The Anthropology of History

THE VARIETIES OF HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

Edited by
Stephan Palmié and Charles Stewart



The Varieties of Historical Experience

This book considers how history is not just objectively lived but subjectively experienced by people in the process of orienting their present toward the past. It analyses affectivity in historical experience, examines the digital mediation of history, and assesses the current politics of competing historical genres. The contributors explore the diverse ways in which the past may be activated and felt in the here and now, juxtaposing the practices of professional historiography with popular modes of engaging the past, from reenactments, filmmaking/viewing, and historical fiction to museum collections and visits to historical sites. By examining the divergent forms of historical experience that flourish in the shadow of historicism in the West, this volume demonstrates how and how widely (socially) the understanding of the past exceeds the expectations and frameworks of professional historicism. It makes the case that historians and the discipline of history could benefit from an ethnographic approach in order to assess the social reception of their practice now and into a near future, increasingly conditioned by digital media and demands for experiential immediacy.

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The Anthropology of History
Series Editors: Stephan Palmié and Charles Stewart

Anthropologists have taken apart Western assumptions about Law, Economics and Religion in order to overcome ethnocentrism in the study of these domains in other societies. The category of History, however, has not been subjected to such treatment. Although anthropologists and historians have collaborated to produce a large and vibrant subfield of 'History and Anthropology', they have tended to be guided by a readymade model of history. There has been little systematic reflection on the Western commonsense idea of history, nor much focus on the particular assumptions about the past that animate other societies. With this book series, we are calling for a new orientation that will concentrate squarely on how people, whether far away or within our own society, establish relationships with the past.

Examples of such alternative historicities (culturally particular ways of relating to the past) include spirit possession, popular genealogy and genomics, rituals ranging from shamanic practices to Easter processions, reenactments, and video gaming among many other possibilities. The editors invite monographs that approach the question of history through historical research, ethnography, cultural studies or other relevant methodologies. The past may be experienced through various senses and genres including music, drama, film and digital media thereby making the Anthropology of History a wide domain of interdisciplinary collaboration extending beyond Anthropology and History to approaches from Music, Art, Archaeology, Drama, and STS.

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The Varieties of Historical Experience
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Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2019
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN: 978-1-138-31514-3 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-429-45652-7 (ebk)

Typeset in Sabon
by Apex CoVantage, LLC

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Preface

This volume grew out of discussions between the editors that go back at least a decade. Both of us are sociocultural anthropologists who worked for periods in history departments, and our areas of ethnographic expertise (the Mediterranean in Stewart's case, the Caribbean in Palmié's) can hardly be studied without engaging the deep and turbulent pasts of their respective social and cultural formations. We have each published essays and monographs with significant historical dimensions, and we regard the historical method as an indispensable element of anthropology's epistemic tool kit. Yet both of us, at some point, came to realize the limitations of the kind of anthropological historicism that first emerged under the label ethnohistory in the 1950s, and came to prominence in our discipline under the rubric historical anthropology from the 1980s onward. To be sure, this new rapprochement between anthropology and history produced some of the finest monographs of the late twentieth century: examples range from Verena Stolcke's *Marriage, Class, and Colour in Nineteenth Century Cuba* (1974), Renato Rosaldo's *Ilongot Headhunting* (1980), Marshall Sahlins's *Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities* (1981), Eric Wolf's *Europe and the People Without History* (1982), Richard Price's *First Time* (1983), William Roseberry's *Coffee and Capitalism in the Venezuelan Andes* (1983), J.D.Y. Peel's *Ijeshas and Nigerians* (1984), Sidney Mintz's *Sweetness and Power* (1985), Ann Laura Stoler's *Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatra's Plantation Belt* (1985) Frank Salomon's *Native Lords of Quito in the Age of the Incas* (1986), Gerald Sider's *Culture and Class in Anthropology and History* (1986), and Timothy Mitchell's *Colonizing Egypt* (1988) to David Sabean's *Property, Production and Family in Neckarhausen* (1990), Jean and John Comaroff's *Of Revelation and Revolution* (1991–97), Nicholas Thomas's *Entangled Objects* (1991) or Michael Herzfeld's *A Place in History* (1991). These were books that we read in graduate school, or soon after, and they proved eminently inspirational. Gradually, however, we came to realize that few of them – Sahlins and Herzfeld being perhaps the most notable exceptions – effectively problematized the epistemic infrastructure of Western academic historicism.

Unsurprisingly, the first reaction against anthropologists' (and historians') attempts at historicizing non-western pasts came from non-Euroamerican

scholars, most importantly from the Subaltern Studies group of Indian historians and critics such as Ranajit Guha, Ashis Nandy, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Dipesh Chakrabarty. As anthropologists belatedly discovered history, these scholars in many ways developed a rival approach. They asked if extending Western historicism to the rest of the globe might blot out local forms of relating the past that did not fit within the discursive regimes of European and American academic history. The irony in this is easy to see, and actually quite exquisite: just as anthropology came to reflect on its own involvement in colonialist projects and grasped the inevitably historical nature of all human sociality, it became clear that it could not be our task to extend to non-western people versions of their histories modeled on that of the West, nor to integrate such versions as subsidiary plots into supposedly universal narratives of world history. While calls for the historicization of anthropological praxis go back to the 1950s, what few of our colleagues realized was that, as Sahlins (1985) argued, history was socially relative: "other cultures, other historicities".

In our own work on matters such as dreaming or spirit possession as forms of historical praxis inadmissible within the evidentiary paradigm of academic history, we came to similar conclusions: rather than simply integrating historicism into anthropology, ought we not first inquire into the history, conditions of possibility, and ontological presuppositions of what Karl Mannheim termed the "Worldview of Modernity"? As a "North Atlantic Universal" (in Rolph Trouillot's deliberately paradoxical formulation) might history – in the sense that academic historians use the term – not turn out to be a far from self-evident way of relating to the past of one's own or other societies? If so, might not anthropologists train their comparative lenses on historicist "past making" itself — as one, among many other epistemic practices generative of what J.G.A. Pocock in 1961 felicitously called socially organized "past relationships"?

Together with Eric Hirsch, Stewart took a step in this direction by organizing a panel on "Ethnographies of Historicity" at the 2004 biennial meetings of the European Association of Social Anthropologists in Vienna (published in the journal *History and Anthropology* in 2005). In 2013, the two of us organized a double panel on "The Anthropology of History" at the American Anthropological Association meetings in Chicago, which appeared as a special section of the journal *HAU* in 2016. The present volume, in turn, grew out of an interdisciplinary symposium "The Varieties of Historical Experience" held under the auspices of the University of Chicago's Neubauer Collegium for Culture and Society in April 2014. It inaugurates the Routledge Series "The Anthropology of History" under our joint editorship. In contrast to the *HAU* special section, which assembled contributions by sociocultural and linguistic anthropologists, the present volume is deliberately multidisciplinary in orientation. In additional contrast, this volume deliberately focuses on "The West", i.e. Europe and North America, the homeland, so to speak, of historicism – originally a provincial, but nowadays an increasingly globalized form of relating to the past.

The goal of our initial Neubauer symposium, and now this volume, was *not* to show how "Western History" conflicts with non-Western ways of conceiving of and relating to the past. On the contrary, what we aimed to probe was the uneven spread – and problematic status – of historicism even within its supposed home territory. We took advantage of the symposium location in Chicago to address the USA as a representative example of a Western society with a thriving variety of co-existing types of historical experience. The majority of contributors to this volume offer studies focusing broadly on North America. They include: Steven Conn on the history profession; Lily Hope Chumley on biographers; James S. Bielo on a creationist museum, Cailín E. Murray on Native American remains; Mark Auslander on reenactments of lynchings; William J. Turkel and Edward Jones-Imhotep on digital history; and Ivan Ross on art and films depicting the Civil War. To these contributors we added a smaller number of contributions providing a European comparative perspective: Vanessa Agnew on recollecting the past through music audition; Ann Rigney on the mediation and remediation of the Battle of Waterloo; and Jonah Rubin on exhumations in contemporary Spain. The French historian François Hartog closed proceedings at the symposium, as he closes this volume, with a thought piece on presentism. Obviously, we are deeply grateful to all of the contributors for their participation at the symposium, and their commitment to producing the essays which allowed this book to come to fruition.

We would also like to thank the University of Chicago faculty members who delivered striking insights as session chairs, and commentators on the papers: Dipesh Chakrabarty (History); Judith Farquhar (Anthropology); Constantin Fasolt (History); Rachel Fulton Brown (History); and Françoise Meltzer (Comparative Literature). We owe a special thanks to Michael Silverstein (Anthropology) for reading Marshall Sahlins's paper in his stead.

* * *

As conveners of the original symposium and now editors of this volume, we have incurred many debts of gratitude. Foremost, we would like to acknowledge the generous financial support from the Neubauer Collegium, the University of Chicago's Department of Anthropology, and the University of Chicago's Department of History. We also thank David Nirenberg, then director of the Neubauer Collegium, as well as his wonderful staff members Josh Beck and Jamie Bender. Jamie, in particular went out of her way to make sure the logistics of the symposium went as smoothly as possible. A good deal of the event's success owes to her. On the Routledge side, we thank Katherine Ong for her confidence in the idea of this book and book series; Marc Stratton for his good advice on procedural matters; and the two anonymous readers who offered helpful commentary and critique.

Finally, and this should go without saying, we thank our partners Doris and Deena for their unflagging support of all the craziness they had to put up in living with anthropologists like us for so many years.

1 Introduction

The varieties of historical experience

Stephan Palmié and Charles Stewart

> In the tale of human passion, in past ages, there is something of interest even in the remoteness of time. We love to feel within us the bond which unites us to the most distant eras, – men, nations, customs perish; THE AFFECTIONS ARE IMMORTAL! – they are the sympathies which unite the ceaseless generations. The past lives again when we look upon its emotions, – it lives in our own! That which was, ever is! The magician's gift, that revives the dead, that animates the dust of forgotten graves, is not the author's skill, – it is the heart of the reader.
>
> – Edward Bulwer-Lytton. *The Last Days of Pompeii* (1834)

> Nonetheless, it did not take long for me to register, in the apparent silence of these corridors, that there was some movement, some whisper which was not dead. These papers, these parchments deposited long ago were asking nothing less than to come into the light of day. These papers are not just papers, but the lives of men, provinces and populations. . . . And as I blew away their dust I saw them rise up. They rose out of the crypt; here a hand, there a head like that in the Last Judgement of Michelangelo, or in the Dance of the Dead. The galvanic dance that they performed around me, that is what I have tried to reproduce in this book.[1]
>
> – Jules Michelet. *Histoire de France* (1835)

The feeling of knowing the past

Going by the title, a reader might pick up this book expecting to learn how people in the past experienced life. At least since the rise of the New Social History in the 1960s, the elucidation of the historical experience of "common people" has become central to the discipline of history. As E.P. Thompson urged the members of his discipline in 1968, their task was no longer to recount the history of "great men". It was to rescue the experience of "the poor stockinger, the Luddite cropper, the 'obsolete' hand-loom weaver . . . from the enormous condescension of posterity" (Thompson 1968 [1963]: 12). Thompson's injunctions fell on fertile grounds. His methodological intervention in a field then dominated by quantitative methods and the

epistemology of structural Marxism led, among other things, to the flourishing of histories focused on the everyday lives of working classes, ethnic minorities, women, and other marginalized subjects (not, however, without incurring criticism concerning the reification of subaltern experience – such as Scott 1991). Whereas social historians and many other historians along with them seek to recover the full range of people's daily experiences in past times, this volume addresses a much more circumscribed domain of experience, namely the activities, techniques, and sensations through which people feel they come in touch with, or even enter into the past with – the types of experience that Bulwer-Lytton and Michelet extol in the epigraphs.

Social historians' attempts to know the past from the inside thus remain central to this volume but with an important twist: rather than exploring the experiences of past populations in order to approximate how it might have been to live through, for example, the Conquest of Mexico as a Native American woman or a Spanish foot soldier; the French Revolution as an aristocrat or sans coulotte; or the American Civil War as a Southern slave or Northern industrial worker, we ask a rather more restricted but at the same time substantially different question. What experiences do people *in a given present* undergo in order to relate to the past as a significant and often affectively charged aspect of their current lives? This volume concerns, in other words, how history is subjectively *experienced* by people in the process of orienting their present toward the past.

In presenting case studies of practices such as the reenactment of a Jim Crow–era lynching (Auslander, this volume), the temporal transportation felt while listening to indigenous Brazilian music (Agnew, this volume), or the cultivation of emotional responses during exhumations of Spanish Civil War victims (Rubin, this volume), our contributors consider the diverse ways in which the past may be activated and felt in a here and now. How and why the past can and does become palpable in our present-day experience is a genuinely anthropological question, and this volume aims to probe exactly this issue. Neither is this merely a matter of theoretical interest. If otherwise ostensibly irreconcilable high modernist thinkers such as Karl Marx and Henry Ford could agree on one thing, it was that the past no longer held any relevance for the present: "Let the dead bury their dead", and "history is bunk" they opined respectively. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, such a consensus (never mind between such ideological opposites) no longer exists. The profusion of living history exhibits, historical docudramas, past-themed computer games, or battlefield reenactments belie such confident opinions. A systematic demand for "experiences of the past" (not just the sporadic tendency to meditate on the past or recall it nostalgically) is currently expanding, and detailed work goes into scripting, engineering, and staging the most popular forms. With what desired results in mind, for example, are Civil War films shot (Ross, this volume) or creationist museum exhibits conceived and mounted (Bielo, this volume)? In addressing "the

varieties of historical experience", this volume opens for social scientific consideration the techniques that produce, induce, or otherwise conduce to the feeling of "being in touch" with the past.

Historical reenactments, historical feature films, docudramas, and video games such as *Brothers in Arms: Road to Hill 30* (Rejack 2007) and other manifestly performative and highly sensorial modes of engaging the past have not generally been conceded the status of "history". At the same time, historiography[2] is not usually thought of as an activity geared toward or informed by "experience" (though it undoubtedly is, as we will see). The practice of professional historians appears to stand apart as the yardstick against which other historicizing practices are judged to be "experiential", a label implying insufficient detachment and lack of critical reflection resulting in a less trustworthy version of the past.[3] The reasons for this are well-known. As Tacitus famously proclaimed in the first century CE, history should be written "*sine ira et studio*" (without anger or favor, without bitterness or partiality). Though the Renaissance and Baroque periods saw rather different – namely sensually persuasive – deployments of narratives of the past (Burke 1969; Maravall 1985), this view of history as dispassionate was reemphasized in the nineteenth century when the discipline of history espoused a rigorous form of reasoning influenced by procedures developed in legal scholarship and the natural sciences (Conn, this volume). History eventually solidified as an academically enshrined activity centered on the methodical critique of evidence of the past, the colligation of the data so derived, and the marshaling of these data into the most plausible narrative of the past.[4] These and other procedures governing objective analysis, which history shares with many other social science and humanities disciplines, including anthropology, distinguished professional historiography from less acceptable practices, such as popular antiquarianism or historical fiction.

The ideal of objectivity, furthermore, implied a view from nowhere occupied by an observing subject who stood apart from, comprehended, and ultimately represented the object of study – the past, in the case of historians (Novick 1988). To date, most discussions of objectivity in history have concerned the matter of veracity under a correspondence theory of truth. This volume concentrates on a different concomitant of objectivity, namely the question of experience and embodiment. A view from nowhere supposes not only an ideal perspective but also the elimination of bodily or affective interference that could cause bias. In historiography as in science, too much emotion and embodiment putatively impeded good research (Lawrence and Shapin 1998: 4). As the historians of science, Daston and Galison (2007: 375) have shown, epistemology required insulation from "the tumult of experience" and the seductive projections of the imagination. Scientists in the nineteenth century thus hoped to eliminate the distorting factor of human subjective involvement by utilizing meters, graphs,

mechanical measuring devices, and photography in order to allow nature "to speak for itself" (Daston and Galison 2007: 120; see also Turkel and Jones-Imhotep, this volume). Historiography's parallel contention has been that immersion in documentary evidence could practically allow the facts of the past to speak for themselves.

If we adopt a general definition of experience as a form of interiority based on the registration of sensory impressions by an individual, then even the historian reading quietly in an archive or sitting at a desk typing is having experiences, even possibly historical experiences, where the past is directly felt or perceived.[5] Historical experiences occur along a spectrum from narrow to broad sensory bandwidth; from mentally processing information in the climate-controlled calm of one's study to running across a Civil War battlefield on a 90-degree day carrying a pack and authentic rifle through a cacophony of shouts and explosions. One of the original departures of this collection is that it juxtaposes the practices of professional historiography with popular modes of engaging the past such as public history (Conn, this volume), reenactments (Auslander, this volume), historical fiction (Rigney, this volume), biography (Chumley, this volume), pictorial media and film (Ross, this volume), web crawlers, and digital storage or retrieval mechanisms (Turkel and Jones-Imhotep, this volume) as varieties of media that convey or induce historical experience. Acquiring knowledge is not cordoned off as an exclusively cerebral and conceptual enterprise but is widened to include sensual and performative ways of knowing, many of which are backed by their own implicit philosophies and cosmologies. A genuinely anthropological approach to history (Palmié and Stewart 2016; Stewart 2016) requires this ethnographic appreciation of the ways in which people – in this case, our "modern" Euro-American contemporaries – know the past: not in the manner in which educational institutions impress indexical dates like 1066, 1789, or 1939 upon primary and high school students in Western nation-states but in the way that iconic signifiers such as the "Norman Yoke", the "Declarations of the Rights of Man", or Nazi Germany's attempt at global totalitarian domination inform how we all view and experience our respective worlds and anticipate their futures (cf. Wineburg 2010; Hodges forthcoming)

Although modern historians teach their students to avoid anachronism, the cardinal sin of "presentism" (i.e., reconstructing the past in the light of contemporary concerns) cannot be avoided. As Benedetto Croce (1921: 12) famously argued, "Every true history is contemporary history" – in the sense that the historian's interest and engagement with a particular period or figure of the past inevitably grow out of the historian's present experience.[6] What is more, the experiences of historians and those of reenactors may not always occupy polar extremes. Jules Michelet's epigraph to this Introduction, in which he describes his experiences upon entering the Archives de France for the first time, may be booked as romantic rhetorical excess. But

consider as sober a thinker as the great Dutch historian Johann Huizinga commenting on what he termed "historical sensation". On viewing some unexceptional engravings by the seventeenth-century Dutch artist van der Velde depicting people moving to a new house, he reported:

> [I]t may well be that such a historical detail in an engraving, or in a notarial act for that matter, while it may be indifferent to me, may suddenly give me the conviction of an immediate contact with the past, a sensation as profound as the profoundest enjoyment of art, an (don't laugh) almost ekstatic experience of no longer being myself, of a flowing over into the world outside myself, of a getting in touch with the essence of things, of the experience of Truth by history. . . . It is a pathos, an ebriety of the moment. . . . It is familiar to you, is it not? . . . This is the nature of what I call historical sensation.
>
> (Trans. Ankersmit 2005: 126)

Although the means of arriving there are very different, Huizinga's description of this experience converges on that of an African American participant in the reenactment of a slave auction in St. Louis. As this man, Arthur, told the anthropologist Mark Auslander (2013: 162):

> I can't explain it, something happened to me up there, standing on that block. I looked out there, and it wasn't just my eyes I was seeing through. I was seeing what somebody else saw, a long time ago, being torn away from everyone they loved. I felt what my ancestors must have gone through. . . . Up there on the same block, I guess you could say I was touching the past and, the past, well, it was touching me.

The adherence to scientific protocols such as dispassionate reason has by and large prevented historians from publicizing their own personal, affective experiences of the past and the excitement of its retrieval. Perhaps it is the case that heuristics are deemed much less important than the validation of whatever was found.[7] Sensitive to the possibility of ridicule, Huizinga asks the reader not to laugh at his account while at the same time he ventures on the generality of the experience: "[Historical sensation] is familiar to you, is it not?" In her contribution to this volume Lily Hope Chumley draws on confessions divulged by biographers about their – at times astonishingly intense – emotional relationships to the (often deceased) people they write about. Such registrations of intimate historical experiences lead one to suspect that similar data could be collected from a wide range of historians (Wineburg 2010).

Frank Ankersmit (1996, 2005) has focused on a particular type of sublime historical experience just exemplified in the quotations of Huizinga and the reenactor Arthur, an experience that, in his words, "pulls the faces of past and present together in a short but ecstatic kiss" (Ankersmit 2005: 121).

Many historians besides Michelet report sensations of this sort while visiting archives, handling original documents, and breathing in the musty smell of the historical record (Robinson 2010). Such experiences may not easily be dismissed as outliers; they arguably arise from a passion for the past that drives modern historiography. As Emily Robinson (2010: 504) contends, this affective dimension of historical experience has not only endured; it may have been instrumental in seeing off the skeptical challenges of poststructuralism and postmodernism, which would reduce history to a set of optional stories. Far from being daunted by the unknowability of the past, historians have never lost the conviction that they can recover it with, as it were, "high fidelity" to that which really was (Conn, this volume). Certainly their publics have now entered an ever more adventurous affective turn (Agnew 2007), informed, or so we would argue, by forms of virtual mediation that have come to saturate our lifeworlds to a degree unthinkable only 20 years ago. We will return to this issue. For now we would just emphasize in concluding this opening section that Ankersmit's sublime historical experience (which has come in for criticism, e.g., Domanska (2009) is not the only focus of this volume. There are manifestly many other types of historical experience and diverse intermediary techniques for producing them.

The tension within history

Determining the correct experiential bandwidth for encountering the past has been a matter of ongoing debate within the history profession,[8] and reference to the broader framework of Judeo-Christianity sets this dilemma in cultural context. In a substantial chapter on "Religious Collective Memory", Maurice Halbwachs (1992 [1925]: 84–119) asserted that religions produce symbolic histories for those who practice them. The challenge to Christians, for instance, was how to preserve knowledge of Christ after living memory had vanished. Two alternative techniques for recuperating the past emerged, which Halbwachs labeled "dogmatism" and "mysticism" respectively. The priesthood and theologians approached the truth of Christ through intensive study of the canonical texts, while mystics held that they could sense it directly in visions, in dreams, during prayer, or via other forms of personal revelation. In his own parallel formulation of Weber's charisma and routinization thesis, Halbwachs maintained that Christian historical consciousness derives from the ebb and flow between mysticism and dogmatism. Bouts of pious absorption followed periods of rational scholarship because it was not enough to read about Christ and know him textually and intellectually; the truth needed periodically to be regrounded sensorially and emotionally. We could describe this as two types of authenticity: one philological and external, the other psychological and internal. As Halbwachs put it:

> The mystics seek the meaning of a sacrament not exclusively in what the Church teaches, but above all in the feelings that participation in the

> sacrament evokes for them, as if it were then possible directly to reach the event or the sacred personage that the sacrament commemorates. (1992: 118)

The relevance of this example for our discussion of history is not difficult to see. Professional historians work in a mode comparable to scholastic theology, while Halbwachs's mystical dimension models the more performative experiential relationship to the past. Halbwachs's configuration is, however, more than just an elaborate analogy for the relationship between scholarly historiography and experiential historicizing practices. The particular Judeo-Christian heritage of Passover seders and Eucharistic communions – both anamnestic rituals – has long conditioned Western sensibility about the past, producing a "historically effected consciousness" (*wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*), to use Hans-Georg Gadamer's (2004 [1960]: xv, 300) terms. In other words, current attempts to historically understand Jesus or the Exodus have been shaped by these original episodes (whether or not they actually happened is immaterial) and the history of practices for recuperating them. This matter will come to the fore later in this chapter, where we observe that technological innovations have continually provided new media for recording a given present, while also offering the present new techniques and metaphors for understanding its relationship to what preceded it. For example, Ivan Ross (this volume) studies the successive application of new visual media to represent the American Civil War. He thus shows how emerging technologies affect the ways in which the past may be conceived, represented, and consequently experienced. In the case at hand, the rituals and theologies of Western mainstream religions have, we would argue, created a dichotomy between experiential immediacy and synoptic scholarship that has conditioned everyday thought about the past along those lines.

This duality between dispassionate scholarship and sensorial/emotional immersion has been fundamental within professional historiography ever since Ranke's Berlin seminars in the late 1820s.[9] Most people take Ranke's famous dictum that history is the endeavor to present the past "as it actually was" to be a call for increased archival research. The copious use of footnotes (Grafton 1997: 45) – partly motivated by the desire to distinguish proper historiography from historical fiction[10] – displayed the erudition, factual basis, and critical reasoning validating historians' assertions. This image of Ranke anchored the scholarly ambitions of historiography in America (Iggers 1962: 18), setting a tyrannizing research standard for practitioners to live up to, pushing them to the precipice of pedantry as historians such as Becker (1932: 234; Conn, this volume) lamented.

Yet Ranke has also been foundational for a very different trend in historical thought: the hermeneutic, interpretive tradition. To know the past "as it really was" also involved capturing the inner feel of that past, the subjective situation of past actors – a feat of transhistorical understanding on

the part of the contemporary historian. Guided by what Ranke's followers recognized as "intuitive cognition" (*ahnende Erkenntnis*), this involved empathically grasping the past through an idealism verging on the mystical (Iggers 1962: 32ff.). Ranke's historicism stressed the particularity of culturo-historical worlds,[11] each of which required understanding on its own terms, and so anticipated a radical cultural relativism half a century before anthropology took up this idea (e.g., Boas 1896; Hocart 1915).[12]

In the view of his pupil Dilthey,[13] however, Ranke erred in thinking that a historian could successfully occupy the thought world of the past because the historian's connection to the present could not be transcended (Makkreel and Rodi 1996: 15). Ranke, the hardcore archival historian, thus features as an extreme Romantic within the hermeneutic tradition for his assumption that the historian could enter into an immediacy of "empathy" (*Einfühlung*) with the past. Dialing back his entertaining teacher a notch in the direction of empirical reason, Dilthey stipulated a mediated and more critical "understanding" (*verstehen*) of the past – an exercise in which contextual psychological and social data modified "intuition" (*Anschauung*). In his view, the student of the past needed to pursue the contrapuntal processes captured by Kierkegaard's aphorism: "Life can only be understood backwards; but it must be lived forwards" (cited in Makkreel 1975: 328). The historian could relive the past, retracing the footsteps of the original actors to "re-experience" (*nacherleben*) their lives as they unfolded (Dilthey 2002 [1910]: 235). This movement, however, required counterbalancing by the procedure of *verstehen* in which the researcher evaluated past actions and their social interpretations against the researcher's own experience of life and general expectations of human action (Holborn 1972: 137). This reduced the affective dimension of historical experience but did not eliminate it entirely. Some potential for feeling the past remained, but Dilthey considered the exclusive resort to empathy or intuition to be a faulty method for producing history because immersion in the thoughts and feelings of historical actors implied an attenuation of the present subjectivity of the historian that rendered understanding "uncritical" (Makkreel and Rodi 1996: 5). A latter-day instantiation of this concern not to tip over entirely into empathy may be seen in Chumley's consideration (this volume) of the admissions of contemporary biographers who confide that, in imaginary conversations, they sometimes ridicule, argue with, or curse their biographical subjects in order not to become overwhelmed by them.

Another problem with empathy as a historical method is that the researcher might experience sensations and attribute them to past actors without any way of knowing whether these were accurate (cf. Wineburg 2010). Dilthey's hermeneutics addressed this by moderating the sensorial and emotional heights of transhistorical identification with a cautious reasoning that has become basic to modern social scientific thought. Nor was he alone in trying to map out what were to become disciplinary boundary

lines between scholarly diegesis and unruly mimetic reenactment, let alone inadmissible, viscerally "experienced" encounters with the past. His formulations were endorsed and further developed in the 1920s and 1930s by Collingwood, who proposed that historians "re-enact the past" not through intuition but (as Peirce might have said) "abductively" through the exercise of an informed "historical imagination" rooted in a priori reason (1946: 241, 248).[14]

Collingwood used the term "reenactment" to describe a situation where the historian mentally restaged past thought but always in full awareness of doing so, even in the depths of imaginative reflection.[15] Historians thus avoided the dissolution of their subjective control, and maintained a critical relationship to the past reconstituted (reenacted) in the mind as a discrete object (i.e., in an act of metaconsciousness). One could know the past by this procedure, but Collingwood did not believe that one could "experience" the feelings felt in the past (1946: 297, 303; D'Oro 2000: 92, 95). While for Bulwer-Lytton (in our epigraph), the affections were "immortal" (i.e., transhistorical), for Collingwood they remained time bound. Past sensory experience attached to the moment of its original registration and could not be repeated later in time. Reenactment only captured the conceptual level of past thought; the sensorial immediacy of the original experience was flattened into an "objective spectacle" (Collingwood 1946: 299) in the historian's mind. Thus it could be said that Collingwood reeled in the hermeneutics of history still further toward a rational imagination occupying a very narrow sensory bandwidth. It remains a curiosity, however, and a point of occasional confusion, that the term "reenactment" describes both Collingwood's bloodless imagination and the activities of those who dress up in period clothing with the goal of wading into the emotions and sensations of the past – even if some of them may be trained historians themselves (McCalman 2005).

Communicating with the dead and other telecommunications

Collingwood considered that the past was gone and therefore unavailable to present perception:

> Historical thought is of something which can never be a this, because it is never a here and now. Its objects are events which have finished happening, and conditions no longer in existence. Only when they are no longer perceptible do they become objects for historical thought.
>
> (1946: 233)

Yet even Collingwood conceded that this seemingly inevitable sense of distance was itself the product of a relatively recent shift in "regimes of historicity" (Hartog 2015 [2003], this volume; Phillips 2011). Writing in

1759, Adam Smith could still express a relation between past and present in which reading about the past appeared to provide far more vivid experiences than even Gadamer's (2000 [1960]) notion of "fusion of horizons" would allow for:

> When we read in history concerning actions of proper and beneficent greatness of mind, how eagerly do we enter into such designs? How much are we animated by that high-spirited generosity which directs them? How keen are we for their success? How grieved at their disappointment? In imagination we become the very person whose actions are represented to us: we transport ourselves in fancy to the scenes of those distant and forgotten adventures, and imagine ourselves acting the part of a Scipio or a Camillus, a Timoleon or an Aristides.
>
> (Smith 1790: 66)[16]

Less than two generations later, this was no longer so. As the eminent British historian Thomas Babington, Lord Macaulay noted in 1828 (1848 I: 65 ["Hallam"]):

> To make the past present, to bring the distant near, to place us in the society of a great man or on the eminence which overlooks the field of a mighty battle, to invest with the reality of human flesh and blood beings whom we are too much inclined to consider as personified qualities in an allegory, to call up our ancestors before us with all their peculiarities of language, manners, and garb, to show us over their houses, to seat us at their tables, to rummage their old-fashioned wardrobes, to explain the uses of their ponderous furniture, these parts of the duty which properly belongs to the historian have been appropriated by the historical novelist. On the other hand, to extract the philosophy of history, to direct our judgment of events and men, to trace the connexion of causes and effects, and to draw from the occurrences of former times general lessons of moral and political wisdom, has become the business of a distinct class of writers. Of the two kinds of composition into which history has been thus divided, the one may be compared to a map, the other to a painted landscape. The picture, though it places the country before us, does not enable us to ascertain with accuracy the dimensions, the distances, and the angles. The map is not a work of imitative art. It presents no scene to the imagination; but it gives us exact information as to the bearings of the various points, and is a more useful companion to the traveller or the general than the painted landscape could be.[17]

This shift from iconic to indexical mediation, from mimetic evocation to analytical abstraction, that Macaulay captures in the comparison of the aesthetics of landscape painting with the mensurational logic of cartography not only spelled the end to eighteenth-century sentimentalism in the

academically disciplined study of history; it was part and parcel of a larger sea change in European historical consciousness and experience. As Reinhart Koselleck (1985) argued, it was only in the nineteenth century that "History" as a collectively singular – and so universal – human condition became available as an ideological template.[18]

To the degree that the present came to be oriented toward an ever accelerating march toward the future, the past became over and done with. No longer *magistra vitae* – the central topos of what Hartog (this volume, 2015) identifies as the characteristic historicity of the *ancien régime* – but not amenable either to being recuperated into the emerging modernist regime of historicity as anything but what had successfully been superseded – so alien, in ontological terms, that it seemed to demand its own form of secular anamnesis, namely disciplined historiography, a science of the traces the past had left on the surface of the contemporary world to be studied *for their own sake*.

