energy program, it also left its political mark by accentuating an already existing political divide between eastern and western Canada. Some forty years later, in an interview, Tom Flanagan, professor of political science at the University of Calgary, still speaks of “mourning” for the people of the West, when evoking the National Energy Program (NEP).³ This policy of Pierre Elliot Trudeau's government pursued three objectives: “(1) Increase Canadian participation in the oil and gas sector, (2) Establish fair energy pricing for Canadian consumers, (3) Secure Canada’s supply of oil and gas”.⁴

However, it was received by Westerners as being real robbery of their resources. To this day, it remains for them a symbol of the power and arrogance of Eastern Canada. This memory feeds the feeling of Western alienation, or “quebecbashing.” In the contemporary context of the fight against climate change, it also colors the debates on reducing oil production from the tar sands. For example: “Just a few months after his election as Premier of Quebec in 2018, François Legault engaged with this sensibility by expressing his desire to liberate Quebec from Alberta's dirty oil in favor of green energy.”⁵

Fig. 6.1

Greenhouse gas emissions by provinces and territory, Canada, 1990, 2005, and 2022. Sources Government of Canada, https://​www.​canada.​ca/​en/​environment-climate-change/​services/​environmental-indicators/​greenhouse-gas-emissions.​html

In fact, greenhouse gas emissions vary from one jurisdiction to another. Figure 6.1 shows greenhouse gas emissions by jurisdictions. Even if Ontario and Quebec are the most populous jurisdictions, Alberta continues, with its energy sector, to produce the most greenhouse gases in absolute terms, but also in proportion to its population. And rather than falling, these emissions continued to rise in 2022.

In 2015, the Government of Canada joined the Paris Agreement. This implies maintaining “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels” and pursue efforts “to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels.”⁶ Achieving this target must translate into public policies. In concrete terms, this should mean the following:

«In 2021, Canada committed to reduce its GHG emissions by 40 45 percent below 2005 levels by 2030. In the 2030 Emissions Reductions Plan, released in March 2022, Canada announced an interim objective to reduce GHG emissions by 20% below 2005 levels by 2026...»⁷

Various measures have been put in place to meet these targets. But Canada is still a long way from achieving this goal. In addition to regulations and subsidies to improve carbon–neutral technologies, mechanisms have been used to attach a cost to carbon through green taxation. As early as 2008, British Colombia was the first jurisdiction in North America to implement a carbon tax.⁸ In 2013, Quebec set up a carbon market. This is a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas emissions. Quebec linked its system to California's in 2014. Originally, this system included Ontario. However, conservative premier Doug Ford ended his province's participation as soon as he came to power (Forde, 2022). The Northwest Territories also have their own carbon pricing policy. Along with Quebec, they are the only two jurisdictions with a carbon pricing system completely independent of the federal government.⁹ In Alberta, with the Conservatives’ back power in 2019, the province's existing carbon tax was abolished.

In 2016, Justin Trudeau's Liberal government announced that a federal carbon pricing system would be introduced and applied in provinces that did not have a regime in place to meet the Paris Agreement targets.¹⁰ The federal system is based on a performance-based pricing system for emitters and a fuel levy that would be gradually increased. To offset the effects of this tax, a rebate was introduced for individuals. In the 8 provinces and two territories subject to the system, the federal government imposes its own rules. However, they are modulated to consider measures already put in place by each jurisdiction.

A New Structuring Environmental Divide

In Ottawa, the environment has long been one issue among others. For years, each of the major parties had commitments in regard to this issue, without making their commitments a distinctive feature in their election platforms. The environment was not a salient issue, a subject that divided the electorate.

There is a Green Party in Canada, but it remains marginal. Founded in 1984, it had to wait 20 years until the 2004 election to surpass just 1% of the vote. Jim Harris, the party's leader at the time, was initially active in the Progressive Conservative Party. In 2011, Elisabeth May became the party's first elected member of the House of Commons.

But recently, the environment has become more saliant and divisive. On climate change and biodiversity, different visions oppose major parties. On one hand, there is opposition to more restrictive policies and green taxation. On the other, there are calls for even firmer action to achieve carbon neutrality. In short, the more the environment is associated with the notion of sacrifices, the more it is debated. This is even truer when the debate concerns people's lifestyles. With global warming, the environment is set to structure political debate to a greater extent.

How is this new divide articulated in Canada? If you are on the right, you are for the environment; if you are on the left, you are against it? It would be far too simple to limit our analyze to the traditional left–right spectrum.

To illustrate this new divide, we will take a look at 5 issues that have made the headlines in Canada: (1) the introduction of green tax mechanisms, (2) the development of a new battery industry for transport, (3) the development of wind power, (4) the development of new pipelines for fossil fuels, and (5) the imposition of protected areas to prevent the extinction of Boreal woodland caribou.

The introduction of green taxes is not popular with the electorate. In Canada, as we have seen, the Liberals imposed a new carbon tax. Pierre Poilievre was quick to associate this measure with an increase in the cost of living and defining it as Justin Trudeau's inflationary measure. This position contributed to Poilievre success in the polls and put the government on the defensive. In the 2022 Quebec election, Québec solidaire proposed higher taxes for larger cars, including station wagons. The Coalition avenir Québec labeled this measure the “orange tax,” in reference to the party's color, which had the effect of cutting off the left-wing formation's momentum.

Another debate: the creation of a battery industry and the regulation of gasoline-powered cars to encourage decarbonization of the transport sector. With generous subsidies from the Trudeau, Ford and Legault governments, a strategy is underway to ensure that Quebec and Ontario are at the heart of the transition to electric vehicles. This implies the development of a genuine value chain from a rare mineral mine to battery manufacturing plant. In Quebec, the construction of a battery plant by the Swedish multinational Northvolt has provoked protests and even acts of vandalism on the site. Certain environmental activists are opposed to this type of development. For them, there should be no cars at all, even electric ones. On the other hand, the Conservative Party of Quebec is critical of the public funds invested, while questioning the ban on new gasoline-powered vehicles planned in a few years’ time. It has even launched an Internet campaign to force the Quebec government to back down. It's called “My car My choice”¹¹ The party is coping a strategy of American lobbyists of the car industry.¹²

As we have seen, Quebec has long since opted for renewable energy to power its residential and industrial sectors and is therefore a major producer of hydroelectricity. To please environmentalists, the government closed the only nuclear power plant on its territory in 2012. Quebec is also a major electricity exporter to New York and New England. In this way, Quebec contributes to lower the carbon footprint of the entire northeastern part of the continent. Nevertheless, there are new needs for green energy. Quebec has chosen to increase its wind power production. However, for environmental and landscape protection reasons, local environmental activists and citizens are opposed.

Alberta is a gas and oil producer but has no access to the sea to export its resources. To increase production, it needs more pipelines. To the Pacific, the federal government owns a new pipeline worth an estimated $34 billion.¹³ It has been the subject of much debate, not only because of the growth in oil production it will enable, but also because of the protection of the aboriginal territories it passes through, and because of its cost overruns. Toward the Atlantic, a new pipeline project is still being debated. The Conservatives are in favor. As long as there is no social acceptability, the center-right Quebec government is opposed. In fact, the Coalition avenir Québec has passed a law banning oil exploration and drilling on Quebec territory.

Finally, a debate is raging over the measures to be taken to save endangered species from climate change and the forestry industry. The Liberal government is proposing to unilaterally establish protection zones to protect the Boreal woodland caribou. In the long term, this would mean the closure of wood mills and threaten the survival of many communities. This time, the Quebec government and Pierre Poilievre's Conservatives were on the same side against the Trudeau government to save jobs with a mitigation plan.

The environment is thus becoming a sensitive, divisive subject that mobilizes when it affects people's life and lifestyles. Whether we are talking about sacrifices imposed on them, or the not-in-my-backyard syndrome in reaction to projects, divides are appearing. Divisions also exist according to one's position on environmental science.

Climate sceptic versus eco-anxiety? Among the electors against policies to combat climate change, we can find a variety of individuals. Like we mentioned earlier, there are those who simply don't believe that global warming is caused by humans, but also those who say it is already too late to act. Among those who want to act against global warming, there are also those who want to take advantage of the transition to develop the economy in a more sustainable way. But there are also people for whom the fight goes hand in hand with a decrease in consumption and production.

If this is not a left–right divide, what form should the environmental divide take? We have to envisage a more precise scale, with those in favor of growth without regard for the environment on one side, and degrowth without regard for the economy on the other. And in the middle would be the parties that favor sustainable development. Because populism looks for culprits who act against the people, populist parties’ discourses on environmental issues are generally not nuanced. Populists could then be found at both ends of this environmental scale.

The Carbon Tax a New Partisan Issue

On environmental policies, Canadian voters have several visions to choose from. That said, it was on the issue of carbon pricing that the various programs differed the most. First, let's apply our classification scale to the main parties.

Trudeau’s liberals seemed committed to sustainable development and to a managed transition to a carbon–neutral economy. So does the Bloc Québécois. The principle of carbon pricing has also been supported by the NDP for several years. Here's an excerpt from its platform:

«Putting a price on carbon has been an important tool in efforts to drive emissions reductions. We will continue with carbon pricing while making it fairer and rolling back loopholes this Liberal government has given to big polluters. But we also recognize that carbon pricing won't be enough to tackle the climate crisis. Further action is needed.»¹⁴

Jagmeet Singh did not, however, go so far as to name a degrowth objective. But to protect his electorate, as the carbon tax was raised by 23% on gas in April 2024, he felt the need to criticize the liberals. Not to leave Pierre Poilievre the monopoly on defending the working class on that issue, it then seemed that the NDP was moving back on gasoline taxation:

«Our position on fighting the climate crisis has not changed. We believe absolutely in a price on pollution, but we also believe the price has to be fair, and right now the Liberals are not making a fair plan. They're saying big polluters get bigger and bigger profits and working-class people get nothing. That is wrong.»¹⁵

A few months later, in response to Pierre Poilievre's attacks on the carbon tax, he clearly stated that he wanted to abolish the Liberal tax: “We want to see an approach to fighting the climate crisis where it doesn’t put the burden on the backs of working people, where big polluters have to pay their fair share.”¹⁶

Both Pierre Poilievre as Maxime Bernier prioritize economic growth over the environment. They also share a narrative in favor of oil and gas industries. They want to allow more pipelines to operate to reduce gasoline prices and promote gas exports. The Conservatives are opposed to all carbon tax measures and are counting on technological innovation to limit carbon emissions. The People's Party, on the other hand, does not believe in the very existence of climate change.

For Bernier, climate change is as an invention made up by the elites. Carbon is even seen in a positive light in the PPC's platform:

«None of the cataclysmic predictions that have been made about the climate since the 1970s have come true. No new ice age. No steady warming in direct relation with increases in CO₂ levels. No disappearance of polar ice caps. No exceptional rise in ocean levels. No abnormal increase in catastrophic weather events. No widespread crop failure and famine. In fact, CO₂ is beneficial for agriculture and there has recently been a measurable “greening” of the world in part thanks to higher levels. Despite what global warming propaganda claims, CO₂ is not a pollutant. It is an essential ingredient for life on Earth and needed for plant growth.»¹⁷

This party also defends the oil industry based on conspiracy theories: “Under the influence of radical environmental activists and American left-wing foundations, the Trudeau government has done everything it can to stifle the growth of Canada's oil industry by preventing it from transporting and selling its products.”¹⁸

During the forest fires that hit Canada hard in June 2023, Bernier also echoed some conspiracy theories about climate change. Even going as far as falsely accusing environmentalists for having committed terrorism for deliberately starting the fires.

With Pierre Poilievre as leader, the Conservative Party clarified its orientation. It has stepped up its attacks against the carbon tax. Abolition of the tax was the message at the heart of his attacks on the Liberals. He constantly repeated his “Axe the Tax” slogan on every podium or platform. Advertising campaigns have been launched. Poilievre is even regularly seen wearing an “Axe the Tax T-shirt”… It has also become a means of mobilization and financing for the party, whether for petition signatures, collecting donations or selling promotional material.

At first, the effectiveness of this campaign forced the Liberals to back down and delay the implementation of certain carbon tax measures in the Maritime provinces, a region dominated by liberals’ MPs and now in danger of falling into the Conservative.

In January 2025, in the early days of the race to succeed Justin Trudeau, the main candidates chose to quickly distance themselves from the carbon tax. Paradoxically, former Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland is the one who was instrumental in bringing it into effect. Mark Carney also announced that one of his first acts as Prime Minister would be to abolish the carbon tax for individuals, replacing it with incentives.¹⁹ He was thus reacting to Pierre Poilievre's attacks, which attempted to define him on social media as “Carbon Tax Carney.” Poilievre could have chosen to claim victory and celebrate the Liberals’ abrupt setback. But, just a few minutes after this announcement, he maintained his rhetoric, saying that the Liberals had a hidden agenda and would suspend “Trudeau's carbon tax until after the election and then bring in a bigger tax with no rebate.”

The Conservative Party spent a lot of energy and resources fighting this environmental policy. A review of party press releases between August 2023 and August 2024 reveals that the party issued 21 press releases on the carbon tax and Liberal environmental policies, more than on any other subject. For example, an April 2024 press release emphasized the unpopularity of the tax, even within Liberal ranks, and the carbon tax's effects on rising inflation:

«70 percent of Canadians, and 70 percent of provincial premiers, including the Liberal Premier of Newfoundland and Labrador and Liberal parties in Ontario, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, oppose Trudeau's tax hikes. But Justin Trudeau and his NDP coalition partners won't listen. (...) Liberal and NDP MPs had the opportunity today to provide Canadians with some relief, but instead voted to make them pay even more in taxes. They did this in spite of the Parliamentary Budget Officer confirming that Trudeau's carbon tax will cost families $911 in Alberta, $525 in Saskatchewan, $502 in Manitoba, $627 in Ontario $627, $537 in Nova Scotia, $550 in Prince Edward Island and $377 in Newfoundland and Labrador. Trudeau's inflationary spending and taxes have taken more and more money out of Canadians' pockets, leaving a record number of people using food banks, while families must choose between heating their home or filling up their car.»²⁰

Another excerpt from a Conservative press release from 2023 emphasizes the failure of the carbon tax to reduce emissions:

«The Government isn't bothering to set implementation deadlines for 49% of their measures. They have also admitted that only 43% of their so-called “climate measures,” many of which are actually just taxation measures, will have any direct impact on emissions. The Government's plan didn't even bother to include a target or expected emission reductions for 95% of its measures. They know their punitive plan won't accomplish anything, and the Environment Commissioner's report shows they haven't done their homework on how this will affect Canadians.»²¹

But beyond the criticism, what would the governing Conservatives do? To find out, it is important to analyze the documents discussed at the party convention held in September 2023.²² One of the resolutions insisted on the abolition of the carbon tax and the development of new technologies. It stated:

«We believe that there should be no federally imposed carbon taxes or cap and trade systems on either the provinces and territories or on the citizens of Canada. The provinces and territories should be free to develop their own climate change policies, without federal interference or federal penalties or incentives. Significant emission reductions are achievable through development and application of new and/or improved technologies and wise policy.»