Consider here how one of the prime analysts of "historicism", at the point of its unquestionable triumph, phrased the relation between cause and effect. "It is not historiography which brought us historicism" wrote Karl Mannheim in 1924 (1952: 850). Rather, "the historical process through which we have lived turned us into historicists". This statement provides another illustration of the circularity of historically effected consciousness where conditions lived through inform the terms in which the world, including the past, is framed.[19] Such considerations led Mannheim to qualify "historicism" as the "*Weltanschauung* of Modernity" – a highly self-conscious cultural formation suffused with a structure of feeling celebratory of its own relentless progress toward a (however uncertain) future.[20] Still, despite these crucial insights, Mannheim spoke of "the historical process" in agentive terms and so revealed himself to be among the believers: history, now with a capital "H", had come to be the "space of experience" (Koselleck 1985) conjoined to a horizon of expectations of future presents in relentless and irreversible supercession of the past. In other words, Mannheim's was a world in which historicism's project of rationalizing social being and becoming had already left no other alternative than to attribute these changes to the "historical process".

Difficult as it may be to step back beyond that threshold, it isn't hard to see how Mannheim's diagnosis of a new regime of historicity dovetails with Latour's (1993) diagnosis of the "modern constitution" as a project of purification productive of its own hybrids. And indeed, even among the educated bourgeoisie of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (for whom Mannheim spoke), there were indications of uneasiness about the effects of the historicist conceptual separation between the past and the present: extreme forms of sublime historical experience thrived before, during, and after the moderating pronouncements of Dilthey, Macaulay, and Collingwood. Prime examples would be personal reactions to ancient ruins, beginning with the reports of travelers on the "Grand Tour" in the second

half of the eighteenth century. Stendhal's syncope in Florence belongs to this genre, as does Freud's "Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis" (1964 [1936]) a century later. As Georges Poulet (1954) has argued, *paramnesia*,[21] the experienced fusion of past and present, was actively cultivated by European intellectuals ranging from Mme. de Staël to Coleridge, Byron, De Quincey, Baudelaire, and, of course, Marcel Proust (opium often helped in the process).[22] The latter-day creation of psychiatric nosological categories such as Jerusalem Syndrome (first denominated as such in 2000) speaks to this issue: here, typically, devout Christian tourists come progressively unhinged while visiting Israel's holy sites, until one day they tear up their hotel room sheets and descend toga-clad onto the streets acting as if they were Biblical figures. Consider also Stendhal Syndrome, first described by Stendhal himself in 1817 but only recognized as a syndrome in 1979 (though not included in the DSM). It manifests in disorientation, heart palpitations, and fainting that overcome visitors to Florence. In other words, academic historicism has not and perhaps cannot neutralize other ways of experiencing the past. These other modes have not been diminished, only pathologized by it (Bar-El et al. 2000; Bamforth 2010).

An even more dramatic countercurrent to the rising tide of historicism directly paralleled its emergence as the "Weltanschauung of Modernity". Ironically, it fed on the same positivist scientism that, as Macaulay had predicted, was gaining ground in academic historiography. Thus, while Marx was cautioning his contemporaries to let the dead bury the dead and forge ahead toward a future of unalienated social being, some of them – including Friedrich Engels – were at least curious about one of historicism's illegitimate Western doubles (*sensu* Nandy 1995): spiritualism, a (however variegated) mode of giving voice to historicism's ultimate subalterns – the dead. Ever since the Hydesville incidents in 1847, when a dead peddler revealed a hitherto unknown aspect of the past (his own murder) to the Fox sisters, the dead were no longer in need of representation. They spoke for themselves and garrulously so. As is well-known, the voices of the dead, mediated through table rapping[23] and, later, by means of photography, automatic writing, and direct voice manifestations, attracted some of the best minds of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: Crookes, Wallace, Galton, Conan Doyle, William James, you name them. Spiritualist séances and their print promulgation offered a way of communicating with the dead not just through the traces their lives left on the surface of contemporary worlds – documents, objects, and other evidence for their perceptually inaccessible agency in the past; rather, spiritualism made the dead contemporaneous with the living. It gave the dead the means to affect the here and now through their presence, and it afforded them the kind of agency for producing evidence of their own existence that the newest communications media – particularly telegraphy but later also telephony and wireless radio – also afforded the living in their real-time interactions with others at a significant spatial remove.

If Michelet's "galvanic dance" of the dead in the Archives de France (in our epigraph) had drawn its metaphorics from the electrical sublime that had begun to impact the European imagination from the late eighteenth century onward, then Anglo-American spiritualism of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries drew ever newer technologies into its orbit. Although it was not until two decades after Daguerre's invention of photography that spirits began to manifest in this medium when William Mumler published the first images of ectoplasmic manifestations in the 1860s, analog media capable of arresting past actuality – thus binding time and space in ways that superseded written documentation – became subject to necromantic investments. If musty whiffs of dust exuded by papers and pergaments had once allowed Michelet to enchant the archive itself, conjuring the deceased up from the records they had left, then photography and phonography visually inscribed and audibly echoed that which was no more. Indeed, the very modernity of the recording, storage, and circulation systems ("*Aufschreibsysteme*", in Friedrich Kittler's (1992) sense) that superseded writing and print in the course of the nineteenth century enabled a seemingly paradoxical counterpoint to the abstract cartographic imagery that Macaulay envisioned as the touchstone of the historicist imagination. As the saying went (before the advent of digital photoshopping, at any rate): a photographic picture (or analog audio record) was worth more than a "thousand words" in its seeming capacity for unmediated transcendence of temporal distance, less an interface between the present and the past than a portal to bygone times.

If writing and print had once provided the infrastructure to Halbwachs's "scholastic" modes of transcendence, the technologies of remediating the past that began to supersede writing in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries came to serve the "mystical" pole of his dialectic. The kind of "paradoxical positivism" (Porter 2005) characterizing spiritualism – especially once some of its proponents took the turn toward parapsychology around the turn of the twentieth century – might thus be seen as a running commentary on, perhaps even a critique of the rise of historicism as a kind of secularized, materialist idealism.[24] Historicism, we might say, was able to claim the high ground, but the "Weltanschauung of Modernity" produced problems as fast as it solved them. Alternatives, such as spiritualism offered "experience-near" solutions to the death of the past and found willing followers. Many more solutions have since been socially demanded and offered as new technologies and novel phenomena inspire us to think in different ways about the past.

Technologies of/and historical experience

Having considered two of historicism's alters, paramnestic "loss of self" (in a more dramatic form than Dilthey and Gadamer probably imagined) and spiritualism, we now turn to another example, namely the psychometric

science proposed by the nineteenth-century geologist William Denton (1823–1883), because it highlights the ways in which technologies of mediation are not only intrinsic to historically effected consciousness but can come to set the pathways for specific forms of historical experience (Ross, this volume; Turkel and Jones-Imhotep, this volume). Inspired by daguerreotype, Denton (1988 [1863]) posited that events imprint traces on all kinds of matter and that these traces can trigger vivid visual and sensory experiences of just such events in the minds of what he called "sensitives" – people capable of rendering accessible to the senses (very much akin to photographic development) the past so recorded in brute matter.[25] Happily, Denton's wife was one such "sensitive", and while a good number of the experiments he conducted with her fall in the geological realm, he also saw how the then nascent disciplines of history and archaeology might benefit from psychometric science. Such as when, in the course of experiments with a fragment of a fresco, pieces of tuft, and other specimens procured from Pompeii and Herculaneum, wrapped up in paper and placed in Mrs. Denton's hand, she psychometrically corroborated the dread and terror Pliny the Younger conveyed in his narrative of his uncle's death (in the Vesuvius eruption) in CE 79 – and she did so without any previous knowledge of the nature and origins of the specimens.

Denton's methodology involved the haptic inspection of objects, thus allowing the past to "speak for itself" through the consciousness and sensorium of privileged observers. His was a spectrographic approach to the past, an alternative optics before the advent of X-rays, ultraviolet, and infrared photography. That Mrs. Denton spoke of the remains of the dead in terms resembling the plaster casts that Giuseppe Fiorello was manufacturing of them at just the same time – revealing their bodies from the "negatives" they left in pyroclastic matter – certainly provides ground for intriguing speculations (Denton 1988 [1863]: 178–193).[26] Here one sees a remarkable convergence of older "low-tech" impression-taking with novel technologies of photographically remediating the (now absent) past in reshaping forms of historically effected consciousness. Up to this point, there had been divergences in practice regarding, for example, the iconic visualization of the past in genre painting, bird's-eye views (Ross, this volume), or panoramas (Rigney, this volume; Ross, this volume). But the rise of new indexical media such as photographic image impression and internal "darkroom development" of the past, the equally novel sonic evidencing of the past in Edisonian phonography, and the possibilities for "replay" afforded by the Lumière brothers' cinematograph now began to impinge upon the type of cognitive processing necessary to produce textual accounts of the past.

In part, what may have been at issue was a competition for a monopoly over *hypotyposis*[27] – the ability to make a particular description so vivid as to be compelling. Contemporaries of Walter Scott though they were, Ranke and Macaulay thought historiography could and should surpass historical fiction, whereas later thinkers otherwise as different as Herbert Butterfield

and Georg Lukács agreed on the superior *effectiveness* of the historical novel for the inculcation of (both liberal and proletarian) historical consciousness. With the advent of cinematography, however, optics flipped around from Denton's emphasis on registration/detection to the concerted, visual representation of historical topics in films such as D. W. Griffith's *Birth of a Nation* (1915) and Sergei Eisenstein's *Battleship Potemkin* (1924). Film removed historiography's cornerstone: the written word. And hypotyposis has been completely reconfigured in the age of digital, 3-D, and interactive media.[28] It strikes us that academic historians' belated coming to terms with the *rhetorical* aspects of their praxis – traceable, perhaps most prominently to Hayden White (1973) – may owe a good deal to the competition that historical fiction and film posed by the middle of the twentieth century. That so many recent films – for example, *Argo*, *42*, *The King's Speech*, *The Butler*, *12 Years a Slave*, or *Dunkirk* – are accompanied by explicit riders advertising that they are "based on a true story" indicates that cinema and history are negotiating for space.[29]

We thus need to take into account how the specific affordances of different media "inflect the historical imagination" (Ross, this volume); how specific "media ideologies"[30] shape our experience of interacting with the technologies in question; how such media are perceived as transducing and amplifying what we judge to be not only authentic but *experientially significant*, "signals from" a certain past over the sheer noise constituted by the data stream of which such signals inevitably form part (an old archival problem only partly solved by institutional appraisal of sources and finding aids – cf. Hedstrom 2002). This is a moment well exemplified in Bielo's chapter (this volume), where we see professional designers working for a Kentucky-based creationist museum (whose most ambitious project – a "life size" replica of Noah's Ark – has meanwhile been realized) struggling to generate multimediated forms of hypotyposis in the absence of an academic endorsement that the message is "based on a true story". But we also see this moment at work in Murray's chapter (this volume) where state-ordained legal recognition of indigenous visions of the past forces curators in an academic institution to resort to ways of dealing with the past that stand in marked contrast to the historicist strictures against contaminating past with present and vice versa. In Murray's case study, the forms of mediation are remarkably "low-tech", involving the overcoming of institutional fire regulations for burning smudge sticks or the imposition of menstrual taboos on female employees in the presence of Native American remains among the more dramatic mediating measures. The protective strictures of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) reorient the historicist tendencies of academic museology back to the uncanny pre- or nonhistoricist relationship to the past sensed in the archives by Michelet and given freer play in spiritualism or the paramnestic rapture of the Stendhal Syndrome. Or consider the implicit dissonance, discussed in Rubin's chapter (this volume), between activists in the Spanish movements to recover

the memory of fascist crimes during that country's civil war and that of the archaeologists and forensic scientists involved in the exhumations of Franco's victims. Here the objective forensic scientific procedure – locating mass graves, carefully exhuming the human remains, assembling osteological profiles of identifiable victims, conducting DNA tests, contacting survivors who might corroborate such finds by personal memory – are a vital but distinctly subordinate element of a larger project: that of instilling a sense of the incompleteness of Spain's return to democracy after generalissimo Franco's death. To achieve this, Spain's ARMH (Asociaciones para la Recuperación de la Memória Histórica) movement activists resort to diverse techniques for arousing affective responses among witnesses to such exhumations: they select testimony from descendants of victims not on the basis of richness of historical information but performative pathos; they stage pedagogical exercises where volunteers at excavations are invited to assume the place of the fallen; and they produced a video where the process of unearthing a victim of Franco's violence is presented from the point of view of the dead person whose bones are slowly being released from his or her untimely grave, transferred to a laboratory, and eventually reunited with his or her descendants.

What could be a more powerful incitement to virtually "reexperience" the past in its relation to the present than to look through the eyes of the dead? But what if the intended subjects to such experience fail to let themselves be interpellated into such spectacular forms of mise-en-scène – as in the case of the resistant MA students who feature at the beginning of Rubin's chapter? To be sure, the past is always only accessible to us in mediated – and so ultimately virtual – form. No matter what disciplines and techniques go into their making, a historical monograph is no less a virtuality than the kinds of "universal capture" hybrids between old style cinematographic methods, 3-D imaging, and digital animation that Lev Manovich (2006) hails as the infrastructure of a new "information aesthetics" that has begun to override older senses of the rhetorical trope of hypotyposis. What we should reckon with, in other words, are novel – and now decidedly "nonmodern" (in Latour's sense), perhaps posthistoricist – practices of mediation that play on a variety of human sensory capacities in order not only to suggest verisimilitude but to synesthetically elicit visceral response: to generate, in other words not mere representational interfaces between present and past but to engineer a "fusion of horizons" to the extent that the medium becomes the message: a portal to the past.

An example suggestive of both promises and failures of novel forms of technological mediation comes from the African American sociologist Alondra Nelson's (2016) account of the genomic "reveal": a term directly borrowed from reality TV shows. Here African Americans (usually prominent public figures) who have taken genomic ancestry tests are asked to ascend to the podium at elaborately staged events so as to publicly exhibit their reaction to the genomic disclosure of their (probabilistically calculated)

biogeographical origins in Africa. Nelson, who spends much energy in her book hailing DNA-based ancestry searches as a potential means toward restitutive justice[31] eventually recounts taking such a test herself, and participating in a public "reveal" ceremony. The results are anticlimactic. Where others break down in tears of joyful realization that a past denied to them by the violent genealogical rupture of slavery has finally been restored, Nelson finds herself anxiously glancing at the genomic scientist she had been working with. No pathos, no catharsis. Just a glance toward the biogenetical gatekeeper to her African past. In the end, Nelson admits that she "felt like a fraud". No matter how sophisticated the technology involved was, no matter how important Nelson feels its effects may be for some African American heritage seekers or what weight the evidence so produced can lend to claims for restorative justice: for her, it remained an interface – as between oil and water, in the original physical sense of the word – not an entry point into an affectively convincing past. No cathartic unification with a lost past, only resigned skepticism.

The anthropology of historical experience

As Steven Conn (this volume) observes, we are in the midst of a generic turn. Before the advent of professional historiography, Western societies looked to many diverse media for knowledge of the past – song, poetry, weaving, and graphic arts, among others. With the rise of history as a discipline, the number of credible genres for the transmission of history shrank dramatically in the face of a historiography governed by protocols of evidence, research, objectivity, and dispassion. The earlier modes of relating to the past and producing statements about it did not entirely disappear, however, and other modes have come and gone over the last two centuries. But they have all occupied marginal positions in informing mainstream society about the past. Now, like a delayed return of the repressed, a new variety of alternative historicizing genres have appeared in modern societies, and they look to be displacing the singular authority of conventional historicism. This transition did not happen in the last year or even in the last decade. The new generic moment has been gestating since the introduction of photography and film. It increased in size with the arrival of television and digital media, and it will likely expand yet further as the public take up virtual reality devices and as the various media remediate one another (Rigney, this volume): historical fiction into films and into video games; Internet culls of medieval monster lore made over through computer graphics and film special effects into Biblical era "dinosaurs" for display in an experiential museum of Noah's Ark (Bielo, this volume). Each new technology has created new genres opening new experiences of the past and the present.

Neither the availability of technologies nor their particular capabilities are, however, sufficient to account for the increasing demand for historical experiences. This change in sensibility requires social and historical context,

and we may turn to Hartog's contribution to this volume, which extends the ideas presented in his book *Regimes of Historicity* (2015). There he proposed that the West has entered an epoch of "presentism" in which it has come to see itself against a limited horizon of the now, as if in a Las Vegas casino with no clocks (2015: xviii). This regime of historicity does not derive from Croce's presentism; it arises, among many other factors, from the social consequences of twentieth-century pessimism after two major wars. At best the past could no longer be taken by the present as a useful guide, and at worst it was irrelevant (as Henry Ford more or less put it). At the same time the future became dystopic, clouded by the possibilities of nuclear Armageddon, large-scale pollution, and global warming. With the past and the future foreclosed, "there is no longer anything but the present" (Hartog, this volume).

As indicators of this truncation, we judge events to be "historical" the moment they occur, arrogating thereby the ability to speak for the future. And we live the future in the present through strategies of risk assessment, insurance underwriting, and debt accrual.[32] While conventional historians still address the past across the gulf of time assumed by Macaulay and Collingwood, a heritage industry has sprouted around them governed by market considerations of entertainment and profitability and approached by the public as a consumable good. The past becomes part of a contemporary "experience economy" (Pine and Gilmore 1998), which involves the staging, theming, memorability (souvenirs), and sensual engagement of consumer activities. Within this logic of presentism, emotional engrossment in the past is actively "preferred to the values of distance and mediation" (Hartog 2015: 191).

In addition, the presentist regime we seem to be inhabiting has been inflected by the challenge memory studies made to history beginning in the 1980s, a challenge analogous to Halbwachs's opposition between "mysticism" and "scholasticism". In remembering, a person may confidently assert what it felt like to live a past in all its subjective emotional and sensory immediacy. A good example of this power of memory to summon forth the interior of historical experience may be found in Vanessa Agnew's study (this volume) of the French Calvinist traveler de Léry's reaction to hearing the music of the Brazilian Tupi. Their sublime harmonies left him enraptured, and decades later he claimed the ability to reexperience this initial rapture whenever he summoned up the event in his aural memory. Like olfaction, music has a particular power to collapse the distance between past and present across a singular experience that belongs both to then and now. The question then arises as to whether listening to this music could allow others not present in the sixteenth century alongside de Léry to enter into a historical experience of the Tupi. Can music audition transfer beyond personal memory to become a collectively available historical instrument, another portal to the past? Does the phrase "the soundtrack of our lives" convey a mere slogan geared toward the consumptive choices of aging baby

boomers, or does it indicate a moment of broader, genuinely historical, let alone anthropological interest? In any event, Agnew's case not only highlights the different qualities and constraints of history and memory; it shows how ideas from the field of memory studies come into dialogue with history and possibly prompt historians to explore broader experiential bandwidths in their research.

Listening to music may be a form of reenactment, and in other publications Agnew (e.g., 2004, 2007) has considered the value of all manner of reenactments for learning about the past – again with a view to expanding the methodology of history. Practices of reenactment have been on the rise, and in many cases they are bound up with the heritage industry as when visitors to a medieval site watch a combat between knights in armor. What is more striking than this kind of spectatorship is the number of people who themselves dress in period costume to reenact battles or just enjoy an Edwardian picnic in their local park. In only a minority of cases is popular reenactment a quest to know the past "as it really was" (and, at this point, our placing that old Rankean phrase in quotation marks ought to be justified). As Handler and Saxton (1988) have shown, a number of competing impulses drive reenactment; surprisingly, they may all be addressed through a single term: authenticity.

Historicist authenticity means fidelity to an original across time, and reenactors go to great lengths to acquire or make clothing and accessories that conform to that expectation. A good many of them also read history books to get a more informed sense of the past. They diverge, however, over the extent to which they want reenactments to be historically accurate. Among German "Indianists", who gather on an annual *Waldlandtag* (Woodland Day) in eastern Germany to reenact the historic lifeworld of Native Americans, political rifts have opened between those advocating scholarly correctness and those who see authenticity residing elsewhere. Some Indianists contend that too much anthropology stifles the authentic personal experience of reenactment, which offers valuable self-knowledge and self-transformation (Kalshoven 2015: 571). In this latter view, the playing of Bohemian folk music in lieu of Native American songs should be allowed as a way of capturing the inner experience of the Indian world through analogy with the present. Civil War reenactors are similarly willing to travel only so far with historical facts, which serve as a springboard off which they launch into their own adventures that have authenticity (and factuality) because one experienced them oneself (Handler and Saxton 1988: 247, 253). Coherence with a present that the past is expected to enhance and experientially deepen is what appears to be sought after, not necessarily correspondence to an evidence-based theory of truth.

Then there is at least one more important sense of "authenticity" at play in modern reenactments, the one advanced by Heidegger and taken forward in existentialism; a set of ideas that may well have contributed to the rise of the presentism diagnosed by Hartog (this volume) by asserting that one

must aim to be free to act in a given present. In an ironic twist on Marx, authentic being nowadays seems to derive from self-authorized choices that diverge from the expectations of historical tradition or the consensus of the madding crowd (cf. Handler and Saxton 1988: 250) and that find fulfilment in individualized acts of consumption. Putting on a Confederate uniform or joining the Society for Creative Anachronism are such steps toward producing oneself as an authentic individual. Yet one is united with thousands of others doing broadly the same thing. Authenticity of the Heideggerian existentialist sort may, thus, not be successfully achieved by mere affiliation or outward participation. It resides at a deeper level, in the ecstasies and transformations realized at the core of actual reenactments, in sublime historical experiences such as the one described by Arthur earlier in this Introduction.

The idea of authentication via personal revelation has been loaded with potential in Western practice since the rise of Protestantism with its insistence on the validity of personal experiences of God, the Spirit, and Holy Scripture. The prominence of such convictions has ebbed and flowed, but the current fluorescence of charismatic Evangelical Christianity (e.g., Guyer 2007; Luhrmann 2012) – where people may form personal relationships with and converse with holy figures – has conditioned a broad swathe of society whose religious experiential tropes could easily inform their approach to the past. The New Age movement (Heelas 1996) has encouraged the pursuit of personal spiritual practices that can expand and improve the self, an orientation consistent with the previous reading of reenactment and, like Evangelism, a potential general influence on approaches to the past. Those practicing traditions descended from spiritualism, such as channeling (Brown 1997), usually mediate spirits and gods, such as Thor and Freya, but occasionally they do also commune with historical figures. An example would be Jane Roberts who famously channeled a nonphysical (i.e., nonhistorical) guru named Seth whose teachings became a cornerstone of the New Age. Later, she wrote a book detailing her communications with none other than the spirit of William James (Roberts 2001). Undoubtedly there are many more sources influencing the expanding variety of historical experiences. The regime of presentism broadly designates this conjuncture of forces, notably the turn to immersive, self-expanding ventures into the past that are often more concerned with present experience than with past experience, thus completely upending the assumptions and priorities of academic historiography. While the majority of these emerging forms and genres of historical experience pull the individual off the sideline of dispassion in the direction of fuller sensory engagements, variety is also expanding in the other direction and stretching the bounds of quietude. Turkel and Jones-Imhotep (this volume) call attention to the use of Internet spiders, bots, and search engines that can cut down the amount of effort involved in research and make traditional scholarly practice look impossibly energetic. And as Ernst (2006) suggests, eventually the digital archive might be made to speak to us like an Intelligent Personal Assistant such as Siri or Alexa.

Whether that would be a low-bandwidth or a broad-bandwidth historical experience (in Michelet's sense or that of Spike Jonze's 2013 movie *Her*) cannot yet be said.

This type of historical experience will not, however, and perhaps intrinsically can no longer yield to the kind of class-based collective historical being that Marx and his successors once imagined. In the age of big data – to whose scrutiny every Internet past seeker now willingly submits – we may all well be acquiring heritages *of* our individual selves but not necessarily *for* our collective selves. Never mind the genuine potential of digital media for the retrieval of data *on* our pasts (Turkel and Imhotep-Jones, this volume; cf. Rosenzweig 2011 for a measured account by a pioneer of "digital history"). Yet our aggregate choices (a click here, a click there) may well come to haunt us in the form of pasts composed of stochastic accumulations of choices that machines read off of our clickstream behavior. Transduced into humanly readable text, such (principally meaningless) patterns of binary code might then come to indicate what kind of past we appear to be most likely to consume. In other words, as computational processes (programmed by humans, to be sure) second-guess our experience of the past so as to predict our future behavior, we become part of anonymous collectivities of individual consumers, socially unconnected in what scholars of virtual reality tend to call RL (real life).[33] We all know that Google, Amazon, and other IT giants already tell us that people (like us!) who ordered the latest biography of Abraham Lincoln, a book about colonial atrocities in the Belgian Congo, or Apicius's Late Roman culinary breviary "might also be interested in . . .". Could this be the future of historical consciousness and experience in the online age?

In sum, the current proliferation of techniques for relating to the past has made the issue of historical experience thinkable in new ways that this interdisciplinary collection brings forward in aggregate and in its various synergies around topics such as technologies, remediation/transduction, and (post)historicism. Conventional historiography consistent with the precepts developed in the nineteenth century still reigns supreme in the West, but this should not render us incurious about other ways of gaining knowledge about the past. Our title alludes to a famous work by William James (1982 [1902]) who surprised conventional Christians with his descriptions of the seemingly unconventional, even weird forms that Christian practice could take even within respectable denominations. His work was ethnographic in its descriptions of the luxuriant variations of practices that, according to the sensibilities of instituted theology, should simply not have existed at all. This volume shows how many types of historical experience are flourishing in the shadow of historicism, the theology of modern history. To conventional historiography, the proliferation of forms of historical engagement such as commercialized mediatization, heritage-ization, and reenactment may seem like so many barbarians at the gate (they might, on the contrary, prove to be so many career opportunities). Like James, our approach undertakes to

describe them, to understand them in their own terms, and to study what sorts of pragmatic effects they may have on the world. For a discipline like anthropology whose mission once was to study the barbarians on Europe's colonial peripheries (and their supposedly mythically warped visions of their own past), turning the mirror toward our own relations with the past seems not only a logical but a necessary critical task.

Notes

1 "Toutefois je ne tardai à m'apercevoir dans la silence apparent de ces galleries, qu'il y avait un movement, un murmure qui n'etait pas de la mort. Ces papiers, ces parchemins laissés a la depui long-temps ne demandaient pas mieux que de revenir au jour. Ces papiers ne sont pas des papiers, mais de vies d'hommes, de provinces, de peuples. . . . Et en mesure que je soufflais sur leur poussière, je les voyais se soulever. Ils tiraient du sépulcre qui la main, qui la tête comme dans le Jugement dernier de Michel-Ange, ou dans la Danse des morts. Cette danse galvanique qu'ils menaient autour de moi, j'ai essayé de la reproduire en ce libre".
2 We employ historiography either in its literal sense as "history writing" or to refer more generally to the history profession for which writing books and articles about the past is central. Historiography can also mean the study of styles of history writing, but we do not use it in that sense.
3 This volume generally focuses on the experiencing of pasts that one did not live through and that are not, therefore, accessible to personal memory. Memory is undoubtedly a conduit for historical experience because sensations felt in the past can be reactivated or at least serve as the basis for activating strong new emotional reactions. This is an important topic but a large one, which we leave to one side here, except to say that the phenomenon of memory and the rise of memory studies do condition, among several other influences, the historical experience of the more distant past. For critiques of the "history vs. memory" literature of the 1990s, see Huyssen (2000), Klein (2000), and Rigney (this volume).
4 The concept of colligation in history – the identification of individual events as forming a conceptual whole as part of an epoch (e.g., the Renaissance) or in relation to particular trajectories (such as the expansion of liberty or a buildup to war; McCullagh 2009: 160) – exemplifies this modeling on natural science procedures. The paradigmatic example of colligation, identified by Whewell in 1847, was Kepler's plotting of the various positions of Mars, which allowed him to determine that its movement formed an ellipse (Walsh 1958; McCullagh 1978).
5 Some might consider the activity of thinking not to be an experience (Williams 1976: 12f.). We view it, along with other relatively tranquil activities, asperhaps less striking and sensational than other experiences but as experiences nonetheless.
6 As Croce explains:

> When the development of the culture of my historical moment presents to me (it would be superfluous and perhaps also inexact to add to myself as an individual) the problem of Greek civilization or of Platonic philosophy or of a particular mode of Attic manners, that problem is related to my being in the same way as the history of a bit of business in which I am engaged, or of a love affair in which I am indulging, or of a danger that threatens me. I examine it with the same anxiety and am troubled with the same sense of unhappiness until I have succeeded in solving it.
>
> (Croce 1921: 13)

7 A view associated with the philosopher of science Carl Hempel (e.g., 1942: 44f.), who marginalized discovery procedures in his focus on the explanation and validation of findings (Apel 1987: 135; Stueber 2002: 25).

8 As an example, in 2013 British politicians and historians debated the pedagogical value of experiential exercises such as dressing up in period costumes or standing tightly packed to feel what transportation on a slave ship might have been like. Some claimed that this sort of "child-centred" learning had prevented generations of children from learning history properly (Ferguson 2013).

9 Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886) was one of the founders of a modern historiography characterized by the rigorous critical approach to historical sources.

10 Ranke wrote: "In making the comparison [between historical fiction and the use of historical documentary sources] I convinced myself that the historical tradition is more beautiful, and certainly more interesting, than the romantic fiction" ["Bei der Vergleichung überzeugte ich mich, dass das historische Ueberlieferte selbst schöner und jedenfalls interessanter sei, als die romantische Fiction"] (Grafton 1997: 38).

11 Ranke (1981 [1854] wrote:

> I would maintain, however, that every epoch is immediate to God, and that its value in no way depends on what may have eventuated from it, but rather in its existence alone, its own unique particularity. [Ich aber behaupte, jede Epoche ist unmittelbar zu Gott, und ihr Wert beruht gar nicht auf dem, was aus ihr hervorgeht, sondern in ihrer Existenz selbst, in ihrem eigenen Selbst].

Reference to the English-language expression "We are all God's children" possibly illuminates Ranke's use of "God" in this assertion about equal validity despite difference.

12 Furthermore, historians thought deeply about how to bridge the chasm between past and present, an issue that recurs in anthropological worries about translation and radical alterity. The two disciplines are indeed closely related.

13 Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) studied under Ranke in Berlin and he recollected this "liveliest of figures", in the following words:

> An inner movement, which also manifested itself outwardly, seemed to always transfer him into the event or the human being of which he was speaking. I remember the effect as he spoke of the relation of Alexander VI to his son Cesare [Borgia]: He loved him, he feared him, he hated him. I was greatly influenced by Ranke, even more by his seminar than by his lectures. He was like a mighty organism assimilating chronicles, Italian politicians, ambassadors, historians. . .- transforming everything into the power to objectively intuit what has been. To me he was the embodiment of historical insight as such.
>
> (2010 [1903]: 389)

14 Tellingly, Collingwood (1946: 266) recurred to the analogy of detective fiction: arguably commencing with E.A. Poe – the genre itself was barely a hundred years old by then. It was revived, and incorporated into anthropology by none other than Marcel Griaule (1957) in his bizarre comparison of the native informant with the criminal and the ethnographer as the trial judge determining the "social fact" at issue.

15 It is hard to say what the status of Collingwood's formulation is among historians today – that is an empirical question that an ethnography of historical practice might answer. Our sense is that it has filtered into the widely held

assumption that historians necessarily use their imagination to recover the past for their accounts. It has certainly found its way into the teaching of history in schools (Pattiz 2004, but see also Wineburg 2010).

16 Consistent with his notion of mutual sympathy, Smith (ibid.: 13) elsewhere elaborates on feelings for the dead that uncannily seem to anticipate some of Heidegger's thought on death and finality in relation to historical being.

17 Here we should note that this reductionist program comes from the pen of none other than the author of the infamous *Minute on Education* (1835) in which Macaulay lashed out against local forms of knowledge, thus laying the foundations for the colonization of the Indian past. As Macaulay wrote then:

> It is said that the Sanscrit and the Arabic are the languages in which the sacred books of a hundred millions of people are written, and that they are on that account entitled to peculiar encouragement. Assuredly it is the duty of the British Government in India to be not only tolerant but neutral on all religious questions. But to encourage the study of a literature, admitted to be of small intrinsic value, only because that literature inculcated the most serious errors on the most important subjects, is a course hardly reconcilable with reason, with morality, or even with that very neutrality which ought, as we all agree, to be sacredly preserved. It is confined that a language is barren of useful knowledge. We are to teach it because it is fruitful of monstrous superstitions. We are to teach false history, false astronomy, false medicine, because we find them in company with a false religion".
>
> (www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00generallinks/macaulay/txt_minute_education_1835.html)

Since the present volume focuses on the (however uneven) spread of historicism in its original homeland ("The West"), this is not the place to discuss this fascinating and important moment (see Nandy 1995; Feierman 1999; Chakrabarty 2000; Palmié and Stewart 2016).

18 This novel conception enabled a variety of characteristically "modernist" projects and notions that drove human becoming back into what became Darwinian biology (Trautman 1992), forward into what Marx and Engels saw as a coming new political-economic dispensation, and toward the more general structure of feeling that Henry Adams, at the end of that century, diagnosed as a pervasive sense of acceleration of social eventuation.

19 The hermeneutic circle at the core of historically effected consciousness is consistent, if not identical, with the circular interchange between *Erlebnis* (particular experience) and *Erfahrung* (cumulative experience) formulated by Dilthey and developed by many thinkers in his wake (Jay 2005: 11, *et passim*; Carr 2013: 220). Any given sailing excursion – the first one especially – is an experience (*Erlebnis*); having undertaken many such trips makes one a sailor with experience (*Erfahrung*). This accumulated experience modulates the experience of each new sailing trip, and each further voyage contributes, in a loop, something to the overall experience-derived understanding of sailing.

20 Or alternatively – the other side of the coin – a melancholic mourning of the passing of the past as seen in the rise of folklore as a field of study, or even in Durkheim's mechanical vs. organic solidarity, and the focus of his early sociology on the ills brought on by industrialization.

21 Drawing on Poulet (1954) we define paramnesia as: "a condition or phenomenon involving distorted memory or confusions of fact and fantasy, such as confabulation or déjà vu". This covers a wide range of phenomena from false memories, to disorienting temporal confusion as seen in Jerusalem Syndrome (see later in the chapter).

22 In a more anguished fashion, the sense of fusion of temporal horizons also animates both Ernst Bloch's reflections on the simultaneity of the noncontemporaneous (*Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen*) and Benjamin's (1976) meditations on "messianic time".
23 One is reminded of Marx's own evocation of the imagery of dancing tables in his denunciation of the queer metaphysics generated by commodity fetishism.
24 In part, this is the sense of "historicism" in which Karl Popper (1957) would come to (however mistakenly) denounce Marxian teleologies. But it is also present in the way that, e.g., Ernst Troeltsch – who coined the phrase "crisis of historicism" in 1922 – began to worry about the radical critique of any meaning of and in history for which Nietzsche (and in a different sense the historical biblical criticism of Feuerbach, Renan, Robertson Smith, and Troeltsch's own earlier work) had paved the way.
25 Denton was likely not aware that the general idea – sans the photographic analogy – was all but new (he cited the Cincinnati physician Joseph R. Buchanan who coined the term "psychometry" as his crucial source of inspiration). Most proximately, it was none other than Charles Babbage who in his polemically self-titled *Ninth Bridgewater Treatise*'s (1837) chapter ix "On the Permanent Impression of Our Words and Actions on the Globe We Inhabit" expounded remarkably similar ideas.
26 That Freud (1959 [1907]) would later recur to Jensen's *Gradiva* to hone his archaeological metaphorics regarding memories inaccessible to conscious introspection – buried – beneath surface "screens" only adds to the – shall we say uncanny? – nature of Denton's psychometric science.
27 Hypotyposis: "vivid description of a scene, event or situation bringing it, as it were, before the eyes of the hearer or reader" (*OED*).
28 Ann Rigney has written that "given the new media ecologies in which we are presently immersed . . . the core business of professional historians" (namely *writing* about history) might not any longer be the same business, even though it appears the same (2010: 117; see also Beck 2012: 119 *et passim*).
29 In journals such as *Rethinking History*, founded by a historian who advised on films, the pros and cons of history on the big screen have long been debated.
30 Gershon (2010). Socially salient apperceptions of what can or cannot be communicated through specific channels of information conveyance (about the past, for example).
31 Such as when the problem of establishing the plaintiffs' legal standing (which has long hobbled reparation suits) is circumvented by molecular-biological means.
32 Cf. Guyer (2007) for a sophisticated anthropological reflection on the consequences of recent trends in macroeconomics for Western experiences of time that dovetails with Hartog's assessment but also references prophetic modes of temporality.
33 In saying so, we readily concede that – as scholars who lived the better part of their lives in the twentieth century – we remain haunted by what Derrida once diagnosed as the specters of Marx. Of course, RL (real life) has become just as much a convenient technological fiction as AI (artificial intelligence) and VR (virtual reality) have long been. Cf. Brey (2014) for a useful parsing of the philosophical issues involved in these distinctions.

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Genres

2 The generic turn

Genre, audience, and reclaiming historical authority

Steven Conn

I begin every undergraduate course I teach with a small, lightweight introduction to the epistemological problem of history. Most of my students come to class burdened by the idea that history is a collection of dates and events, people and places – a set of factoids from the past that they must memorize more or less in the right order. They have learned this in high school from their history teacher, a man – yes, almost inevitably a man – whose first name is more often than not "Coach". So I try to disabuse them of their idea by explaining that the facts, though they must be mastered, are less interesting than what we do with them.

Where, I ask them, do we find the past? You can't visit it, after all; nor can you recreate it in the lab. The past does not, strictly speaking, exist, not the way a Shakespeare play does or a work of architecture. "All we have is mere fragments", wrote Hippolyte Taine in his *Histoire*. "The historian's task is to restore them – he reconstructs the wisps of the threads that he can see so as to connect them with the myriad threads that have vanished" (quoted in Berlin 1998: 38). The fragments, I go on, aren't "history". What we – historians – do with those fragments is. And what we do *after* we have discovered and assembled those fragments is to make some sort of sense out of them by arranging, interpreting, discussing, and writing about them. In this way, I conclude, history isn't written by the winners, as the old cliché goes, so much as it is written by the writers. It is important to think about the writers of history I tell them, as E.H. Carr directs us to do in his classic 1961 treatise *What Is History?* Whether or not this little introduction to the epistemological problem of history makes any difference to my students I am not sure. Some of them, at least, seem to take a break from online shopping during this presentation.

But though history may be written by the writers, it is just as important to think about the writing itself. That the past does not exist independently of how historians think, talk, and write about it is not a new insight. A century ago, Henry Adams recognized the very basic relationship between history and the writing of history. Adams regarded himself as a failed historian – as a failed everything else as well – and he never had any intention of publishing some of his historical writing or presenting it to a broad audience. *The*

Education, for example, was first published posthumously, in accordance with Adams's will, in a small, private edition and distributed to a handful of friends. And yet he continued to write because, as his longtime confidante Elizabeth Cameron explained, "[H]e told me it was his way of mastering a subject. He was not sure of it all until he wrote it" (quoted in Tehan 1983: 12). In this sense, the act and process of writing itself become the answer to the epistemological question, "How do I know the past?" and constitute its own form of historical experience.

In this chapter, which I confess at the outset will reflect my experience as an American historian of American history with all of the parochialism that comes with it, I want to discuss this relationship between historical understanding, historical writing, and the way we communicate – or don't – with a variety of audiences. Those audiences themselves engage with history through a range of genres, most of which, I think it is fair to say, professional historians haven't thought much about. At stake, I believe, in thinking more about the genres in which we write and the audiences for whom we write is reestablishing a more confident sense of historical authority. As I will discuss, reasserting our professional authority through multiple genres is the only way that historians can expect our work to matter much beyond the narrow confines of our academic worlds.

Discipline envy: writing history and the search for authority

Charles Stewart and Stephan Palmié have done an able and efficient job charting the development of the historical discipline with its attendant conundrums in their introduction to this volume. So I'll only remark that as history, at least in the United States, became professionalized in the late nineteenth century, American historians were less interested in the philosophy of history – it's hard to think of American analogs to Taine, Toynbee, or Croce – and spent more time concerned with method. And while the founding of the American Historical Association in 1884 signaled a certain coming-of-age confidence, beneath it American historians have felt an ongoing methodological anxiety. Accumulating archival bits and turning them into "history" has always been more problematic than many historians would want to let on, and thus to do its work, history has borrowed methods and aspirations pretty promiscuously from other disciplines. So it was that, born in an age of science triumphant, professional history tried to fashion itself as a science.

The scientific ideal was never really achieved, but neither did it exactly die, despite repeated admissions by historians and analyses by philosophers that history was not nor could ever be a true science. As early as 1936, for example, Karl Popper, reacting in horror to the way history had been deployed in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union as the explanatory engine of human destiny, began a refutation of what he called "historicism" or historicist thinking, indicting it for the arrogance of supposing that it could,

like a natural science, predict the future. Published in a three-part series of articles in 1944 and then in book form in 1957, Popper's *The Poverty of Historicism* amounted to a dismantling of the foundations of the so-called social sciences as an "attempt to solve the old problem of foretelling the future" (Popper 2002: 37). The natural sciences draw their power precisely from their ability to predict – astronomers, for example, can tell us exactly when the next eclipse of the moon will take place – but the social sciences failed this basic test and for several reasons. As Popper summarized it at the beginning of his 1957 book, "I have shown that, for strictly logical reasons, it is impossible for us to predict the future course of history" (Popper 2002: xi). A few years later, Isaiah Berlin also asked the question of whether history could – or should – aspire to be a science and argued: absolutely not. The problem wasn't with method or with execution but existed at a basic conceptual level. "What they seek is not the same", Berlin reasoned, and concluded, "to say of history that it should approximate to the condition of a science is to ask it to contradict its essence" (Berlin 1960: 22, 31). That these two major philosophers were still addressing the problem in the mid-twentieth century attests to the tenacity of the idea (or ideal) that history could be scientific.

I have wondered how many historians really believed that what they did was a science or could be sometime in the future, whether "scientific history" became something of a straw man for critics. Still, though scientific history never achieved the goals it allegedly pursued, many historians have pursued something adjacent, what Peter Novick called the "noble dream" of historical objectivity.

In pursuit of new ways to achieve that objectivity, or at least searching for more rigor and exactitude, after the Second World War historians looked over the disciplinary fence at sociology, political science, and economics, and they thought things looked pretty interesting there. Hence the quantitative "revolution" of the New Social History, which not only tried to incorporate the big social theories of mid-century social science but also relied on the new mainframe computers recently arrived on campuses in those years to do its quantitative work. When I was in graduate school, taking statistics fulfilled a language requirement.

Even before the enthusiasm for quantitative history had waned, its limitations had become apparent. One could count only the things that could be counted, and human experience was surely far more than the sum of those things. As a result, other historians grew interested in the cultural dimension of human history and turned to the anthropologists for more rigorous frameworks with which to analyze it. Citations to the work of Marshall Sahlins, Victor Turner, Mary Douglas, and Clifford Geertz began to appear in a remarkable number of historical works, as historians tried their hand at fine-grained, thickly described, locally informed analyses of the past.

More recently, historians have been taking "turns" as they cast about for fresh analytic tools and conceptual frameworks with which to recover and

represent history – so many turns, in fact, that observers could be forgiven for thinking that the discipline resembles one of those elderly Floridian drivers who can't quite stay in their own lane. The literary turn, or turns if you prefer, has now been joined by the "spatial turn" and the "affective turn".

One consequence, or perhaps the very purpose, of poststructural, deconstructive and other sorts of analysis was to demonstrate once and for all that the practice of history was hopelessly contingent, that historical truth was nothing more than a set of social constructions, and that historical objectivity was a chimera that was both unattainable and that was used to mask political agendas on the part of those who wrote about the past. Taken together, these amounted to powerful linguistic, philosophical, and methodological critiques.

And yet . . . the tools with which this dismantling was accomplished were all labeled: theory. Never mind that these critical postures amount to the very opposite of theory in the hard, scientific definition of the term. Those who took the literary turn in history in order to distance themselves as far as possible from truth and objectivity still traded on the authority that attaches to science by calling what they do "theory". Karl Popper recognized this problem long before anyone started "turning". Faced with the challenge of being overwhelmed with information, historians needed "consciously to introduce a *preconceived selective point of view* into one's history; that is, to write *that history which interests us* . . . . Historicism", he continued, "mistakes these interpretations for theories. This is one of its cardinal errors" (Popper 2002: 150–151).

Let me summarize here by saying that the absence of a discipline-defining method or framework or analytic hypothesis, and certainly of any proper theory shared by the field as a whole, has left historians free, or free-floating, to borrow from any number of other disciplines and enterprises. In addition to our voracious appetites for conceptual approaches, we have become equally omnivorous with those historical fragments. Surely one of the signal developments of the field across the twentieth century has been the ever expanding circle of what we might consider historical subjects and what we use as historical evidence. The American History Association's (AHA's) slogan sums this up: "Everything Has a History". Historians don't really resemble scientists, therefore, but rather one of those huge Russian fishing trawlers that simply suck up everything in the sea. And reading this right now you might hear the faint rumble of large diesel engines.

Writing history, audiences, and the question of genres

Ironically, however, even as historians have swallowed up any number of methodologies and even as there is virtually nothing now that we do not consider a historical fragment – from visual material to material culture, from probate records to census tables – historians have not, as a rule,

explored how to turn historical understanding into historical narrative in many of the genres now available to us.

Genre, of course, simply means "type", and we use the term primarily to talk about literature and art – and the various types of them. In the world of marketing, genre is used to sell movies and music as well – the Grammy Awards, after all, are essentially an exercise in genre. According to my *OED*, the word itself only entered English usage from the French in the early nineteenth century. Arriving when it did in our language, "genre" can be seen as part and parcel of the larger taxonomic impulse that drove so much scientific and other activity during the nineteenth century. Victorians imposed classifications on everything from butterflies to department store merchandise (order: clothes; family: adult; genus: men's; species: shirts). In fact, the word itself has its roots in the Latin word "genus", and in this sense, genre attempted to apply Linnaeus-like categories to the world of the arts.

Foucault, among others, helped us to see that all sorts of categorizations do not really mirror a reality external to those who create them, that classifications are socially constructed through discourse. (This insight was also not entirely new; biologists for some time have recognized that the "genus" and "species" of the Linnaean system of binomial nomenclature have fuzzy boundaries and that they serve a useful function as much as they represent a hard and fast biological reality.) Still, I think art historian George Kubler and anthropologist Igor Kopytoff were right when they each noted that classifying the world seems to be a basic human necessity. "We can grasp the universe", Kubler wrote, "only by simplifying it with ideas of identity by classes, types, and categories" (Kubler 1962: preamble). Kopytoff agreed when he wrote that "the human mind has an inherent tendency to impose order upon the chaos of its environment by classifying its contents, and without the classification knowledge of the world . . . would not be possible" (Kopytoff 1986: 70).[1]

At one level, the history of history is a story of genre. Human beings have attempted to record their activities for some posterity for a very, very long time, and we have done so in a number of genres over the centuries. Take these examples from earlier ages: the epic; the ode; the chronicle; the hagiography, to name four that have gone out of fashion. Add to that historical narratives inscribed in visual form: the Roman triumphal arch; the sculptural programs of medieval European cathedrals; eighteenth-century grand-manner history painting. These too have faded as ways of narrating the past.

Each of these genres represents not just the attempt to record history but an experiment in how to do so most effectively within a particular set of social circumstances, and each had its own conventions of what constituted historical truth. Sir Joshua Reynolds, for example, drew an important distinction between what he dismissed as the merely factual and the more significant "truth" that grand-manner history painting could convey.

In his thirteenth discourse on art, he told his audience, "It is allowed on all hands that facts, and events, however they may bind the Historian, have no dominion over the Poet or the Painter. With us History is made to bend and conform to the great idea of Art" (Reynolds 1959: 244). Paint could infuse fact with didactic purpose and moral valence.

At the dawn of the professional age, history was still often seen as a variety (a genre) of polite literature. The pioneers of the new history wanted to supplant that genre with one of their own creation: the archivally based research monograph. Yet even as the professionalized field of history narrowed the number of "serious" practitioners by drawing a sharp distinction between amateurs and professionals, it incorporated some older genres into its domain – biography springs first to mind – while creating several new ones: the thesis (subgenres: undergraduate; MA; PhD dissertation); the scholarly essay; the edited collection of scholarly essays; the edited collection of documents; the "big synthesis"; and the textbook, which has the potential to be the most influential, most widely read of them all.

This recitation is perfectly straightforward – historians move in and between these genres all the time and without thinking much about it. As I look at this list, I realize that I have worked in almost every one of them. But perhaps that's the point – we don't think too much about it. Would it be fruitful, I wonder, if historians were as self-conscious about our genres as we are about our choice of subjects or our methodological approach? Genres impose their own forms and constraints, follow their own rules and traditions, which we often don't acknowledge or even recognize.

Take, again, the example of biography. The writer Lytton Strachey recognized the dilemma a century ago. Introducing his own biographical project *Eminent Victorians*, he complained about the British tradition of biography – "those two fat volumes, with which it is our custom to commemorate the dead – who does not know them, with their ill-digested masses of material, their slipshod style, their tone of tedious panegyric . . ." and he opined "we do not reflect that it is perhaps as difficult to write a good life as to live one" (Strachey 1918: vi). The biographical genre is, in fact, deceptively easy, and the shelves groan with biographies in part because they sell well but in part because biography appears to be a straightforward genre. A life organizes nicely into beginning, middle, and inevitable end. Put bluntly, it is easy to write a biography. At the same time, however, I suspect it is quite hard to write a good one. My own estimate is that the small shelf of truly good biographies has been written by people who thought about the genre as much as about the life.

Likewise, translating historical understanding into an 800-word op-ed column requires a discipline quite different than writing it as a 25-page journal article. As historian-turned-*San Francisco Chronicle*-columnist Ruth Rosen described it, "You must catch the reader's attention instantly, and that person has to want to read the second sentence. . . . I have had to learn to be vivid, precise, and lucid, and, of course, to avoid academic jargon at

all costs" (Rosen 2004: 577). Which, frankly, sounds like the way we ought to write most of the time.

Turning history into a museum display requires yet a different sensibility and set of skills. The exhibition is a genre that works with both the visual – two- and three-dimensional – and with the verbal and often other senses as well, especially hearing and touch. "I have learned more about writing museum labels from poetry and children's picture books", says museum-based historian Barbara Franco, "than from reading or writing traditional history texts" (Franco 2004: 576). All of which is to reiterate that moving across genres means learning the conventions of each. The reward for learning those rules is that it may well enhance all the work we do regardless of how or where we do it.

My point here is not to argue that historians should become even more self-conscious about the work we do. Instead, I want to note not only that historians already work in many different genres but that we now have unprecedented opportunities to work in even more. Another quick, incomplete list: cable television, documentary film, museum exhibit, newspaper op-ed, blogs, and a large grab bag, the "multi-media" project.

The good news – and I firmly believe it – is that there is a public demand for history. However, that demand is also for a variety of historical genres, and this is where many academic historians begin to grind their teeth. To call a book "popularized" history is a dismissive epithet, code for dumbing-down, cutting corners, for playing fast and loose, or, worse, that it might become popular. As for Hollywood movies, I have a colleague who kept a count of the historical inaccuracies in Steven Spielberg's movie *Lincoln* (4 major, 6 minor). At one level, this is pure professional turf guarding. If anyone with a web domain or some financing from a movie studio can "do" history, where does that leave those of us who toiled through graduate school to earn the privilege? At another level, our discomfort is pure Ranke after all. We may no longer quite have the confidence that we can produce "the past as it actually was", but we're still pretty sure when other people get it "wrong".

Let me add quickly that I don't disagree. Plodding empiricist as I am, I do hang on to the idea that some history is better than others, that you can get it more right and thus more wrong. Not all history is created equal. But that issue to one side, I believe that if historians want to engage more broadly with the public, we need to recognize that the public engages with history through a variety of genres, and most of us feel comfortable with only some of them.

What would it mean, therefore, were historians to engage more fully with the question of genre? Three things strike me immediately.

First, it would take us back to that late nineteenth century moment of professionalization and force a reexamination of the role genre has played in the discipline's professional growth and development: what genres were permitted, which weren't, how has that changed, and why? A history of

history, in other words, not focused on subjects or schools of interpretation but on how the stories themselves were written and how those stories reached different audiences.

If we were to expand the genres in which we worked, this would surely require a fairly substantial reorientation of our system of professional training, incentives, and rewards. I'm struck by a remarkable paradox: over the last two generations, the field of history has truly flourished. We have given a history to a range of subjects and topics simply inconceivable in an earlier time and have done so by employing a variety of sophisticated and innovative methodologies in creative ways. And at the same time, what "counts" in the professional world of history – the single-author monograph, the peer-reviewed, heavily footnoted journal article – has changed hardly at all (indeed, I could make a case that it has narrowed). Engaging with larger audiences by engaging with different genres generally falls into the "AND" category in our professional accounting: publish your peer-reviewed, single-author monograph AND write newspaper columns that use the past to illuminate the present. Rarely does this kind of work fall into the "INSTEAD OF" category. And more often than not, it doesn't count for much at all. Write a high school textbook, and your department chair might well dismiss the effort as not serious AND be jealous that you might actually sell some books.

Graduate students get the message about what counts and what doesn't in the world of academic history the day they enter their programs. Graduate training remains primarily focused on working only in one genre: the dissertation. And even here we are sometimes guilty of a kind of writing malpractice. As the Harvard historian Oscar Handlin described it acerbically, "As creative scholarship, there was something pathetic about the PhD dissertation, laboriously compiled, meticulous in its apparatus, factually accurate but intellectually arid, and generally marking the end rather than the beginning of a writing career" (Handlin 1979: 76).[2] Not too long ago I had a perfectly articulate graduate student in my office to discuss a particularly turbid piece of prose she had given me. Her face fell into her hands and she said, "I didn't used to write like this!" How many times have we taken competent writers and turned them into, well, academic writers?

It is certainly true that some historians can move effortlessly between genres; most of us, on the other hand, can't. Few of us, I suspect, were ever given the chance or the training to try. If we are candid with ourselves, we will admit that the way we train "the next generation" of historians doesn't even prepare them well for jobs inside the academy, much less to move in the worlds outside of it. Historian Jonathan Zimmerman has recently suggested that "anyone who writes an MA or PhD thesis should also be required to produce a piece of work about their project for public audiences". His point is not simply that this is valuable for the public but that it is necessary "to create an academic culture that prepares people for jobs outside the academy, not just within it", especially given that the "crisis" of the academic job market has moved from an acute condition to a chronic one (Zimmerman

2014: 10–11). As things stand, however, training our students to be just like us, more or less, means that we tie their hands and rarely offer opportunities for them to learn how to work in other venues and in other media. We also thus virtually guarantee that their historical discoveries will never reach much beyond campus.

The third implication of taking the "generic turn" follows from that last observation. Recognizing the variety of genres in which historians might work, we also need to acknowledge that this corresponds to a variety of historical audiences. I don't want to suggest that historians start to think more like marketers, but marketers certainly understand the relationship between genre and audience much better than we do. The academic enterprise traces its origins back to the monastery, and we still operate much the same way, including the vows of poverty we take in graduate school. We think of our audience in two broad groups. First come those of us inside the cloister. These are the ones we hope to engage and impress. Second, everyone else. (Plumping our prospectuses, we try unashamedly to convince our press editors that this "general public" will buy our books – awkward silence often follows the pitch.)

There are, of course, multiple audiences out there, and thinking about genres necessarily means attending to their differences and needs. The undergraduates in our survey classes are not the same audience as the history book group that meets at the local library who are not necessarily the same as those who use the web to explore history, nor are they the members of the U.S. House of Representatives Oversight Committee, where I was invited in December 2013 to testify about the history of government involvement in health care. (I was unable to go, but I was able to recommend a colleague who did testify.)

Without going into an extended exhortation here, I genuinely believe that we ignore, at our peril, the varieties of historical audiences and the genres with which each engages. As I said previously, there really is an audience hungry for history but not necessarily in the forms we are trained to and rewarded for producing. If we don't engage more regularly and energetically with other genres, fools will rush in. Bill O'Reilly already has.

Or more dismal than fools, economists. As historians have spoken more and more only to one another, economists have been emboldened to speak more and more to the rest of us and about more and more issues. As Justin Wolfers, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, discovered, poking around in the now easily searchable *New York Times* archives, roughly 1% of *Times* articles in recent years mentions an economist. Historians pop up far less frequently (though perhaps we can take solace that sociologists and anthropologists hardly show up at all). Wolfers did the same searching over the last 25 years in the *Congressional Record* and found virtually the same prevalences (Wolfers 2015). These are crude measures for sure, but they provide us with a barometer to gauge how much economists shape public opinion and the public debate and, by

comparison, how little historians now do. Give the dismal scientists their due: they have been remarkably successful at convincing the public over the last few decades that all the questions that confront us can be reduced to a set of market transactions, never mind the mess those economic rationales have made of the world in recent years.

There is a pure professional pragmatism here. If we can't or won't utilize the variety of genres at our disposal to communicate with audiences, we have only ourselves to blame if the wider public ceases to engage much with what we do. This is the dirty little irony of the New Social History that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. Here was promised a "people's history", written about marginalized, overlooked, and forgotten groups, a history "from the bottom up", and much of it was so deadly dull that no one outside the academy ever read it. Arguably, matters only got worse when certain scholars took the sloppy, impenetrable, and sometimes badly translated prose stylings of French critics as their model for scholarly writing. By the early 1990s, there was enough of it circulating that the journal *Philosophy and Literature* began holding an annual "Bad Writing Contest". If the public doesn't want to read our books, who exactly is to blame?

At some point in the late twentieth century, Americans stopped fighting about the future and started fighting about the past. Thus did we engage in the "culture wars" of the 1990s. Three of the most vicious battles took place over how to interpret episodes in American history: The West as America exhibition at what was then called the National Museum of American Art, the Enola Gay exhibit across the Mall at the National Air and Space Museum, and the national history standards.

These were dreary, dispiriting moments in American life at the time, and looking back on them they only seem more absurd. But without defending in any way the pitchforked partisans who attacked the Smithsonian, let me offer that there was an inadvertent silver lining to all of the nonsense. The culture wars demonstrated that Americans really do care about history, that they can get quite excited about it, and that the work historians do does, in fact, matter to a wider public. But the culture wars also demonstrated that many historians simply did not know how to navigate the public debate as it took place in newspapers, on television, and in the halls of Congress.

I'm not insisting that if more historians had been more fluent in different genres and more comfortable operating across different venues, the battles of the culture wars would have turned out differently. But, then again, perhaps they might have.

Lost confidence, historical authority, and doing work in the world

If history is written by the writers, then it is probably fair to say that no single scholar has made historians more self-conscious of the writing we do than Hayden White. His literary analysis of historical writing has forced

historians to think about both the "history" and the "writing" of the past, even if many of them initially bristled, as when Gordon Leff complained in a review of White's book *Metahistory* that the book "reduces history to a species of poetics or linguistics" (Leff 1974: 600). White asked historians to turn away from their focus on historical fragments and toward the words with which they knit those fragments into historical narratives. Viewed from that altitude, historians shared the problem of narrative choice or strategy with novelists and poets. Historians might disagree with White over just how many different ways there might be to tell – or emplot, to use White's preferred term – an historical tale, but as John Clive wrote in another review of *Metahistory*, after reading it, "there is no getting around the fact that ordinary as well as great historians are quite capable of presenting the same events . . . in different literary modes" (Clive 1975: 543). Having tried since the mid-nineteenth century to become a science, with all the intellectual and cultural legitimacy that science bestowed, history, it seemed, had been tossed back into the nineteenth-century category of "polite literature".

White – and many who read him – then used that analysis to ask fundamental questions about the claims historians (and their writing) made to objective truth. White called history a "fiction-making operation", which certainly rankled many who thought they were writing, well, nonfiction. This radical relativism – that any "historical object can sustain a number of equally plausible descriptions or narratives . . . as long as the account produced is structurally coherent" – left historians, some of them at any rate, standing "on the edge of the cliff", as Michel de Certeau described the work of Michel Foucault.

The problem here, I hasten to add, is also not new. Nearly 100 years ago, Henry Adams cast a wonderfully skeptical eye on the practice of history, writing in his *Autobiography*:

> Historians undertake to arrange sequences – called stories, or histories – assuming in silence a relation of cause and effect. These assumptions, hidden in the depths of dusty libraries, have been astounding, but commonly unconscious and childlike; so much so, that if any captious critic were to drag them to light, historians would probably reply, with one voice, that they had never supposed themselves required to know what they were talking about.
>
> (Adams 1918: 382)

We may be plodding empiricists, but most historians, I would wager, are haunted to one degree or another by the utterly contingent nature of what we do.

My own sense is that in the twenty-first century, historians have taken a step or two back from the edge of that cliff. Elegant as White's arguments remain, the "literary" and "linguistic" turns struck many historians as a set of parlor tricks played with words – amusing, perhaps, at best; irresponsible

at worst. As historian Drew Faust once said to me talking about all of this: "Just because we can deconstruct the language of homelessness doesn't mean people aren't sleeping on the streets". Or as Roger Chartier described it, a poststructuralist or deconstructive history risked "the dangerous reduction of the social world to a purely discursive construction and to pure language games"(Chartier 1997: 4). Many historians worry that spending too much time fretting about the impossibility of writing means that we risk trivializing the real experiences of the people about whom we write.

Even if they were not entirely persuaded by the arguments, I suspect that this turn toward the literary and cultural left many historians with a collective feeling of doubt, a professional loss of confidence. Perhaps not in our own work but in the larger enterprise of which we want to be a part. Wary now of vast generalizations, phobic of grand – meta – narratives, many historians fret that, even as our scholarly production has proliferated, historical understanding has become something less than the sum of all our books. That uneasiness over the loss of common purpose spans political points of view: it motivated Oscar Handlin, who some came to see as a post-1968 conservative, to write *Truth in History* in 1979, and it animated Geoff Eley, a man of the left, to write *A Crooked Line* nearly 30 years later. *A Crooked Line* is a just slightly wistful book, an intellectual autobiography cum historiographic musing in which the British-trained Eley tracks the discipline's move from the Big Social History of the heady 1960s to the cultural history of the 1980s and 1990s, whose aspirations can't help but feel diminished by comparison.