Emphasizing innovation, another proposal was along the same lines:

«In order to ensure a consistent energy supply, a Conservative Government will encourage innovation in research and development aimed at creating diverse, safe, dependable, and economical energy options, including renewables and other carbon and non-carbon based energy sources that function well in Canada's climates and geography.»

Finally, one proposal focused on a gradual transition to carbon reduction, while reiterating the importance of research and development:

«In pursuit of a purposeful, gradual transition to a lower carbon-use future, a Conservative Government will support the continued use of oil and gas while encouraging research and development aimed at creating safe, dependable and economical options, including carbon capture technology, battery-based storage, small modular reactors, and hydrogen-based generation.»

The Conservatives thus seem to have removed from their platform the idea of achieving carbon emission reduction targets through binding measures set by the federal government. This would leave it up to each province to set its own targets and measures to achieve them.

At the same time, Pierre Poilievre has succeeded in making the carbon tax a central issue by associating it with the rising cost of living.

A Divided Society

According to the 2020 wave of the World value survey, the Canadian society was split between environmental protection or job creation and economic growth. Figure 6.2 illustrates the results between the choice of environmental protection or job creation/economic growth. 60% of respondents prioritize the environment over economic growth, compared to 40% who prioritize the economy over the environment. This division becomes even clearer when we analyze respondents’ priority by age. The younger you are, the more you choose the environment and conversely, the older you get, the more you prioritize the economy.

Fig. 6.2

Environment and economy as top priority

The recent evolution of public opinion on the environment is even more revealing. A survey conducted by Angus Reid in March 2024 with 1602 representative respondents across Canada shows a major shift from the 2020 World Value Survey. Specifying the cost of living rather than the wider economy, “Most Canadians currently say that cost of living concerns (56%) should outweigh climate change concerns (31%) when making economic policy.”²³

The link Pierre Poilievre wanted to establish regarding the inflationary effect of the Liberal plan was established among 66% of voters. Thus: Two-in-five Canadians (40%) say the carbon tax is making their life “a lot” more expensive. One-quarter (26%) say it's increasing their cost of living “a little.” A majority of respondents also saw the measure as ineffective in tackling climate change. And even 54% agreed with Saskatchewan's unilateral decision not to apply the federal law and collect the carbon tax in that province.

And when we look at how the electorate reacted to the decision to abolish the carbon tax, only 22% indicated support for the former Liberal policy. Twice as many, 40%, wanted it abolished and 11% wanted it reduced. Among Conservative voters, 75% were in favor of abolishing the carbon tax altogether, and just 9% wanted to maintain it in its current form. Even among Liberal and NDP voters, a majority of respondents were against the measure. Paradoxically, at 42%, Bloc Québécois voters were the most supportive of the Liberal measure.

Another Angus Reid poll conducted in July 2024, this time on a summer gas tax cut proposed by the Conservatives, was supported by 56% of 4204 respondents, against 33% who were opposed. Quebec was the only exception. More respondents, 44% versus 42%, wanted to keep gasoline taxes at the same level.²⁴

***

Canadians appear divided on the priority to be given to the environment over the economy. With its carbon tax, the Trudeau government faced headwinds. The measure was unpopular with the electorate. In the spring of 2024, the Conservatives attempted to topple the Trudeau government with a non-confidence motion in the House of Commons. Their target: the abolition of the carbon tax. At the time, the Liberals succeeded in retaining power with the support of the NDP and Bloc Québécois.

The unpopularity of the carbon tax even had an impact on party positioning. To add insult to injury for Justin Trudeau, the carbon tax took effect during a time when Canada was experiencing its highest inflation in decades. On the left, the NDP wanted to distance itself from it. Singh adopted a populist stance. His party would make the big business pay rather than the working class. On the right, Maxime Bernier's populist rhetoric sinks into climate conspiracy.

Gasoline and energy, in an inflationary context, was used as a wedge issue by the Conservatives. Poilievre has skillfully occupied all the political space and became the champion of carbon pricing opponents. Among the main parties, he was the only one against a three-party speech defending carbon pricing. But, while adopting a populist stance, he was careful not to fall into Maxime Bernier's conspiratorial rhetoric on global warming. Instead, he used this opportunity to reinforce his message in favor of the working class and ordinary people. He presented himself as the only one who understood their harsh reality and presented himself of wanting to give them a break from the hard times. By choosing to make the carbon tax a wedge issue, he has strengthened his position of defender against a group of elites who go unaffected by these new environmental measures.

Poilievre’s message was so effective that it forced Justin Trudeau's successor to backtrack on a key Liberal policy. Mark Carney, who previously worked as a United Nations special envoy for climate action, justified this shift saying that the carbon tax “has ‘become very divisive for Canadians,’ in part due to misinformation around it.”²⁵

Footnotes

1

Le Climatoscope, https://​climatoscope.​ca/​article/​les-changements-climatiques-et-leurs-impacts-au-canada-et-dans-le-monde-etat-des-lieux/​.

2

McBean, G. Expert insight: Canada is warming faster than anywhere else on earth, Western News, January 12, 2024. (https://​news.​westernu.​ca/​2024/​01/​expert-insight-canada-is-warming-faster-than-anywhere-else-on-earth/​).

3

Roquette, T., Programme énergétique national: l'est l'a oublié, l'ouest le hait toujours, Radio-Canada, November 19, 2020. (https://​ici.​radio-canada.​ca/​recit-numerique/​1062/​programme-national-energie-politique-trudeau-lougheed-40-ans).

4

Noakes, T.C., National Energy Program, The Canadian Encyclopedia, May 28, 2020. (https://​www.​thecanadianencyc​lopedia.​ca/​en/​article/​national-energy-program).

5

Canadian Press, ‘Dirty’ oil finances Quebec’s schools, hospitals, Alberta reminds Legault, The Gazette, December 12, 2018. (https://​montrealgazette.​com/​news/​local-news/​dirty-oil-finances-quebecs-schools-hospitals-alberta-reminds-legault).

6

United Nations, https://​unfccc.​int/​process-and-meetings/​the-paris-agreement.

7

Government of Canada, https://​www.​canada.​ca/​en/​environment-climate-change/​services/​environmental-indicators/​greenhouse-gas-emissions.​html.

8

Reelected in 2024, the NDP government promised to remove the BC Carbon Tax if a change in federal government allows for its removal without the imposition of the federal fuel charge.

9

Government of Canada, https://​www.​canada.​ca/​en/​environment-climate-change/​services/​climate-change/​pricing-pollution-how-it-will-work/​putting-price-on-carbon-pollution.​html.

10

Prime Minister of Canada, https://​www.​pm.​gc.​ca/​en/​news/​speeches/​2016/​10/​03/​prime-minister-justin-trudeau-delivers-speech-pricing-carbon-pollution.

11

Canadian Press, Quebec Conservatives want province to delay ban on sale of gas-powered vehicles, The Gazette, August 20, 2024. (https://​montrealgazette.​com/​news/​politics/​quebec-conservatives-want-province-to-delay-ban-on-sale-of-gas-powered-vehicles).

12

My Car my Choice, https://​mycarmychoicemai​ne.​com/​.

13

Jones, J., Graney, E., Stueck, W. and Jang, B., After 12 years, the $34-billion Trans Mountain pipeline is finally finished. But what happens next?, The Globe and Mail, April 26, 2024. (https://​www.​theglobeandmail.​com/​business/​article-canada-trans-mountain-pipeline-expansion/​).

14

New Democratic Party, https://​www.​ndp.​ca/​climate-action?​_​gl=​1*qp7kya*_​gcl_​au*MjAxMzgyMjMzMS4x​NzI1MzA3ODUy*_​ga*MTExNzE1NTExNS4x​NzI1MzA3ODUy*_​ga_​97QLYMLC56*MTcyNTMwNzg1Mi4x​LjEuMTcyNTMwNzg3​Ny4zNS4wLjA.

15

Baxter D., NDP leader not saying if ‘fair’ carbon price includes levy on gasoline, Global News, April 15, 2024. (https://​globalnews.​ca/​news/​10424745/​ndp-leader-carbon-price-levy-gasoline/​).

16

Curry, B., Singh signals NDP plan to oppose Liberal version of carbon pricing, says it puts burden on ‘backs of working people’, The Globe and Mail, September 12, 2024. https://​www.​theglobeandmail.​com/​politics/​article-ndp-singh-carbon-tax-climate-plan/​.

17

People Party of Canada, https://​www.​peoplespartyofca​nada.​ca/​global-warming-environment.

18

People Party of Canada, https://​www.​peoplespartyofca​nada.​ca/​pipelines.

19

Ha, S., If he becomes prime minister, Mark Carney will ‘immediately remove’ the consumer carbon tax, CTV News, January 31, 2025. (https://​www.​ctvnews.​ca/​politics/​liberal-leadership/​article/​if-he-becomes-prime-minister-mark-carney-will-immediately-remove-the-consumer-carbon-tax/​).

20

Conservative Party of Canada, https://​www.​conservative.​ca/​let-canadians-decide-in-a-carbon-tax-election/​.

21

Conservative Party of Canada, https://​www.​conservative.​ca/​just-the-facts-environment-commissioner-confirms-trudeau-carbon-tax-has-failed/​.

22

Conservative Party of Canada / National Policy Committee, https://​cpcassets.​conservative.​ca/​wp-content/​uploads/​2023/​08/​25121334/​1a7e47096845523.​pdf.

23

Angus Reid, https://​angusreid.​org/​raise-pause-abolish-carbon-tax/​.

24

Angus Reid, https://​angusreid.​org/​fuel-tax-holiday-trudeau-poilievre/​.

25

Ha, S., If he becomes prime minister, Mark Carney will ‘immediately remove’ the consumer carbon tax, CTV News, January 31, 2025. (https://​www.​ctvnews.​ca/​politics/​liberal-leadership/​article/​if-he-becomes-prime-minister-mark-carney-will-immediately-remove-the-consumer-carbon-tax/​).

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2025

E. MontignyPopulism in CanadaPalgrave Studies in Populismshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-89134-2_7

7. Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Post-national State

Eric Montigny1  

(1)

Political Science, Université Laval, Québec, QC, Canada

Eric Montigny

Email: eric.montigny@pol.ulaval.ca

Abstract

This chapter provides an overview of the demographic situation and changes in the migration context in Canada. We then present the mechanisms and main rules of the Canadian immigration system. Accordingly, we also define Canadian multiculturalism and Quebec interculturalism. With the rise in immigration, we provide closer look at the concept of “social capacity.” What does this mean in terms of public policy and immigration management? What about the labor market? What is the link between immigration and the housing crisis or the access to public services? The growth in immigration thresholds under Justin Trudeau’s government was significant. This brings us to examine the place of nativism in Canadian populism. To do so, we analyze the evolution of Canadian public opinion on immigration. We see a growing gap between the largely pro-immigration stance of economic and media elites and the increasingly negative perceptions of a growing segment of the population. This helps us to better understand the evolution of the immigration discourse of Canada’s three main federal populist leaders.

Keywords

PopulismCanadaImmigrationMulticulturalismPost-national stateImmigrationSocial capacityNativism

Canada is a country of immigrants. Justin Trudeau even claimed that Canada is the world's first post-national state. In 30 years, the country has seen one of the most important population growths of the industrialized world. From 27.5 million in 1990, Canada's population is now over 40 million. And this growth is mainly driven by immigration.

Compared to Americans, Canadians have historically perceived newcomers as less of a threat to their economic and cultural values. Indeed, when measured, the relationship between identification with the country and support for immigration and multiculturalism diverges markedly between the two countries (Citrin et al., 2012). Ten years ago, well before Donald Trump, whereas in Canada the relationship was positive, support for immigration and multiculturalism was already negative in the United States.

For a long time, immigration was not a politicized issue in Canada. In fact, the immigration system put in place over the years was widely consensual. However, times are changing. The rapid and significant population growth not only affects regional balances, but also the development of the Canadian economy and the provision of publics services. It also poses integration challenges, whether cultural or even material in terms of housing. This is reflected in the gradual changing public perception of immigration over the years. Becoming less positive, could this change ultimately give traction to a nativist discourse?

Nativism could be defined as “an ideology, governmental policy, or political stance that prioritizes the interests and well-being of native-born or long-established residents of a given country over those of immigrants, typically by advocating or enacting restrictions on immigration.”¹ A right-wing populist discourse, if nativist, develops primarily along socio-cultural rather than socio-economic lines (Hawkins, 2003). The other, the newcomer, is then perceived as a threat to the people's identity and cultural security.

Until now, Canadian populism has generally been exempted from this type of discourse. Adopting a nativist posture, Maxime Bernier was the first to break from this tradition. Without much success. As we will see, Pierre Poilievre remains an advocate of Canadian multiculturalism, but his discourse is evolving in line with Canada's socio-economic capacity to welcome immigrants.

In this chapter, we begin by considering the Canadian immigration context. We will see that the growth in immigration thresholds under Justin Trudeau's government was significant. We will also present the mechanisms and main rules of the Canadian system. Accordingly, we will define Canadian multiculturalism and Quebec interculturalism. In connection with the rise in immigration, we will be taking a closer look at the concept of “social capacity”. What does this mean in terms of public policy and immigration management? What about the labor market? What is the link between immigration and the housing crisis or the access to public services? We will then examine the place of nativism in Canadian populism. To do so, we analyze the evolution of Canadian public opinion on immigration. We see a growing gap between the largely pro-immigration stance of economic and media elites and the increasingly negative perceptions of a growing segment of the population. Finally, we study the evolution of the immigration discourse of Canada's three main federal populist leaders.

A New Canada

Recent years have seen a marked and rapid increase in the Canadian population. Statistics Canada has even developed a real-time model to measure population growth. In September 2024, Canada's total population stood at 41,691,295, with a rate of one new immigrant every 1 minute and 14 seconds, and one new non-permanent resident every 25 seconds. This compares with one new birth every 1 minute and 22 seconds.² The federal agency notes that:

«Canada's population is currently growing at a record-setting pace. In 2022, the number of Canadians rose by 1,050,110. This marks the first time in Canadian history that our population grew by over 1 million people in a single year, and the highest annual population growth rate (+2.7%) on record since 1957 (+3.3%).»³

To understand this rate of growth in immigration, it is important to go back in time using Statistics Canada data. In 1929, Canada's population passed the 10 million benchmark. It took 37 years, until 1966, to add another 10 million. This period was marked by a post-war baby boom. And it took only 26 years, between 1997 and 2023, for the population to rise from 30 to 40 million.

From 1995 onwards, we witnessed a new phenomenon in which the primary source of population growth was immigration. 20 years later, this phenomenon was coupled with an accelerated aging of the population. In 2015, for the first time, the number of citizens aged 65 and over surpassed the number of children under 15.

If these demographic trends continue (based on 2022 data), Statistics Canada's projections for 2041 point to an even more populous, more diversified country, with even greater population disparities between regions.⁴ According to these forecasts, the Canada of 2041 would have:

1.

nearly 50 million inhabitants;

2.

half of its population would either be born outside Canada (up to 34%) or having parents born outside Canada;

3.

in terms of diversity, 2 out of 5 Canadians (double from 2016) would belong to a racialized group. More specifically, one in four Canadians would be of Asian origin, but the Black population would exceed that of Chinese origin.