We have demonstrated that the past resists easy simplification. In fact, it has become an implicit professional goal to "complicate" matters more and more. We have been less successful, however, at translating that complexity into the kinds of "usable pasts" that most of us need. At one level, this too is a genre problem. The dissertation, the scholarly monograph, and the journal article enable complexity and complication. Magazine pieces, museum exhibitions, and policy debates demand that we streamline and simplify. Though every fiber of our professional training strains at the very suggestion, engaging with other genres, on their own terms, is necessary if we want our history to do work in the world – to matter not just to us and our tribe of historians but to the larger body politic.

Aside from the promise of riches and fame, many of us became historians because we felt some affective relationship to the past. The work of the historians I most admire has stayed with me not because it dug up the most obscure archival sources or made the most novel argument but rather because those historians seem to possess an almost intuitive connection to the past, and they are able to communicate it to me. This is probably true for most of us. As Barbara Franco put it about her work at the Minnesota History Center, "[P]eople were better able to engage in critical analysis of history after they had made an emotional connection to people or events of the past" (Franco 2004: 581).

In fact, the rules that govern the scholarly monograph as a genre probably make it difficult for most authors to achieve that kind of affective connection to the past for their readers. But it is central to the genre of "narrative" or "literary non-fiction". Erik Larson, one of the most successful contemporary practitioners of this genre, described his aims this way: "It is not necessarily my goal to inform. It is my goal to create a historical experience with my books. My dream, my ideal, is that someone picks up a book of mine, starts reading it, and just lets themselves sink into the past" (quoted in Sides 2015).

Yet I suspect many of us also want to do something more in the world than simply connect at an emotional level with the past. Many of us want to give the concerns and debates of the present a deeper historical context, hoping that in so doing we can make better choices about the future. Still others believe that their scholarship might lead to specific kinds of social change, taking seriously the adage, "Who controls the past now controls the future", though, of course, Orwell was speaking in a cautionary way, not in a prescriptive one. At its worst, that yearning explains how often historians nowadays borrow from the language of the security state and "interrogate" the past (if you employ more than one critical approach, do you engage in an "enhanced interrogation"?) or apply the language of humanitarian disaster by staging "interventions". At one level, the use of that language is pure professional puffery designed to amplify the significance of the activity; at another, of course, this overinflated language risks underscoring the distance between feeding refugees in Darfur and presenting a seminar paper, and it risks confusing the role history can play in the public sphere.

Whether this kind of politically inflected scholarship is effective, tendentious, or merely quixotic I'll put to one side. Let me offer, however, that if history is going to contribute to the debates that matter in our world, historians have to help people move from the affective to the analytic, from feeling to thinking. The sorts of immersive, affective historical experiences now on offer in the real and digital worlds, some of which are discussed in this collection, are, in the end, purely personal ones. Politics, however, is a collective enterprise. So let me suggest further that exploring history's genres might help to improve the efficacy of what we do. It will enable us to better align what we want to accomplish with the venues in which that work can best be carried out.

In some sense, Carl Becker anticipated some of what I've discussed in this chapter in his now classic work "Everyman His Own Historian" (which he delivered as the presidential address to the American Historical Association in 1931 and published the following year). Since this piece remains so well-known, only a quick review here: Becker argues that Mr. Everyman – "not a professor of history, but just an ordinary citizen without excess knowledge" – makes sense of his present by employing historical techniques. Becker walks us through the steps involved as Mr. Everyman goes about paying his coal bill and concludes that "Mr. Everyman would be astonished to learn that he

is an historian, yet it is obvious, isn't it, that he has performed all the essential operations involved in historical research".

Becker wanted his fellow professional historians to recognize that history mattered to regular people, though they approached it for their own reasons and in their own ways, usually the practical and the personal. As Becker put it toward the end of the speech, "Berate him as we will for not reading our books, Mr. Everyman is stronger than we are, and sooner or later we must adapt our knowledge to his necessities". For this reason, Becker is often seen as a forerunner of the "social history" project. At another level, however, Becker drew the analogy between professional historians and Mr. Everyman because he wanted to remind his fellow AHA members that the two had much in common. "What have we to do with Mr. Everyman", Becker asked, "or he with us? More, I venture to believe, than we are apt to think". The connection, as Becker saw it, was that both were "subject to the limitations of time and place" despite whatever pretensions professional historians had to objectivity and omniscience: contingency, subjectivity, doubt (Becker 1932).

As we think about the "literary turn" and all it has meant for the practice of historians, as well as about the role history can or should play in the larger world, I can't help but historicize this question as one of those proverbial "first-world problems". It is surely no coincidence that the ideas we associate with this turn germinated and grew in the political soil of the 1960s and proliferated in the post-1968 political landscape. This was certainly true in the Anglo-Franco-American world where 1968 seemed to represent the impossibility of human agency to change the course of human history. Once the tear gas had cleared, after all, DeGaulle and Nixon were still standing, and the Thatcher/Reagan age was just dawning.

That sense of political failure corresponded with the failure, or, better, perhaps the exhaustion of the big historical projects of the mid-twentieth century: Marxist history, probably most influential in England; the French *Annales* school; and the quantitative/computing revolution that attracted many American historians. Eley, for example, opens *A Crooked Line* by describing his younger self as "a young person seeking change in the world", and he thus became a historian "because history really *mattered*". He was formatively shaped, he confesses, by "the British 1968", but he moves from an intellectual "optimism" (title of Chapter 2) to "disappointment" (title of Chapter 3) as the decades wear on (Eley 2005: ix, xi).

That declension was particularly true in France, where 1968 represented, at least for a number of intellectuals, the second failure of national nerve in 30 years. As Gabrielle Spiegel put it in her address as president of the American Historical Association in 2008, the deconstructive ideas of Jacques Derrida stand for "an entire generation's understanding of the wreck of history attendant upon the war and the revelations of its horrors". For Primo Levi, Auschwitz killed god; for Theodor Adorno, it killed poetry. For Derrida and the rest, it killed history too.

Faced with those disappointments, it was no surprise that some intellectuals should conceive of a world in which power was exerted by disembodied discourses and in which words did not – could not – have any reliable meaning. Having failed to destabilize governments, French critics, philosophers, and others destabilized language instead, taking with it those disciplines – literature, philosophy, history – that traffic in words. That they, and many of their acolytes, pursued an attack on Enlightenment rationality in the name of left-leaning liberation meant that defenders of "truth", "objectivity" and the like were cast as revanchists. One can almost hear the exasperation in Noam Chomsky's voice when he wrote of these intellectuals in 1993:

> Remarkably, their left counterparts today often seek to deprive working people of these tools of emancipation, informing us that the "project of the Enlightenment" is dead, that we must abandon the "illusions" of science and rationality – a message that will gladden the hearts of the powerful, delighted to monopolize these instruments for their own use.
> (Chomsky 1993: 286)

Or, as Todd Gitlin archly put it, the triumph of this self-anointed academic left came when they took over the English department. Meanwhile, in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the right took over everything else.

The year 1968, of course, happened behind the Iron Curtain as well, most tragically in Prague. And at the very same moment that French critics were demonstrating the impossibility of attaching meaning to words, of truth to history, Vaclav Havel drew a different lesson from 1968. The playwright found himself blacklisted shortly after the failed Prague Spring, and so in April 1975 he wrote an open letter to Gustav Husak, then the general secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. In the middle of his withering critique of life under Czechoslovak communism, Havel made a plea for history and drew a distinction between what he saw as "real history" and the "*pseudo-history*" that had replaced it.

"Any society that is alive", Havel wrote, "is a society with a *history*". Under the current regime, certainly under a more concrete "regime of truth" than those imagined by Foucault, Havel continued, "the elimination of life in the proper sense brings social time to a halt, so that history disappears from its purview". At this level, Czechoslovakia was dead. If real life, with all its attendant messiness, authored real history, according to Havel, then pseudo-history was created by "an official planner". Instead of real life, Czechoslovakians were:

> offered non-events; we live from anniversary to anniversary, from celebration to celebration, from parade to parade, from a unanimous congress to unanimous elections and back again. . . . It is no coincidence that, thanks to this substitution for history, we are able to review

> everything that is happening in society, past and future, by simply glancing at the calendar.
>
> (Havel 1986: 25–226)[3]

At the very moment when Western critics were eroding the idea that there could be historical certainty, that there was even a distinction between "real" and "pseudo-" history, Havel spoke for all those who needed the real thing desperately, and at the very moment when some academics asserted the impossibility of historical truth, Havel published his essay in a collection he titled "Living in Truth".

There was an old Soviet joke that mocked the vicissitudes of Russian history as manufactured by the Communist party's official keepers of truth. As events were told one way and then retold another, and as people appeared and disappeared from the historical scene depending on the direction of the Kremlin winds, Soviets cried: "Comrades, the future is certain! But the past changes all the time". That joke turned into a kind of collective existential crisis for Russians in the mid-1980s. Central to Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms was a rehabilitation of history itself. Archives opened up, censorship eased, and Russians began to confront their own past in a way that they had not for over half a century.

On November 2, 1987, Gorbachev, in front of the Soviet Communist Party Congress and surrounded by the leaders of virtually all of the Soviet client states, addressed the nation on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. His subject was history: "Many thousands of members of the Party and nonmembers were subjected to mass repressions", Gorbachev lectured. "That is the bitter truth". He wasn't finished. "Even now", he continued, "we still encounter attempts to ignore sensitive questions of our history, to hush them up, to pretend that nothing special happened" (quoted in Remnick 1994: 50).[4] Gorbachev was, in effect, asking Soviets to now live in truth. Seven months later, and with Gorbachev's approval, the national end-of-year exams in history were canceled for students aged 6–16 – all 53 million of them. Why, after all, test students on their mastery of lies?[5]

It was an exciting, vertiginous moment, captured brilliantly by David Remnick in his Pulitzer Prize–winning book *Lenin's Tomb*. Within just a few years, the cadaverous leaders who flanked Gorbachev during his history speech would all be gone, and the Soviet Union itself would dissolve. The recovery of the past, as Remnick tells it, was a central – perhaps *the* central – act that undermined the legitimacy of all those regimes. "History, when it returned", Remnick observed, "was unforgiving" (Remnick 1994: 51).

Historical truth might have fallen out of fashion in the post-1968 West, especially in certain academic circles, but in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, it turned out to matter crucially. History did indeed do a great deal of work in that world. And the story is a cautionary reminder that if historians cede too much ground on the notion of historical truth, if we hedge

on our own historical authority, history will quickly become fake history that will just as quickly become political propaganda. Which now, in the twenty-first century, it has – from Beijing to Budapest and from Moscow to Washington, D.C.

Honesty, consensus, and authority, or where have you gone William James?

The title of this volume plays with title of William James' Gifford Lectures, published in 1902 as the book *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. As it happens, I taught parts of that book to an undergraduate class as I was sitting down to write this chapter. I love teaching James – in large part because my students almost invariably enjoy wrestling with him. They noticed right away the space James leaves individuals to hang on to their religious faith. But then after some further discussion, they also contemplated the inherent challenge James lays before us if *we*, not some distant or external source of the divine, become the real source of religious authority. Can God really exist, they wondered, if faith becomes simply a matter of personal choice? In fact, isn't the whole point of faith that there is a providential power external to ourselves that we worship, appeal to, or otherwise engage with?

The religious dilemma my students debated when we discussed James is, in some sense, the dilemma of history. If everyone is his or her own historian, if each of us gets to "choose" our own historical truths, does that mean that they are all equivalently true? If I believe something about the past because it has a "cash value" to me (to borrow one of James' most famous (or infamous) phrases), does that make it history? If historical truth can reside in the realm of the purely personal, then how can it function to help us to make sense of our shared present and shape our shared future? Mr. Everyman might function as his own historian, but does his history matter to anyone else?

Questions like these make me a bit uncomfortable with the premise of this volume. There are without a doubt a variety of historical experiences, and it behooves us to explore them. But in turn those various experiences don't necessarily constitute history, nor can they make the claims to authority that I believe history needs to make. My uneasiness is not entirely hypothetical; these questions have popped up in a number of places in the recent past. When the Smithsonian's National Museum of the American Indian opened in 2004, its exhibits were predicated precisely on the notion that there exists a great variety of Native historical experiences. That was reinforced when the Museum turned over the curatorial work to individual Native groups. While this allowed Native people to "tell our own stories", those stories did not include much of what historians – Native and non-Native – have learned about Native history. The result of this exclusively "insider history" was a welter of historical incoherence.

James credited the remarkable, erratic polymath Charles Sanders Peirce with putting him on to the idea of pragmatism. In particular, James cited this line from Peirce's 1878 essay "How to Make Our Ideas Clear": "Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have" (Peirce 1878: 294). Peirce was primarily a logician and mathematician; James took Peirce's insight and explored how it might be applied to metaphysical disputes. He wrote against the claim made by science that it possessed a transcendent authority, a claim that he saw as stifling.

Yet as much as James wanted to reclaim the intellectual respectability of faith and those things not strictly rational for individuals in a Darwinian world, he took for granted that, as each of us worked through our beliefs, we would do so as part of a larger social process. In this he borrowed another concept from Peirce: the community of inquiry. As historian David Hollinger notes, when James introduced the notion that an *individual's* experience mattered in the formation of truth, he "takes for granted the place of this individual in a cooperative, *social* process", or, as James himself put it, "we trade on each other's truths" (Hollinger 1985). "Truth happens to an idea", James wrote in his essay "Pragmatism's Meaning of Truth", but not simply because that truth happened for me but because it happened for us through that process of inquiry whereby my truths had to be made compatible with yours.[6]

There is direction here for historians. No one, I think, still believes "truth" and "objectivity" ought to be history's goals. Besides, that nineteenth-century scientific ideal against which history has measured itself and come up wanting has proved to be a bit of a straw man anyway. Scientists themselves see "truth" as an answer to a question that is settled only for the time being.

When I teach James, it has always seemed to me that "truth", however contingent, was a goal, but that the process of getting there required intellectual honesty. That process might be at least as important as the goal itself. When James wrote that "the greatest enemy of any one of our truths may be the rest of our truths", he wasn't simply turning a clever phrase. He was saying that if we are honest with ourselves, we must give up one or the other of those conflicting truths, which is the very definition of something easier said than done. Some of what we call historical knowledge will survive this deceptively simple test. Much of it will not, because it cannot be reconciled with other historical interpretations we agree are true.

Honesty, then, not objectivity or truth, is what history as a practice can achieve. On the one hand, this requires that each of us individually do the best we can given the fragments we have in front of us. On the other, honesty means arriving at consensus collectively over the meaning of those fragments, even while acknowledging that our conclusions might well be conditional and incomplete. This is what distinguishes history from the myriad other ways in which we might access the past, whether through myth, tradition, nostalgia, or religious invocation. As Roger Chartier puts

it, "identitarian history" risks "muddying all distinction between a universally acceptable, verified knowledge and the mythical reconstructions that sustain particular memories and aspirations" (Chartier 1997: 8). In this Jamesian sense, history becomes a commons, a body of shared knowledge around which a consensus has been achieved across various groups. Historical experience that does not pass the pragmatic test is no less important for those who have it, but it cannot serve as the foundation for doing work in the world.

So what does this have to do with my generic turn? Perhaps the most famous line in Carl Becker's essay – and you can imagine the uneasy murmuring in the room as he spoke it – was this: "The history that lies inert in unread books does no work in the world". We can do that work in the world, I believe, if we engage with the varieties of historical genres available to us and if we assert our historical authority in all of those places. Otherwise, as Becker also said, Mr. Everyman "will leave us to our own devices, leave us it may be to cultivate a species of dry professional arrogance growing out of the thin soil of antiquarian research" (Becker 1932: 234). And I don't think any of us wants that.

To reestablish our voice in public, however, means speaking in different places to different audiences in different ways. Whatever the genre, it also means reasserting the authority that comes from honesty and consensus.

Notes

1 There is now a field of "genre studies". See for example, Anis S. Bawarshi and Mary Jo Reiff, *Genre: Introduction to History, Theory, Research, and Pedagogy* (West Lafayette, IN: Parlor Press, 2010).
2 William James also had something to say about this. William James, "The PhD Octopus", 1903.
3 Emphases in the original. The book is a collection of essays published to mark Havel's winning of the Erasmus Prize.
4 Transcripts of the speech are widely available.
5 Quoted in "History Tests Cancelled for Soviet Youngsters", *Los Angeles Times*, June 11, 1988.
6 Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacobs also pointed to pragmatism as a way forward for the future of the discipline in their book *Telling the Truth About History* (New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), p. 284.

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3 Biographical construction and intertextual being

Lily Hope Chumley

Social scientists have long criticized the Western concept of the skin-bound individual, often by offering comparisons to relatively materially diffuse or socially entwined conceptions of personhood (e.g., Geertz 1974; Strathern 1988). Among the most influential critiques of the Western individual is Bourdieu's "The Biographical Illusion" (1987), which argued against the use of life-history in anthropology by claiming that biography – any narrative text focused on a single person – is the textual form and primary reproductive vehicle of the ideology of an autonomous, discrete, bourgeois self (see also Comaroff and Comaroff 1992; Rose 1996, for related critiques of self-narration). Extending these arguments, this chapter shows how diffuse, dividual, entwined, and embedded the most prototypically Western individuals (mostly white, mostly male, mostly English or American, mostly novelists and poets) already are, by examining how they are constructed in and through fictive relationships. Rather than following Bourdieu in collapsing together an array of texts whose only common characteristic is that they center around individuals, I focus on the genres of contemporary American and English 'literary' or 'true' biography, as defined by self-proclaimed 'literary' or 'true' biographers. And rather than analyzing the familiar textual forms of this genre, I examine the intertextual methods of biographical research and the epistemology that underlies it, using books and periodicals on twentieth-century biographical method, criticism, and theory: books with titles like *Biography as High Adventure*, *Life into Art*, and *Reassembling the Dust*.

If immortality or at least expanding intersubjective spacetime (Munn 1986) is the goal of fame, Anglophone literary biography is an approach to transubstantiation that makes use of mediated reproduction: the "dying animal" converted into a three-inch hard-backed "monument of unageing intellect" (Yeats 1928), with the option of reprints. But paper tombs do not build themselves. Much like a spirit medium (Espirito Santo 2015), the biographer, neither kin nor fan, revives the dead and presences the absent through narrative text rather than a possessed body. Biographers describe the process of writing "a life" as a relationship (often compared to a marriage) that requires the sacrifice of their own claims to authorial personhood.

This sacrifice is justified because the biographer's subject is no generic bourgeois or liberal individual but a special kind of artistic self, more important than the biographer or her readers and more deserving of representational labor. Biographers represent themselves as laboriously constructing coherent, whole persons out of diffuse, fragmented, and contradictory ephemera and archives, or chiasmatic "unfetishes" (Newell 2014), items that have collected the leaking residues of their subjects. However, the "referential ideology" (Silverstein 1987, 2000) underlies the biography's transubstantiation: in order that the final, published text be read as a true and transparent representation of a real individual, the biographer's careful process of construction and the peculiarly exhaustive practices that underlie it must be continuously erased (Irvine and Gal 2000), both in the text and in its less than critical receptions, whether it is reviewed in an influential journal or gathering dust on a bookshelf. The resulting biographer's paradox[1] is an instance of what Crapanzano called:

> the inevitable failure . . . of the possibility of the full emergence of the self as at once narrated and narrating . . . the submerged, self-constituting dialogical relationship between the narrating self and the narrated self would collapse, and self-constitution would have to depend fully on another, more resistant, more independent, and paradoxically never specified interlocutor.
>
> (1996: 118)

Narrative pattern and literary personality

A catalogue search for books on biographical method and theory produces a clearly demarcated section of the Library of Congress subject heading system (CT21.B4) that comes between the history of biography and manuals for autobiography. In this section one finds a large number of books by a relatively small number of English and American biographers, published from the 1970s to the present and a journal titled *Biography and Source Studies*. The authors of these books are all biographers themselves because there is no established, separate genre of biographical criticism. Most claim to participate in "literary" or "true" or "pure biography" (Oates 1986), as opposed to "historical" or "critical" biography.

Literary biography sells considerably fewer books than autobiography (the most popular genre of book other than advice and fiction). But literary biography receives more elite Anglophile critical attention than any other best-selling genre. In *The New York Review of Books* and *The New York Times Book Reviews*, for example, a quarter to a half of each issue's reviews are devoted to biography. Unlike the authors of commercial genres such as romance and self-help, most biographers have intellectual aspirations that commit them to extensive archival research. Some are commercial writers

who work exclusively on spec for publishers or the estates of deceased biographical subjects, or else they support their research with old royalties and even paychecks from normal jobs and then offer the finished product to publishers. Although most universities have never had a Biography Department,[2] many literary biographers are professors. In the introduction to her collection of interviews with contemporary biographers, Mandell complains of the lack of teaching positions in biography (1991: 9), but she and all but one of her interviewees teach in English or history departments at prominent universities.

Like an academic discipline, literary biography is variously defined by its textual form, method, and subject. Literary biographers regard themselves as members of a discipline; they often cite one another, the most prominent names being Backsheider, Drinker-Bowen, Kendall, Mariani, Marois, and Oates. They recite a history according to which biography is a peculiarly Western genre that originated in Plutarch, developed in Christian hagiography, was made personal by Augustine, flowered in Boswell, and was modernized by Leon Edel (*Henry James*), Lytton Strachey (*Eminent Victorians*, *Queen Victoria*), Virginia Woolf (*Orlando*, *Roger Fry*), and Richard Ellman (*James Joyce*). Literary biographies are generally long (between 500 and 1,500 pages, often forced down by publishers from 2,000 or even 3,000 pages).[3] Because there is no specific certification process, the professional trajectories of these biographers vary widely, but insofar as the genre demands extensive research (reading "thirty thousand letters", "sixty boxes of papers", etc.), it shapes their lives. Literary biographers spend between six and a dozen years working to produce these giant books; most write more than one biography, but few write more than four. Literary biographers look down on those who churn out short scandalous books about ordinary celebrities; they profess to balance a demand for honesty (willingness to report "stains" on the subject's moral character such as homosexuality, infidelity, and addiction) with a general tone of admiration. They describe their method as an intimate "relationship", characterized by (one-directional) affection and admiration characteristic of this relationship, and by an insatiable demand for archival records. The biographer's subject is no generic liberal individual, but a special kind of self, deserving of such representational labor: much better than the biographer or his readers.

In describing the process of research and writing, literary biographers represent their subjects as a substantial essence that persists in scattered possessions, archives, and the memories of friends. Biographers approach these materials as something more than pieces of evidence containing information; they read the indexical detritus of daily life iconically, and in the long process of research, they treat the stuff as if people leaked into everything they touched. According to biographers, biographical construction is the process of converting all this material into the skin-bound, autonomous,

agentive, bourgeois Western subjects that appear in finished biographies. However, not all humans can be made into such persons. The literary biographer's task is formulated in terms of a distinction between "life" (relationships, marriage, friendship, family) and "work" (action, authorship, artistry); "life" is "private" and "work" is "public", though the public/private distinction, of course, recurs: there is also public and private life, and "work" may take place in the home while "private life" takes place in public spaces. Biographers argue that life and work *are* inseparably linked but also that the biographer's task is *to link* them (Levin 1996: 112; Nadel 2003: 111). Crucially, "work" is defined in terms of creativity as agency, subjectivity, and form of labor (Pang 2012): fame is much less important than "work", and this is proved by the fact that it is possible to write "true" biography about unknown painters.[4]

Fundamental contradictions in Anglophone conceptions of person, creativity, and agency reappear as a tension in the "discipline" of biography between the putative autonomy of the biographical subject and the ambivalent legitimacy of the biographer. This conflict can be resolved only insofar as the peculiarly exhaustive research practices described in how-to books is erased from the finished product (Irvine and Gal 2000). Erasure results in part from the referential ideology that frames language as a transparent medium for the conveyance of information (Silverstein 2000) and the related epistemological demand for a natural object that leads to the erasure of laboratory work (Latour 1979). It also results from the conflict between biographers' hero worship and their desire for creative legitimacy, a conflict that appears in these discussions of the biographical "relationship" as an array of anxieties around relationality, dividuality, and immortality.[5] In literary biography, the similarity between the biographer and the subject as writers threatens the subject's precedence, while the supremacy of the subjects' fame wears away at the biographer's desire for a self.

Gail Mandell: People write biographies of fiction writers while nobody seems very interested in knowing about biographers themselves!

Phyllis Rose: You mean, readers don't feel personally about the biographers themselves? But a biographer cannot wantonly display personality. That would be a violation of the pact. As biographers go, I probably display more personality than many, but I think it's a delicate line. You can't consider yourself more important than your subject. It's simply a violation of good taste for a biographer to think that he or she is even as important as the subject. So it becomes a very fine line. Unfortunately, the more you write, the more you get to think that you are interesting, so it becomes harder to *suppress your personality*.

(Mandell 1991: 122, emphasis added)

The "pact" that biographers claim to have made with their (generally dead or unwilling) subjects is a sacrifice: they contribute their own literary gifts to the narrative construction of a person, while relinquishing any claim to artistic agency or legitimacy that might accrue to that gift by "suppressing" their own personalities. The biographers' own genre is to blame for a dangerous tendency to interestingness: contemporary biographers want to resist the temporal closure Bakhtin attributes to the "classical genres", which "are structured in the zone of the distanced image, a zone outside any possible contact with the present" (1981: 19), by making the text more like a novel, so that it offers the reader a sense of immediate intimacy with the subject. Nevertheless, the same biographers frequently insist that their task is precisely to find "narrative" and "trajectory" in the fragmentary, non-narrative lives of their subjects, to find a beginning and an end, and "it is in this orientation to completeness that the classicism of all non-novel genres is expressed" (Bakhtin 1981: 20). There is a pervasive ambivalence about the epistemological status of the narrative flow that is the object of biographical work: is it found in the archive or constructed in the text?

> It's only in the actual process of rewriting that you can see the patterns. . . . By the pattern, I mean what really held his life together. All I've got are these disparate, individual, discrete facts, and a lot of them don't gel at first . . . but as long as I keep working with them . . . then I begin to see a pattern that is, something at the center of the individual. My sense is that we are fragmented, but I still believe that at the heart of us is something that is a kind of core that is driving at something.
>
> (Paul Mariani in interview with Gail Mandell, Mandell 1991: 10)

This "pattern" does not inhere in the mass of material that confronts the biographer during research; it appears in the first drafts of the biographical text – from which the biographer extracts it by rewriting. According to Mariani, the biographical subject is accessible only as an object of knowledge in the biographer's writing, even to the biographer himself, just as a statistical pattern is only observable in diagrams.

The biographical subject's "life" must be as special as his "work". It must "reflect, transcend and impact" his era (Reynolds 2003), in part because of a conscious self-construction or a deep introspection that yields a wealth of self-expressive texts, whether in the form of biographies, parties, quotable quotes, interviews, and the like. Marois argues that, like landscapes:

> There are lives which have a natural beauty, which, either by chance or by some force inherent in their being, are somehow constructed like spontaneous works of art. . . . [H]is personality loses something of that obscure complexity common to all men and acquires a unity which is not wholly artificial. . . [and acquires] that statuesque quality.
>
> (Marois 1986: 7–9)

Note that Marois describes the "personality" and its "statuesque quality" in the present tense, unlike Mariani who described "the pattern" in the past tense, as something internal to life as a limited period of organic viability. "Lives", in Marois' usage, are like statues in that, like marble, they persist. These less mortal "lives" are identified with the stuff, the crude matter, of biographical research:

> I think the best subjects of biography – but this is my personal opinion – are the ones who intensely guarded their privacy. They kept it within, and so you can find it; but those people who spread it out for the general public in memoirs – I think they dilute their private lives. . . . To get to the real person is a terrific project – you have to penetrate the personal myth.
>
> (Elizabeth Young-Bruehl in Mandell 1991: 179)

The "it" that Young-Bruehl worries will get "spread out" is "personality", "self", "deep structure", "personal narrative": if anything is the "biographical illusion", this is. But in this description of the best subjects, there is a vacillation between properties of the bounded, mortal person (the bourgeois subject as normally understood) and the properties of the archive. "Keeping it within" means not publishing memoirs or otherwise constructing a personal life-story that will conceal the true self; rather, "it" must be privately expressed in the form of diaries and letters, notes, offhand comments, in which the biographer can find it. The "real person" that Young-Bruehl is searching for is not the person that friends and lovers or even fans and admirers knew. It is a form of personhood that can exist only as an object of knowledge through the complex process of biographical research and writing. But the ideological autonomy of the good biographical subject conflicts with the constructed nature of the text that represents and constitutes that subject.

Intertextualizing subjects

Literary biography shares many modes of research and writing with academic and scholarly disciplines, including archival research and interviews, but biographers describe these mundane research practices in terms that point to several differences between biographical and academic research. Mark Schorer says that biography requires "three people" (all embodied in the same biographer): the drudge to gather papers, the critic to analyze them, and the artist: "the man who can give [the mass] living shape . . . make him live in a living world" (Schorer 1986 [1962]: 87). The biographer begins research as the "drudge", by reading the subject's published works and locating archives (or, if working for the estate, locating supplementary, journalistic materials and potential interviewees).

> What you are doing in this brooding phase of the writing process . . . is feeling for your subject, getting the excitement of someone else's life into the pores of your skin so that you can share it with readers.
>
> (Lomask 1986: 9)

Like the spirit medium who allows the subject into his or her body, in this quote, the biographer's role is clear: to serve as a medium connecting the reader to the subject. In order to do this, the biographer must "feel" and even absorb the subject through the archive. Once familiarity is achieved, the biographer begins primitive accumulation:

> For a major biography you are going to need as much of the kind of material Holroyd mentions ["thirty thousand letters to, from, and about my subject, in addition to trunks full of miscellaneous paper, diaries, speeches, autobiographical pieces, poems, and so on", Lomask 1986: 11] as you can find. It's amazing sometimes the sidelight on a person that a laundry slip, a checkbook, a shopping list – any scrap of paper on which your hero scribbled – can provide. Even if no writing adorns these bits and pieces, the knowledge that your person handled and used them makes them part of the unpublished subject matter your work is almost certain to require. . . . Selecting a good subject may be half the battle, but victory is [sic] to the biographer who can *lay his hands on good subject matter*: on information sufficiently ample, rich, and authentic to permit the writer to say something provocative about the human being he has chosen to delineate.
>
> (Lomask 1986: 12–13, emphasis added)

In this quote, it is not writing as such but physical contact with the subject that gives value to archival materials that can hardly be called evidence. This fetishism about physical contact with the subject is widespread in biography, leading biographers to take trips to important sites in the subject's life not to collect facts but to experience what the subject experienced and to "lay hands" on the "subject matter". Paper archives that were produced "in the moment" and especially "in unguarded moments" are overwhelmingly preferred to interviews.

GAIL MANDELL: Did the interviews you conducted help much in understanding him?

ARNOLD RAMPERSAND: No, I came away with little or no regard for the interview process. I'm sure I'm too hard on it, but most of my interviews were done after I had gone through the correspondence, which is enormous – over three thousand folders of manuscript material alone. The inaccuracy of fact in the interviews was quite startling. How people would invent for you! . . . I don't think you can ever get the "truth" of a character, because the character doesn't know his or her own truth. So nobody can say, "this is a true portrait" of the subject. Even in life, you could ask five friends about the true character of a certain person and come up with five different opinions. . . . What I did was to search for the evidence that Hughes left behind in more unguarded moments – for letters, especially early letters of adolescence and young manhood when he wasn't writing for posterity as he was toward the end of his life.

(Mandell 1991: 59–60)

Interviews are problematic not just due to the "dividuality" (Strathern 1988) of subjects' relationships to others but also because the mediation of the interviewee eliminates the sense of immediacy that biographers manage to experience when handling archives: "with these personal documents in your hands you are in the very presence of your hero" (Lomask 1986: 88).