Geographically, the major cities of Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver would continue to attract most immigrants. In fact, by 2041, 80% of the population of Toronto, the fastest-growing city, would be foreign-born or born to immigrant parents. Given these demographic upheavals, what would be the share of the Indigenous population in the overall Canadian population? Statistics Canada projections predict that they “could range from 5.4% to 6.8% in 2041, compared with 5.0% in 2016.”⁵

With an estimated population of 9.5 million in 2041,⁶ the weight of Quebec, the only jurisdiction in the federation whose common official language is French, would decline and fall below 20% of the Canadian population. This would represent a major shift in the country's political balance. Before the British conquest, Canada was a French-speaking colony. In the regimes that followed, linguistic duality was considered to varying degrees.

In 1982, with the unilateral patriation of the Constitution, the concept of multiculturalism was constitutionaly introduced. A few years later, under a Progressive Conservative government, the federal government's multiculturalism policy was enshrined in law. The latter emphasizes “importance of cultural diversity as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian identity and promotes the idea that all Canadians should have the opportunity to preserve, enhance and share their cultural heritage.”⁷ This model of living together translates into a mosaic in which each new citizen is encouraged to preserve the culture of his or her country of origin.

In terms of public policy, the Act promotes equity, diversity, and inclusion in federal programs. Federal institutions are assigned “a crucial role that federal institutions play in preserving and enhancing multiculturalism in Canada.”⁸ In the political arena, multiculturalism is reflected at the federal electoral level in the political clientelism. It is practiced toward the country's different cultural communities, by Liberals, New Democrats and Conservatives alike. So much so, that many of the digital and traditional communications of the various federal leaders are aimed at highlighting different national or religious holidays.

This clientelism can even translate into targeted political commitments for specific communities, ultimately influencing Canada's immigration or foreign policies. Take, for example, a commitment made by Pierre Poilievre in front of a crowd of Toronto’s Filipino community members to facilitate recognition in Canada of the skills of nurses trained in the Philippines.

But as Reitz, Simon and Laxer (2017) point out:

«Any discussion of Canadian multiculturalism must recognize Québec's distinctiveness (Grabb & Curtis, 2010). From the perspective of Québécois nationalists, the policy reduces the status of French culture to one among many.» (Blad & Couton, 2009).

With interculturalism, Quebec has developed a different model of living together. Developed in response to Canadian multiculturalism, but also to take account of Quebec's social evolution, interculturalism is based “on the idea that equality between the cultures in Quebec requires francisation and secularization of the public domain.”⁹ For Quebec sociologist Gérard Bouchard:

«interculturalism encourages interaction, rapprochements, exchanges and joint initiatives between all components of society, both to better serve the goal of integration and to counter the stereotypes that feed discrimination and exclusion. It is particularly important to ensure that these exchanges help to bring members of the majority and minorities closer together.» (translation)¹⁰

Rather than seeing living together as a mosaic, interculturalism recognizes the foundation of a common culture to which new arrivals are grafted, contributing to its evolution.

From the 1960s onwards, Quebec underwent a major process of secularization. It went from being a place where the temporal power of the Catholic church was dominant to one of the least religious places in the world. In this perspective, Quebec has chosen to legislate in order to provide legal guidelines for reasonable accommodations. Bill 21, adopted in 2019 by the National Assembly was the latest development in a debate which spanned over a decade. The principle of Québec secularization, which is more moderate than French laïcité, stipulates that representative of state authority such as judges, police officers, and teachers must not display any religious symbols in the course of their work. The constitutionality of this law has been challenged in courts and has passed the test of the Quebec Court of Appeal. Pierre Poilievre, Justin Trudeau and Jagmeet Singh were opposed to the law. In line with their shared philosophy of Canadian multiculturalism, they all support the principle of a federal intervention in the Canadian Supreme Court. Two models of integration are therefore confronting one another.

As for Canada's immigration system, it is based on (1) precise rules for the various immigration categories, (2) established selection criteria and (3) annual targets for regular immigration. For 2024, the target set by the Canadian government was 485,000 immigrants and 500,000 per year for the following two years. There are three different categories of immigration. First, there are economic immigrants, selected for their ability to contribute to the economy and meet labor needs. Next come family-sponsored immigrants. This is essentially a family reunification program. Finally, there are refugees, people who have reason to fear returning to their country for security reasons. This is a humanitarian category. Then there are temporary residents, essentially temporary foreign workers and foreign students. In 2023, there were 2.5 million temporary residents across Canada, including 500,000 in Quebec.¹¹

Because of its francophone language and culture, Quebec has a special status in the management of its immigration. Under an agreement between the governments of Quebec and Canada, Quebec is responsible for setting its own targets and criteria for the selection of economic immigrants to its territory. In 2022, Quebec admitted nearly 70,000 immigrants and 50,000 immigrants in 2023. But if we add in temporary immigration, the real annual growth in migration to Quebec in 2023 was a record 217,600 people.¹² In 2023, Quebec received 45% of all refugee applications in Canada, almost double its weight in the federation.

The face of Canada is changing. Historically, immigration to Canada was seen as an economic issue and was managed as such. Now, immigration is becoming a political issue. Over the years, Justin Trudeau has increased regular immigration thresholds. At the same time, as the population ages, the number of temporary immigration authorizations has risen in response to labor shortages in specialized sectors. And a new phenomenon of migrants has developed on the border with the United States. In addition to questions of integration or living together, immigration now raises more logistical issues of public services provision and housing.

Immigration and “Social Capacity”

In Canada, the term “absorptive capacity” is said to have first appeared in the 1930s. It was mainly used by Mackenzie King. The former liberal Prime Minister of Canada used it to justify limits on immigration.¹³ Almost 100 years later, Former Canada's Finance Minister, Chrystia Freeland used the concept of “social capacity” to explain the Liberal government's high immigration thresholds.¹⁴

Similarly, for many years, the Quebec government has used the term “capacité d’acceuil” (welcoming capacity) to frame its thinking on setting immigration thresholds. But how is this capacity to be established? Is it the capacity of public services to respond effectively to new immigration demand? Is it the evolution of the labor market in relation to unemployment indicators? Or is it the capacity to integrate into the culture of the welcoming country?

In 2017, in a widely publicized report, the Auditor General of Quebec severely criticized the government for its failures in francizing immigrants (Vérificateur général du Québec, 2017). In response to this report, François Legault developed a formula to sum up his future government's policy of limiting the annual immigration threshold to 50,000: “En prendre moins, mais en prendre soin” which can be translated into “To take less but take care of them well.” He was also careful to point out that with such a threshold, Quebec would still be one of the most open places to immigration in the world in proportion to its population. And add that his party would make the necessary investments in francization and that the selection of new arrivals would respect selection criteria in line with Quebec values.

In 2024, his pro-independence opponent, the Parti Québécois, indicated that it wished to reduce Quebec's annual threshold to less than 35,000.¹⁵ Paul Saint Pierre Plamondon also called the federal government's migration policy an ideological delusion and a denial of democracy.¹⁶ At the same time, voices were being heard in favor of further immigration. Such is the case of a group said to be close to the federal Liberals, Century Initiative. It was even accused to be inspiring the party's policies. Here is the group's vision:

«Growing our population to 100 million by 2100 would reduce the burden on government revenues to fund health care, old age security, and other services. It would also mean more skilled workers, innovation, and dynamism in the Canadian economy. 100 million by 2100 is not just a number. It's a vision for the Canada we want to build for future generations.»¹⁷

Opposingly, an important voice from the business community, which is generally in favor of immigration, expressed concern for the Canadian economy. A study published in 2024 by the National Bank fueled the debate on the country's social capacity to keep the pace. It concludes that Canada is caught in a demographic trap. With a population growing that fast, no increase in the standard of living is possible. The authors of the study directly questioned the Trudeau government's immigration policy:

«We agree that immigration is good for our potential GDP, but all good things have their limits. Is it possible that the economic capacity to absorb new people is less than the 'social capacity' mentioned by the Minister (of Finance)?» (Marion & Ducharme, 2024).

Some politicians would rather leave it to the experts to come up with the best answer. This was the position of the Parti Québécois in 2018. But can we use demo-economic models to establish the optimum immigration threshold? In 2023, the Fonds de recherche du Québec—Société et culture (FRQSC) and its partner, the Ministère québécois de l'Immigration, de la Francisation et de l'Intégration (MIFI), launched a call for research projects aimed, among other things, at improving our knowledge of Quebec's immigration “welcoming capacity”.¹⁸ Scientifically, however, a certain consensus seems to be emerging that it is rather difficult to establish precisely what constitutes such a threshold. Too many variables are involved. And to establish such thresholds, we may choose, as is the case in Canada and Quebec, to periodically rely on public consultations.

In his book on conservatism and populism, the founding leader of the Conservative Party of Canada made no secret of his pro-immigration stance. Stephen Harper put it this way:

«My views on the desirability of immigration are well known. Good immigration policy can support economic growth. It can also contribute much more. Immigrants can be an overwhelmingly positive source of social energy and cultural diversity. And immigration done right can attract string political support. (...) Bad immigration policy and its cousin, bad multiculturalism policy, two often mask important truths. Immigrants want to succeed, and immigrants want to belong.» (Harper, 2018: 137)

But he also made an important warning to avoid slippage:

«Reward illegal immigration, ignore real security treats, have no economic focus, encourage the kind of multiculturalism that fractures society, and two things will happen. Immigrants will often fail and immigration will be widely resented.» (Harper, 2018: 138)

For Stephen Harper, to remain a positive issue, immigration had to be managed seriously, based on specific priorities and tested mechanisms.

But in the early years of his first mandate, in January 2017, Justin Trudeau set the tone for his government's policy with a tweet that quickly went viral. He wrote:

«To those fleeing persecution, terror & war, Canadians will welcome you, regardless of your faith. Diversity is our strength #WelcomeToCanada.»

According to a journalistic investigation, this new directive from the Prime Minister published on social media had an immediate impact. It “prompted a spike in inquiries from would-be refugees to Canadian embassies abroad and resulted in confusion within the federal government.”¹⁹ This announcement came within hours of Donald Trump's executive order to ban refugees and visitors from mostly Muslim countries. The effect was felt not only in embassies, but also on the ground at the Canada-US border, where an irregular crossing between Quebec and New York State, Roxham Road, saw thousands of migrants seeking a better life. In fact, two-thirds of the 150,000 refugee claimants arriving in Quebec between 2017 and 2022 crossed the border via the Roxham Road.²⁰ Because of its geography, Quebec rapidly became the epicenter of Canada's migration crisis.

And this crisis had repercussions on the capacity of schools, public services, and social assistance. But also, on housing. It has become an issue of federal-provincial relations, not only in terms of social spending, but also in terms of the distribution of refugees across Canada. Criticism of the federal government's management of the border appeared for the first time.

For years, due in part to the aging of the population, a situation of full employment prevailed in many parts of Canada. At the same time, the Trudeau government, like Quebec's authorities, had opened the floodgates to temporary immigration in response to labor shortages in specific sectors. When the economy slowed in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the employment situation deteriorated. Even the Quebec Liberals, who had decried the labor shortage for years, had to admit that Quebec's capacity for integration had been exceeded.²¹

So much so, that the Trudeau government was forced to make a radical and swift change of course. Roxham Road was closed. Having been abolished in the early months of the Trudeau government, visas were re-introduced for Mexicans. A review was initiated to reduce the thresholds for permanent immigration, and measures to reduce temporary immigration were announced at the end of summer 2024. A system that once enjoyed consensus was now the subject of debate and criticism.

What Place for Nativism in Canadian Populism?

During the 2015 election, the French-language leaders’ debate was marked by an acrimonious exchange pitting then NDP leader Thomas Mulcair against Stephen Harper. The argument was over the government's policy of legislating a ban on new citizens being sworn in with their faces covered. The debate had been initiated a few months earlier by a young woman of Pakistani origin. While Justin Trudeau strategically gave his turn to speak to the Green party leader, Mulcair sounded the charge. With a felt emotion, he accused his Conservative opponent of “playing a dangerous political game” and using this issue as a “weapon of mass distraction” to make people forget his record.²² This attack plunged the NDP campaign in Quebec, where the issue of religious symbols was already being debated, without helping the Conservative leader. Shortly after his election, Justin Trudeau symbolically gave the green light to covered-face citizenship ceremonies.

Whether in Quebec or elsewhere in Canada, identity issues do not resonate in the same way in the public arena. It is true that on the Quebec political scene, established political parties have been discussing identity issues for years. This can be explained by the need to protect the French language and culture of a national minority of barely 9 million people, like a small island, threatened by being surrounded by an English-speaking Ocean in North America. This is also due to Quebec’s very different historical relationship with religion than that observed in English Canada. As Justin Trudeau said in a 2015 French-language interview on Radio-Canada:

«In Quebec, we understand that there's a strong identity that we've defended for hundreds of years. We add to that a beautiful diversity, a Quebec culture that's more deeply rooted than what you find in English Canada.»²³

In relation to cultural issues, Meideros (2018) further notes a greater disconnect between elites and the population in English Canada. Thus: “while anglophones in the ROC clearly manifest discomfort related to issues of immigration and integration, these attitudes are seldom voiced by their political representatives.” In his view, the elites of English Canada should stop focusing on Quebec, often in a negative light, and look to their own backyard and start taking seriously the cultural insecurity felt by their citizens. He takes as an example the ban on full-face veils in public services, which was strongly supported by citizens but demonized by elites.

Such a divide provides fertile ground for a populist, even nativist, movement in English Canada. And Meideros (2018) predicts: “While English Canada has avoided the rise of movements similar to those credited with leading to Brexit and to the Trump presidency, it is not immune to this trend.” Before concluding:

«A mature democratic society should be able to discuss and debate responsibly the most uncomfortable of issues affecting its population. If not, a populist and nativist movement that seeks to represent the 'unrepresented' might become a serious political force in English Canada.»

Empirically, the WVS immigration data presented in Figs. 7.1 and 7.2 show contradictory trends toward Canadians attitudes and values. At the time, immigration was still generally viewed positively, but there were signs of change. Figure 7.1 shows a marked increase in the percentage of respondents who do not wish to have immigrants as neighbors. Between 2006 and 2020, this proportion hiked from 4.1% to 8.8%. Is this increase attributable to the survey methodology, considering that the surveys have been done online rather than in person since 2020? The next results of the WVS wave will confirm it or not. In Fig. 7.2, we see that there has been a decrease in the number of respondents who want to prioritize hiring Canadians before immigrants. It went from 47 to 37% between 2000 and 2020.

Fig. 7.1

Evolution of % of People who would not like Immigrant/Foreign Workers has neighbors in Canada WVS (1990–2020)

Fig. 7.2

  When Jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to Canadian over Immigrants - WVS (1990–2020)

But as Fig. 7.3 illustrates, immigration was perceived in 2020 as a problem by an important part of the electorate. One-third of respondents associate immigration with an increased risk of social conflict, while one in 5 saw it as a risk to increase unemployment and crime rates. Nevertheless, more than one in two respondents saw immigration as a solution to fill the labor shortage that prevailed at the time in many parts of the country.

Fig. 7.3

What are the effects of immigrants on… (2020)

The World Value Survey immigration data show contradictory trends toward Canadians attitudes and values. In 2020, a significant proportion of the population associated immigration with negative issues. Three years later, in November 2023, a majority of 53% of respondents surveyed across Canada (n = 1529) by Léger/Canadian Press indicated that the Liberal government was welcoming too many immigrants. In fact, 48% of respondents said that even fewer immigrants were needed than in the past. The impact of immigration on the economy was deemed negative by 45%. Three out of four Canadians said that immigration was contributing to the housing crisis and that immigrants were putting additional pressure on the healthcare system. Nearly two out of three respondents also said that pressure on the school system was due to increased immigration. While 58% said increasing immigration had an impact on the affordability crisis, slightly less (56%) saw immigration as a solution to labor shortages.²⁴

By August 2024, Canadians’ perception of immigration had deteriorated even further, according to a Léger/National Post poll (n = 1602).²⁵ This time, 65% of respondents, up 12% from 2023, said the Liberal government was welcoming too many immigrants. As for the housing crisis and the affordability crisis, at 78%, nearly 4 out of 5 respondents associated them with immigration levels. Canadian immigration policies were also perceived as too generous by 72% of those surveyed. Partisan cleavages also appeared to be forming. Voters who were more supportive of the Conservatives (86%), the Bloc Québécois (75%) and Maxime Bernier's party (81%) were also more critical of high immigration thresholds than those voting liberal (53%) or NDP (46%).

Higher immigration thresholds and increased temporary immigration seem to have influenced public opinion. Will this change in perception toward Canada's immigration be structural or contextual? Once a matter of consensus, immigration now structure’s opinion and divides Canadian voters along partisan lines. In this sense, the concerns raised by Stephen Harper in his book seem to be materializing. In the wake of the pandemic, the rapid growth of immigration has become a real issue on the Canadian political agenda, becoming an even more important concern for the electorate. If problems persist, such movements in opinion could offer some opportunities for a rightward and nativist populist discourse to emerge.

An Analysis of Populist Discourse on Immigration

So what about the exceptionalism of Canadian populism when it comes to immigration? Can we still claim that populism in Canada does not always include a xenophobic dimension in its discourse? To answer these questions, we need to analyze the positions of the leaders of the People's Party, the Conservatives and the NDP on this issue. Have they made immigration a public policy issue or an ideological one? Do their discourses align with the economy or with identity more?

An analysis of the manifesto of Maxime Bernier's party, allows us to establish distinctions between his position and that of Pierre Poilievre's on immigration issues. More specifically, the PPC's manifesto reveals that immigration should be linked with identity issues. For instance, here's how an attack on Justin Trudeau immigration policies takes shape:

«With his cult of diversity, Justin Trudeau has pushed this ideology even further into a form of extreme multiculturalism. He described Canada as the first post-national state, with no core identity.»²⁶

Consequently, the party proposes to abolish the Canadian Multiculturalism Act and to stop all forms of federal funding that support multiculturalism.

And on selection criteria, the PPC insists to protect Canadian identity:

«The primary aim of Canada's immigration policy should be to economically benefit Canadians and Canada as a whole. It should not be used to forcibly change the cultural character and social fabric of our country. (...) It should prioritize Canada's economic interests and be calibrated in a way that does not jeopardize Canadian values and the maintenance of our national identity.»²⁷

As for the immigration thresholds, Maxime Bernier proposes lowering those from 500,000 annually to a range of 100,000–150,000 maximum in normal times and reducing them further in times of crisis.

And on social media and right-wing alternative media, Bernier doesn't hesitate to denounce mass immigration. According to him, Canada is becoming a “third-world” country. He also attacks Poilievre and Ford, calling them “fake conservatives” or “hypocrites” for their openness to immigration.

The Conservatives’ interest in immigration is more recent. In fact, the only proposal on this subject debated at their 2023 national convention concerned ways of facilitating the recognition of immigrants’ professional skills:

«A Conservative Government will work with the provinces to encourage and support Canadian professional and trade associations to expand their academic program accreditation activities internationally for immigration priorities. A Canadian accredited academic program, from inside or outside of Canada, could be used for immigration registration purposes.»

During his leadership election, Pierre Poilievre remained largely favorable to immigration. In many speeches, he praised the integration of his wife's family, who are of Latin American origin. He also unreservedly supports the Canadian vision of multiculturalism.

But in early 2024, Poilievre tied the Liberal government's immigration policy to the housing crisis. He began by proposing linking immigration thresholds to the capacity to build new housing.²⁸ Touring Quebec in June 2024, he explained that, in his opinion, Quebec had reached a breaking point in terms of housing. “There's no more room,” he said.²⁹ He also promised to reduce temporary immigration.

By late summer 2024, his attacks on Justin Trudeau had become more incisive on immigration.

In an exchange with journalists in August 2024, Poilievre was asked to clarify his immigration policy. While not specifying precisely what would be the thresholds, he established criteria that point toward a significant reduction in immigration. Here is a transcript of a post that went viral on TikTok and X:

« First of all, we have to acknowledge that Justin Trudeau has destroyed our immigration system. We had a multigenerational consensus in immigration for literally decade before Trudeau came along. Immigration was not even a controversial issue prior to Trudeau. We brought in hardworking law-abiding citizens in numbers that our housing market, and our job market and our health care system could absorb.»

In addition to attacking Justin Trudeau, he made a distinction between good, law-abiding, hardworking immigrants and fraudsters. He continued his attacks by denouncing the rate of population growth in relation to housing capacity:

«What since then happened? Trudeau and (Sean) Fraser destroyed the Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) by telling their bureaucrat to overlook fraud, by getting rid of the rule that required that you could not bring in temporary foreign workers for low wage jobs in places where there was over 6% unemployment. In other words, where there is a lot of people looking for work. The destroyed the international student program by swallowing rampant fraud and abuse. And increasing numbers to a level that we cannot afford, and they grew the population almost 3x as fast as the housing stocks. That is entirely a decision of Justin Trudeau and the NDP Liberals.»

He clarified his policy by detailing materialist selection capacity criteria:

«When I am Prime minister, the Temporary Foreign Worker Program will be exclusively to fill jobs that Canadians cannot or do not fill like in agriculture sectors, but never to replace Canadians or drive down wages. We will only admit international students if they have their way to pay their bills, a house to live in and a real admission letter in a real educational institution, and population growth will be below the growth in jobs, housing and healthcare. That is a common sense plan.»

For Poilievre, the issue of immigration is first and foremost mathematical and economic. Housing, access to healthcare, the job market, he insists on Canada's capacity to welcome newcomers. His criticisms of Justin Trudeau's immigration policies were reminiscent of Stephen Harper's warnings in his book on populism. Indeed, Pierre Poilievre’s statements suggest that a new Conservative government would return to the immigration thresholds of the Harper era.

As we have previously cited, Pierre Poilievre associates the NDP with the Liberals on immigration. So, what does NDP’s program say?³⁰ Firstly, in addition to recognizing the importance of diversity, the party wishes to increase immigration linked to family reunification. For example:

«Immigration makes Canada stronger, welcoming new talent and energy from around the world to build our communities and boost our economy. Canada is one of the most diverse countries in the world - and we are richer and stronger for it. Yet, under the Liberal government, too many new Canadians are waiting years to reunify with family members. (...) We believe that in Canada, family reunification should be a priority. But thousands of families who hoped to apply to bring a parent or grandparent are let down by the lottery system when the available spots were filled in just minutes. (...) Under the Liberals the backlog of immigration applications for the family members of refugees nearly doubled by 2021 - meaning that people will have to wait years to be reunited with loved ones.»

It also expresses an ideology of open borders in line with Canada's humanitarian role on the world stage:

«As the world experiences an unprecedented refugee crisis, Canada also has a vital role to play in resettling people forced out of their homes by conflict, persecution and disasters. But under the Liberal government, the backlog of asylum seekers is set to more than double in the next few years. A New Democrat government will fix the system to get rid of the backlog, and work with Canadians to resettle refugees in our communities, ensuring they are given the support they need to build successful lives and new homes here in Canada.»

Finally, in terms of identity, immigration is perceived as a source of wealth:

«We know that immigrants strengthen our country, and we will always stand against those who would use fear of our neighbors to divide us.»

Jagmeet Singh's positioning was, as we might expect, much less associated with the economy. For humanitarian and family reasons, the NDP program calls for increased immigration in the family reunification and refugee categories.

***

Considering these discourse analyses, does the Canadian populism exceptionalism still exist when it comes to immigration? The answer is yes. Exceptionalism remains consistent within the main parties. Only the People's Party of Canada has adopted a right-wing populist discourse on immigration. Bernier doesn't hesitate to speak of mass immigration, of the country becoming a third-world nation. At the same time, he denounces multiculturalism and fears for Canada's values and identity. For now, the party’s discourse remained marginal. But will it last? Will the Trudeau government's policies cause the pendulum to swing back?

In Pierre Poilievre's public statements, the Conservative Party of Canada's rhetoric has gradually shifted to place greater emphasis on immigration. Is this shift a response to changing public opinion, or a reaction to Maxime Bernier's outspoken views? Regardless, Pierre Poilievre appears to be following Stephen Harper's strategy. His arguments are primarily grounded in mathematical and economic reasoning, focusing on public policy management rather than ideology. In contrast, the NDP's stance aligns with that of left-wing populists, who champion diversity and open borders.

But as he does on economic and environmental issues, Pierre Poilievre doesn't forget to target the NDP's traditional electorate when it comes to immigration. To do so, he has incorporated a message related to his working-class audience, carefully linking immigration thresholds to the protection of wages.

Since Donald Trump's first term in office, Canadian border management has become a major political issue, especially in Quebec due to the presence of an irregular crossing point for migrants leaving the United States through the State of New York. In 2023, pressure from the Quebec government and the public forced the Trudeau government to close it. But Donald Trump's return to power in 2025 once again rekindled the debate on the Canadian border management. This time, the 47th president is accusing Canada of letting migrants and drugs such as fentanyl through to the south. He is even making border management a condition for avoiding the imposition of tariffs on Canadian products imported into the United States.

The United States and Canada share the longest border in the world. Few had imagined that Donald Trump's rhetoric toward Mexico would one day apply another direction: north. In the final days of his job as Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau was forced to make a series of announcements aimed at tightening border controls and surveillance. What a contrast with the tone of is 2017 tweet, when he opened the Canadian borders in the wake of Donald Trump’s first inauguration.

Footnotes

1

Samie, A. Nativism and governance, Encyclopedia Brittanica, https://​www.​britannica.​com/​topic/​nativism-politics.

2

Statistics Canada, https://​www150.​statcan.​gc.​ca/​n1/​pub/​71-607-x/​71-607-x2018005-fra.​htm.

3

Statistics Canada, https://​www.​statcan.​gc.​ca/​en/​subjects-start/​population_​and_​demography/​40-million.

4

Statistics Canada, be https://​www150.​statcan.​gc.​ca/​n1/​daily-quotidien/​220908/​dq220908a-eng.​htm.

5

Statistics Canada, https://​www150.​statcan.​gc.​ca/​n1/​daily-quotidien/​211006/​dq211006a-eng.​htm.

6

Institut de la statistique du Québec, https://​statistique.​quebec.​ca/​fr/​document/​projections-de-population-le-quebec/​figure/​population-observee-et-projetee-selon-le-scenario-quebec-1986-2066Il.

7

Government of Canada, https://​www.​canada.​ca/​en/​canadian-heritage/​services/​about-multiculturalism​-anti-racism/​about-act.​html.

8

Government of Canada, https://​www.​canada.​ca/​en/​canadian-heritage/​services/​about-multiculturalism​-anti-racism/​about-act.​html.

9

Proulx-Chénard, S., Inteculturalism, The Canadian Encyclopedia, June 22, 2021. https://​www.​thecanadianencyc​lopedia.​ca/​en/​article/​interculturalism​e.

10

Bouchard, G., L’interculturalisme québécois ACFAS Magazine, February 2, 2013. https://​www.​acfas.​ca/​publications/​magazine/​2013/​02/​l-interculturalism​e-quebecois.

11

Colpron, S., Le Québec franchit le cap des 500 000 immigrants temporaires, La Presse, December 20, 2023. (https://​www.​lapresse.​ca/​actualites/​2023-12-20/​le-quebec-franchit-le-cap-des-500-000-immigrants-temporaires.​php).

12

Institut de la statistique du Québec, https://​statistique.​quebec.​ca/​fr/​communique/​croissance-migratoire-record-217-600-personnes-au-quebec-en-2023.

13

Champagne, S.R. La capacité d’accueil, un concept qui rebondit à travers l’histoire, Le Devoir, March 5, 2024, https://​www.​ledevoir.​com/​societe/​808290/​immigration-capacite-accueil-concept-rebondit-travers-histoire?

14

National Post staff, Freeland on why immigration levels are high: ‘Canada has the social capacity to welcome immigrants’, National Post, January 12, 2024. (https://​nationalpost.​com/​news/​freeland-on-why-immigration-levels-are-high-canada-has-the-social-capacity-to-welcome-immigrants).

15

Lévesque, F. Seuils à 35 000 immigrants Le PQ révisera son engagement électoral, La Presse, January 17, 2024. (https://​www.​lapresse.​ca/​actualites/​politique/​2024-01-17/​seuils-a-35-000-immigrants/​le-pq-revisera-son-engagement-electoral.​php).

16

St-Pierre-Plamondon, P., Politique migratoire fédérale: un délire idéologique et un déni de démocratie, Journal de Montréal, January 16, 2024. (https://​www.​journaldemontrea​l.​com/​2024/​01/​16/​politique-migratoire-federale-un-delire-ideologique-et-un-deni-de-democratie).

17

Century Initiative, https://​www.​centuryinitiativ​e.​ca/​why-100m.

18

Gouvernement du Québec, https://​frq.​gouv.​qc.​ca/​lancement-capacite-daccueil-de-la-societe-quebecoise-et-etablissement-durable-des-personnes-immigrantes-en-region/​.

19

Smith, M-D, Trudeau tweet caused influx of refugee inquiries, confusion within government, emails reveal, National Post, April, 03 2018. (https://​nationalpost.​com/​news/​politics/​trudeau-tweet-caused-influx-of-refugee-inquiries-confusion-within-government-emails-reveal).

20

Richer, J. Réfugiés: le Québec submergé depuis le tweet de Trudeau, Journal de Montréal, December 3, 2022. (https://​www.​journaldemontrea​l.​com/​2022/​12/​03/​refugies-le-quebec-submerge-depuis-le-tweet-de-trudeau).

21

Pilon-Larose, H., Le PLQ dit que la capacité d’intégration du Québec est dépassée, La Presse, August 27, 2024. (https://​www.​lapresse.​ca/​actualites/​politique/​2024-08-27/​planification-de-l-immigration/​le-plq-dit-que-la-capacite-d-integration-du-quebec-est-depassee.​php).

22

La Presse canadienne, Niqab et constitution enflamment les chefs, Le Devoir, September 24, 2015. (https://​www.​ledevoir.​com/​politique/​canada/​451007/​en-direct-debat-des-chefs-a-radio-canada).