When biographers accumulate an archive (if they haven't found it already neatly catalogued by a librarian, whose work they never acknowledge), they must develop a system for organizing incoming information. This analytical activity is the work of the "critic" in Schorer's terms. While biographers speak of phases in the process (acquaintance, accumulation, writing), these systems mediate between the phases, insofar as they are always oriented both to the subject as a historical object and to the future, finished text. There may be alphabetical files for each friend or family member and each place, chronological files for particular periods and events, and files organized as chapters or book sections. Notes move from one system to the other over the course of the process until they are all in the book drawer. In a file card system, the cards may at first be organized chronologically and alphabetically. When accumulation ends, the biographer lays the cards out and arranges them into a pattern that is the outline of the final text.

By the time the biographer begins writing, the biographical subject and the text have already begun "to emerge" in this process of arranging and rearranging preselected quotations, facts, and images. These processes are quite familiar to academic researchers in other, more "scientific" fields, including anthropology and historiography. However, the primary metaphor that biographers use to describe the process is not scientific research but an intimate relationship. The biographical relationship is a method based on an understanding of what personality is and how it can be accessed that directly conflicts with the ideas that people are self-contained, that is, bounded by the skins of their bodies, and self-controlled, that is, autonomous agents – ideas that biography itself, paradoxically, promotes.

Biographical construction as relationship

In the introduction to his book, *Biography as High Adventure*, Stephen Oates says: "This volume is concerned exclusively with biography as a narrative art. . . . [These essays] afford rare insight into that unique interaction between two humanities that is the essence of life-writing" (Oates 1986: xii). This "relationship" is discussed obsessively because it is central to disciplinary boundary making and because it is fraught with intimate anxieties. The biographical "relationship" includes both research and writing; it begins when the subject is selected, found, or met and ends with publication, which, like divorce, leaves sweet or bitter memories.

The most famous modern biographical relationship was the "first" one, the relationship between Boswell and Johnson. Boswell met Johnson and fell into an ardor of respect. He lived and traveled with Johnson, recording

his every action and every word, as well as surreptitiously copying his diaries. Johnson in turn performed himself for Boswell, repeating himself in order to polish his phrases when Boswell was taking notes (though Johnson also professed himself sick of this adulation). But this is not the way most biographers today relate to their subjects, nor is it the ideal form of biographical relationship. Most biographers meet their subjects once or twice or not at all. This lack of social intercourse results in part from the fact that many subjects of biography are dead, and those who are alive are usually ambivalent or even (in extreme cases) violently opposed to being biographied. But over time this distance has developed a methodological justification and become a standard of research. Distance allegedly gives biographers an objectivity, freedom in writing, and control over the text, which would be threatened by a social relationship with the subject. Unauthorized biography offers ideal freedom, but restricted access to texts; the ideal is to have unlimited access to the archives (given by the estate) but a contract that guarantees total freedom to publish. Biography and the novel share a perspective that is not found in autobiography or memoirs, the position of an observer with multifaceted access to the subject, who stands as mediator between the subject and the audience. Many biographers believe that the perspectives provided by a social relationship with a living person (a friend, family member, teacher, etc.) are inadequate for biography; friends and family members have a narrow perspective on the subject defined by their single relationship to her or him (their dividuality), while the biographer observes subjects in all their relationships, thereby replicating the novelist's omniscience. However, biographers also claim that they are capable of having dialogic relationships with their subjects, relationships that they describe as intersubjective even if the subjects are dead or refuse to talk to them.

Though actual social interaction is considered unimportant or even problematic for biography, the biographical relationship is frequently compared to love, marriage, or cohabitation, complete with bouts of fighting and periods of romantic infatuation. The long duration of biographical research means that a biographer can have about as many subjects as spouses, and the analogy is ubiquitous (e.g., Mariani 1986: 117). Bowen talks of humming "getting to know you, getting to know all about you" (lyrics from a modest love song from the Rogers and Hammerstein musical *The King and I*), while going through the archives (Drinker-Bowen 1986: 65–666). If biography-writing is described as marriage, the publication of a text is a kind of divorce; biographers speak of relief or sorrow at "leaving" the subject behind and going on to another one.

The biographical relationship is also described as psychoanalysis: "the biographer is a kind of confessor and a psychiatrist, as well" (Mandell 1991: 26) or even as a kind of psychic intersection, wherein the biographer lives through and becomes his subject. "I have lived through four human lives besides my own, something that has enriched me beyond measure as

a writer and a man" (Oates 1986: 137). The biographer sees through his hero's eyes but with a perspective enriched by extensive research rather than hampered by the individual's fallible memory of his own life. At the same time, the biographer gives life to the subject, both in the process of writing, where she claims to interact with the dead, and in the final text, which ideally makes the subject "live and breathe" for readers too (Lomask 1986: 89). The same combination of romantic infatuation and identification appears in stories about finding a subject; many biographers speak of choosing a subject unconsciously based on the need to understand themselves. "An autobiographical impulse often takes possession of me when I discuss Nathaniel Hawthorne" (Erlich 1996: 82). This autobiographical impulse recalls the dilemma suggested by Phyllis Rose, in which the biographer must always remember the priority of the research subject.

This kind of empathy and "intimacy" is considered to be a precondition of good biography. It is also considered dangerous for the biographer, psychologically as well as intellectually. Paul Kendall writes that "the novelist fights for detachment from his subject, where the biographer is already detached and must fight for intimacy" (Kendall 1985: 40). But many more biographers say that intimacy comes too easily, that subjects overpower their biographers, and that biographers have to resist. In an interview with Gail Mandell, Arnold Rampersand (biographer of Langston Hughes) says that it was important:

> not to allow him to penetrate my own spirit, not to believe that I had some special relationship to him, that we were kindred minds or kindred spirits, or anything like that. . . . Beyond that it was just as important to realize that I was not he, and he was not I. . . . I would talk about him slightingly and call him names like "runt", "pipsqueak", "little son of a bitch" or "bastard" – anything to get distance.
>
> (Mandell 1991: 62)

Rampersand's feeling that he had to defend himself from his subject is quite common, though his method of achieving it is somewhat extreme. Many biographers speak of being taken over, controlled, or possessed by the subject, particularly in the phase of writing where they feel that they are "living" through the subject. Mandell speaks of "trying to enter somebody else's mind" and says that biographers "view their subjects and the lives of their subjects from within rather than from without". This often leads to an identification with the subject so intense that, as Rose illustrates in the case of her narration of Virginia Woolf's suicide, it can threaten the biographer herself. "The biographer's artistic challenge becomes achieving a proper distance from the subject through tone and point of view" (1991: 7). Writing a suicide is described as a traumatic process because while the biographer "experiences" it as an event in time,

she already knows what is going to happen and can't "stop" it. Mariani says, "At one time, I thought I could do both biography and the poetry, and Williams allowed me to do that. Insofar as you can talk to the dead, he said, 'OK, Mariani, go do something else for awhile.' But Berryman didn't. Berryman said, 'You belong to me. You belong to me'. As it got darker and darker, there was nothing else I could do except Berryman. . . . He just took all my energy" (Mandell 1991: 18).

Conversely, the biographer exerts power over the subject. The same biographers who compare the biographical relationship to marriage and psychoanalysis compare it to a fight or an act of physical violence. Frederick Karl describes biography as a struggle in which the author overcomes an adversarial subject (Karl 2003: viii), and Klein compares herself to a spider waiting to trap her subject (Klein 1996: 95). "Dead or alive, the biographical subject puts up resistance" (Rollyson 2003: 19). This is because subjects desire to maintain control over themselves, and the biographer attempts to wrest control from the subject. "The author repeatedly tries to kick over the screen that protects his subject" (Nadel 2003: 104).

This aggressive rhetoric might seem absurd, given that they are talking about conducting research in an archive of papers. But it is precisely by merging the person and his archive that biographers can make a claim to intimacy at all. Paul Mariani says, "But I guess what I'm trying to do is discover something in the unfolding of the material. I try to listen hard to what it wants to tell me, you understand, or what Berryman wants to tell me" (Mandell 1991: 39). These metaphors about the biographical method – like the biographical method itself – depend on the identification of subjects with the inscriptions that signify them, from the letters and diaries and shopping lists of the archive, to memoirs and autobiographies, to the biographies that are produced out of all of these texts. This notion of the subject as pile of paper is captured in the following quote from Leon Edel, one of the most influential biographers of the twentieth century: "a tension . . . develops between the subject, as brute materials, and writer, as shaping intelligence" (Edel 1986: 41). Insofar as an intimate relationship with the subject is considered essential to biographical method, this method depends on a collapse of the distinction between sign and object or, as Briggs and Bauman call it, a strategy of minimizing the gap between the context of the sign's production and its later interpretations and instantiations (Briggs and Bauman 1992; see also Wagner 1986).

Insofar as the subject can be identified with her archive, the production of biography is described as a battle for control of the subject's person. Biographers are not alone in making this identification. Famous people who intentionally destroy records of themselves in an attempt to control their posthumous representations are legion. Famous people assume that their letters, diaries, and memorabilia, and even their shopping lists and the paper they touch, will be taken up as signs and that such signs will be especially vulnerable to interpretation after death. Literary biographers

and famous people both express a conception of the role of things in fame and the relationship of famous persons to things that echoes the account of spatiotemporal expansion of self through kula exchange in Nancy Munn's (1986) analysis of fame and value on Gawa. The famous person has a self that extends beyond the body through the circulation of objects, and subjects intersubjectively construct one another; despite distances of space and time, death, and even the subject's ignorance of the biographer, biographer and subject mutually constitute or transform each other. But whereas in the Gawan case neither party claims to understand the other's inner life (following the Melanesian tendency to claim that other minds are opaque, see Robbins 2008; Keane 2008), biographers claim to have access to the subject from all interior and exterior perspectives.

Unlike the extension of self through transaction of kula objects, the extension of personality through the objects that form the archive is not an achievement. It is constant and unintentional, leakage rather than projection: the impression that subjects "give off", as Goffman put it. While the biographical subject is defined by creative agency, the biographer relies on the least agentive products of their lives, the effluvia. The most significant inscriptions are the least intentional, such as shopping lists, scribbles, and unguarded comments; because they are more free, or genuine, or real, these forms of inscription are preferable to the more intentional forms of self-textualizing found in diaries, interviews, autobiographies, and life-stories.[6] Naomi Klein writes of finding insight into Doris Lessing's personality in the memories of bare acquaintances, and Carl Rollyson of finding materials among friends' things in other archives (2003: 20); many biographers use "metaphysical" forms of evidence. Brenda Wineapple writes of finding an "invisible archive" by touching a blanket (2003: 53), and many take special trips to visit the houses or favorite spots of their subjects.

This notion of an unscripted, true self is familiar as the bourgeois subject. But the biographical subject is not bound by the biological body. The emphasis on a special, privileged form of artistic subjectivity suggests that the biographical form of subjectivity is not conceived as universal: the special, extended, immortal (even atemporal) biographical subject that appears in these methodological discussions is unlike the chronological, self-contained, self-controlling subject of the "biographical illusion" (Bourdieu 1987). Biographers often say that the object of biographical construction is to produce a coherent, bounded, structured individual in the form of a book. But insofar as agency implies autonomy (conscious, free, and rational choice), biographers do not design the text to demonstrate the agency of their subjects. Lytton Strachey, Leon Edel, and other fathers of modern biography began writing after reading Freud, and literary biography is still overwhelmingly psychological, if not psychoanalytic. The subject that appears in the text is almost always at the mercy of unconscious forces, both internal and external, both psychological and social.

In discussions of the final text, there is a persistent ambiguity between biography as a process and biography as a text representing the subject to a reader. The identification of sign and object that makes the biographer's "relationship" with the subject possible is also thought to give the reader an "unmediated" access to the subject. Biographers frequently claim that they strive to give the reader the same experience they have in research. Thus, Michael Mott says, "I was determined to, as it were, put the reader in the same situation I had been in. That is, to amass the material, to present it in the best possible way, then let the reader decide" (Mandell 1991: 88). But he also says that, in producing the text, he had to "boil down", "assimilate", organize, select, and resist the temptation "just to let Merton talk for himself" (Mandell 1991: 96).

Many biographers extend the metaphor of personal relationship to include the relationship between the subject and the reader. The reader is "in the biographer's hands"; in a good narrative, readers become entranced, heart rates falling, allowing them to "absorb" the story (Backsheider 1999: 10–11). "The voice of the biographer . . . is the *invisible* bridge between biographer and reader and reader and subject" (Backsheider 1999: xx, emphasis mine). O'Connor describes biography as "the remobilization of fact in a creative context" as a way to overcome the problem of knowing others (O'Connor 1991: 7). The idea that the biography contains the archive and the archive contains the person makes the book itself a sort of link with the subject, whether it gets read or not. As Rampersand says, explaining why hardcover sales are so much higher than paperback sales:

AR: I think that a lot of people who buy them never read them. They see them as tombstones. Memorials of people they admire. And because biographies are seen as monumental and tributary, biography therefore has – not a sacredness to it, but inherently a prestige to it that a novel doesn't have.

GM: There does seem to be something permanent about it.

AR: Yes. It's not ephemeral, even though the life itself was more or less ephemeral.

(Mandell 1991: 67)

Because of its obsessive minuteness, literary biography's relationship to time is complex: the biographer's goal is to know what the subject did every day from birth to death and select from that total knowledge. A massive biography takes weeks to read and gives details of every year, every month of the subject's life; it can be like watching a film of the whole life on fast-forward. The process of research and the book are each supposed to allow biographers and their readers to have "relationships" with dead people. This is a form of rendering the ephemeral permanent but quite unlike that found in classical biography (such as Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*) where heroes

"are raised to the valorized plane of the past, and assume there a finished quality" (Bakhtin 1981: 18).

Biographical erasure

Is the biographer's narrative found or constructed? Is the personality, the "pattern", or "driving force", which biographers seek to find in the archive, "there" in the subject, considered as a skin-bound individual? Or does this coherent self exist only in the finished text? Literary biographers answer both that it is found and that is constructed, though not necessarily at the same time. It must be "found" to legitimate their claims to truth, and it must be "constructed" to justify their claims to artistic agency and their desire for a mode of criticism that approaches the biography as a work of art rather than a transparent re-presentation. The tension between these two goals appears in the discourse about "art" and "science" pervasive in these methodological and theoretical essays. In the introduction to her collection of interviews with literary biographers, Gail Mandell says:

> Each of these biographers consciously aspires to create literature: that is, to create works of art distinguished by beauty of form and expression. . . . No less than the historian, they desire to ascertain the facts of the lives of their subjects, but like the novelist, they also aim to create through language the illusion of life. In Woolf's terms, they struggle to bring a young art to maturity.
>
> (Mandell 1991: 3)

By calling biography "science", they highlight its orientation to research, the discovery, confirmation, and publication of "facts". By calling it "art", they emphasize its formal beauty, expressiveness, and illusion. Biographers recognize the incoherence of their subjects and desire that others recognize this incoherence in order to recognize the work they do in constructing the coherent individual that their texts represent. Insofar as both their literary genre and the ideology that underlies it demand that the texts they produce represent coherent individuals, the texts conceal the work that goes into producing them: the biographical paradox.

Most forms of writing with the intellectual cachet to get reviewed in high-end scholarly magazines have one of the two following forms of legitimacy: the institutional structure of a research-oriented scholarly field or the separation between practice and criticism characteristic of artistic fields. The former typically involves named academic departments, routinized certification, and a structure of expertise such that reviewers will all be practitioners. The latter typically involves a division of labor, in which practitioners teach practice, and critics teach criticism (as with poetry, literature, and visual art; in all these fields, the separation

between the disciplines is maintained by the critic's confession that he or she is incapable of making good art and by the artist's ignorance of or impatience with criticism and theory). In the *London Review of Books*, books of political theory and history are almost always reviewed by experts in the same subfield, while novels and poetry collections are reviewed by literary critics. But biography does not have the structure of a scholarly/scientific field or the separation between theory and criticism characteristic of art. Consequently, in the *London Review*, biographies are reviewed by a variety of authors with a range of qualifications. Biography is institutionally as well as methodologically halfway between "art" and "science" and is developing in both directions at once. At the turn of the twenty-first century, a few universities began offering degrees in biography (for example, University of Hawaii and Buckingham University). Some of these degrees are MAs aligned with literary criticism or history, while others are MFA's offered in creative writing (just as some literary biographers teach creative writing and others teach criticism). This conflict points to the tension between biographical process and product: the biographical double bind.

In attempting to make their various sources – interviews, archives, notes, public records, published books, paintings – refer to a coherent personality, biographers strive to represent autonomous agents who are the sites of subjectivity and thereby reproduce the bourgeois individual. Depending on their age and association with literary theory, biographers either worry over or rejoice in the unbounded incoherence of their subjects, but all conceive their discipline as a process of constructing individuals out of numerous "public" and "private" selves, as well as "life" and "work". Biographers end with the life-narratives of autonomous agents only after a great deal of work, and they recognize (and assert) that people in general do not come this way ready-made. The process of producing a text in which the subject appears as a unified agent is arduous.

Literary biographers complain that reviews of their work rarely pay attention to the literary aspects of the text itself, instead focusing directly on the subject as if the biography were a transparent medium.[7] They "deplore the lack of critical acumen about biography on the part of critics and general readers alike" and argue that the best readers of biography are biographers (Mandell 1991: 14).[8] But in fact many reviewers of biography *are* biographers, and, when serving as critics, biographers read biography transparently too. For example, in the March 3, 2005, edition of the *London Review of Books*, there are three reviews of biographies. One is by Paul Laity, an editor, who mentions neither the author nor the book itself until the very end of the review and then only by mentioning one of the author's opinions; if you weren't looking for the biographer's name, you might wonder who he was talking about. Rosemary Hill, a biographer reviewing a biography of the seminal biographer Lytton Strachey and his family, mentions the author and comments on her technique about halfway through the first page; yet

the majority of her review, like Laity's, is a mini biography without citations, presumably but not explicitly recapitulating the book being reviewed. Only John Kerrigan, chair of the Cambridge English department, reviewing yet another biography of Yeats, writes a review that focuses on the text, and he addresses it primarily as a work of literary history or criticism. Reviews of books from other genres of writing in the same edition do not take this form. All mention the author within the first few lines and address her argument as a perspective.[9]

The biographers work is erased (Gal and Irvine 1995; Irvine and Gal 2000) both by the way that biographers write biography (a range of textual strategies beyond the scope of this chapter) and by the presumptions that guide readers' engagement with biographical texts, the way we read biography as a transparent medium to an autonomous, bounded, heroic subject. But many biographers, when talking about their desire for recognition, seem not to recognize their own role in erasing the act of biographical construction. Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, who complains of the lack of a "cultivated readership" that reads for something more than "the life story", also says that "you should not appear in the biography at all, the reader should feel as though no one wrote it" (Mandell 1991: 179, 210). Moreover, even biographers who themselves construct people and academics who are aware of critical theory read biography transparently. If biography is the "textual vehicle" of individualism (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992), it is in part because in this mode of reading (or interpretive genre), the work of construction is erased.

Conclusion: industries of person construction

Literary biography is, in its own self-conception, the most sophisticated, respectable, and historically venerable part of a vast field of person construction. Biography shares its relational method of mediumship with other disciplines that create and maintain famous, influential, and autonomous individuals. Artists and critics, movie stars and agents, politicians and campaign managers all depend on each other in ways that are illuminated by the methodological ideologies of biographical writing because they share a form of "codependent" relationship rooted in text production. (The temporal structure of the relationship obviously differs insofar as political campaign directors, Hollywood agents, publicists, managers, and coaches all interact directly with their stars, and this also changes the semiotic organization of their labor.) These relationships produce heroes, but their very existence threatens the autonomy – and thus the agency – of the heroic figures they produce. The constructor assumes a position of power in managing the representation of the subject (whether in life or posthumously) and at the same time erases the work of construction by asserting the preeminent agency of the heroic subject. This is especially true of creative agency, especially in the critical practice of romantic formalism, which emphasizes both the artist's

transcendent expressive capacity and his inability to speak for himself (a job humbly adopted by art critics and historians).

Literary biographers' representations of biography as an ambivalent relationship between two people suggest that even if persons are the sites of agency, they are not always in control of themselves. They may be forced to "marry", "live with", or "be inhabited by" a biographer even after their deaths. The destruction of evidence and imposition of legal restrictions afford only temporary protection. Worse still, aspiring individuals may never be biographied and thus fail to achieve the coherence and unity of purpose – the narrative – that biography can give. Famous people are vulnerable to and dependent on biographers to make them into persons.

In describing the long process of research, biographers speak of searching for the "pattern" that is personality; but how did they know to search for it? The story of the moment of meeting appears in all those forms of work that erase themselves in order to produce the heroic subject. In the moment in which they first "found" the subject, saw his charm, and fell in love, they saw instantaneously the personality that only years of work can make into a text available to the public. Specialists in person construction such as managers (for example, Karl Rove and George Bush) and art critics (for example, Clement Greenberg and Jackson Pollock) build up their subjects, give them meaning, develop their complexity, clarify and edit them, *as if* they were texts, while erasing their own work. In all these disciplines, it is the moment of meeting that legitimates the priority of the subject. When a biographer tells of discovering his subject, or when Karl Rove tells the story of his discovery of George Bush or Greenberg tells the story of his discovery of Pollock, each affirms that the person he made was already there when he met it: he *recognized* the life.

If it takes two to make a hero, only one person gets to be famous. Boswell died penniless and was ignored by descendants who were ashamed of his profession. The erasure of the person-constructor's work (including the work of the biographer) creates a tension between the constructor's desire for recognition and the heroic preeminence of the subject. Biography cannot be respected as an artistic field so long as it participates in this erasure and is not content to be a "science"; that leaves biographers looking for some other way to make their mark, to become worthy (in turn) of biographical construction:

> I don't know that I'll, at the end of my life – say I've got another twenty – I don't know that I just want to be known as a biographer. You know what I mean? I want to have a wider designation. I want to be known for the poetry, too.
>
> (Paul Mariani in Mandell 1991: 19)

Notes

1 Thanks to Charles Stewart for the suggestion of this phrase and to Stephan Palmié, who oversaw the chapter's initial formulation and brought it back to life more than a decade later with the invitation to this volume (and for many productive criticisms throughout the years). The chapter also owes much to Erica Robles-Anderson, with whom I coteach a course on Fame.
2 There were Departments of Biography in the early part of the twentieth century. Carleton College claims to have established the first such American department in 1919 (www.acad.carleton.edu/campus/archives/history/chrono/chrono1916–1940.html), and there are references to departments or professors of biography in the archives of Dartmouth and the University of Iowa from the 1940s to the 1960s, but none of these schools currently has a department of biography. Paul Murray Kendall, a famous biographer, is listed as a Professor of Biography and History at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, but there is no corresponding department. In the late nineties, a few such departments were established in the United States and England, offering degrees in biography: the University of Hawaii, Manoa, offers MAs and PhDs in Biography and Life Writing, and the University of Buckingham, England, offers MAs in Biography.
3 It is curious that there are only two subjects on which you can publish a book over 1,000 pages long: the history of an entire "civilization" and the life of a single individual. Everything else must be said in 150 to 400 pages.
4 Gail Levin began writing a biography of Jo Hopper when, in the process of writing Edward Hopper's *catalogue raisonné*, she discovered that Jo Hopper had donated all her paintings to the Museum along with Edward's and that the Museum had thrown the paintings away (Levin 1996).
5 Quite similar to the anxieties of art students unsure of whether they will be regarded as having "artistic personality", on which I have previously written.
6 Stephan Palmié points out that, in adopting this tactic, biographers are following the Annales school's turn to "non-intentional" sources.
7 Similarly, academics almost always recite biographical introductions culled from longer biographies when introducing major figures to undergraduates, but they rarely cite sources on these "facts", thus performing (and training their students in) the erasure of biographical work.
8 That they feel the need to argue this points to biography's marginal position between literature, which has a specialized critical discipline, and science, where it is a matter of course that reviews are written by specialists in the same field.
9 Reviews of multiple books may start without mentioning the book or author but only when they are written by an expert in the same field, who starts by writing an independent piece, in the mode of journalism, and then turns to review the books in turn; each review begins with the author's name and thesis, not the subject.

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Emotions

4 Gooseflesh

Music, somatosensation, and the making of historical experience

Vanessa Agnew

Introduction

Listening attentively or halfheartedly – it does not seem to matter – the skin on our arms sometimes starts to crawl, a prickle runs down the spine, hairs stand on edge, and for a brief moment small bumps rise on the skin: gooseflesh. We give a shiver, a tremble, a shudder, and feel inexplicably chilled. Then as suddenly as it overcomes us, the sensation is gone. We are left knowing that the music we are listening to has acted upon us involuntarily (Benedek et al. 2010: 989–993). Indeed, we know more than this. We know that the music is not what we expected: it is good. A judgment has been made, one could say, without conscious thought and without aesthetic categories. Gooseflesh, a kind of testimony of the body, gives us this knowledge.

This was an experience with which the French Calvinist Jean de Léry (1536–1613) was familiar. Sent in 1556 to missionize in France Antarctique, a French colony in the Bay of Rio de Janeiro founded by Nicolas Durand de Villegaignon as an intended haven against Huguenot persecution, Léry and fellow Protestants were soon forced to flee because of confessional disputes within the colony (Whatley 1990: xv–xxxviii). Seeking refuge among indigenous Tupinambá people on the mainland, Léry's stay was the basis for a subsequent ethnography, *Histoire d'un voyage fait en la terre du Brésil* (*History of a Voyage to the Land of Brazil*) (1578). This foundational text in the Protestant critique of the Spanish Conquest – part of what has come to be referred to as the "Huguenot corpus" (Bataillon 1974: 41–52, cited in Lestringant 1993: 127–128) – contributed to an image of free and happy savages subject to European abuses, a position taken up and transformed by Enlightenment writers (Greenblatt 1993: xii).

After living more than a half a year among the Tupi, Léry reported that he was quite familiar with the indigenous ways, and, in a chapter cataloguing their religious sensibilities, he described overhearing the singing of a group of men that was echoed by some 200 women (Léry 1990: 141). Their voices, he said "resounded in a harmony so marvelous that you would hardly have needed to ask whether, since I was now somewhat easier in my mind at hearing such sweet and gracious sounds, I wished to watch them from nearby" (p. 141).

He entered the longhouse to witness circles of singing dancers affecting "solemn poses and gestures" (p. 142). In the middle were three or four *caraïbes* decked out in robes and feathered headdresses, each playing a maraca "or rattle made of a fruit bigger than an ostrich-egg" (p. 142) (Figure 4.1).

Summing up his impressions of the performance, Léry compared the singing and maraca playing to Catholic bell ringing, reliquary processions, and "other such instruments of idolatry" (p. 142). Yet notwithstanding his functionalization of Tupi music within Reformation confessional debates (Bloechl 2008: 45), Léry described a sense of fear overcome by surprise, wonder, and even joy at what he heard:

> [The Tupi] ceremonies went on for nearly two hours, with the five or six hundred men dancing and singing incessantly; such was their melody that – although they do not know what music is – those who have not heard them would never believe that they could make such harmony. At the beginning of this witches' Sabbath, when I was in the women's house, I had been somewhat afraid; now I received in recompense such joy, hearing the measured harmonies of such a multitude, and especially in the cadence and refrain of the song, when at every verse all of them would let their voices trail, saying *Heu, heuaure, heura, heraure, heura, heura, oueh* – I stood there transported with delight.
>
> (Léry 1990: 142–144)

Apparently at odds with Léry's determination that the Tupi "did not know what music [was]", later editions of the work would include a number of musical transcriptions (Figure 4.2). It is unclear whether Léry himself was responsible for these transcriptions or for merely recalling the melodies (Harrison 1973: 6). For early modern readers of travelogues, however, the transcriptions constituted a form of earwitness testimony, an authenticating gesture in a genre not known for its factual reliability (Agnew 2013: 83–85). Divorced from its performative context, the musical transcription homogenized and regularized (Radano 2003: 190). Thus, rather than Léry attempting to have the reader hear the music and thereby share in his "ravishment", as has been claimed (Greenblatt 1991: 17), the transcription both attested to the scrupulousness of the travel writer and confirmed the strange mundanity of his subject matter.

Yet if the Tupi songs' status "as music" remained uncertain, Léry's written account was unequivocal about their effects on the listener. Here we find restored what Radano refers to as "the bodily experience of hearing" (2003: 190). Léry claimed that the Tupi's harmonious voices were so marvelous that even 20 years later, the memory of the songs still caused him to "tremble", for the voices were "still in his ears" (Léry 1990: 144).

Léry's report about his response to non-European music is often cited by contemporary scholars, and it has come to occupy an understandably important place within the scholarly literature on the history of ethnomusicological



Figure 4.1 A dancer and a maraca player.
Source: Léry (1580[1990]).



Figure 4.2 Jean de Léry's musical transcriptions.

Source: Based on the transcriptions published in Harrison (1973: 203) and in consultation with the third French edition (1585) and first Latin edition (1586)[1]

writing. After all, if there is a positive correlation between music and charged emotion, then the correlation tends to be between pleasure and the aesthetically familiar. It is possible for listeners to experience gooseflesh in response to music they have never before heard, but more often it is music that is familiar and well liked that elicits a response like the chills and the shivers (Cantor and Zillmann in Panksepp 1995: 171). Léry's reporting marks, in other words, a kind of ideal moment within the emerging conception of music and the anthropological during the early modern period: although unfamiliar with Tupi music and only superficially familiar with their culture generally, the Calvinist missionary was transfixed rather than repulsed by what he did not know and did not understand. Further, his affective response – and the acknowledgment of difference that accompanied it – created new possibilities for writing and thinking about indigenous peoples. The Tupi may have practiced polygamy, eaten their enemies, and adopted practices inimical and unintelligible to sixteenth-century European colonists

and missionaries, yet, by Léry's reckoning, in their singing and dance lay a source of commonality and communicative potential. Relativism and the acknowledgment of difference – nestled within a fragile universalism – could form the basis of emerging anthropological writing in the early modern period (Todorov 1994).

The missionary's account also makes interesting claims about the relationship between music and memory. By his own account, Léry not only retained an aural memory of the performance over an extended period of time; years later, he claimed to reexperience the physiological response originally associated with the foreign sounds. Such aural retention adds an unexpected temporal dimension to the act of listening: music's physiological and emotional effects, Léry claims, are not exclusively confined to the present: music's agency in the past can be revived in the present and, by implication, also animated in the future. The multiple temporalities described here challenge a conventional understanding of emotion bound up with immediacy and presence, just as they challenge ideas about music as a phenomenon, which structures time but which does so ephemerally and in the present.[2]

In this sense, music's somatosensory effects are akin to olfaction and its ability to transport the listener back to an earlier time and place, a kind of Proustian effect for the ear, in which music revives lost memories (van Campen 2014). Music allows for a collective reexperiencing of the past: the soundtrack to youth, for example, provides a vivid rekindling of memories and is, indeed, the basis for music therapy and its uses in treating the elderly, in particular (Bunt and Hoskyns 2013). Yet Léry's gooseflesh moment raises other possibilities, namely that music's somatosensory effects might serve as more than an *aide-mémoire* and the physiological sign of a collective sonic experience in the past. Rather, the episode prompts the question as to whether the intense emotion associated with music – manifest in a somatosensory response – might allow a past, of which we have no firsthand knowledge, to be "experienced". Does music's emotional import, in other words, allow us to reenact the past and thus constitute a useful vehicle for historical knowledge making?