23

Interview with Patrice Roy, SRC, December 21, 2015.

24

Leger, https://​leger360.​com/​wp-content/​uploads/​2024/​04/​Leger-X-CP_​Immigration-Plan.​pdf.

25

Leger, https://​leger360.​com/​wp-content/​uploads/​2024/​08/​Leger-X-National-Post_​Politics-August-26th-2024-002.​pdf.

26

People’s Party of Canada, https://​www.​peoplespartyofca​nada.​ca/​canadian-identity.

27

People’s Party of Canada, https://​www.​peoplespartyofca​nada.​ca/​immigration.

28

Platt, B., Pierre Poilievre pledges to tie immigration levels to homebuilding, Financial Post, January 12, 2024. (https://​financialpost.​com/​real-estate/​pierre-poilievre-pledges-tie-immigration-levels-homebuilding).

29

TVA Nouvelles, Immigration: «Le Québec est au point de rupture», dit Poilievre, June 20, 2024. (https://​www.​tvanouvelles.​ca/​2024/​06/​20/​immigration-le-quebec-est-au-point-de-rupture-dit-poilievre).

30

New Democratic Party, https://​xfer.​ndp.​ca/​2021/​Commitments/​Ready%20​for%20​Better%20​-%20​NDP%20​2021%20​commitments.​pdf?​_​gl=​1*1uoxtnr*_​gcl_​au*MTI0MzcxMzE3Mi4x​NzI2MjI4Njc5*_​ga*MTM1ODEwMTc4Ny4x​NzI2MjI4Njc5*_​ga_​97QLYMLC56*MTcyNjIyODY3OC4x​LjEuMTcyNjIyODY5​NS40My4wLjA.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2025

E. MontignyPopulism in CanadaPalgrave Studies in Populismshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-89134-2_8

8. Wokeism as Symbol of Cultural Clash

Eric Montigny1  

(1)

Political Science, Université Laval, Québec, QC, Canada

Eric Montigny

Email: eric.montigny@pol.ulaval.ca

Abstract

In this chapter, we examine how the debate over the social values embodied by “wokism” is being mobilized politically in Canada. Is it like the debate observed in the United States? How has it been co-opted from a populist perspective? Are we witnessing a “cultural backlash” in Canada that benefits right-wing populist parties? We attempt to contextualize the debate on “wokism” in relation to the country’s sensibilities and religious values. We also examine the debate surrounding freedom of expression and cancel culture. We then look at how political parties are mobilizing issues of gender and intersectionality. Finally, does this debate resonate with public opinion? Can it help explain the rise of populism in Canada? To better answer these questions, we analyze the positions of party leaders and the labeling war being waged by both Pierre Poilievre and Maxime Bernier to determine who is the most “woke.”

Keywords

PopulismCanadaWokeismCultural clashReligionFreedom of expressionSafe space and cancel cultureGender issuesCanadian public opinion

A Montreal daily, La Presse+, headlined: “American TV taught us this week that, due to an excess of wokeism, Canada no longer deserved its title of ‘best country in the world’”.¹ In April 2024, Bill Maher devoted eight minutes of Real Time, his weekly talk show, arguing that the United States was now a better country than Canada. There was, of course, some irony in this monologue.

But at the end of summer 2024, we may have been witnessing the first signs of a pendulum swinging back. The Canadian-American beer company Molson Coors released a memo to its employees: “it will stop linking executive compensation to employee representation, scrap supplier diversity goals, and no longer engage with the Human Rights Campaign's corporate rankings.”² The brewer of the country's iconic beer “Molson Canadian,” which shares its headquarters between Quebec and Colorado, thus put an end to its diversity, equity, and inclusion policy (DEI). An American conservative activist active on X (formally Twitter) claimed victory. He was threatening to encourage a boycott of the company's products for its “woke” policies. The company denied, saying that this withdrawal “won't change employee benefits or the culture and that, ‘We will continue to welcome everyone at our bar.’”³

In Canada, since 2015, Liberals have stepped up their policies toward discriminated, racialized or marginalized populations. They saw it has a way to mobilize their base. It is also a vision Justin Trudeau seemed to hold dear. But at the same time, DEI policies arouse passions in the media and among citizens. Demonstrations with unlikely allies, veiled women and radical with right-wingers on one side and 2SLGBTQ+ supporters on the other, recently took place: “Across Canada, backers of the 1 Million March 4 Children urged parents to have their children miss class (…) in protest against educating young students about LGBTQ rights at school.”⁴ As some Conservative provinces legislate on gender reassignment for minors, this debate even has constitutional and legal implications. This business decision follows the withdrawal of DEI policies by several American companies, including Ford, Lowe's and John Deer. In Canada, it was seen as a first.

Are we witnessing a “cultural backlash” in Canada that benefits right-wing populist parties? In this chapter, we will look at how this debate, which began south of the border, has been mobilized politically, and how it has been recuperated from a populist point of view. We will attempt to contextualize the debate on wokeism in relation to religious sensitivities and values in the country. We will also look at the debate on freedom of expression and cancel culture. Then we will look at how political parties mobilize gender and intersectional issues. Finally, does this debate resonate with public opinion? Can it help explain the surge of populism in Canada? But first, it's important to briefly situate the label war waged by party leaders on who would be the most woke.

A New Game: Tell Me Who Is the Most Woke?

As soon as he was elected in 2015, Justin Trudeau made it clear that diversity and inclusion would be central to his political agenda. In London, in one of his first speeches abroad as Prime Minister in November 2015, he declared:

«Canada's story proves that diversity and inclusion work. Not just as aspirational values, but as a proven path to peace and prosperity.»⁵

How did this translate politically? On gender, Trudeau formed a cabinet in the parity zone. Fallowing the 2019 election, he created a new role: Minister of Diversity, Inclusion and Persons with Disabilities. In its record of achievement, the Liberal Party also insists: “More support for LGBTQ2 Canadians, including federal legislation to protect trans rights and the first-ever investments in LGBTQ2 service organizations.”⁶

Justin Trudeau's government has also adopted a series of policies and measures aimed at strengthening equity, diversity, and inclusion. For example, DEI criteria were asked in the awarding of federal contracts, as well as grants and fellowships in the academic world. Liberals also put in place new programs targeted at some racialized communities. This was the case with a program to help Black Canadians get business loans with national banks. For the NDP leader, however, such measures were not enough. In the wake of protests in the United States associated with the Black Lives Matters movement, Jagmeet Singh accused Justin Trudeau of not doing enough to combat systemic racism in Canadian institutions.⁷

In Canadian politics, the word “woke” has mostly been given to both the former Liberal and NDP leaders. But what is wokeism? A short definition could be one such as: being “invested in addressing social injustices” (Sobande, 2019). Who could be against that and why? In the world of labor and business, “Woke companies are those that are committed to socially progressive causes, with a particular focus on diversity, equity, and inclusion as these terms are understood through the lens of critical theory.” (Foss & Klein, 2023).

However, Woke is not new expression. Davies and McRae (2023) remind us that it can be traced as far back as the 1930s “to pre-war African Americans responding to their racist persecution.” Moreover, that it was folk artist Huddie Ledbetter who used the phrase “best stay woke, keep their eyes open” to warn victims of racist acts. They also recall that during the civil rights movement in the United States in the 1960s, the term was defined as “being fully politically conscious of one's racial oppression.” The term is said to have returned to the forefront of political debate in the wake of the George Floyd murder in the United States and the rise of the Black Lives Matter social movement. But, in many democracies, wokeism has become a rallying cry on the right to criticize policies of inclusion and diversity, a blessing in disguise for right wing populists.

Studying the British right-wing discourse against wokeism, Davies and McRae (2023) also conclude that the political right associate wokeism “with dangerous, punitive and subversive, Stalinist, Maoist, ‘totalitarian’ ideology or pseudo-religion that is ‘infecting’ British schools and universities, and ‘polluting’ British culture.” According to them, wokeism is just the latest in a series of concepts, like political correctness, which it replaces, “to serve a moral panic about perceived cultural hegemony.” From a term with positive connotations, woke has become a divisive word associated to political attacks.

This observation could also apply to Canada. Here is how Pierre Poilievre defined wokeism when he told conservative members he wanted to be an anti-woke Prime minister:

«The woke movement is a movement motivated by control. It's not about social justice or anything else. It's about creating rules every day. Because it's them, these people in power, who want to force people to follow politically correct rules that are invented every day. This has nothing to do with protecting the public. It's motivated by control. (...) I'm the anti-woke candidate and the candidate for free speech.»⁸

For Poilievre “woke culture” is a threat to freedom. As reported in a March 2023 by a conservative candidate’s tweet, the woke policies would be: “Design to divide people by race, religion, ethnicity and vaccine status.” In this post seen by nearly 220,000 people, he added that once divided, it is easier to control people.⁹

Unlike Poilievre, who insists on a definition mostly based on freedom, Maxime Bernier sees his stand against wokeism as a cultural war. He associates wokeism with a degradation of moral values and as a symbol of the radical left-wing discourse. In that regard, he was quick to criticize the opening ceremonies of the 2024 Paris Olympics as “decadent and degenerate.”

But beyond these definitions, there is a desire to define one's opponents. Pierre Poilievre repeatedly associated the term woke with Justin Trudeau. For example, in his discourse, he even attributed the rise in violent crime to Justin Trudeau's “woke” reforms.

On the right of the political spectrum, there's also a war of words over who is the most woke leader. Pierre Poilievre accused Maxime Bernier of being as woke as Trudeau because of his past positions.¹⁰ And Maxime Bernier accused the Conservatives of not only being afraid of the “woke mob,” but also of believing in the radical gender agenda.

In political communication, successfully defining your opponent is a key to winning an election. The term woke has become an insult, an all-purpose word for attacking opponents and policies perceived as being radical. It is a far cry from what the concept was originally intended to mean. And the label is now widely used in the Canadian media. In the Toronto Sun, a tabloid based in Ontario's capital, a columnist even used the concept to explain the growth in the Conservative vote at the expense of the NDP:

«The anti-woke left is made up of small-L liberals who hold Jean Chretien's views on fiscal responsibility and free speech and reject Trudeau's reckless spending and internet censorship. (...) The anti-woke left also includes blue-collar workers who believe in the NDP's past commitment to respecting unions but reject the NDP's current commitment to accusing hard-working Canadians of being complicit in “systemic racism.”»¹¹

Voters who were once more left leaning would no longer find themselves in the woke discourse of the left. This means that for the right, there would be a new pool of voters to court. And as we saw in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. This is precisely what Pierre Poilievre does with the working class.

Wokeism and Religion

One of the attacks on wokeism is to compare it to a new religion. If this framing opposes wokeism to other religions, we also have to consider that the voters’ level of religiosity is not far off. Workeism does not have the same structuring effect throughout the Western world. In fact, it was mostly initiated in Protestant and Anglo-Saxon countries. For Valentin (2023), this could be explained by the history of religious practice: “post-Protestant” countries (USA, UK) are far more woke than their “post-Catholic” counterparts.

Canada's political history has been marked by religious cleavages. For a long time, being Catholic or Protestant influenced partisan identification. And, except for Irish immigrants, this cleavage was largely based on the country's linguistic duality. For most of the twentieth century, French-speaking Catholics voted mostly for the Liberal Party, while English-speaking Protestants voted more for the Conservatives. Even today, religion retains a real space in Canadian politics. In 2020, according to the data of the World Value Survey for Canada, religion was important for 20% of Canadians, and very important for 16%. It was not so important for 29% and not important at all for 36%.

Justin Trudeau, Pierre Poilievre, and Jagmeet Singh all publicly celebrate the various religious holidays of different denominations. This is part of their promotion of Canadian multiculturalism. Pierre Poilievre, however, does not hesitate to court the vote of members of evangelical Christian churches.¹² Maxime Bernier takes an assertively moral right-wing stance, notably on the issue of abortion.¹³

But the relationship with religion differs between Quebec and the rest of Canada. Quebecers attach less importance to religion in their personal lives and have a lower level of practice than the Canadian average (Dufresne et al., 2019). Since the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, the moral right has lost its political grip in Quebec. Most breakthroughs in 2SLGBTQ+ rights, abortion, medical assistance in dying and even cabinet parity were first initiated in Quebec, before being applied elsewhere in Canada.

Turgeon et al. (2019) have carried out a vast empirical study on restrictions on wearing religious symbols. And they conclude that:

«The difference between Quebec and the rest of Canada appears instead to be a fundamental cultural difference a tale of two liberalisms.» (2019: 261)

Thus, the gap between Quebecers’ support and that of Canadians in other provinces is notably between those who, on either side, most strongly support abortion rights, gender equality, medical aid in dying, same-sex marriage, and decriminalization of prostitution. In other words, the higher a Quebec respondent's score on a liberal values scale, the greater the likelihood that he or she supports the regulation of the wearing of religious symbols. However, the opposite relationship was observed for respondents from the rest of Canada. The higher the score on the liberal values scale, the lower the likelihood of support for this kind of restrictive measure.

Dufresne and Gagné (2021) explain this difference by the historical experience that liberals from the French tradition have with religion. For them, secularization primarily manifests as a critique of religion itself, while liberals from the English tradition perceive religion as merely another expression of individual freedom (Dufresne & Gagné, 2021: 285).

To understand how the debate on wokeism can affect the electorate, it is important to understand this dynamic. For example, this is what makes it possible to fully understand how Andrew Scheer's religious beliefs in the 2019 election had capsized the Conservative campaign in Quebec on the abortion issue. Unlike Bernier, Poilievre does not want to reopen the abortion debate, a debate long associated with the religious right. He is personally pro-choice. In fact, he pledges for no change to abortion, same-sex marriage and cannabis laws.¹⁴

Poilievre also defends the rights of 2SLGBTQ+ minorities: “the freedom to marry, start a family, raise kids; freedom from bigotry and bashing; freedom to be judged by personal character, not by group identity; freedom to start a life and be judged on your merit.”¹⁵ He also denounces the homophobic policies prevalent elsewhere in the world, while repeating that Canada should continue to welcome 2SLGBTQ+ refugees.

Both populists’ leaders appeal to a religious electorate. As the Conservative party has appeared divided in the past on moral issues, this is a complex line for Pierre Poilievre to tread. Strategically, his attacks on wokeism and the Trudeau government's DEI policies allow him to please a more social conservative base, more prevalent in Western Canada, while taking more moderate positions in phase with the median electorate on other social issues, such as abortion.

Freedom of Expression, Safe Space, and Cancel Culture

Protecting freedom of expression is a recurring theme in the speeches of Pierre Poilievre and Maxime Bernier. They generally associate wokeism as hindrances and threats to freedom of expression and to a cancel culture. To illustrate this rhetoric, we will use three cases: (1) the cancelation of popular traditions, (2) the removing of books from libraries, and (3) the issue of academic freedom in universities.

The defense of popular traditions is a recurring theme for Pierre Poilievre. In November 2023, The Canadian Human Rights Commission, which wields broad quasi-judicial powers, argued that a day off on Christmas is “discriminatory.”¹⁶ The commission, in a discussion paper, pointed out that Canada's holiday calendar was mostly based on Christian references, and was therefore discriminatory. In that regard, the celebration of Christmas was seen as a manifestation of “Canada's colonialist religious intolerance” and “discrimination against religious minorities in Canada is grounded in Canada's history of colonialism.”¹⁷

The commission's position caused quite a controversy. So much so that both the House of Commons and the Quebec National Assembly passed motions to support Christmas. The Canadian Human Rights Commission defended itself:

«A discussion paper by the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) on religious intolerance as a form of systemic discrimination has caused quite a stir in recent days. On Wednesday, the Quebec National Assembly unanimously adopted a motion in defense of Christmas. On Thursday, the House of Commons did the same. To be clear, the Commission has not issued a statement or a position on Christmas or any other religious holiday. Of course, Christmas is not racist.»¹⁸

In this debate, Pierre Poilievre described the commission as woke. He also invited citizens to sign a petition to oppose the “Cancel Christmas commissioners.”

A few months earlier, he had also accused Justin Trudeau and his woke culture of wanting to abolish Mother's Day. The debate was sparked by teachers at a Quebec City-area school who said they wanted to replace Mother's Day with Parents’ Day. The idea was justified based on inclusion and diversity objectives: “All these teachers are trying to do, really, is to make schools more inclusive for kids from all types of families” said the executive director of a 2SLGBT+ association..¹⁹

In a tweet, Poilievre likened this debate to wokeism and an idea of state control over people. Beyond a question of culture, he framed this debate in terms of freedom and censorship.

Also associated with wokeism, the issue of book removing in school libraries. This controversy was primarily Ontario-based. Paradoxically, it had been taking place under the Conservative administration of Doug Ford and arose in 2021. In Ontario's French-language school system, some 5000 children's books, such as Asterix and Tintin albums, were destroyed in a move of reconciliation with First Nations. A Radio-Canada journalist reported:

«A flame purification ceremony was held in 2019 to burn some 30 banned books, for educational purposes. The ashes were used as fertilizer to plant a tree, turning the negative into a positive. A video for students explains the process: We bury the ashes of racism, discrimination and stereotypes in the hope that we will grow up in an inclusive country where all can live in prosperity and security.»²⁰

The operation was led by Suzy Kies, billed as a guardian of aboriginal knowledge, but who was also vice-president of the Liberal Party of Canada's Aboriginal Commission. Following a series of investigative journalism, her Aboriginal origins would later be called into question.²¹

A few months later, a new controversy arose, this time concerning the censorship of books, this time in Ontario's English-language school network. At a school in Mississauga, a suburb of Toronto, books such as Harry Potter, The Hunger Games and Roll of Thunder, Hear My Cry, and Anne Frank's “The Diary of a Young Girl” were all removed. This was the result of “a new equity-based book weeding process implemented by the Peel District School Board.”²²The institution explained this move by a directive from the Ontario Ministry of Education given when “the board was placed under provincial supervision in response to allegations of racism and dysfunction.”²³ Stephen Lecce, Ontario's Conservative Minister of Education, disassociated himself from the exercise, saying: “It is offensive, illogical and counterintuitive to remove books from years past that educate students on Canada's history, antisemitism or celebrated literary classics.”²⁴

On social media, Pierre Poilievre denounced it as “Authoritarian wokeism,” a threat to freedom. He framed this issue as a fight against censorship and a fight for freedom of expression.

Universities and academic experts are easy targets for populist leaders. It is true that Universities have seen their share of controversies in medias: protests to ban lecturers, hiring practices, the concept of safe space… Many debates have been associated with the woke movement or puritanism on Canadian university campuses.²⁵ Cases of suspension of professors have also been raised in the public arena, notably at the University of Ottawa in connection with the use of the N-word in class.²⁶

During his campaign for the leadership of the Conservative Party, Pierre Poilievre conveyed a message to Canada's universities. Emphasizing academic freedom and the protection of free speech, he proposed the appointment of a retired judge as a Free Speech Guardian. Additionally, he vowed to connect the distribution of federal research grants to academic freedom.

In a disciplinary case between a professor and his university, the leader of the Conservative Party of Quebec also defended academic freedom. This allowed Eric Duhaine to remobilize his anti-vaccination electoral base.²⁷

The struggle for the freedom of the people and against censorship is also a theme championed by Maxime Bernier. The PPC's program addresses censorship imposed by elites as follows: «

The rights of Canadians to freely hold and express beliefs are being eroded at an alarming speed under the Trudeau government.

A growing number of faculty and administrators-those who should be fighting for open debate of controversial ideas-have become aggressive advocates for censorship.»²⁸

In addition to attacking Justin Trudeau, Maxime Bernier's platform takes direct aim at university administrators, accusing them of contributing to censorship.

Bernier also goes much further than Pierre Poilievre by adopting a masculinist discourse on social media to attack university professors. They have, according to him, an ideological agenda: “More young women than men now attend university and are being brainwashed with woke nonsense by communist professors” he declared on X in January 2024. He even added that, with this agenda, the radical left had succeeded in destroying the traditional family.

A New Debate on Gender Issues

“I wish everyone a happy Pride month, because our freedom is something in which all of us can take pride.”²⁹ These words from Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre might suggest that political debates on gender are a thing of the past in Canada. But the reality is far more complex. This time it is a mobilizing issue with a focus on youth, transgender people, and women's rights.

In the wake of the debate initiated by the measures taken by Donald Trump in the United States after his election, Pierre Poilievre felt the need to say that “he is only aware of two genders—male and female—and that the government should leave questions of gender identity alone.”³⁰ He did not, however, specify whether he would ask the new American administration to recognize the gender-neutral “X” marker, which is available on Canadian passports.

In 1969, Canada decriminalized homosexuality. “There's no place for the State in the bedrooms of the nation” declared the then Minister of Justice, Pierre Elliot Trudeau.³¹ Nearly 50 years later, in 2017, his son Justin made an official apology to LGBTQ+ people who had experienced injustice within the federal government and the military. Civil union, which recognizes essentially the same rights as same-sex marriage, was first introduced in Quebec in 2002. In 2005, however, federal legislation made same-sex marriage official throughout Canada.

Since 2020, it has been a criminal offense to subject a minor to conversion therapy in Canada, or to “extricate” him or her abroad to return him or her to the path of heterosexuality. It is also a crime to make an adult undergo such therapy against his or her will. This amendment to the Criminal Code was adopted unanimously by MPs and senators. Quebec has also amended its Civil Code to prohibit such therapies. These advances, in line with the evolution of society, had generated little debate.

The same cannot be said of issues associated with the rights of transgender or non-binary people. In 2016, Bill C-16 was passed without the unanimous support of the Senate and House of Commons. This bill incorporated the concepts of gender identity and gender expression into the Canadian Human Rights Act, making them protected rights. The Criminal Code was also amended to link them to provisions against hate propaganda, incitement to genocide, and aggravating factors in sentencing.

The gender debate has found its way into provincial jurisdictions, notably in relation to the rules to be applied in schools or to minors. More right-wing governments, such as Saskatchewan and New Brunswick, have chosen to legislate in relation to the names given at birth to students. In 2020, New Brunswick first legislated (Bill 713- Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity) to prohibit the use of the preferred name of transgender and non-binary students without parental consent.

For the Saskatchewan government, which followed New Brunswick's lead: “The bill outlines a number of rights that parents have to be involved in their children's education and invokes the notwithstanding clause of the Canadian constitution to ensure parents must provide consent if a child wants to change their gender identification in school.”³² For its opponents, who see it not only as a question of rights but also of health for the young people concerned, this law is seen as a measure “directly aimed at gender non-conforming students.”³³

Alberta Premier Danielle Smith announced measures that would go further than in New Brunswick and Saskatchewan. In 2024, “Alberta has unveiled a sweeping new set of rules aimed at transgender youth, from age restrictions on medical treatment to pronoun usage in schools to sport.”³⁴ Elsewhere, the Quebec government cautiously chose to entrust a committee of experts with the mandate of proposing guidelines.

This debate has also reached federal politics. The Liberals denounced the new provincial laws: “Canada's minister for women, gender equality and youth says Saskatchewan and New Brunswick's decision to require students under 16 have parental consent to have schools use their preferred pronoun and names places trans kids in a “life or death situation.””³⁵ By expressing his support for the measures proposed by Danielle Smith, Pierre Poilievre also aroused the ire of Justin Trudeau, for whom his opponent’s “attack on transgender people puts vulnerable Canadians at risk.”³⁶

At the 2023 Conservative convention,³⁷ underage sex change was one of the topics discussed under the angle of protecting children's mental and physical health. Thus:

«A Conservative government will protect children by prohibiting life altering medicinal or surgical interventions on minors under 18 to treat gender confusion or dysphoria, and encourage positive mental and physical health support for all Canadians suffering from gender dysphoria and related mental health challenges.»

Conservative activists also debated the definition of a woman and outlined specific rights:

«For clarity, the term “woman” used throughout this CPC Policy Declaration means “female person.” The Conservative Party supports the full participation of women in the social, economic, and cultural life of Canada, and believes their unique identity and contributions should be celebrated and supported. The Conservative Party of Canada believes that women are entitled to the safety, dignity, and privacy of single-sex spaces (e.g., prisons, shelters, locker rooms, washrooms) and the benefits of women-only categories (e.g., sports, awards, grants, scholarships). The Canadian workforce has evolved to include more women than ever. We believe all Canadians have the right to freedom from discrimination in the workplace and equality of opportunity. Individuals should be only judged on skills, qualifications and merits. Women must be entitled to equal pay for equal work. We condemn discrimination against girls through gender selection abortions.»

Other criticisms of DEI policies were also heard:

«A Conservative government will restore merit in Canada's innovation by directing hiring practices associated with federal research funding away from ideology and instead emphasizing first and foremost, supporting and retaining Canada's top research talent, irrespective of personal immutable characteristics.»

Maxime Bernier's attacks on those issues are more virulent. On X, he notably shared images of a transgender teacher, asking the “woke bureaucrats” if his picture “is an appropriate display of one's gender identity?”

His party's program states³⁸:

«With the active support of the woke far left and all establishment parties, radical trans activists are trying to transform society in a way that curtails everyone's freedoms. This radical agenda, which contradicts basic biological realities, is proving particularly harmful to women and children. In recent years, cultural Marxists and radical activists in the media, government, and schools have made every effort to normalize toxic transgender ideology.»

And it calls for these measures: «

Modify the Criminal Code to outlaw the use of puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones, and any form of bodily mutilation on minors with the goal of ‘transitioning’ to another sex. Moreover, any person encouraging minors to “transition” could be held criminally responsible for attempting to cause harm.

Remove the ban imposed by Bill C-4, the so-called “conversion therapy bill”, on helping minors who suffer from gender dysphoria accept their body.

Stop funding groups that promote radical gender ideology.

Strictly enforce section 163.1(1) (b) of the Criminal Code in order to remove inappropriate pornographic content from schools and libraries.

Protect women's spaces—prisons, shelters, bathrooms, and changing rooms—from intrusion by biological men.

Maintain separate competitions for women in which biological men cannot participate in sports regulated and funded by the federal government.

Abolish federal programs to fund sex change operations for civil servants and prisoners.

Repeal Bill C-16, the bill that added gender self-identification as ground for protection against discrimination.»

Drag Queens are another of Maxime Bernier's targets. In fact, his program states that “Cultural fads like Drag Queen Story Hours are promoting this ideology among children and making it appear normal to identify as the other sex or as different invented genders.” In so doing, he echoes the stance taken by the leader of Quebec's Conservative Party on the subject. According to Eric Duhaime, who has invited citizens to mobilize and sign a petition, the government must stop funding such activities “which would expose Quebec children to drag queens” in daycares, libraries, and schools.³⁹

Does Wokeism Have Traction in Canadian Public Opinion?

It is always tricky to pit individual rights against the wishes of the majority. This is necessary, however, to understand whether there is a cultural clash in Canada on the issues associated with wokeism and a real opportunity for populists to make electoral gains on such issues.

Initiated by Pierre Elliot Trudeau, the Canadian Charter of Human Rights is a strong symbolic element of Canadian political identity. Yet, according to the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, a non-partisan national public policy think tank, “the structure of Canadian public opinion indicates that there is considerable potential for right-of-centre parties to increase the salience of culture wars issues.”⁴⁰ The general finding of their study: there is a risk for the Liberal Party and parties left-of-center. A risk that other parties will be able to mobilize the electorate around these issues. In fact, when it comes to culture wars, Canadian public opinion is no different than those observed in the United States or in the United Kingdom.

In order to understand this risk, data presented in a report from this Institute published in February 2024 can be examined:

75% oppose gender reassignment surgery for under-16s.

85% oppose teaching children that “There is no such thing as biological sex, only gender preference”.

80% oppose attempts to cancel gender-critical feminists J.K. Rowling and Kathleen Stock;

78% agree that “political correctness has gone too far;

70% oppose the idea that Canada is a racist country, and a similar share do not want this taught at school;

70% prefer a color blind rather than color-conscious approach to issues in society.

In a proportion of 2 for 1, a majority of respondents wanted parents to be informed by their school when a child under 16 wanted to change their first name at school. The same ratio was observed in relation to the issue of transgender women's participation in women's sports competitions.

The study also revealed socio-demographic differences. Even if the attitudes of the two linguistic groups were very similar on the issues associated with the culture wars, Francophones were found to be more skeptical than Anglophones about gender ideology, color-conscious equity, and diversity policies. Similarly, young people would be more sensitive to the Woke reality than their elders, as would be the biggest users of social media and people who have taken diversity training. On the contrary, this type of training would be a source of anxiety for others.

Other survey on specific issues confirmed such trends. A Léger poll confirmed that 3 times as many respondents supported the principle behind the laws passed in Saskatchewan or New Brunswick than those who opposed them.⁴¹ An Angus Reid poll showed that only 14% of respondents should not be informed or required to give consent for their child's name change at school.⁴² Another study also shed light on a more nuanced reality on the presumed openness of younger people to cultural issues (Choy, 2023).

A survey conducted by Pollara in 2023⁴³ revealed that the term “woke” had become a politically charged expression, but that a large proportion of the population still had difficulty defining it properly. While 25% of Canadians called themselves woke, only 14% of Quebecers did so. Among voters of the various parties, 50% of NDP supporters called themselves wokes, 40% of Green Party voters and 33% of Liberals. Among the other parties, the figure fell below 20%, with 17% for the Conservatives, 15% for the CFC and barely 10% for the Bloc Québécois.

***

Being on the right of the political spectrum on issues associated with the culture wars doesn't automatically make one a populist. Despite this, where there is a significant gap between the dominant discourse in the public arena and public opinion, there is space and opportunities for populists.

When the rhetoric used to put gender identity issue on the agenda attacks an elite draped in moral superiority or ideology, cultural clash issues could be recuperated by populists. This is what Maxime Bernier does. In the same way, a populist discourse could also take the form of a conspiracy. When Pierre Poilievre denounces woke policies created by an elite who wants more control over people, this is what he seems to be doing.