***

This significant moment in the history of ethnographic and ethnomusicological writing can be approached through many axes. Léry's contemporary Michel de Montaigne used Léry's reports on Tupi anthropophagy as a point of departure for his essay "Of Cannibals" (1580). In contrast to adventurers like Hans Staden, who was more censorious about the wild and fierce "man-eating" Tupi (1557), Montaigne mounted a defense of indigenous practices so as to critique barbarity closer to home.[3] Such cultural relativism found more cautious expression in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's eighteenth-century reception of the material. One of the Brazilian tunes, attributed to Marin Mersenne (1636), appeared in Rousseau's *Dictionnaire de musique* (1768) under the title "Chanson des Sauvages du Canada" (Figure 4.3), where the

music was said to conform to the probity and hence universality of European musical conventions but, using a familiar Enlightenment trope, was also taken as evidence of the inherent unreliability of travelers and music commentators:

> One will find in all these pieces a conformity of style with our music, which could make some people admire the soundness and the universality of our rules, and perhaps render suspect to other people the intelligence or the accuracy of those who have transmitted to us these tunes.
> (Rousseau in Harrison 1973: 7)

Closer to our own time, Jean de Léry was invoked by anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss in his 1955 memoir *Tristes Tropiques*. Lévi-Strauss claimed to have carried in his pocket "that breviary of the anthropologist" when he first set foot in Rio de Janeiro, "where once Tupinambá villages stood" (1972: 85). Even as he articulates a sense of loss over what has changed in the intervening 378 years "almost to the day" (p. 85), he stages a significant gesture for structural anthropology – that of following in the footsteps of earlier ethnographers. In *The Writing of History*, historian Michel de Certeau adopts a similarly elegiac tone. Certeau relates Tupi culture to European writing about it, such that Tupi culture becomes a kind of "absent presence", the marginalized "figure of the other" that, Certeau argues, "conditioned and allowed [European] writing and knowledge" (1988: 209–243). The poststructuralist argument was pursued in the 1990s by new historicist Stephen Greenblatt, who identifies in Léry's work a basis for Enlightenment critique (1991: 1–25).

Music scholars like Gary Tomlinson, in contrast, emphasize Léry's capacity for articulating a form of shared humanity and an "intercultural communion-in-song" (2007: 45–48, 173–174; 1999–2000: 230). Philip V. Bohlman likewise emphasizes instances of musical exchange, identifying in Léry's listening and performing the first encounter between Old and



Figure 4.3 "Chanson des Sauvages du Canada" (attributed to Mersenne 1636), Jean-Jacques Rousseau *Dictionnaire de musique* (1768).

New World musics and, as such, a foundational spirit for ethnomusicology (2005: 277–289; 1988: 5–27). Ralph P. Locke, on the other hand, situates Léry within a long Western tradition of musical exoticism: Villegagnon took a group of Tupinambá to France to perform for the court, and Tupi music making becomes a site of prospective European musical appropriation (2015: 88–90). Olivia Bloechl's concern is with other forms of appropriation. Providing an account of the reception of Native American song within its historical and cultural contexts, she highlights the ways in which Reformation commentators triangulated indigenous American music within Catholic-Protestant disputes. Commentary on different aspects of Tupi music making thus becomes a way of leveraging criticism of Catholic liturgical practices (2004: 44–86, 2008: 45).

Even as these views on Léry differ, they help us think about historiography in nuanced ways, locating the disciplinary origins of anthropology and ethnomusicology within the European imperial project and the confessional disputes of the early modern period. This chapter uses Léry in turn as a figure for considering how emotional and somatosensory responses to music can constitute a form of knowledge making about the past. The analysis also draws attention to the sensational phenomenon itself. The haptic – something classicist Alex Purves calls "the neglected hand of the historian" (2013: 27–42) – offers new methodological possibilities, inviting us to consider how history might be done differently by attempting to recuperate somatosensation and reinstate music's past agency. To think in these ways is to make reenactment productive for music history, using it to recuperate the musical past in all its fullness, and it is to stitch together fragmented forms of historical inquiry (Agnew 2009: 159–160; see also Bowan forthcoming). The payoff is not just for music historiography, which has typically been more interested in the study of genre and style than in exchange and reception. It also tensions the early music movement, whose concern is with the pursuit of authenticity in musical instruments and historically informed performance practice rather than with the emotional effects of music on the listener (see Goehr 1992; Butt 2002). The psychology of music, in contrast, is concerned with the emotional effects of music on the listener, yet it excludes the historical dimension (Clarke 2005). The payoff is thus also for historical reenactment, that emerging field of study preoccupied with the psychosocial work that things and places perform yet that lacks a rigorous method for interrogating their effects (Agnew 2004: 327–339).

We will find that gooseflesh – known scientifically as *cutis anserina* or peak emotion and, colloquially, as trembling, chills, shivers, or skin orgasm – is the physiological response to an emotion located between awe and fear, sadness and joy, and expectation and surprise (Huron and Margulis 2010: 575–604). The associated rising of hair follicles on the skin (piloerection), is thought, biologically speaking, to serve a thermoregulatory purpose (trapped air pockets keep the skin warmer), as well as a communicative one. Piloerection causes animals to appear larger and more frightening and

is thus used within the context of intimidation displays among social animals like chimpanzees (Chaplin et al. 2014: 1–17). Whether nonhuman animals experience gooseflesh in response to music is not known or, conversely, whether gooseflesh serves a similarly communicative function in humans. That humans experience it involuntarily would suggest, however, that it is an evolutionary by-product rather than a socially adaptive trait (Frijda 1986: 140). Nonetheless, gooseflesh in response to music is common: many listeners experience it intensely, others less so, only a few not at all (8% of listeners in one study reported no such physiological response), with studies suggesting that the phenomenon is correlated to personality type (Nusbaum and Silvia 2010: 199). Specifically, openness to experience – curiosity, creativity, musicality, and imagination – seems to predict the extent to which listeners experience gooseflesh in response to a powerful listening experience.

Although the human brain has processing centers that are independently dedicated to the various senses, and the mechanical receptors in the ear function differently from mechanoreceptors in the skin, in gooseflesh, an auditory stimulus elicits a tactile response. With its substitution of listening for feeling, gooseflesh would appear to be a form of auditory-tactile synesthesia, comparable to some people's tendency to, for example, associate numbers with colors or places with flavors. Yet the ubiquity of music-induced gooseflesh suggests that the phenomenon is not in fact a species of synesthesia, which is experienced by relatively few people and is established early in life. It is neither a perceptual augment like perfect pitch and the existence of a fourth color receptor in the eye, nor is it akin to synesthetic somatosensory phenomena like autonomous sensory meridian response (ASMR). Usually experienced as a tingling on the scalp and state of deep relaxation, ASMR is self-induced in response to purposeful stimuli like whispering, rustling, and other soft, familiar sounds, and their associated visual stimuli (Barratt and Davis 2015).[4] ASMR may invoke reassuring early childhood sensations, but it makes no claim to knowledge of the past. Gooseflesh, in contrast, appears to be something more commonly human, available to most people as the tangible sign of emotions associated with an aesthetic experience in the present or past.

In experiencing gooseflesh, the nature of the stimulus itself appears to be significant. As early as the eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant associated gooseflesh with a sudden shift in emotion ("quickly rising hope or fear") and deemed it a "vital sense" produced by a mental state. It is a thrill, he says in *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* (*Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*) (1798: 33), that arises from the idea of the sublime (see also Shusterman 2005: 323–341). Indeed, empirical research suggests that music-associated gooseflesh is generated more often by sad than by uniformly cheerful music or by music with a "bittersweet" character, leading to speculation 30 years ago by neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp that gooseflesh has its "neurobiological roots. . . [in the] experience of social loss" (1995: 174). Listening to sad music and experiencing the shivers or

the chills, he added, is related to the arousal of social emotions and to brain pathways that "mediate separation distress" (see also Goldstein 1980: 126–129), whereas for Grewe and others, the association is with strong and positive emotions (2009: 351–354). Neuroimaging by Valorie Salimpoor and colleagues shows that gooseflesh (referred to by the authors as "peak emotion") is linked to dopaminergic pathways in the striatum, nucleus accumbens, and substantia nigra, brain regions associated with motivation and reward (2011: 257–262). Surging dopamine in response to the brain's anticipation and gratification of specific musical structures produces the chills, piloerection, and frisson that we associate with gooseflesh. As a somatosensory response, gooseflesh, then, is chemical.

Over time, a musical stimulus may elicit the same response in a given individual, yet not necessarily the same response in different individuals. From this, researchers conclude that the objective physiological response, gooseflesh, is a robust indicator of subjective "emotional peaks" (Grewe, Kopiez, and Altenmüller 2009: 352). Thomas Schäfer and Peter Sedlmeier suggest that the sensation tends to be more strongly linked to some musical structures than others – the initiation of singing, crescendo, and instances of unprepared harmony, for example (2011: 39). Researchers stress, however, that more research needs to be done to establish precise connections between musical structures and arousal and that when looking for causal relationships, it is important to distinguish between musical and extramusical stimuli such as dancing (Schäfer and Sedlmeier 2011: 40; Sloboda 1991: 110–120; Panksepp and Bernatzky 2002: 133–155; McCrae: 2007: 5–11; Grewe et al. 2007: 297–314; Hunter and Schellenberg 2010: 148).

Anecdotal evidence tells us that gooseflesh often constitutes an individual's physiological response to a musical experience involving multiple performers. Léry, for instance, reported the shivers in response to a large group of people singing, and it was their "cadences" – the punctuations in their song – that struck him as particularly affecting. Gooseflesh, it could be concluded from this example, is associated with a sense of sociability, as well as with change and the element of surprise in a performance. It is a sensation that seems to evidence the breaching of intersubjective difference, as well as the potential for losing that sense of connection. If gooseflesh generally speaks to the immediacy of shared experience, we might ask what bearing such a sensation has for the new and changing intellectual modes emerging in the eighteenth century – travel writing, universal history, and the conjectural approach to history writing. We are prompted to ask whether gooseflesh is always involuntary or whether it can be resisted. To what extent does gooseflesh suggest musical preference and so function as a marker of subjective rather than universal responses to unfamiliar aural phenomena? While we can agree that music has agency in the world and that it acts on listeners in unanticipated ways, ways that are sometimes threatening and want resisting, gooseflesh always reminds us of the listener and of his or her emotional life. Paradoxically, it is this involuntary corporeal response that will remind

us of the voluntary – that is to say, of the possibility that listening to unfamiliar music elicited a range of emotional responses. How the early modern listener responded to music was a function not just of the music but also of his or her receptivity, openness to new experience, and personal interests.

We can trace this through the work of the Jesuit missionary ethnographer, Joseph François Lafitau (1681–1746), who attempted to locate the origins of the Iroquois and Huron in the fringes of the classical world. Lafitau spent six years (1712–1717) missionizing near Montreal, where his use of fieldwork and native informants and his systematic, comparative approach made pioneering contributions to anthropology (Kohl 1981: 101; Liebersohn 2003: 1505–1506; Tissot 2004: 296–298). Yet while *Moeurs des sauvages ameriquains, comparées aux moeurs des premiers temps* (*Customs of the American Indians Compared with the Customs of Primitive Times*) (1724) may be hailed as a seminal text because, in some limited sense, it treated indigenous culture "on its own terms", Lafitau's overarching project was a conjectural one.[5] *Customs* ranges over all times and places – Orpheus appears among the Iroquois and Huron, and depictions of the Caribs, Brazilians, Floridians, and Virginians appear alongside a picture of the Acephales, the headless men of South America, described by Pliny (Lafitau 1974: 251–254). Such juxtapositions, like the book's plate, which shows the Iroquois and Huron "turtle rattle or sistrum . . . brought into parallel with Apollo's lyre", illustrate the overall conception of the work. Lafitau used his insights into Iroquois society to draw conclusions about classical antiquity, and, conversely, he extrapolated from antiquity to the present.[6] Although this would have difficult implications for the nature of historical evidence,[7] Lafitau was unselfconscious about his conjectural method, setting out his terms in the introduction to his book:

> I have not limited myself to learning the characteristics of the Indian and informing myself about their customs and practices, I have sought in these practices and customs, vestiges of the most remote antiquity. I have read carefully [the works] of the earliest writers who treated the customs, laws and usages of the peoples of whom they had some knowledge. I have made a comparison of these customs with each other. I confess that, if the ancient authors have given me information on which to base happy conjectures about the Indians, the customs of the Indians have given me information on the basis of which I can understand more easily and explain more readily many things in the ancient authors.
>
> (1974: 27)

Committed to a monogenetic and diffusionist theory of culture that traced the dispersal of cultural features from a single point of origin, Lafitau freely extrapolated from one indigenous society to another (Liebersohn 2001: 21). And it is on this basis that he critiqued the earlier work of Léry, who, he says, "noted down the airs of some Brazilian dances, which seem no

different from those of the Iroquois" (Lafitau 1974: 325).[8] Having struck a correspondence between sixteenth-century Tupi airs and eighteenth-century Iroquois ones, Lafitau triangulated the two with the Greek Maenads – the crazed, female worshippers of Dionysus and murderers of Orpheus:

> [Léry] also gives details of one of their [Tupi] religious dances, which appears to be an imitation of the Maenads' dance. . . . In it, he shows very clearly these barbarians, howling their *hé, hé*, in a horrible manner, foaming at the mouth and making such violent movements that some of the women fell to the ground as if stricken with epilepsy so that, at first, he believed that they were seized by the evil spirit and possessed by the devil in all forms. The men, on their side, danced in the same way and the children at another place. The [Tupi] music was frightful.
>
> (pp. 325–326)

Lafitau added that Léry overcame his initial fear of the performers and subsequently even took pleasure in the music. Moreover, the very memory of the event seemed to make Léry "hear again the sweetness of that harmony", which in turn made him "feel again a new pleasure". This struck Lafitau as improbable, adding:

> I have not felt at all such keen pleasure as Mr. de Léry did at *our* Indians' festivals. It is difficult for me to believe that everyone was as much impressed as he at those of the Brazilians. The music and dancing of the Americans have a very barbarous quality which is, at first, revolting and of which one can scarcely form an idea without witnessing them.
>
> (p. 326)

In making this statement, Lafitau drew on a standard trope within travel writing – the authority of the eye- or earwitness. Here, however, the legitimizing gesture, autopsy, was decoupled from experience. By prioritizing rhetoric, Lafitau foreclosed the possibility of an emotional response. Rather than conveying an experience of gooseflesh in response to non-European music, he framed the Tupi songs first in terms of a demonic Maenadic spectacle and second in terms of a metonymic relationship between Tupi music and "American" music, a relationship that posited the "barbarous quality" of all indigenous music.

Lafitau did concede that, with enough repetition, one could grow used to native performances and even "witness them willingly" (p. 326). Yet he ruled out the possibility that the music might act on the listener in the skin-sensitized way that we heard about from Léry. In Lafitau's account, the corporeal response described by Léry was displaced from the European observer onto the Indians. It was, says Lafitau, the Indian villagers rather than he himself who "trembled" upon hearing the music; it was they who were "mad with enthusiasm" for their own music (326).

In deflecting the effects of music back onto indigenous listeners, we can say that Lafitau limited Neoplatonic ideas about music's capacity to act intersubjectively. The wide circle described by the Orpheus myth collapsed on itself so that performer and listener were reduced to one and the same. Rather than music acting to subdue wild beasts and animate the inanimate, its agency was curtailed. Whatever possibilities music might have held for breaching difference and drawing performer and listener into a shared space, these possibilities were closed down, and music was denied its potential for generating sociability (Agnew 2008: 148).

Conclusion

The use of music in cross-cultural encounters tells us something about the nature of music, about how it acts on us emotionally, and about the ways in which we position ourselves in relation to others. Like those who identify in music a persistence of the past in the present – "catacoustic" or echoing traces that invoke nostalgia and melancholy in relation to a shared traumatic past[9] – Léry claimed that music's agency could be recovered and reexperienced. His act of reclamation was, however, of his own personal experience: upon listening to the Tupi sing, gooseflesh and its associated emotion could be reexperienced even decades later. The consistency of Léry's response is borne out by current research, which shows that in a given individual a musical stimulus elicits the same emotional and physiological responses even over a period of time. It speaks to a consistency of subjective experience in relation to aesthetic phenomena and acts to collapse temporality to create the appearance of shared experience across time. This would suggest that, for the purposes of reenactment, it is not only the chastening of the body that contributes to "period rush", that intense impression of going back in time to experience the past "as it really was". Gooseflesh teaches that reenactors need not starve themselves or wear constraining clothes in order to approximate historical fidelity, nor indeed need they clasp so rigidly to objects and places (Agnew 2009: 294–318). Léry reminds us that recuperating emotional experience can be independent of materiality. Listening with enjoyment and a frisson of excitement is capable of simulating and restaging music's agency. The ephemerality and immediacy of music's effects have, then, their own kind of *longue durée*.

The involuntary character of gooseflesh suggests an authenticity of experience, one that testifies via the body. Yet the fact that not all listeners experience gooseflesh in response to the same musical stimuli limits its usefulness for historical exegesis. There can be no strongly predictive power in hairs rising on the arms, gooseflesh, and trembling, for what gives us the chills is not necessarily the same as what left our predecessors cold. This reminds of the difficulty in historicizing the emotions and the question of the extent to which emotions are culturally as opposed to biologically produced (Reddy 1997: 327–351; 2001; Scheer 2012: 193–220).

If objectivity is not to be gained from gooseflesh, there is, nonetheless, something else on offer – pleasure and, as Gary Tomlinson puts it, a sense of possible "communion" with others. As a would-be reenactor of Léry's auditory experience, Lafitau could recoup that somatosensation neither in response to Tupi songs nor in response to Iroquoi and Huron ones. Refusing to tremble meant a refusal of the emotional engagement with music, and it meant a refusal of the aesthetic judgment of which it was a sign. The body could not testify to the idea of the sublime. This had epistemological implications. Without gooseflesh, there could be no reanimating earlier forms of historical experience, no flux and surprise, no dynamics, no mixed emotions or enjoyment of the bittersweet. It did, however, open the space for conjecture, comparison, and universalization. Whether we attribute this to confessional differences – the Calvinist versus the Jesuit – or to periodic ones – Reformation modes of knowledge production versus Enlightenment ones – is perhaps less productive than the question of music's metahistorical agency. The restaging of earlier somatosensory experience might be used to deepen our understanding of the past and bring it into proper relation to the present.

Notes

1 I am indebted to Andrea Bohlman for the musical transcriptions.
2 The notion that affect has multiple temporalities goes against the notion of immediacy and presence that we find in Greenblatt's 1991 reading of Léry, in which Greenblatt argues that the "experience of wonder seems to resist recuperation, containment, ideological incorporation" (pp. 17–19). For Certeau (1988), the "absence of meaning" signified by Léry's emotional response is something that "opens a rift in time" (p. 213) (quoted in Greenblatt 1991: 19). Léry's trembling, Certeau argues, is tantamount to an absence of meaning making, an incomprehension that suspends history and highlights the differences between the written and spoken word.
3 Having witnessed instances of cannibalism during the Catholic siege of Sancerre, Léry offered in *Histoire mémorable de la ville de Sancerre* (1574) a vivid counterpart to his observations in the New World (for an account, see Whatley 1990: xvii–xviii). As a reader of Léry, Montaigne understood this point well:

> I am heartily sorry that, judging their faults rightly, we should be so blind to our own. I think there is more barbarity in eating a man alive than eating him dead; and in tearing by tortures and the rack a body still full of feeling, in roasting a man bit by bit, in having him bitten and mangled by dogs and swine (as we have not only read but seen with fresh memory, not among ancient enemies, but among neighbors and fellow citizens, and what is worse, on the pretext of piety and religion), than in roasting him and eating him after he is dead.
>
> (Frame 1965: 155)

4 For examples of the stimuli, see GentleWhispering (Online), available at www.youtube.com/user/GentleWhispering (accessed August 23, 2016).
5 On Lafitau as an important influence on Herder, see Kälin (1943). Herder drew on Lafitau's depictions of indigenous song and dance in *Stimmen der Völker in*

Liedern. Among other things, Herder shared with Lafitau an interest in primitive cultures and the origins of monotheistic religion, a belief in the universality of human nature, a dualistic conception of history, and an ethical-pedagogical motive for historical study (p. 146). Zammito points out that Lafitau and Herder shared the view that the:

> *synchronic* dispersal of cultural levels . . . mirrored faithfully the *diachronic* evolution of human cultural levels, so that the juxtaposition of the 'primitives' (Hottentots or Hurons) with contemporary Europeans told the same story of human 'civilization' that could be constructed from the sequence of historical cultures from the ancient Fertile Crescent to the *siècle des lumiéres*.
>
> (2002: 236)

6 Lafitau was not alone in this. Comparisons between indigenous peoples and classical antiquity were made by N. Alexandre, *Conformité des Cérémonies Chinoises avec l'Idôlatrie Grecque et Romaine* (1700) and De la Créquinière, *Conformité des Indes Orientaux, ave des Juifs et des autres peuples de l'Antiquité* (Brussels: Bacher, 1704).

7 On the problem of conjecture for eighteenth-century music history, see Charles Burney's treatment of the Abyssinian lyre based on the report of the traveler James Bruce, in *A General History of Music from the Earliest Ages to the Present Period*, 2nd ed. (London: printed for the author and sold by Payne and Son; Robson and Clark; and G. G. J. and J. Robinson, 1789), vol. 1, pp. 205–209.

8 Lafitau may have been prompted to compare Tupi and Iroquois music because of Gabriel Sagard's *Histoire du Canada* (1636), which harmonized Léry's transcriptions along with some indigenous Canadian melodies. I am grateful to Rogério Budasz for having brought this to my attention (see Budasz 2005: 3–4).

9 The term is Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe's. It is used by Orkideh Behrouzan and Michael M. J. Fischer to describe the effects of music in relation to collective traumatic memory (2014: 105–136). I am grateful to Charles Stewart for drawing my attention to this and other sources and for the feedback of two anonymous reviewers.

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5 Affective democracy

Building a community of feeling through Spanish mass grave exhumations

Jonah S. Rubin

Introduction

At one of the first exhumations I participated in, an anthropology professor from the Autonomous University of Madrid brought along some 18 master's students – a number of them internationals – for a required field exercise. The students were tasked with helping to uncover 22 Republicans killed by fascist forces and buried in a series of unmarked mass graves in southern Navarra, Spain. The informal interment was one of the thousands of unmarked burials throughout Spain, in which over 130,000 civilians killed during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) and ensuing Franco dictatorship (1939–1978) remain. Since 2000, a loose network of civil society organizations collectively known as the "historical memory movement" have dedicated themselves to locating, exhuming, and honoring the legacy of these disappeared citizens.

Spanish exhumations are an especially fortuitous training ground for young forensic specialists. Explicitly modeled after the kinds of high-profile exhumations that accompanied democratic transitions in Latin America, Spanish teams follow the same strict protocols for generating legal evidence from human remains as their international peers. The skills gained through this field exercise would therefore prove highly transferable in the students' future professional endeavors.

However, unlike the state-sponsored interventions that inspired them, the evidence produced by Spanish teams are not destined for a war crimes tribunal, truth commission, or any other juridical forum. Within Spain, the country's 1977 Amnesty Law proscribes the possibility of achieving legal justice for crimes committed by the Franco dictatorship. Outside of Spain, both the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances have ruled on technical grounds that they do not have the authority to investigate these acts. As such, these forensic exhumations provide an opportunity for students to gain firsthand experience, without having to go through the often onerous certification procedures that frequently accompany state-led efforts to recover the missing (see Haglund, Connor, and Scott 2001; Steadman 2003).

To my still undersocialized eyes, the students appeared to do their work diligently: they listened closely as members of the Aranzadi Science Society explained the historical context and technical challenges of the interments; patiently worked alongside more experienced members of the team uncovering human remains and their associated objects; and even obliged, when asked, to write down their reactions in the visitors' book, usually meant for nonvolunteer visitors to the site.

But to my more experienced colleagues, something was missing: "For them, it is just a technical exercise", complained one member of the social team, to widespread agreement. "This is not sufficient". A member of the local Association of Relatives of Those Shot, Killed, and Disappeared in Navarra in 1936 (Asociación de Familiares de Fusilados, Asesinados, y Desaparecidos en Navarra en 1936) noted that when his uncle "spoke of the Republic or exhumations, he cries", adding that such feelings needed to be shared with these young students. In an effort to convey the importance of our practice, the team hastily organized the screening of two short documentaries about previous exhumations for all to watch. But, despite the emotive testimony of an elderly daughter of a victim featured therein, the students did not appear visibly affected. A photographer who lingered after most left chalked it up to a failure of communication: "for young people it is very difficult" to understand this elderly rural woman's manner of speaking.

In this chapter, I describe the kinds of affective historical experience that Spanish memory activists attempt to inculcate through the practice of exhumation. In the absence of any formal state-led program of historical reckoning, Spanish memory activist are incapable of establishing anything like the kind of hegemonic historical narration that transitional justice scholars see as foundational to democratic citizenship. Yet, as my colleagues' disappointment in the MA students shows, there is more at stake in the application of forensic science than a rekindling of the historicist's dream of crafting an ever more perfect account of the past "to show how it essentially was" (Ranke 2010: 86). Memory activists certainly do value historical accuracy. But the kinds of narratives that memory activists seek to produce focus more on displaying the emotional impact of past violence, even at the expense of sacrificing significant historical details. In this context, I show how a historicist practice like forensic exhumation opens up the space for other kinds of affective, ethical, and political experiences of the past.

Over the past three decades, forensic exhumations have become a crucial technology of democracy making after violent conflict. With the development of new technologies for analyzing human remains in the late twentieth century, forensic science promised a putatively objective method for describing past violence (see Keenan and Weizman 2012). In the aftermath of mass violence, when national communities are often still bitterly divided between competing interpretations of past events, transitional justice scholars turn toward forensic science as a method for reckoning with the past

that is not reducible to the subjective historical interpretations of any specific faction.

Spain is a particularly generative place to think through the affective dimensions of forensic history making. Despite popular representations of forensic scientists dramatically extracting historical truth from bones, as its name implies, *forensic* science is first and foremost a juridical practice. In the field, experts concern themselves not with the construction of historical narratives but rather with producing "forensic anthropological skeletal analysis [that] are subject to the rules and regulations of evidence in a court of law and come under intense scrutiny" (Steadman 2003: 2). Although memoirs written by forensic specialists frequently emphasize the emotional experience of returning corpses to loved ones (e.g., Koff 2007), their professional activity is characterized by the cold detachment of the expert advisor, lest their objectivity be called into question in court (see Haglund, Connor and Scott 2001). Inevitably, tensions arise between the procedural requirements of these medico-legal procedures and the desires of families and communities (Stover and Shigekane 2004).

In Spain, however, there is no possibility of judicial certification at the present time. Therefore, unlike their international peers, Spanish exhumations take place in the absence of any legal framework. As I have discussed elsewhere, the lack of state backing has devastating effects for relatives of the disappeared (Rubin 2014). Spanish NGOs have neither the financial means nor the organizational capacity to successfully investigate, locate, and exhume all of the requests from relatives they receive, let alone to conduct the sort of systematic efforts that were launched in the former Yugoslavia or Argentina (Robben 2000; Wagner 2008). And yet, freed from the burdens of conforming to strict legal procedure, Spanish exhumations also provide an important opportunity to focus on the often overlooked affective and political dimensions of exhumations.

To understand the disappointment of Spanish memory activists with the respectful yet detached reaction of the MA students, I begin by analyzing what is at stake for Spaniards in these efforts to recover Franco's disappeared. I then turn toward exemplary interactions with mass graves, in which people are dramatically transformed through their encounters with the dead. Although these transformations may appear instantaneous and natural, I show how they are conditioned by a series of emotional trainings. I conclude by examining the ways the memory movement seeks to broaden this shared affective experience of the dead in an effort to carve out a different kind of public sphere.

Two approaches to postconflict history making

In Spain as elsewhere, the recovery of the missing entails self-conscious attempts to reorient the relationship between historical experience and

political belonging (Verdery 1999: 111). When Francisco Franco finally died after a prolonged illness on November 20, 1975, Spain undertook what until that point in history had been a rarity: a peaceful political transition from dictatorship to democracy.

Franco's death was not accompanied by a complete collapse of the authoritarian state. Instead, the transition would be conducted according to the legal codes and through the political institutions of the dictator's regime (Encarnación 2014: 24). This meant that, in contrast to later democratic transitions in the 1980s and 1990s:

> [n]o military trials of the like that took place in sister military dictatorships such as Argentina, Greece, and Chile to account for human rights abuses were staged in Spain. Nor did the Spaniards see fit to organize a fact-finding and truth-telling commission to chronicle the political crimes of the previous regime, as was done in South America, Central America, and South Africa during the 1980s and 1990s. . . . Finally, there were no bureaucratic purges (so-called lustration) in Spain of the kind that accompanied the dismantling of Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s intended to cleanse the political system of the vestiges of the old regime.
>
> (Encarnación 2008: 437)

Democracy came to Spain not through revolution but through a series of pacts between political elites. Major political and economic reforms were undertaken through negotiations between Franco's successors and the recently legalized Socialist and Communist Parties.

Initially, Spain's transition to democracy garnered the country widespread international praise. As Spanish living standards rose concurrently with the consolidation of democratic institutions throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the country quickly became an archetype for successful democratic transitions, and remained so for decades to come. Soon, scholars were talking about a "Spanish model" of democratic transition (Przeworski 1991; Gunther 1992). When the Berlin Wall came down, a number of Eastern European politicians traveled to Spain to study how properly to establish democracies back home. Spain became a paragon to be emulated elsewhere.

Although it did not feature prominently in most theoretical abstractions of the Spanish transition, central to its workings on the ground was a tacit Pact of Oblivion, whereby major Spanish political actors agreed not to legislate, litigate, or discuss the past in the public sphere. In a country wherein individuals still bitterly disputed whether the Franco years embodied the tragic defeat of a utopian-democratic project or a modernizing national crusade against an insurgent communist threat, political elites succeeded in making the case that the past was a subject best avoided altogether (Aguilar Fernández 2004: 34). The hope was that by self-consciously forgetting their

divisive history, Spaniards could, together, build a common future. In effect, if not always explicitly in their models, proponents of the Spanish model favored a model of democratic transition that called for ignoring or at least temporarily bracketing any reckoning with past violence.

However, on the periphery, a new model of transitional justice was emerging. This model was based not on the principle of elite pact making and amnesty but rather on public remembering, accountability, and reparations for past crimes. In the 1980s and 1990s, a series of prominent semijuridical truth commissions – including Argentina's 1984 National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons, South Africa's 1994 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and Guatemala's 1997 Commission for Historical Clarification – sought to produce authoritative narrations of recent human rights abuses in an effort to forge a fractured nation around a new collective biography of the nation (Robben 2000; Wilson 2001). Beginning in the mid-1990s, transitional justice designers supplemented and sometimes even supplanted truth commissions with criminal prosecutions, starting with the special International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia and culminating in the 2002 establishment of the permanent International Criminal Court (Mamdani 2002; Subotic 2012). With these developments, a new dominant theory of democratic transition based upon the principles of truth, justice, and reparation soon emerged. By the turn of the millennium, the Spanish model of democratic transition – with its emphasis on amnesty for and public silence about past crimes – appeared anachronistic.

The proliferation of transitional justice mechanisms brought with it a new and radically different understanding of the relationship between public history and liberal democracy. As Leebaw explains: "Although this was once a controversial claim, the idea that a durable peace requires countries to address past violence is now widely held and promoted by influential leaders under the broad heading of 'transitional justice'" (2008: 96; see also Teitel 2000: 92; Shaw 2007a). Whereas the Spanish model of democratic transition saw the public examination of the past as a danger to a still fragile political community, transitional justice scholars argue that it is a necessary precondition for securing a stable, liberal democracy.

For the ascendant model of transitional justice, establishing a definitive and accurate account of the past contributes to the project of transitional justice in at least three distinct ways. First, transitional justice scholars see truth telling as essential to healing individuals and nations torn asunder by years of internal conflict. Much like its genealogical predecessors in the confession and the psychiatric couch (Foucault 1973; Asad 1993), transitional justice advocates argue that explicit narration is required in order to successfully work through and come to terms with the violent past. Teitel, for instance, argues, "When victims and perpetrators testify, there is a self-purging and the possibility of personal change regarding the past experience" (Teitel 2000: 88). Here, historical narration is imagined to promote

both individual and social catharsis, allowing the political community to work through past violence and return to a healthy civic environment (Shaw 2007b; Minow 1998).