In Canada, as in the United States and the United Kingdom, there is potential for political parties to turn the issues associated with cultural clash into genuine election issues. But it would take the will of credible political entrepreneurs to mobilize them successfully. In fact, the culture war is no guarantee of political success. In 2024, Blaine Higgs suffered a crushing defeat in New Brunswick after attempting to make the gender identification of children a wedge issue. Not only did the conservative premier lost power to the Liberals, but he was also defeated in his own riding. That said, the economy seems to remain Poilievre’s most important issue, and the working class is main target. For his part, if Maxime Bernier is more insistent on cultural wars issues than his Conservative opponent. He is also more radical.

As discussed in Chapter 1, the media plays a crucial role in the populist framing of issues (De Vreese et al., 2018). Culture clash polemics are often initiated by the media before being reinforce by political parties. Furthermore, as Eric Montpetit (2024) pointed out (see Chapter 4), intellectuals are increasingly perceived as the new elite. Consequently, under the banner of wokeism, it is not surprising that books, gender theories, and universities have become collateral targets in this cultural war.

Footnotes

1

Hachey, I, Trump, la faute du Canada, La Presse, April 19, 2024. (https://​www.​lapresse.​ca/​actualites/​chroniques/​2024-04-19/​trump-la-faute-du-canada.​php).

2

Green, J. Coors Beer Maker Joins Ford, Lowe’s in Diversity Retreat, Bloomberg, September 03, 2024. https://​www.​bnnbloomberg.​ca/​business/​2024/​09/​03/​coors-beer-maker-joins-ford-lowes-in-diversity-retreat/​.

3

Del Rosario,S. Molson Coors latest to back away from DEI after conservative pressure, San, September 4, 2024. (https://​san.​com/​cc/​molson-coors-latest-to-back-away-from-dei-after-conservative-pressure/​).

4

Cabrera, H, Protesters gather in downtown Montreal over sex ed and LGBTQ rights, CBC, September 20 2 023. (https://​www.​cbc.​ca/​news/​canada/​montreal/​september-20-lgbtq-rights-protest-1.​6973255).

5

Prime Minister of Canada, https://​www.​pm.​gc.​ca/​en/​news/​speeches/​2015/​11/​26/​diversity-canadas-strength.

6

Liberal Party of Canada, https://​liberal.​ca/​our-progress/​.

7

CBC News, Trudeau announces new loan program for Black entrepreneurs as Singh calls for action against systemic racism, September 9, 2020. https://​www.​cbc.​ca/​news/​politics/​trudeau-black-entrepreneurs-1.​5717297#:​~:​text=​Prime%20​Minister%20​Justin%20​Trudeau%20​today,tackle%20​systemic%20​racism%20​in%20​Canada.

8

Poilievre, P., on X https://​x.​com/​PierrePoilievre/​status/​1562119914063798​273.

9

Baber, R., on X, https://​x.​com/​Roman_​Baber/​status/​1641957630003277​825.

10

Rebel News, Maxime Bernier denounces Poilievre for calling him ‘woke like Trudeau’, (https://​www.​rebelnews.​com/​maxime_​bernier_​denounces_​poilievre_​for_​calling_​him_​woke_​like_​trudeau).

11

Jivani, J., Liberal-NDP coalition excludes the Anti-Woke Left, Toronto Sun, April 10, 2023. https://​torontosun.​com/​opinion/​columnists/​jivani-liberal-ndp-coalition-excludes-the-anti-woke-left.

12

Akin, D. In groundbreaking move, Poilievre campaigns among evangelical Christians, Global News July 5, 2024. https://​globalnews.​ca/​news/​10604598/​in-groundbreaking-move-poilievre-campaigns-among-evangelical-christians/​.

13

Baxter, D. ‘WE’RE NOT AFRAID’: PPC would ban some abortions, Bernier announces, Winnipeg Sun, May 17, 2023. (https://​winnipegsun.​com/​news/​provincial/​were-not-afraid-ppc-would-ban-some-abortions-bernier-announces).

14

The Canadian Press, Poilievre reiterates: No changes to abortion, same-sex marriage and cannabis laws in Tory plans, The Gazette, June 05, 2024. (https://​montrealgazette.​com/​news/​politics/​poilievre-reiterates-no-change-to-abortion-same-sex-marriage-and-cannabis-laws-in-tory-plans).

15

Slark, C, Poilievre slams Bernier’s Brandon visit as ‘stunt’, The Brandon Sun, June 3, 2023. (https://​www.​brandonsun.​com/​local/​2023/​06/​03/​poilievre-slams-berniers-brandon-visit-as-stunt).

16

Hopper, T., Federal commission declares Christmas holiday is ‘religious intolerance’ National Post, November 24, 2023. (https://​nationalpost.​com/​opinion/​federal-commission-declares-christmas-holiday-is-religious-intolerance).

17

Canadian Human Rights Commission, https://​www.​chrc-ccdp.​gc.​ca/​en/​resources/​publications/​discussion-paper-religious-intolerance#fn4.

18

Canadian Human Rights Commission, https://​www.​chrc-ccdp.​gc.​ca/​en/​resources/​course-christmas-not-racist-we-never-said-it-was.

19

Serebrein, J., ‘Woke’ decision to replace Mother's Day with celebration of parents at a Canadian school stirs controversy, National Post, May 11, 2023. (https://​nationalpost.​com/​news/​canada/​controversy-after-quebec-teachers-replace-mothers-day-with-celebration-of-parents).

20

Gerbet, T., Des écoles détruisent 5000 livres jugés néfastes aux Autochtones, dont Tintin et Astérix, Radio-Canada, September 7, 2021. (https://​ici.​radio-canada.​ca/​nouvelle/​1817537/​livres-autochtones-bibliotheques-ecoles-tintin-asterix-ontario-canada).

21

Gerbet, T., Livres détruits: la « gardienne du savoir « n’est pas Autochtone, Radio-Canada, September 8, 2021. (https://​ici.​radio-canada.​ca/​nouvelle/​1822333/​livres-suzy-kies-gardienne-savoir-parti-liberal-autochtones).

22

Brockbank, N.and King, A., ‘Empty shelves with absolutely no books’: Students, parents question school board's library weeding process, CBC, September 13, 2023. https://​www.​cbc.​ca/​news/​canada/​toronto/​peel-school-board-library-book-weeding-1.​6964332.

23

Rushowy, K. and Allen, K. Education Minister Stephen Lecce orders Peel school board to stop throwing out books, Toronto Star, September 13, 2023. (https://​www.​thestar.​com/​politics/​provincial/​education-minister-stephen-lecce-orders-peel-school-board-to-stop-throwing-out-books/​article_​8011924e-32e5-5908-8092-72e772885df3.​html).

24

Idem.

25

Wells, I., The New Campus Puritanism: free speech, safe spaces, and the limits of tolerance, Literary Review of Canada, May 2018. (https://​reviewcanada.​ca/​magazine/​2018/​05/​the-new-campus-puritanism/​).

26

CBC News, Debate continues year after U of O professor's use of N-word in class, October 17, 2021.https://​www.​cbc.​ca/​news/​canada/​ottawa/​ottawa-professor-uses-derogatory-word-1.​6214139.

27

Bossé, O. Duhaime demande à la ministre d’intervenir en faveur du professeur Provost, Le Soleil, April 20, 2024. (https://​www.​lesoleil.​com/​actualites/​politique/​2024/​04/​30/​duhaime-demande-a-la-ministre-dintervenir-en-faveur-du-professeur-provost-L3Z5JHCZQVGOBDMG​HHIBKPS7MQ/​).

28

People’s Party of Canada, https://​www.​peoplespartyofca​nada.​ca/​freedom-of-expression.

29

Robertson, D., Poilievre wishes Canadians a happy Pride month—but won't say if he'll attend an event, CBC, June 2, 2023. (https://​www.​cbc.​ca/​news/​politics/​poilievre-pride-month-parades-1.​6864017).

30

The Canadian Press, Poilievre says he’s only aware of two genders, challenges interviewer to name others for him ‘to consider’, National Post, January 22, 2025. (https://​nationalpost.​com/​news/​politics/​pierre-poilievre-genders-interview).

31

CBC News, ‘No place for the state in the bedrooms of the nation’, June 21, 2018. (https://​www.​cbc.​ca/​archives/​no-place-for-the-state-in-the-bedrooms-of-the-nation-1.​4681298).

32

Saskatchewan Government, https://​www.​saskatchewan.​ca/​government/​news-and-media/​2023/​october/​12/​parents-bill-of-rights-introduced-in-legislature.

33

Dubeau, K. Inclusionary Practices of Gay-Straight Alliances for Gender Non-Conforming Students, University of Saskatchewan, June 19, 2024. (https://​education.​usask.​ca/​news/​2024/​2024-bill-137-limiting-the-inclusionary-practices-of-gsa-for-gender-non-conforming-students.​php#:​~:​text=​Bill%20​137%20​requires%20​students%20​under,preferred%20​names%20​without%20​parental%20​consent).

34

Boyed, A., Here’s how Alberta plans to restrict surgery, hormone treatment for transgender youth, Toronto Star, February 15, 2024. https://​www.​thestar.​com/​news/​canada/​alberta/​heres-how-alberta-plans-to-restrict-surgery-hormone-treatment-for-transgender-youth/​article_​2f46462c-c08f-11ee-85a4-a7c243e291bd.​html.

35

Taylor, S. Saskatchewan, New Brunswick naming changes means ‘life or death’ for trans kids: Ien, The Canadian Press, August 31, 2023. (https://​www.​thecanadianpress​news.​ca/​national/​saskatchewan-new-brunswick-naming-changes-means-life-or-death-for-trans-kids-ien/​article_​5e71e03d-3d15-5989-aa6a-e6b613be4025.​html).

36

McCharles, T., Pierre Poilievre’s attack on transgender people puts vulnerable Canadians at risk, Justin Trudeau says, Toronto Star, February 21, 2024. https://​www.​thestar.​com/​politics/​federal/​pierre-poilievres-attack-on-transgender-people-puts-vulnerable-canadians-at-risk-justin-trudeau-says/​article_​c601eee4-d0ee-11ee-9883-8f5e7af9c02a.​html.

37

Conservative Party of Canada/National Policy Committee, https://​cpcassets.​conservative.​ca/​wp-content/​uploads/​2023/​08/​25121334/​1a7e47096845523.​pdf.

38

People’s Party of Canada, https://​www.​peoplespartyofca​nada.​ca/​radical_​gender_​ideology.

39

Radio-Canada, Éric Duhaime ne veut pas que les enfants soient « exposés « aux drag queens, April 12, 2023. (https://​ici.​radio-canada.​ca/​nouvelle/​1971209/​conservateur-quebec-petition-conte).

40

Kaufmann, E. The politics of culture wars in contemporary Canada, MacDonald-Laurier Institute, February 15, 2024. (https://​macdonaldlaurier​.​ca/​politics-of-culture-wars-canada/​).

41

Huras, A., Majority side with N.B. premier on gender identity: poll, National Post, June 13, 2023. (https://​nationalpost.​com/​news/​canada/​majority-side-with-premier-blaine-higgs-on-gender-identity-poll).

42

Angus Reid, https://​angusreid.​org/​canada-schools-pronouns-policy-transgender-saskatchewan-new-brunswick/​.

43

Pollara, https://​www.​pollara.​com/​wp-content/​uploads/​2023/​05/​WokeMediaPoll-May2023-rev.​pdf.

Conclusion

Populism Made in Canada

For many Canadians, Donald Trump's first election in 2016 was seen as strange. Americans had opted for an eccentric billionaire TV star. His second election in 2024 was unsettling. From the very first days of his presidency, he had Canada in his sights. Trade war, tariff hikes, threats of annexation by repeating that his northern neighbor would have to become the 51st US state, his aggressive rhetoric caused alarm. Doug Ford estimated job losses of 400,000 for Ontario, while François Legault put the figure at 100,000 for Quebec. For the first time in its modern history, Canada was facing a real threat and hostile behavior from its main economic partner. On the other side of the same coin, the United States was attacking its main export customer. This threat was caused by a populist who had become a role model and inspiration for many authoritarian leaders around the globe.

When Pierre Poilievre was elected leader of the Conservatives, Justin Trudeau's Liberals went to great lengths to portray him as a Trump-style populist. They hoped this would scare voters. This demonization didn't work. At least, not until Donald Trump returned to power. However, it may have contributed to Donald Trump turning his relationship with Justin Trudeau into a personal affair that goes far beyond American interests.

Populism is a fad, some say. It is sign of the times. And it was only a matter of time before a more assertive populist discourse crossed the border and emerged in Canada. After all, all Western democracies are afflicted by this rise. They have forgotten that populism is not disembodied. It certainly takes a political entrepreneur to foster its emergence. It does, however, develop based on specific conditions, notably in relation to an economic context. In Canada, the economic crisis that followed the pandemic created such conditions.

This does not mean, however, that the populism emerging on the Canadian scene is the same as that which came to power in the United States. Indeed, right from the start of the trade war with the Trump administration, Pierre Poilievre chose his side. Taking on Donald Trump head-on is no easy task, as part of the Conservative leader's base is less critical of the American president than the median Canadian voter. He attacked the American president's ambition against Canada, while offering his collaboration to the Liberal government in a time of crisis.¹ In response to Trump's threats, he also adjusted his speech, putting forward the slogan Canada First, while putting aside that Canada was broken.

But populism made in Canada is not new. It builds on a long tradition, with its roots mainly embedded in the western part of the country. Before gaining significant influence at the federal level, populism was able to shape the political life of several western provinces. But by bringing together truckers to occupy Ottawa in 2022, the Freedom Convoy illustrated this new populist surge attacking political elites. Notably fueled by social media, the pandemic and public anger toward Justin Trudeau’s government have made it possible to revive or even unleash such anti-system discourses. Justin Trudeau's diversity policies have surely also contributed to the pendulum swinging back.

So far, only Maxime Bernier has taken a nativist perspective on the issue of immigration. Regarding Russia and abortion rights, he has also adopted a discourse closer to American right-wing populism. On climate change, he endorsed conspiratorial theories. He even wanted to “make Canada great again”. With no electoral success, he was the only one trying to use Trump’s playbook.

But since Pierre Poilievre took over the Conservative Party, populism in the Canadian federal landscape is no longer marginal. The legacy of the Reform Party is now carried by the dominant faction within the Conservative Party of Canada. The rise of populism has brought about a significant change in Canadian political dynamics.

In January 2025, Poilievre's continuing popularity in the polls in 2023 and 2024 led to Justin Trudeau's resignation. This political crisis within the liberal party occurred while Canada was facing its greatest existential crisis since the 1995 Quebec referendum: Donald Trump. To protect its working-class vote, a populist escalation on the left occurred with former NDP leader Jagmeet Singh. Attacking the greed of large corporations against small workers became a central promise of this leader.

Could there exist a uniquely Canadian type of populism? While Maxime Bernier seems to be inspired by the one developing in the United States, Pierre Poilievre appears to have opted for his own Canadian recipe. What are its ingredients? How does this compare to the populism observed in other democracies? To answer these questions, we have employed various analytical frameworks as well as the populist positioning of parties on different issues, such as the economy, environment, immigration, and cultural war-related topics.

While confidence in Canadian institutions has remained relatively stable and polarization within the party system is still lower than in the U.S.  how can we explain the rise of populism in Canada? In this book, we have sought to understand how this evolution in Canadian politics has occurred. We identify three explanatory factors: 1) a favorable post-pandemic context, 2) an effective political entrepreneur, and 3) a realignment of working-class voting.

The End of the Canadian Exception?

When we analyze longitudinally the confidence in Canadian political institutions, we observe stability over a 20-year period until 2020, the year of the COVID-19 pandemic. A slight majority of Canadians reportedly have a negative level of trust in Parliament, the media, and the government. During this period, only political parties have experienced a significant deterioration in confidence. A majority of Canadians still trust their electoral process and experts. In 2020, 9 out of 10 Canadians expressed their attachment to democracy. This is an upward trend since in 2000, only 8 out of 10 felt this way. Thus, we cannot say there is an authoritarian or anti-democratic challenge to the Canadian political regime. Moreover, when Canadians are forced to choose between the values of freedom or equality, nearly 2 out of 3 respondents choose freedom (Fig.C.1). This helps us better understand Bernier and Poilievre's insistence on the theme of freedom in their discourses.

Fig. C.1

Most important value between freedom and equality for Canadians. Source WVS (2020)

The Canadian electorate remains divided on several issues. However, this division does not arise from a political polarization like that experienced in the United States. In Canada, politics is certainly marked by significant regional divisions. But it fits into a fragmented party system where multiple political parties compete. This multiparty system is so fragmented that in the past 20 years, in six federal legislatures, the parties in power have had to operate with a minority in Parliament. In contrast, during this period, only two governments have managed to secure a majority of seats. To advance its political agenda, this implies that the government must navigate in a context of alliances and compromises with opposition parties.

In countries with a more consensual parliamentary system, strong checks and balances, and a respected independent press, populism is much less likely to undermine liberal democracy. Essentially, this remains the case in Canada. Could this change with the election of a populist leader at the head of the federal government? That remains to be seen.

Poilievre’s Populist Effect

The election of a populist leader to head the Official opposition changed the game. Born in 1979, Poilievre is nonetheless an old hand in politics. He has previously served as a minister in the Harper government. By becoming the leader of the Conservatives—an established governing party with a defined electoral base—he has legitimized a populist discourse among a broad segment of the electorate.

According to various criteria established in the scientific literature, Pierre Poilievre is indeed a populist leader. To echo those of Moffitt and Tormey (2014), he repeatedly appeals to the people in his speeches, asserting that his political project is based on common sense. By consistently renaming his party to the “Conservative Party of Common Sense,” he sees himself as the custodian of common good. In his discourse, Poilievre also emphasizes crises. When he stated that Canada is broken, he highlighted the dysfunctions of the country and attributed them to Justin Trudeau. Crises of inflation, housing, opioid addiction, and crime thus became arguments to criticize the Liberal government. He did so with an emotion and anger that stand in stark contrast to the usual Canadian political culture. He did not hesitate to use irreverent language against his opponents and other societal actors. He also staged anti-system spectacles, such as supporting the Freedom Convoy in person in front of Parliament or getting expelled from the House of Commons for hurling insults at the Prime Minister. In the 2025 election, he attempted to polish his image to appear as a potential Prime minister. However, only a few days after the election, he resumed his attacks on the liberals big spending. He also took care to add that his party would also vote with the government when it would be good for Canada, witch it did on an Bill to enact free trade and labor mobility in the country. In line with the Conservative agenda, this bill also enables rapid federal approval for major industrial projects such as mines, pipeline and ports.  

At the age of social media, Pierre Poilievre is also a communication master. The leader of the Conservatives heavily relies on disruptive communication practices identified by Sorensen (2023). In this regard, he is a modern populist whose actions disturb traditional institutional communication. For example, Poilievre adopts anti-system messages and behaviors that aim to destabilize the usual functioning of institutions and push the boundaries of social acceptability. This is evident in his criticisms of media bias and his defiant attitude toward other actors. In his discourse, he constructs an alternative reality by playing on perceptions and beliefs. For instance, he employs a didactic tone to explain a problem or theory. This is the case with his association of “wokeism” to a desire or agenda for state control over individuals’ values. He also refers to the term “gatekeeper” to suggest that journalists or public servants are there to manipulate or harm the population. Consequently, he presents himself as an honest man fighting against a malevolent and controlling elite, claiming his authenticity as someone who comes from a modest background and understands the realities and difficulties faced by people.

While criticizing traditional media, Poilievre utilizes various platforms to directly reach his targeted electorate. He has established a narrative that captures attention, sometimes through controversy. However, as he rose in the polls, he remained disciplined, keeping his message aimed at a target audience that allows to broaden his electoral base. This message has a common thread, and key phrases repeated in various contexts. He was also disciplined, not to cross certain red lines. For example, regarding immigration, Poilievre carefully linked his criticisms to the housing crisis and public services. He framed it as a public policy issue based on mathematics, not identity.

However, the debate on the future of Canadian multiculturalism may not be over within the Conservative Party. Following the introduction in 2025 of a bill by the Quebec government (Bill 84) to define its model of interculturalism, voices are being heard elsewhere in Canada calling for a reflection on Canadian multiculturalism, this time asking Poilievre to adopt Quebec's togetherness vision on a Canadian scale.²

Nevertheless, in this debate, criticism of multiculturalism and immigration would not be any harsher than that of the leader of the People's Party. Maxime Bernier already took more radical positions. For example, he did not hesitate to adopt a nativist stance on immigration by evoking Canada’s third-worldization. Bernier also made masculinist remarks, denies climate change and talks about green terrorism. To make headlines during the COVID crisis, he even broke the law.

Referring to the populist typology developed by De Vreese et al. (2018), Bernier fits within what they term complete populism, incorporating reference to and appeal to the people, anti-elitism, and the exclusion of marginalized groups. He targets immigrants and criticizes university professors, as well as the decadence of moral values caused by marginalized groups. In contrast, Poilievre limits himself to an anti-elitist type of populism. As we discussed, his discourse includes references and appeals to the people. He emphasizes on anti-elitism by primarily aiming at political actors, traditional media, and lobbyists.

This typology helps us understand the fundamental distinctions between the discourses of the two politicians. While initially, Maxime Bernier may have seemed like a serious threat to the Conservatives, his presence seems to have had the reverse effect. In comparison, Poilievre's populism appears less extreme and more reasoned. Positions that might seem radical are perceived as more acceptable than those defended by the People's Party of Canada. Moreover, by no longer mentioning cryptocurrency, Pierre Poilievre softened some angles after becoming leader. Will he stay on this path? Will Donald Trump's return have an even more moderating effect?

The rise of populism on the right of the political spectrum has also influenced the left. As we have seen in Chapter 2, the history of the NDP is marked by its populist roots. Since the arrival of Pierre Poilievre at the leadership of is party, we have witnessed a populist one-upmanship. Jagmeet Singh couldn't remain silent in the face of Conservative attacks. He was already critical of the economic elites. He became more assertive, claiming to be the only one speaking for the people and the working class. To defend his traditional electorate, he has chosen to adopt a style similar to that of the Conservative leader. And to make this positioning more credible, he tore up the parliamentary coalition agreement he had signed with Justin Trudeau's Liberals.

A New Conservative Populism Based on Haper’s Playbook

Success in politics generally requires two ingredients: fortune and virtue, according to the adage derived from the writings of Machiavelli. For virtue, it requires being well-prepared and working steadily to take power. For fortune, it means being fortunate enough to have the right timing to reap what you have sown. This new rise of populism in Canada did not just happen by chance.

It occurred in a favorable context. That is what the end of the pandemic offered. The cost-of-living crisis, coupled with the introduction of the carbon tax, enabled Pierre Poilievre to develop an economic discourse that reached a broader clientele: people whose personal situation had deteriorated after the pandemic. By repeating his Axe de Tax message, Pierre Poilievre has also turned Justin Trudeau's climate policies into a veritable symbol of the rising cost of living. He turned the carbon tax into a political wedge.

Pierre Poilievre's speech was based on a greater anger toward Justin Trudeau. But in both style and tone, Pierre Poilievre has channeled the frustrations of a significant part of the electorate. Prime minister since 2015, it was Trudeau’s turn to pay the price for the wear and tear of power. This climate of tension and anger toward the Trudeau government began to manifest itself in the 2021 election, but the Freedom Convoy has freed a feeling of frustration and an increasingly aggressive tone on social media. The siege of Parliament therefore marks a turning point. It unleashed a populist discourse. Poilievre has chosen to seize the moment. He took a risk by associating himself with it when a majority of Canadians opposed the occupation of the federal capital. It did, however, enable him to attract attention and articulate his own discourse. But, unlike Maxime Bernier, he was able to evolve at the same pace as the Covid crisis.

Moreover, a favorable context alone is not enough to explain this new surge of populism in Canada. It also takes political entrepreneurs who will succeed in imposing such a discourse. This is why the strategy developed by Stephen Harper in his book on populism (2018) is so important. In it, the former Prime minister defends the thesis that to regain power, the Conservative Party must adopt a populist turn. But a less radical populism than that seen south of the border with Donald Trump as president of the United States. And this Canadian-style populism should focus on one thing: winning the working-class vote.

In other words, to succeed, it had to steal some of the NDP's traditional voters. To regain power, the NDP had to be weakened, whereas previously the Conservatives had relied on a stronger NDP to sneak ahead of the Liberals. However, this meant a major shift in positioning for the Conservatives, who were perceived as being closer to the business community than to the unions. Pierre Poilievre methodically succeeded in doing just that. Instead, Maxime Bernier chose a type of populism inspired by American Republicans. And that doesn't work with the Canadian electorate.

Finally, the working-class electorate had to be receptive to this change. Judging by the adjustments made to the NDP's strategies and the resulting populist spiral, the target was hit. Jagmeet Singh has adapted his message to speak more to the working class, even if it means downplaying the ideas he was defending in connection with culture wars topics or climate change. In British Columbia, even the NDP government abolished its provincial carbon tax. Let’s recall that British Columbia was the first jurisdiction in Canada to impose real carbon pricing.

Canadian Populism 2.0

What implications does the rise of populism in Canada have for our understanding of populism worldwide? Does this mean that no democracy is immune to this trend? As we have seen, the Canadian political context is important. Based on our study of the Canadian case, three observations can help reflect on the evolution of populism.

1.

The transformation of the means of communication used to reach voters, even in an established democracy, is forcing politicians to adopt a more direct strategy to talk and mobilize new categories of voter. To do so, even established parties with a history of government may be tempted to use populist rhetoric.

2.

The issue of climate change, when combined with the cost of living, can become as powerful a tool for mobilizing voters. Maybe even more than the issue of immigration. The pricing of carbon has repercussions on the budget, but also on the lifestyle choices of voters. So, it is not only an economic or public policy issue. It is also a lifestyle and cultural wedge. Therefore, research on culture clash and lifestyles must also include environmental issues.

3.

The working-class vote is a target that now cuts across traditional divides. Whether on the left or the right, this electorate is coveted by two political players who have adopted an anti-elitist populism. The result is a spiral of populist one-upmanship. On the other hand, the only party who adopted a complete populist stance remains marginal.

The Conservative leader has reappropriated a populist discourse that originated in Western Canada a long time ago. He has brought it up to date. This right-wing populism 2.0 is neither nativist nor in favor of a more direct democracy. It targets people's everyday lives, the issues they face, and the role of government. This enables this new strand of populism to hunt on the NDP's turf to its left, while neutralizing Maxime Bernier to its right. Will this be a lasting realignment of Canadian politics? Whatever the case, it is Pierre Poilievre's primary objective to win. He has demonstrated that he is prepared to use any means at his disposal to achieve this goal.

If Pierre Poilievre is ever elected, would he then govern like Doug Ford or Danielle Smith? This is a legitimate question. But one thing is certain: for this made-in-Canada populism, Pierre Poilievre is not using Donald Trump's playbook. He is rigorously and methodically applying the playbook written by his mentor, Stephen Harper.

Paradoxically, Pierre Poilievre's biggest obstacle in his quest for power was another populist: Donald Trump. His election and his attacks on Canada have put the Conservative leader in a difficult position. This time, the big bad guy was no longer a domestic political player. He had a different face from Justin Trudeau. Donald Trump diverted attention away from the main issues of the 2025 election, which were supposed to be inflation and the cost of living. It was if Donald Trump's name was on every ballot. And the Liberals did not hesitate to associate Poilievre's populist style to Trumpism.  For a large part of the electorate, the Canada/US relations became the ballot question. For them, fear seemed to replace anger, to the detriment of other domestic issues.  This change even forced the Conservative leader to abandon his anti-system rhetoric. Parliament became useful again in times of crisis and had to be convened as a matter of urgency. He even reached out to a departing Justin Trudeau and made proposals to face this new economic crisis and inflation resulting from Trump’s tariffs policies.

In Quebec, comparing Donald Trump's comeback to the Covid pandemic, François Legault, resurrected his narrative of leadership in times of crisis. Eric Duhaime chose to keep a low profile on issues related to U.S. President. Ontario Premier Doug Ford has instead chosen to tackle Donald Trump head-on. He even triggered a snap election by hammering home the message that Canada was not for sale. As for Alberta's Premier, Danielle Smith unsuccessfully went to meet Trump in Florida at Mara Largo to calm the President's desire to impose tariffs on Canadian oil. She then unenthusiastically joined the consensus of Canada's premiers on a global strategy to avoid tariffs. But, in response to the reelection of the Liberals, she opened the door to a referendum on Alberta's independence.   

The real villain has become Canada’s southern neighbor's populist leader. And little by little, Canadians anger at their government turned into fear for the country's security and economic foundations. This fear has also inspired patriotism and a surge of solidarity in response to threats from the United States. Proof that Justin Trudeau's dream of a Canadian post-national state was just a myth.

Will the new surge of populism in Canada last? Is Poilievre's more moderate populism the best antidote to that of the American administration’s complete populism? Or, on the contrary, based on what is happening in the United States, will the new populism practiced by the Conservatives be seen as a deviation to be avoided?

Liberal Mark Carney has also adapted his narrative. As former head of the Bank of Canada, he knew how to deal with the 2008 financial crisis. As head of the Bank of England, he had to manage the Brexit transition and deal with populists. The Liberal contenders to succeed Justin Trudeau quickly made their choice to attempt a chance at being reelected. The first casualty of the new Canadian populism surge was the government's carbon pricing policy. It was quickly consigned to oblivion. Conservative, Liberal and NDP leaders, all want to “axe the tax” on carbon. The fight against climate change will have to wait.

Footnotes

1

CPAC, Pierre Poilievre Responds to US Tariffs, February 2, 2025. (https://​www.​cpac.​ca/​headline-politics/​episode/​pierre-poilievre-responds-to-us-tariffs--february-2-2025?​id=​dd80cb4e-0b9e-4542-9139-d8c29a60caf5).

2

See: Sharma, N. This is what Poilievre’s Canada First movement should look like, National Post, February 3, 2025. (https://​nationalpost.​com/​opinion/​neil-sharma-this-is-what-poilievres-canada-first-movement-should-look-like?​taid=​67a0a53680b4da00​016d2bef&​utm_​campaign=​trueanthem&​utm_​medium=​social&​utm_​source=​twitter).

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