Second, transitional justice scholars believe there is an explicit connection between establishing a historically accurate account of a violent past and achieving justice for those crimes. While criminal prosecution may ideally hold to account those who are most directly responsible for human rights violations, it is neither practical nor, in most cases, desirable to subject the more banal forms of widespread complicity required to sustain repressive regimes to juridical examination. In this context, the official processes of establishing "truth accounts enable a broad sense of historical justice" by establishing a narrative framework of heroes and villains, victims and victimizers, and innocence and responsibility (Teitel 2000: 91; see also Leebaw 2008). For transitional justice advocate, "historical truth *is* justice in a certain respect inasmuch as it is the basis of the moral accountability that prepares the ground for *reconciliation*, the ultimate goal of transitional justice" (Scott 2014: 150, italics in original). Beyond its curative properties, here history itself acquires an emancipatory quality.

Finally, transitional justice advocates argue that historical accuracy is in itself a necessary precondition to the consolidation of liberal democracy. As the "Truth Seeking" section of the International Center for Transitional Justice's website exemplifies, advocates argue that: "Repressive regimes deliberately rewrite history and deny atrocities to legitimize themselves" (Burns 1998: 83; see also Herz 1989: 19; Leebaw 2008: 107). Implicit in this account is an assumed universality of liberal values. From this perspective, illiberal regimes can only survive if they maintain a populace ignorant of its own history; those who are exposed to a historically accurate account of the past will, inevitably, end up supporting liberal democratic projects (see van Zyl 2002). Here, historical accuracy is a necessary, if not always sufficient quality for securing a democratic state.

The transitional justice project, then, combines two distinct and usually irreconcilable philosophies of history into a single, uneasy hybrid. On the one hand, we find the kind of mythic emplotment of history that Anderson sees as the *sine qua non* of modern nation-states (1991: 201). The narratives promoted through transitional justice mechanisms endeavor to serve as foundational myths, uniting the political community around a common understanding of the past and articulating its defining moral lessons (Leebaw 2008: 109). However, unlike the nineteenth-century historians that Anderson examines, transitional justice practitioners see the narratives they produce as objective and accurate representations of the past "how it essentially was" (Ranke 2010: 86). In fact, it is precisely this claim to the superiority of state-sponsored expert-written history that allows the field to command authority over other, undisciplined and uncertified representations of the past. In an ironic twist, transitional justice advocates use historicism as a platform for the myths that ground the moral community.

As numerous anthropologists have demonstrated, the assumptions about historical experience that guide the transitional justice project are far from universal (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992; Hirsch and Stewart 2005; Palmié 2010). For instance, Cole's (1998) ethnography of postcolonial Madagascar and Shaw's (2007b) work on post–civil war Sierra Leone both demonstrate the limits of transitional justice's faith in historical reckoning in contexts where local memory practices emphasize the forgetting of past violence. Moreover, as Scott argues in his analysis of the Grenada Truth and Reconciliation Commission, transitional justice's assumption that historical truth necessarily legitimates liberal democracy can erase other kinds of historical and political projects (2014). Even where there is support for official commemorations, transitional justice's privileging of legal testimony may also obscure other forms of truth telling (French 2009).

In Spain, however, memory activists not only share but actively covet the kinds of memory practices that animate this model of transitional justice. As the prominent philosopher Reyes Mate argued at a conference, while directly addressing forensic scientists. "By your own work and prestige, you have become privileged readers of the past, no? You are the ones who understand the eloquence of the bones, which is great". Or as two Andalusian activists put it while overlooking an exhumation, "This is the confirmation that what we have been saying is the truth".

Yet, as the earnest but unemotional response of the MA students to the mass grave makes clear, the "truth" that memory activists speak of encompasses more than just a concern with historical accuracy. In order to understand my colleagues' disappointment, I next turn toward the kinds of historical engagements that memory activists foster in and around mass grave exhumations.

The importance of being earnest: constructing victim testimonies

In late summer 2011, I met up with another American anthropologist returning from her first forensic exhumation. By then, I had spent well over a year actively participating in the Spanish historical memory movement's efforts to locate, exhume, and honor the disappeared. So it was with an understandable degree of hesitation that she asked me if I was uncomfortable with the enormous pressure memory activists sometimes placed on relatives of the disappeared to provide on-camera interviews, recounting the violence they and their families suffered under the dictatorship. I reminded her that in all of my follow-up research, I never met a person who expressed regret at providing testimony.

Nevertheless, the conversation reminded me of my own initial reservations with what I had at first described in my field notes as the "nigh-coercive tactics" employed by memory activists. During the very first exhumation in which I actively participated, the leader of the social team dogged one

relative with a recorder for days on end, constantly reminding him of the importance of testifying. Refusal after refusal, she persisted, until he finally granted the interview.

In part, this zeal for recorded testimony is explained by the advanced age of the generation who lived through the Civil War. As the coordinator of one memory association explained at a workshop of potential volunteers, "Every year so many people die and with them goes the memory that allows us to say what happened in this country". On another occasion, he was even more specific, noting that if a person dies off prior to providing recorded testimony, "we don't just lose the location of the grave, but also part of the history of this country". Whereas the documents of the fascist regime – if they could even be located – were riddled with errata, political bias, and self-serving justifications, memory activists repeatedly emphasized to me both the accuracy and historical import of gathering these accounts. As one veteran volunteer explained, "There is no better source than the testimony of an old person".

As my colleagues predicted, during my collaborations with the historical memory movement, I frequently encountered information in oral testimonies that eluded state archives. Following one exhumation, per exemplar, I accompanied the lead social scientist to interview Eleanor,[1] the granddaughter of one of the disinterred, in her Madrid apartment. Although Eleanor had been too young to remember much about her grandmother, she was still able to provide a unique perspective on the early days of the dictatorship. As a young child, "my first remembrances were of seeing the women in the kitchen talking and writing letters to those who were in the prisons", approximately 900 kilometers away.

At the time, she didn't fully understand what was happening: "Us little children didn't have the feeling of being – as they say in the village – 'the defeated' ". As the war dragged on, however, she would come to internalize the feelings of humiliation bestowed upon those who had resisted Franco. At home, her family was forced to house Italian and German troops, sent by Hitler and Mussolini to aid in Franco's coup. And at school, she was mercilessly taunted as the "daughter of a red". Eventually, these experiences "gave me the feeling that my father was one of the guilty ones".

Despite the great repression, she emphasized, her home was never completely depoliticized. Following his release from prison, her father, banned by the fascist state from resuming his profession as a schoolteacher, was forced to leave the village. But after the Allied victory in the Second World War, he became convinced that Franco would inevitably fall. It was only a matter of time. In reality, more than three decades passed until her father's prophecy would be fulfilled. Now, Eleanor concluded, all she wanted to do was recover the bones of her grandmother and give her a proper burial next to her grandfather.

To me, the encounter exemplified the great potentials of Spanish memory activists' multidisciplinary approach to exhumations. Eleanor's testimony

provided precisely the kind of information that neither fascist state archives nor analysis of human remains could ever yield. From her vivid recounting of the ways women took advantage of domestic spaces to resist Franco to her frequent trips to visit her father in prison, and including an account of maintaining a faith in future democracy amidst fascism, Eleanor's narrative was one of the most detailed recountings of what life was like under the Franco dictatorship that I heard during my entire field research. Without the effort to recover the physical remains of her grandmother, Eleanor's remembrances would likely never have been recorded.

To my surprise, however, the lead social scientist did not share my enthusiasm for the testimony. In fact, she appeared somewhat disappointed in Eleanor's presentation: "It's unusual to find someone so calm and optimistic" she commented after the interview. Eleanor chalked up her tranquil demeanor to her "family atmosphere", as well as her having moved away. In the small village, "the situation is more closed off. They are still harassing them". As Eleanor's son walked us downstairs after the interview, the lead social scientist continued to marvel that she had been "so calm and clear". Others are "more emotional. She is more reflexive. It's curious", she remarked, with a distinct note of disappointment.

As our divergent evaluations of the interview indicate, for memory activists, there is more at stake in the collection of recorded testimonies than the archiving of information about past events. To memory activists, what matters is not only the content of the testimony but also its performance. At one exhumation, a man requested to be interviewed together with his childhood friend, who had accompanied him to the site for emotional support. While the lead social scientist acceded to the request, afterward, she persisted and eventually succeeded in also soliciting a one-on-one interview with the relative. She would later explain her preference for the individual interview: "because if not, he won't cry".

Working at exhumations, I quickly learned just how highly the memory movement values explicit displays of emotion. In an interview I conducted together with another member of the social team, a granddaughter of one of the persons we were exhuming soon began crying. Having been separated from her family at an early age, she was unable to convey the kind of knowledge that might aid in an identification, especially since "my parents didn't tell me anything". But sitting in front of the excavation, she broke down in tears as she discussed the pain of losing multiple relatives during the war.

The recording instantly grabbed the attention of my colleagues. One of the exhumation directors approached me afterward to request that the video be shown for the entire forensic team that evening.

Echoing the transitional justice calls that inspired them, Spanish memory activists see the forensic exhumation as a process for producing historical truth. However, as their prioritization of emotive testimonies reveals, the truth memory activists produce is not only and perhaps not even primarily one of correcting a faulty historical record. Although scientific procedures

do yield significant new information about individual graves, even highly detailed testimonies that may reveal underrepresented perspectives on Franco's repression are archived with little fanfare. Overcoming the legacy of the Franco regime requires a different kind of historical experience, one based upon securing an affective attachment to the disappeared. In order to see why, I turn toward some exemplary stories of the kinds of emotional and political transformations that people undergo through their encounter with the mass grave.

Bodies of historical production: personal transformations at mass grave exhumations

I came to know Beatriz[2] through our work together on exhumations led by the Association for the Recovery of Historical Memory (Asociación para la Recuperacíon de la Memoria Histórica, ARMH). Ever since the exhumation of her great-grandfather a few years earlier, Beatriz had become a frequent volunteer, traveling with the team across the country to help other families whose relatives had been forcibly disappeared. In this she exemplified the sort of gratitude and dedication regularly displayed by a great many relatives of those directly affected by Francoist violence.

I was particularly struck by the way that Beatriz described her great-grandmother's reaction to the exhumation. As she explained to me in an interview, her grandmother did not succumb to the silence that predominated so many families:

> I know that in other houses, it is a taboo subject that family members can hardly talk about, that they forget, et cetera. But in my house, no. In my house we always talked about my great-grandfather. We always knew what happened. But always also with the caution not to talk about it with anybody else. . . . I think because of fear that it could happen again.

When the memory movement began making national headlines in the mid-2000s, Beatriz and her mother talked about their mutual desire to recover the remains of their loved one. But they dared not approach Beatriz's grandmother: "when the topic came up she didn't have any problem talking about it, but she suffered greatly when she did. When she talked about it, it was almost like she was reliving it in that moment. As though she were [still] 13 years old". Still, for Beatriz and her mother, an exhumation was important: "When the ARMH started doing exhumations, I said to my mother, 'Look, there are people who are doing this'. But my mother always said that it was too painful for my grandmother. We didn't want to tell her. We didn't want to do anything that might cause her harm. So we let it go". Nevertheless, Beatriz and her mother remained committed to recovering the remains: "I said to my mother, 'We are waiting until my grandmother dies'.

I told her many times, 'This is something that we have to do' ". But until then, "it was complicated".

The issue was forced one day when a local historian, whose own relative happened to share a mass grave with Beatriz's great-grandfather, approached the family to gather information. He too wished to recover the remains of his loved one and was conducting the research in preparation for a possible exhumation. Uncomfortable a situation though it may have been, they now had to approach Beatriz's grandmother for permission to exhume the mass grave.

Much to their astonishment, Beatriz's grandmother enthusiastically supported the idea: "to the surprise of everyone, my grandmother said, 'Yes, yes. This seems very good to me. And if we can do it, then we must do it' ".

The first couple of days of the exhumation provoked "great anxiety" as the team searched for the remains without finding anything. Once the bones appeared, however, the effects were dramatic. For Beatriz's grandmother:

> it was a tremendous catharsis. . . . Before it was very difficult for her. When she spoke about this, she cried like she was a 13-year-old girl. . . . Now, she talks about it with more distance, she talks about them like events that occurred 75 years ago.

Although the murder of her great-grandfather still causes tremendous pain for the entire family, now the psychic trauma of the forced disappearance has been resolved, and Beatriz's grandmother is no longer trapped in the past.

Although Beatriz's story is exemplary in both the level of detail and the nature of the changes undergone by her grandmother, it is far from unique. Hang around long enough at exhumations, and you start to collect dozens of stories of people dramatically transformed through their encounters with the dead. There is the frequently related story of the large, macho man who, the second the bones appear, begins to uncontrollably weep. But asked the next day if he felt better having witnessed the horrific scene, he confirmed that he did indeed. Then there is the one about the man who brought his sleeping or anxiety pills to the exhumation (the malady differs depending on who tells the tale). Showing them off to all who would see, he remarked that today was the first day in decades that he did not feel the need to take them. In time, I even began to add my own stories whenever I came back from exhumations, like the one about the elderly man who, when I asked him each morning how he was doing answered "bad" until the day we removed the bones from the grave when his answered changed to "good".

In these exemplary stories, we encounter a series of individuals, most often children of Franco's victims, who continue to experience psychosomatic maladies stemming from the violence of the dictatorship. Although the Franco regime ended over three decades prior, memory activists speak of a "psychological Francoism" that extends to this day. In part, they argue,

this is the effect of unaddressed trauma. As one man explained when I asked him why he thought his aunt hadn't told him about his grandfather's death, "Francoism did a lot of mental damage". At the same time, they maintain, it would be a mistake to consign the causes of this psychological Francoism solely to the past. As the social anthropologist and frequent collaborator with the memory movements, Francisco Ferrándiz, argued at one conference: "The graves of the defeated were the central axis in the Francoist strategy of sowing terror". In this case, the refusal of post-Franco Spanish governments to locate and exhume those who were killed in the Civil War is not simply evidence of politicians' unwillingness to face their fraught history. It is also the means by which the political leaders of past eras continue to terrorize the citizenry (Rubin 2018).

Memory activists frequently represent the older generation as fearful, traumatized, and suspicious of any explicit engagement with the past. Several memory activists related warnings their mothers conveyed upon first learning of their involvement with exhumations: "my mother always says the same thing to me. 'Although you may not believe it, another war can happen. You don't know what a war is' ". "That", he explained, "is what fear is" – the consciousness of a return to a state of war as an always looming possibility on the horizon – a fear that "doesn't go away from these persons". His mother dared not enter into politics because, even if the current government could guarantee her safety, the specter of a renewed dictatorship remained an ever present possibility, hovering just beyond the foreseeable future. Here, the dictatorship's effects manifest not only through the body but also in the subject's horizon of expectation.

The varied symptomology of this terror is united in its debilitating effect on an individual's political life. As a result of these experiences, one social psychologist and regular volunteer for the ARMH-Madrid explained to a gathering of university students, they "have not been allowed to develop as persons. They have not been allowed to develop their truth". In these stories, such a lack of development is manifest on the body of these relatives: they speak like children, need to take pills, or simply feel bad all the time. Therefore, the social-psychologists concluded, "they cannot close this and say that we are in a democracy".

In this context, encounters with the mass grave operate simultaneously as a psychological, material, and political intervention. As the social psychologist Guillermo Fouce explained at a conference, exhumations "return the possibility of speaking" to victims rendered mute by such acts (see also Fouce Fernández 2008: 90). By, at long last, definitively establishing the location of a missing loved ones, families may find a degree of closure. One relative described his encounter with a mass grave as "a physical opening and, I believe, also a spiritual liberation". Even when an interment cannot be located, many relatives cite the efforts of memory activists or their aid to families in similar situations as a source of comfort and healing.

Lastly, as Emilio Silva, president of the ARMH and organizer of Spain's first scientific exhumation, explained to me, there is a performative dimension to exhumations:

> If someone shows their hand one day, and it is hit with a pole, it makes them be careful and they don't go outside without first looking if there is a stick, well, they keep their hands to themselves. If a group of archaeologists comes and say: "listen, there is no stick here, stick out your hand!" And nothing happens, then. . . . For me this is like a citizen who is born. I have seen citizens being born at 70 years old. They have never been free, including during 25 years of democracy, and when they see this, they are.

Witnessing the ways that forensic specialists interact with the dead, Silva argues, provides the possibility of reorienting the futures naturalized by older Spaniards. Upon seeing the lack of consequences for engaging with the violent past, elderly citizens may yet lose their fear of the possibility of radical political upheaval.

Like the transitional justice scholars who inspired them, Spanish memory activists believe that a thorough reexamination of the past is a necessary precondition for a stable democracy. However, the kind of historical reexamination favored by Spanish activists is not limited to a narrative reconsideration of the past. After all, the protagonists of these stories usually know only too well the violence of the Franco regime. In the absence of state-led criminal prosecutions, the exhumation itself must become a site of psychological catharsis and political transformation.

However, the protagonists of these emblematic transformation stories represent only a fraction of the Spanish populace. To fully appreciate the role of these non-narrative forms of memory on postconflict historical reckoning, in the next section I broaden my perspective beyond those directly affected by Franco's violence.

Dismantling structures of fear: cross-generational responses to forensic exhumations

Although the debilitating effects of the Franco dictatorship are most acutely experienced by those who lived through the dictatorship, the memory movement is quick to point out the ways it affects younger Spaniards as well. As a social psychologist from the Forum for Memory put it, a "genetic fear" is also transmitted across generations.

This fear, though, is of a different kind than the "psychological Francoism" that afflicts many elderly relatives of the disappeared. During one assembly at Madrid's Friends of UNESCO Club (CAUM), an activist described it as a "sociological Francoism that transmits fear and which has infected the society". This sociological fear manifests in far subtler ways

than the psychosomatic effects we witnessed in the preceding section. But its effects are no less pernicious. While the younger generation does not display the same outward signs as their parents, according to the memory movement, they too suffer from a form of stunted development. But instead of its manifesting in halted speech or medication, memory activists argue that those born after the fall of the dictatorship suffer from structural deficits in their capacities to inhabit a democratic tradition.

In its most extreme form, this sociological Francoism is evident in those young people who object to exhumations. For memory activists, these opponents are motivated not by ignorance or even by their ascription to an immoral set of political values. Instead, as one granddaughter put it, they are constitutionally: "incapable of understanding. . . . They don't have the imagination to realize that this is not right". Hence, memory activists' most common retort to these opponents asks that they embrace not a specific political ideology but rather a specific subject position: "If it were your grandfather in a ditch, you wouldn't think that".

Even those who do put in a good faith effort to understand the mass grave, though, often fail to fulfill this entreaty. Like the MA students with which we began, some are simply incapable of engaging in this kind of imaginative projection of the self. Thus, two visitors to an exhumation in Espinosa de los Monteros, Burgos, in 2012 expressed their gratitude to the Aranzadi Scientific Society in the visitors' book: "Thank you to [lead forensic scientist] Professor Paco Etxeberria for giving us this opportunity. . . . It has awakened different feelings in us". However, they continued: "Although interesting, it is also difficult to put yourself in the place of the families who finally know with certainty the whereabouts of their ancestors' remains". In this case, the inability to inhabit the subjectivity of a victim's relative clearly does not stem from disrespect or political opposition. Rather, as with the international master's students, it stems from an incommensurability of perspectives. Particularly for those who grew up after the return of democracy in Spain, imagining, let along inhabiting the loss of a relative in a bloody civil war is a difficult task.

Therefore, both at the mass grave and beyond it, the memory movement engages in a variety of practices designed to help people imaginatively project themselves into the place of those directly affected by fascist violence, be they those searching for mass graves or those within them. At least once a day, the team leads what Bevernage and Colaert call "mobile seminars", explaining an opaque burial scene to the uninitiated (2014: 5). The chief scientist invites relatives and passersby to gather around the grave, as he demonstrates the number and disposition of each skeleton, making certain that each of the observers can see the jumble of bones as a series of human bodies. Memory activists also encourage visitors to imagine what would remain of their own bodies "if I shot and buried you right now". As they list those elements of the person that would decay (hair, soft tissue, clothing) and those that would remain preserved (bones, watches, leather shoes),

the living learn to see their own bodies as fundamentally like those being exhumed in front of them, save for a few decades of decay.

A similar attempt to illustrate the mutual corporeality of the living and the dead can be seen in the occasional practice at the end of excavations conducted by Dr. Francisco Etxeberria's Aranzadi Scientific Society. After the remains and found objects have been removed from the grave, Dr. Etxeberria selects a number of volunteers to reenact the victims' final moments. One by one, they mime being "shot" by the forensic scientist, falling into the grave, and assuming the exact position of the recently removed corpse. The effect, once completed, is to recreate the final scene of the victims, displaying a mass grave comprised not just of bones but of flesh as well (see Figure 5.1). The ceremony, Dr. Etxeberria acknowledges, "is very difficult for the families. But it helps them too". If in the ensuing 75 years, the dead have become so unlike us that they are now difficult to recognize, then at least they can be simulated by extant bodies. In so doing, volunteers use their own flesh as a medium for recreating the horrifying final moments, hailing a community of feeling through their spectacular reenactment of the original crime.

These subjectifying practices extend well beyond the immediate environs of the exhumation. For instance, the ARMH-Madrid organizes "sympathy workshops" at local universities in which, as the facilitator introduces the

Figure 5.1 Volunteers from the Aranzadi Scientific Society assume the position of corpses recently removed from a mass grave in Barcones (León).

Source: Photo by Oscar Rodríguez, 2013.

event, participants would "learn to empathize with families". The workshop begins by reading "real letters" from relatives to their disappeared loved ones, "so that you can see the sort of terms relatives use". They are then asked to "write a letter as if you had a disappeared victim" in your family. The goal, the students are told, is "to put yourself in the place of the other and try to feel". Much like with the eighteenth-century literary sphere analyzed by Habermas, here too the letter acts as a technology for facilitating "experiments with subjectivity" (1991: 49). By attempting to inhabit the perspective of a relative of a disappeared, participants become "persons capable of entering into 'purely human' relations with one another" (1991: 48–49). If the present generation cannot naturally sympathize with relatives of the disappeared, it seems that they can at least be trained to do so.

In 2013, the Platform for a Truth Commission attempted to provoke such identification with Franco's victims on a mass scale through an online video. The short film opens in darkness. A scraping sound accompanies the gradual lighting of a textured brown surface, until it becomes apparent that the viewer is in a mass grave. Sharing a first-person perspective with the deceased, the viewer is extracted by forensic scientists, boxed, and transported to a laboratory where a white-coat prods the screen with instruments, pronouncing the viewer: "a very robust individual, male, age at death twenty-five to thirty-five years old. Cause of Death: there are two entry orifices from a projectile". The bones are then repackaged in a cardboard box.

After a brief interlude in which actors recite facts about forced disappearances in Spain, we see that same box being handed over, presumably returned to its family. Then, the film once again adopts a first-person perspective but this time taking us through a celebratory family dinner. The camera holds our gaze on an overjoyed elderly woman, seated at the head of the table as younger family members hug, kiss, and eat. It quickly becomes clear that the viewer is still maintaining the perspective of the dead, this time reincorporated into the joyous family. But just as this realization occurs, the camera rapidly pulls back, leaving the house, traversing the laboratory, and returning to the mass grave, where the human remains of the viewer/deceased await their scientific recovery and reincorporation into the domestic sphere.

Whereas the ARMH-Madrid's sympathy workshop tried to make the living identify with relatives of the deceased searching for their loved ones, the Platform for a Truth Commission has the living directly adopt the perspectives of the dead, who yearn to be freed from their mass grave and reunited with their families. By becoming the object of the other's gaze, this technique allows the viewer to inhabit a different form of subjectivity. In both scenarios, however, the goal is to train the living to recognize themselves not only as sharing fundamental characteristics with the disappeared but also as sharing an emotional terrain with them and their kin.

As transitional justice scholars would predict, learning about past violence is a necessary precondition for extending sympathy and supporting

reparations for state crimes. But for Spanish memory activists, this narrative history is not sufficient. Although the aftereffects of the Franco dictatorship upon the general populace may manifest in subtle ways, they too prevent the formation of certain kinds of collectivities. Through a series of exercises at the exhumation and beyond it, those who interact with the memory movement can open themselves up to the possibility of participating in a radically different kind of affective public sphere. It is to the nature of this public that I turn toward in the next section.

Building a republican community of feeling

Emotional testimonies have the power to circulate well beyond the activists who comprise the historical memory movement. The case of Hilda Farfante Gayo is instructive. Hilda is the daughter of Balbina Gayo Gutiérrez and Ceferino Farfante Rodríguez, both schoolteachers who were murdered between the 10th and 12th of September 1936 near the town of Cangas de Narcea, Asturias. Though she was a regular participant in the Platform Against Francoism's weekly protest in Madrid, Hilda had great difficulty talking about her parents in public. She had tried to read her poem, "The Scream", on several occasions but inevitably broke down in tears after only a few verses. At each public recitation, a friend of hers would have to finish the poem. When the Platform Against Francoism asked her to speak at a major assembly, she fretted to me: "they couldn't find someone who is calmer? Every time I speak about them, I cry. Everybody knows this". But after repeated requests from the group's leaders, she relented and agreed to participate.

As Hilda predicted, she was unable to get through the public recitation of her poem. A few lines in, she broke down in tears, passing the text off to a supportive friend to finish. Yet, far from being disappointed with her unintelligibility, as Hilda had feared, audiences were captivated, responding to her tears with long applause.

These emotive performance garnered her family history more and more attention. She was repeatedly asked to recite her poem, and, following several media reports, her story was later incorporated into the documentary film *The Teachers of the Republic* (Solano 2013). The trailer for the film states, "From here, we want to recover their memory because their educational and ideological legacy illustrates the path that we travel on today".

In Hilda's experience, we encounter some familiar themes. Like the relatives pursued by the memory activists at exhumations, Hilda came under tremendous pressure to testify. Initially, she felt unable to convey the story of her parents in the calm way that would facilitate transmission of their experiences to the audience. Ironically, though, it was precisely her inability to produce a coherent narrative that made her such an in-demand speaker. As with the victims at exhumations, here too it is Hilda's emotional

breakdown, more than the historical content, that enables her testimony to circulate within the public sphere.

Firmly ensconced within a community that has undergone the kinds of trainings documented in the past two sections, we can see how Hilda's emotional display calls forth a collectivity. Upon seeing Hilda break down in tears, the crowd broke out into a loud applause. In so doing, they are able to do more than just provide support for a woman in obvious pain. Instead, we see the first steps in the formation of a public organized not, as the classic liberal public sphere would have it (e.g., Habermas 1991), around rational debate so much as around a community of feeling (Kunreuther 2014; Tambar 2011). The public is here defined in part by those who are capable of empathizing with Hilda and, through her pain, recognizining the wrongs committed by the Franco regime against her parents and the thousands like him.

In such events, applause acts as something of a hail,[3] interpellating those who participate into a community oriented around their mutual respect for testimony about the dead. Thus, at one reburial ceremony, ARMH vice president of Santiago Macias instructed those of us carrying coffins into the municipal building to begin a loud round of applause as soon as we laid the caskets on the table. The gathered took up the social cue, joining in our clapping. At other times, this organization of a public around a common reservoir of feeling is somewhat less subtle. At a Forum for Memory reburial service, the emcee instructed us to march in a silent funeral procession from the municipal building to the cemetery: "that way, we can demonstrate to the village our pain and also our happiness". In this moment, the normally implicit orientation of the remembering public became explicit: we were those who felt pain and happiness when reburying the recovered corpse.

The emotive testimony of a victim's relative is critical to the formation of a counterpublic. The pain they perform and the support they demand provide opportunities for others to join together and express a common appreciation for the dead and a recognition of the continuing harm caused by their forcible disappearance. This comes out particularly clearly in the way one woman reported on Facebook her experience listening to Hilda:

> Hearing it [the poem] recited by the voice of Hilda Farfante Gayo was something very emotional. Hilda began to speak this poetry and later she screamed and when Hilda screams it gives you goosebumps, a lump forms in your throat, and tears in the eyes, because Hilda's scream carried with it the scream of all the teaching persons [*personas docentes*] who were shot like her father and her mother, in the scream of Hilda is the scream of my grandfather and all of the innocent persons like him who were shot . . . the scream of all of the families and also my own scream, screaming with her from the bottom of my heart.

Hilda's scream first gives this listener a window into the pain of one woman whose parents were both murdered by fascist forces. But through her emotional rendition, the listener also comes to hear other cries, first that of other educators and later of all the innocent persons murdered by Franco's armies. Finally, Hilda's scream acts as a hail, interpellating the listener as a person who screams "from the bottom of my heart". Here, Hilda's stirring recitation becomes a way of building a community of screamers, both living and dead.

Note that it is Hilda's inability to reproduce a coherent narration of her parents' death that eventually leads to a project of reorienting the politics of the living. Through Hilda, we come to recover not only a memory of who the deceased were but also an "educational and ideological legacy" which provides a guide for our own action in the present. In this last moment, Hilda herself fades into the background. Her emotional performance becomes a medium through which the living come to know what the dead want of them (Rubin 2015).

The ability to call together such a gathering helps explain the memory movement's emphasis on producing and circulating emotional testimonies. These testimonies are not an end in themselves. Rather, they are essential to constituting these alternative democratic publics. In Hilda's case, they provide a way for listeners to forge a relationship with the dead that affected the behavior of the living. Yet, as the trailer of *The Teachers of the Republic* indicates, these publics are not comprised of living persons alone.

Conclusion

Spanish memory activists share the historicist orientations of the postconflict forensic interventions that inspired them. However, far more is going on at Spanish exhumations than an attempt to generate new narratives of past violence. As Verdery notes, the controversies over dead bodies that animate postconflict societies point to a realm of politics that goes beyond legal reforms or territorial management to include "reordering the meaningful universe" (1999: 26). From this perspective, Spain's transition to democracy was not just about controlling the ways people could talk about the past. As I have shown in this chapter, the Pact of Oblivion manifests in both the spectacular and subtle ways that people experienced the dictatorship and its aftermath. The Pact of Oblivion, in other words, proscribed not only certain kinds of narrations; it also effectively foreclosed the possibility of certain kinds of attachments. Merely narrating the past is not sufficient to overcome the dictatorship's effects.

In this context, the memory movement represents a kind of politics that extends beyond their policy demands for government action in locating and exhuming mass graves. Emotive testimonies like the one Hilda produced become an important site for constituting new kinds of historically grounded publics. By reincorporating the dead who had been violently

excluded from the public sphere by the Franco dictatorship and later suppressed by the post–fascist state, memory activists alter the emotional, symbolic, and ethical commitments that define civic belonging. When a forensic specialist trains laypersons to recognize the dead, when memory activists encourage students to write letters to the disappeared, and when video campaigns place the viewer in the perspective of a victim lying in a mass grave, they seek to build sympathy through the aesthetics and technical procedures of forensic exhumations

However, as I have shown in this chapter, the sympathy generated by these emotive testimonies is neither predetermined nor guaranteed in advance. Both at exhumations and beyond them, Spaniards must undergo a series of trainings in order to be able to join the emotive public hailed in the performance of testimonies. But for those who learn how to accept the hail, these testimonies become sites for considering the ongoing legacy of Franco's victims within a community of feeling and sympathy.

Moreover, this is not just a matter of a political and subjective project existing alongside a scientific-historical one, following parallel tracks that never meet. For the historical memory movement, the historicist's impulse to recognize the truth of past events is inextricably tied up with a set of emotional, ethical, and political responses.[4]

To be sure, Spanish forensic scientists do seek to separate out the scientific process of making facts from the subjective political project in which it is enveloped. Upon my first visit to the ARMH's laboratory in northwestern Spain, the manager explained to me that, although the group "has our ideology, as you know, from this door forward, it is a scientific work. . . . We don't fly any flags here". In line with international protocols and professional best practices, forensic exhumations seek to separate out the work of identifying victims from that of building a more democratic practice (Haglund, Connor, and Scott 2001).

Yet as Latour (1993) would predict, these efforts at purifying the scientific practice of forensic experts from the cultural and political force of testimony yield a proliferation of historical hybrids. Moreover, as the forensic anthropology students with whom we began the chapter make evident, a true separation between the forensic-historicist project and the affective, ethical, and political implications of that history is not only implausible. It is also undesirable.

For one, forensic scientists rely upon oral testimony not only to locate mass graves, but also to provide the most reliable source of biographical information about the disappeared. As I found out through my interview with Eleanor, however, the memory movement's practice of forensic history is not limited to narrating the past. For it is not alongside but through the rigorous production of scientific facts about the past that the Spanish memory movement seeks to combat the "sociological" or "psychological Francoism" that continues to haunt the historical present. The same process that allows one to recognize the forensic fact as authoritative also produces

the sympathy that memory activists see as the heart of their ethical and political project.

This is why memory activists were so disturbed by the respectful but detached reaction of the forensic anthropology MA students. For memory activists, there ought to be an essential connection between forensic exhumations as a historicist project of producing new facts about past crimes and the ethical commitment to reviving the republican values of those who lie in mass graves. Embodying the historical assumptions of the broader field of transitional justice, the students were only able to do the former. Although they conducted their work in a respectful and professional manner, they were not affected by it. While they could recognize and even produce authoritative narrations of history, they were incapable of joining the community of feeling invoked through testimonies of it.

There are important lessons in the Spanish case for the field of transitional justice. Because the interventions that inspired Spanish memory activists took place alongside state-led programs of democratic transition, they have placed great emphasis on the importance of producing definitive accounts of past crimes. This is entirely understandable, given the field's legal and institutional focus. Truth commissions, war crimes tribunals, and even commemorative acts most often confer their evaluations in narrative form. However, as the Spanish case exemplifies, transitional justice's faith in the power of historical narrations to heal a fractured society, secure a democratic public sphere, and achieve justice for past crimes is misplaced. For embedded within the historicist's imperative to narrate the past as it essentially was are other kinds of ethical, affective, and political projects. Rather than treat these nonhegemonic forms of historical experience as history's undisciplined others, to be ignored or worked out in other contexts, the Spanish memory movement indicates the need to place these diverse forms of interacting with the past at the center of our analysis.

Notes

1 Pseudonym.
2 Pseudonym.
3 In analyzing applause as a hail, I draw on the work of Louise Althusser (2001). For Althusser, a communicative acts "hails" or "interpellates" people into a specific identity. For example, in responding to a call of "my friend!", respondents recognize themselves as my friends. In a similar sense, respondents of the applause for the deceased come to recognize their own identities as part of a public that respects and responds to the deceased.
4 Ironically, as Palmié and Stewart point out in the Introduction to this volume, the memory movement's project of cultivating certain affects of history is not entirely dissimilar from the project articulated by Ranke's project of not only "capturing the past as it really was" but also of "capturing the inner feeling of the past".

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Places

6 Reframing Waterloo

Memory, mediation, experience

Ann Rigney

In 1956, Fritz Stern edited an anthology of reflections on what it means to be a historian and how best to conduct the business of "doing history". It was called *Varieties of History*, and it stretched, as the subtitle put it, from "Voltaire to the Present". The very fact of displaying a variety of perspectives on the historian's craft, and hence implicitly calling into question the idea that there was only one road leading to Rome, already made this a landmark publication in the development of what in the decades following became known in the English-speaking world as "theory of history".[1] That there are "varieties of history" – in terms of topic, method, genre of writing, medium of expression, and even targeted public – is now generally accepted. The recognition of the inevitability of variation has itself shifted the terms of the debate: the main question is now which variant, among all the varieties of history possible, should be prioritized within the profession at any given time.

So much for history – at least for history in the sense of the work done by historians. Looking back at Stern's anthology at a distance of more than half a century, it is striking how much it leans toward history in the sense of historical scholarship conducted at universities. The discussion of "variation" revolves around the same underlying question, how *knowledge* about the past and societal change can best be pursued by experts who self-identify as historians. In the intervening half century, it has become apparent, however, that there are other modes of engaging with the past than that of historiography, even when this concept is broadly understood to include public history (see Conn, this volume). For better and for worse, historians do not have a monopoly in this arena.

An important recognition of the importance of historical fiction, for example, came just six years after Stern's collection with the English translation of Georg Lukács's (1962) landmark study of the historical novel, originally published in Russian in 1937. Lukács's work provided a powerful and still influential demonstration of the importance of fictional narrative since the early nineteenth century, showing how creative writers elaborated a model for understanding individual action in relation to collective change that was hugely influential among the public at large. In the last half century, scholars

in the burgeoning field of cultural memory studies have become aware of the great variety of other genres, media, and modes through which the past is collectively recollected across generations and virtually experienced in the present.[2] Movies and novels, commemorations and monuments, family photograph albums, reenactments, historical tourism, genealogical websites, public apologies: although these do not fall under the aegis of the historical profession, they are to be taken seriously as cultural phenomena in their own right. They have a key role to play in the formation of shared ideas about history and about the relation between individual and collective experience. Often using experiential and aesthetic modes of engagement that mobilize affect as well as cognition, they perform memory work that is different from that of professional historiography but no less significant in terms of its societal impact. Drawing on such insights from cultural memory studies, I argue that we cannot fully understand "varieties of historical experience" without taking into account the "memory culture" (Erll 2011) at large in which individuals establish their relationship to the collective past. Memory culture provides a repertoire of ways of performing a relation to the past, ideas about what is memorable and what trivial, and a "horizon of expectations" (Jauss 1970) based on earlier narratives about particular topics. Together, these create the cultural conditions within which embodied historical experience arises.

In the introduction to the present volume, Stephan Palmié and Charles Stewart outline a genealogy of "historical experience", presenting it in terms of the embodied sensation of being in touch – sometimes literally so – with times past. They recognize the importance of technologies in transporting individual subjects back in time or in 'resurrecting' something from the past so that it seems now to be "present". Coming from the field of comparative literature, I too will emphasize the importance of mediation, but where Palmié and Stewart highlight the way particular media have worked as conduits to the past, the emphasis here will be on the ways in which media also shape the experience they convey. They are interfaces that link but also stand between the present and the past. They are sets of affordances that facilitate our imagined access to the past while also channeling that access, not least at those moments when we enjoy the sudden sense of being in "direct contact" with times past.

In emphasizing the inseparability of experience and mediation, this analysis resonates with the powerful critique offered by Joan W. Scott, almost 30 years ago (Scott 1991). Reflecting on the ubiquity of the concept of "experience" as an alternative to more hieratic approaches to historical inquiry and as putatively closer to ordinary lives, Scott warned against the essentializing tendencies behind the use of the term. She queried the way "experience" was being invoked as an irreducible foundation for historical truth that lies outside the reach of discourse and, in being associated with the visceral and embodied, seems somehow closer to the "real". Against this romanticization of experience, Scott argued for the importance of reading

for "the literary" (1991: 796). By this she meant the critical scrutiny of the cultural and discursive conditions behind any lived "experience". To be sure, Scott's concern was with the concept of experience among historians, but her point can be extended to the idea of "historical experience" as used in more common parlance. The sense of immediacy associated from the emic perspective with historical experience needs to be analyzed from the etic perspective in terms of the discursive and representational categories that make "experience" possible. These categories not only inform how the particular place or moment is perceived but also define its very character as historical. Indeed, the active pursuit of an experiential relation to the past on the part of individuals should itself be seen as the historical by-product of Romantic historicism (Rigney 2001) and not something of all times.

Reading for the literary

In what follows I take Scott's injunction to "read for the literary" seriously and indeed literally by analyzing a section of W.G. Sebald's *Die Ringe des Saturn: Eine englische Wallfahrt* (1995), translated as *The Rings of Saturn* (1998). This work has already generated a huge amount of commentary (indeed by now there is a virtual industry around Sebald), but it still deserves revisiting here for what it reveals about historical experience in its relation to memory culture. *Rings of Saturn* is difficult to define in terms of its genre but can perhaps best be classed as a novel-cum-travelogue. It describes a walking tour or "pilgrimage" undertaken by the first-person narrator who may be roughly identified with the author himself (the original German subtitle means literally *An English Pilgrimage*). It is based on Sebald's own pilgrimage to various historically significant locations, and, as a travelogue, it provides its readers with the possibility of armchair tourism and their own virtual experience of history. As those readers quickly see, Sebald's personal encounters with particular places is informed by the weighty mnemonic baggage he carries with him, which makes him aware of the layers of meaning already attached to what he sees.

One of the many sites Sebald visited on his walking tour and later described in his book is the battlefield of Waterloo. As *Rings of Saturn* reminds us, the place called "Waterloo" is not only the original site of the famous battle; in the intervening two centuries, it has become a palimpsest of ever renewed attempts to recreate the experience of June 18, 1815, including multiple reenactments of the fighting. This means that Sebald's intimate encounter with the historical site is shaped not only by what he himself sees, hears, smells, and touches on the spot but also by his personal recollections of earlier stories about the battle that have been circulating as part of cultural memory. While Sebald is in many ways an atypical visitor to Waterloo, his singular account offers a valuable case study for demonstrating the interplay between cultural memory, media, and personal experience. Precisely because Waterloo was already memory laden before Sebald's visit in the

early 1990s, it is necessary to approach his text indirectly in what follows, through the many other accounts that preceded his tour of the battlefield.

Waterloo as memory site

It is by now generally recognized that cultural memory tends to become concentrated into what Pierre Nora has influentially called "sites of memory" (Nora 1989, 1997 [1984–1992]). There are common points of reference that, as such, become objects of recursive symbolic and affective investment as keys to identity (see also Rigney 2005). Building on Nora's fundamental insight, later scholars have highlighted the ways in which such memory sites come into being and are maintained, thanks to the interplay between different media, symbolic practices, and material traces. While the notion of "site" in Nora's account covers both symbolic "sites" (such as "Anne Frank" or the "Holocaust") and actual locations, in practice the symbolic and the concrete reinforce each other, with places playing a key role in memory dynamics. As Maurice Halbwachs already put it in his *Memoire collective* (1950), space "allows a group to organize its actions and movements in relation to the stable configuration of the material world" and, for this reason, places "can give us the illusion of not changing across time and of finding the past in the present" (1997 [1950]: 236). As more recent studies have shown, however, the meaning attached to places is entirely dependent on their prior mediation in a variety of cultural forms (Erll and Rigney 2009). Take an actual location like the Anne Frank House in Amsterdam: to step through the bookcase to the hidden room gives visitors a frisson of actually sharing the same space (and hence imagining they share the same time) as the family hiding from the Holocaust. However, that physical frisson of proximity is only possible because of the visitor's memory of Anne Frank's diary or its multiple remediations in theaters, on screens, and in photographs (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett and Shandler 2012). As a "memory site" in Nora's sense, Anne Frank has become the object of massive semantic investment that crosses different media platforms and modes of recollection, both the symbolic and the embodied.

In the case of such memory sites, success breeds success: once a site has emerged, it continues to receive excessive amounts of attention, generating ever new acts of recollection at the cost of the collective forgetting of other topics. While sites of memory like Anne Frank or Waterloo thus facilitate the sharing of memory, they also run the risk of becoming compartmentalized as canonical highpoints that are otherwise disconnected from the wider histories in which they are embedded. As we will see, however, a memory site's high public profile can also allow it to become a launching pad for undoing the amnesia that is the inevitable counterpart of the selectivity of collective remembrance.[3]

Although Waterloo does not figure in Nora's overview of French *lieux de mémoire* (1984–1992), not surprising given its association with a French defeat, it does provide a textbook example of a site of memory in the English-speaking world and, to a lesser extent, in the countries of the other victorious

armies. In line with Nora's definition of a memory site as a "minimum of signs with a maximum amount of meaning" (Nora 1997 [1984–1992], I: 36), Waterloo is a multilayered signifier. It marks a historical turning point, an actual location outside of Brussels, and a "portable" (Rigney 2012) symbol of victory that has been transplanted to multiple other locations across the former empire in the names of streets, towns, and railway stations. As a major battle concentrated in space and time, Waterloo has become the very epitome of "battle history" (Veyne 1971): the idea that history is determined by exceptional turning points and exemplified by them rather than by the rhythms of everyday life or slowly turning systemic change.[4]

That being said: both for contemporaries and for later generations, Waterloo has always been something of a paradox. It combines enormous historical significance with a rather featureless physical appearance. Thus, while its historical importance as a battle site has attracted generations of visitors eager to be physically on the spot where "it" happened and see it with their own eyes (Assmann [1999: 174] refers in this regard to the Antaean aura of actual places), they have discovered time and again that there is not very much to see (Figure 6.1). The historical significance of the site seems puzzlingly incommensurable with its emptiness – Victor Hugo memorably invoked the "mournful plain" of Waterloo (Hugo 1853), while Henry Crabb Robinson, who visited the site just a couple of months after the battle, noted: "A more uninteresting country, or one less fit for a 'glorious victory', being flat and almost without trees, than that around Waterloo cannot be imagined" (Crabb Robinson 1869, 1: 497; see also Seaton 1999).

Figure 6.1 Landscape at Waterloo with the Lion Monument.
Source: © Myrabella CC BY SA 30.

Waterloo clearly challenged the imagination of visitors and in various ways. The scale of the battle and the number of casualties made it difficult to comprehend: with an estimated 20,000 human fatalities, this was one of the bloodiest days in European history prior to the Second World War. As Philip Shaw demonstrates in his excellent *Waterloo and the Romantic Imagination* (2002), there was a strong sense that "Waterloo" was sublimely ungraspable. The challenges involved in trying to grasp it is one of the reasons for its rich cultural afterlife. Although it may have stood for history reduced to a single dramatic turning point (a single place, a single day), it was only barely imaginable in its size, horror, and import. Moreover, as contemporary accounts show, the visible traces of the battle in the immediate aftermath seemed but poor reminders of its nature and significance. For all these reasons, Waterloo exemplifies in an acute way the interdependence of cultural memory and imagination.[5] Recollecting historical events in which one did not participate directly requires an active imagination and a capacity to call to mind things of which one has no direct experience, only the prosthetic memory (Landsberg 2004) generated by books, images, and other media.

The imaginative challenges posed by Waterloo gave rise to multiple attempts to reconstruct the texture of the battle and how it was experienced by participants, on the basis of documentary reports and, especially, material remains. A case in point is the memoir written by Walter Scott in July 1815, just a month after the battle. Scott's milestone historical novel *Waverley* had been published a year earlier to great acclaim, and he would later be a key influence on the development of the experiential modes of remembrance so central to nineteenth-century memory culture (Rigney 2012). Although Scott had been eminently successful in evoking historical conflict in his fiction and poetry, he found himself at a loss when physically confronted by the material remains of an actual battle. His memoir invoked the overwhelming stench of dead men and dead animals but dwelt above all on incongruous details, the things he hadn't expected but that struck him all the more. He noted, for example, the many letters and other documents strewn across the battlefield, including a collection of drinking songs and a recipe for soup; he noted also how British soldiers were using the armor of a (presumably dead) French soldier as a makeshift frying pan; all of which were reminders of life in the midst of chaotic destruction (Scott 1816; Lee 2004: 74–104). These unscripted and often grotesque traces of battle seem to have generated for Scott what Roland Barthes once described as the "effect of the real" (1968): the power of details to seem closer to "real" experience because they escape the scripts with which we usually make sense of the world. In Scott's account of Waterloo, these random material traces mediated his experience, opening up a keyhole perspective on the unknown lives that lay beyond the standard account of the battle: the regular soldiers who fought, sang songs, fried their food, and prepared soup (Rigney 2015b). His sense of encountering history in the raw did not come from a feeling of being immersed "in"

the past, then, but from this combination of presence (material remains) and elusiveness (the momentous event that could now only be imagined).

Remediation and immediacy

The comprehension-defying chaos encountered by Scott and his contemporaries in July 1815 fed into a popular demand for augmenting the plain of Waterloo with textual guides (Shaw 2002). These proliferated in the weeks and months after the battle itself as thousands rushed across the Channel to see for themselves where "it" had all happened. In order to meet the ever renewed demand for a framework with which to grasp the event and overcome the imagination gap (and presumably also to support the local tourist industry), each generation of visitors ended up being served by new displays (Watelet et al. 2001). As a result, the battlefield has become a museum of mnemonic devices that give access and meaning to the battlefield but at the cost of also scripting it in limited ways according to the affordances of particular media.[6] The continuous invention of new mnemonic devices reflects the paradoxical interdependence of mediation and the sensation of immediacy as proposed by David Bolter and Richard Grusin (2000) in their influential theory of remediation. Briefly put: the use of a new medium (remediation) can paradoxically give individuals the sense of having an unmediated relation to the world because of the unfamiliar and sensorially novel ways in which the medium works; while remediation facilitates a renewed sense of immediacy, this effect will diminish once the medium has become too familiar.[7] As a result, cultural practices will continuously tend toward further experimentation with new technologies and modes of representation – as we shall see in the case of Waterloo.

The first among the mnemonic devices developed at Waterloo was the so-called Lion of Waterloo: the gigantic cone-shaped monument erected by the King of the Netherlands in 1823–1826 to celebrate victory over the French and ostensibly to mark the very spot where his son, the Prince of Orange, had been wounded (Figure 6.2). What makes this 45-meter-high monument interesting here is not so much the discrepancy between its gigantic size and the relatively modest contribution of the Prince of Orange to the defeat of Napoleon but the fact that this giant mound doubles as an observation point: it is an interactive device that allows people to "see" the battlefield. As such, it was a follow-up to several temporary observation posts that were used by early visitors (Shaw 2002). If you trudge up the 226 steps leading up the side of the Lion's mound, you can look out over the undulating fields and, with the help of a bronze guide to the landscape, imagine the alignment of the different troops 200 years ago. This is an artificial, literally engineered perspective, one that was not granted any single individual on the ground on June 18, 1815. It allows all subsequent visitors to see *more* than their ancestors did, while in other respects they see much less since the fields are now empty of the thousands of troops and horses that were once there.

Figure 6.2 The Lion's Mound at Waterloo.
Source: Photograph by Ann Rigney.

The second memory device at Waterloo worth mentioning here is the magnificent panorama painted by Louis Dumoulin in 1912, which was erected to mark the centenary and, still standing, is now recognized by UNESCO as part of world heritage. The Waterloo panorama is a very late example of a genre that had been developed in the late eighteenth century as a way of providing, through a new technology, a sense of immediacy with respect to distant places and past events (the Gettysburg cyclorama painted by the French artist Paul Philippoteaux in 1883 belongs in the same tradition). Panoramas were generally enclosed in a rotunda and took the form of a 360-degree painting that viewers accessed from a central observation platform. They were designed to give viewers a visually immersive experience, so intense indeed that they could imagine themselves as "there" while actually being "here". Already in 1817, a very popular panorama of Waterloo had been erected in Leicester Square in London, and it later toured the provinces (Shaw 2002), allowing people across Britain to become virtually immersed in the battle and to acquire as citizens a "prosthetic memory" (Landsberg 2004) of events of national importance.

Recent historians of the panorama have emphasized that the purportedly immersive quality of these experiential machines was actually limited (Oettermann 1997; Comment 1999; Oleksijczuk 2011). Their immersive realism

always supposed what Coleridge famously called the "willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic faith" (1965 [1817]: 169) since viewers standing on sometimes rickety platforms needed to keep the awareness of artifice at bay. As the genre evolved, moreover, visitors were more often than not offered "historical keys" on entering the rotunda, which meant that viewing involved alternating between text and image, immersion and interpretive distance. Although panoramas ostensibly offered viewers an untrammeled and nonperspectival experience of battlefields or of distant places (these were the two main topics of the genre), in fact they were helping, in conjunction with the keys provided, to turn viewers into imperial subjects who had internalized the putative position of the central command rather than the position of the foot soldier (Oleksijczuk 2011). It is unclear whether Dumoulin's panorama at Waterloo was originally designed with a textual key, but visitors nowadays certainly find interpretive aids inscribed in the viewing platform, while recordings of appropriately martial sound effects (presumably not there in 1912) complete the multimedial spectacle. As Figure 6.3 shows, the rotunda containing the Waterloo panorama is very much part of the battle site at the same time as it is hermetically closed off from it. As such, it is emblematic of the genre's potential to combine a fictive overview with the equally fictive assumption that a battle could be disentangled from the world around it and put on display as a momentous event standing both out of time and out of place (Presner 2004). The panorama thus vividly encapsulates the way in which sites of memory like Waterloo have a tendency, in attracting ever more attention, to become commodified and disengaged from their broader context.

Figure 6.3 The Waterloo panorama (exterior).

Source: Creative Commons license: © Zairon CC BY SA 40.

More recent mnemonic devices at Waterloo have included dioramas, a wax museum, audiovisual displays, and an annual reenactment of the battle on the part of several thousand, mainly British enthusiasts who experience the battle as a "day out" of the everyday.[8] The numbers of reenactors pale in comparison with the 200,000 or so men on the battlefield in 1815, suggesting again that the immersive experience of reenactment, however well supported by authentic uniforms and equipment, is also premised on a willing suspension of disbelief that temporarily keeps at bay the awareness of artificiality and the contemporary world.

Much more could be said about the ways in which the battle site has been represented over the years. But enough has been shown to map the mnemonic landscape into which the author of the *Rings of Saturn* wandered on a December day sometime in the early 1990s. W.G. Sebald came into an actual site that was heavily overlaid with its earlier mediations, including both the memory devices in the landscape just mentioned and, carried in his personal recollection as a highly read man, the cultural memory of Waterloo that had accumulated since Scott's visit in 1815.

Sebald's Waterloo

Sebald's four-page description of Waterloo in *Rings of Saturn* begins with a brief comment on the Lion Monument as the epitome of Belgian ugliness (its Dutch provenance apparently overlooked), with an ink drawing of the hyperbolic monument included by way of illustration (Figure 6.4). In a world where color photography has now become the norm, the black-and-white handcrafted character of the drawing is estranging, an effect aggravated by its just being plonked down in the text, Sebald style, without any subscript indicating a source. In the subsequent lines, Sebald goes on describe the desolation of the place, recalling the long tradition of reflections on the emptiness of Waterloo mentioned earlier. The only people around, we are told, was a "squad of characters in Napoleonic costume . . . beating drums and blowing fifes" (1998 [1995]: 124).[9] It is not clear who these characters are, but clearly this is an outsider's depiction of reenactment practices in the mode of estrangement rather than of enchanted immersion.

Sebald reserves his greatest attention, however, for the panorama, whose mechanics and structure he describes in great ekphrastic detail. His account also includes a black-and-white reproduction of a section of the huge colorful panorama, now confined to an oval frame and difficult to decipher (Figure 6.5). In his verbal reconstruction of the scene, Sebald evokes among other things the three-dimensional wax figures placed between the viewer and the actual canvas:

> [A]midst tree-stumps and undergrowth in the blood-stained sand, lie life-size horses, and cut-down infantrymen, hussars and chevaux-légers,



Figure 6.4 Drawing of the Lion Monument, Waterloo.
Source: © W.G. Sebald, reprinted with kind permission of the Sebald Estate.

> eyes rolling in pain or already distinguished. Their faces are moulded from wax but the boots, the leather belts, the weapons, the cuirasses, and the splendidly coloured uniforms, are to all appearances authentic. (1998: 124)

Having taken in the scene visually and walked around the painting, Sebald then reflects on the limits of the panorama as a mnemonic technology and indeed of any "art of representation" that attempts to be totalizing.[10] In doing so, he also demonstrates how language has an evocative power that, in some cases, may exceed that of the visual:

> This then, I thought, as I looked around me, is the representation of history [*die Kunst der Repräsentation der Geschichte*]. It requires a falsification of perspective. We, the survivors, see everything from above, see everything at once, and still we do not know how it was. The desolate field extends all around where once fifty thousand soldiers and ten thousand horses met their end within a few hours. The night after the battle, the air must have been filled with death rattles and groans. Now there is nothing but the silent brown soil. (1998:125)

While the panorama itself leaves the narrator dissatisfied, it does trigger his imagination and his memory. Turning from the visual stimuli around him, he closes his eyes to conjure up the battle and, in doing so, remembers Stendhal's *La Chartreuse de Parme* [*Charterhouse of Parma*] (1961



Figure 6.5 Reproduction of detail of the Waterloo panorama.
Source: © W.G. Sebald, reprinted with kind permission of the Sebald Estate.

[1839]). This notoriously ironic novel depicts the naive and romantic Fabrizio del Dongo stumbling through the chaos of Waterloo in search of his hero Napoleon, only to find him such an insignificant physical presence that he almost overlooks him. Echoing Stendhal's disenchanted representation of the famous battle, Sebald writes:

> Only when I had shut my eyes, I will recall, did I see a cannonball smash through a row of poplars at an angle, sending the green branches flying in tatters. And then I saw Fabrizio, Stendhal's young hero, wandering

> about the battlefield, pale but with his eyes aglow, and an unsaddled colonel getting to his feet and telling his sergeant: I can feel nothing but the old injury in my right hand.
>
> (1998:126)[11]

Sebald's text is both memory productive and memory reflexive, to use Astrid Erll's distinction (Erll 2011). Through his engagement with the panorama and Stendhal, he succeeds in producing a new memory of the battle that builds on a continuous train of transmission that goes back to 1815. At the same time, he also invites his reader to share in his reflexive distance vis-à-vis the various experiential technologies in evidence at Waterloo: from the straggling group of reenactors, to the panorama, to the gigantic monument in honor of a single prince. In this way, his memoir builds a critical feedback loop into the remediations of the battle, reflecting on the very desire to keep "experiencing" the same old event and to revisit the same self-enclosed site of memory. But in the process, as we shall see, he also broadens the framework within which his readers may conceive of "Waterloo".

Aesthetics and variation

Rings of Saturn may have had an autobiographical basis in Sebald's own travels, but it is also a highly wrought piece of writing, an artifice that demands we read it for "the literary", to recall Joan Scott's words. Comparison with an earlier journalistic version of Sebald's visit to Waterloo (Sebald 1991) shows, for example, how he rearranged details in his original account so as to highlight the panorama in the final version. As a literary writer, he enjoys poetic license, of course, and he uses this freedom from the disciplinary rigors that affect historiography in order to leave things out, to misinterpret some of the things he sees (for example, that the Lion Monument is a burial mound), and to mix and match his observations to particular effect. As my brief analysis has shown, he depicts Waterloo in an estranging way that renders the site grotesque rather than monumental. As the Russian Formalists famously argued at the beginning of the twentieth century in ways that resonate with the theory of remediation mentioned earlier, aesthetic experience arises in the encounter with an unusual or complex mode of representation which, in forcing readers to slow down and overcome ingrained habits, also enables a new awareness of the realities depicted in the literary work. Sebald's account of Waterloo, including his use of images, exemplifies such aesthetic defamiliarization (Shklovsky 1964 [1925]; Erlich 1965). Crucially, he uses these aesthetic effects to interrupt the chain of mnemonic transmission from 1815 to the present.

The distinction made by Paul Ricœur between "repetition memory" and "critical recollection" (Ricœur 2006, 2000) is useful here. By repetition memory Ricœur meant a constant return to the same old story that

continuously feeds back into received ideas and affects, into entrenched positions and familiar scripts. Critical recollection, by contrast, involves the opening up of new perspectives and frameworks that, among other things, help break through cycles of violence and grievance as embedded in inherited stories. With this in mind, Sebald's writing can be seen as a performance of critical recollection that uses defamiliarization both to challenge received ideas and to open up new perspectives.

The latter occurs in the final passages on Waterloo when Sebald's narrator describes how he, like so many other tourists, ended up in the café. For the first time, he encountered here things that were not a pre-scripted part of "Waterloo" and hence that trigger his imagination and memory in unexpected directions. He sees an old woman wearing fingerless gloves, obviously a habituée of the dimly lit establishment, who on being served "a huge piece of meat", stared at it for a while and "then produced from her handbag a small, sharp knife with a wooden handle and began to cut it up (1998: 127)".[12]After this graphic and apparently random detail that echoes the "reality effect" described earlier with reference to Walter Scott, Sebald then adds as his final word on Waterloo: "She would have been born, it occurs to me now, at about the time the Congo railway was completed" (ibid.). Having thus explicitly used the image of the old woman to link Waterloo to the notorious building of the Matadi-Kinshasa Railway (1890–1898) that cost thousands of African lives, Sebald's memoir of his travels in Belgium continues with more examples of his encounters with traces of colonialism. Through the literary artifice of a travelogue, Waterloo is thus brought into the same frame as the Congo rather than allowed to subsist as a discrete site of memory. Where the panorama compartmentalizes the battle and detaches it from the larger historical context, *Rings of Saturn* decompartmentalizes it, bringing it multidirectionally (Rothberg 2009) into conversation with another set of events from which it had hitherto been sealed off.

In this way, Sebald's Waterloo helps to turn an iconic memory site into what Michael Rothberg and others (2010) have called a "memory node" (*noeud de mémoire*): a point of departure for connecting one history to another. Its canonical status meant that "Waterloo" could help bring into the beginnings of public visibility forgotten or "disabled histories" – the term used by Ann Laura Stoler (2011) with reference to the overlooked entanglements between the history of metropolitan Europe and that of European colonialism.

If historical innovation is certainly fed by historical research that brings new information to light, *Rings of Saturn* shows how it can also be the outcome of aesthetic practices that help make forgotten histories the source of new experience. The cultural work done by Sebald's text is not a function of its veracity as an account of what actually happened to him in 1991, not to mention June 18, 1815. Its importance lies instead in how it engages the reader's senses and memory in evoking and reflecting on violence in its

various manifestations, from the old woman's small, sharp knife cutting into a huge piece of meat to the memory of the Congo and of Waterloo.

Envoi

"The history book on the shelf/Is always repeating itself", ABBA famously sang in their "Waterloo" (1974). The case of Waterloo demonstrates how mediation, memory, and experience are deeply intertwined in ways that need further exploration with reference to other cases. It indicates that future studies of historical experience should expand the current focus on individual subjects to take into account the ways their engagement with the past is informed by cultural memory and the media landscape that shapes individual perceptions of the world. It calls for more attention to be paid to the broader frameworks in which any experience of history is produced. In particular, Sebald's rendering of Waterloo shows how creativity and imagination help to ensure critical variation within what constitutes "the historical". The change introduced by *Rings of Saturn* is not quantitatively significant but qualitatively so. Like other forms of art, this literary work contributes in a small way to imagining the world differently and to broadening the public's horizon of expectations. It provides not new knowledge but a new framework for experience. In the end of the day, the more interesting question may not be how "history" is experienced but *which* history becomes the object of public attention and affective investment, and how that history can change.

Notes

1 *History and Theory* was founded in 1960.
2 The term "collective memory", recalling Halbwachs (1997 [1950]), is the preferred term among social scientists and highlights the social interactions at the heart of memory production (see Olick,Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Levy 2011). The complementary term "cultural memory" is preferred among scholars in the field of literary and cultural studies and serves to highlight the cultural constituents of shared memory and its transmission; for introductions to the field of cultural memory studies, see Erll and Nünning 2008; Erll 2011; Olick,Vinitzky-Seroussi and Levy 2011; Hagen and Tota 2015; Rigney 2015a; Cubitt 2018. This generic use of "cultural memory" differs from the more restricted use of the term in the distinction made (by Assmann 1997 [1992]; 1999) between "communicative memory" (face-to-face exchanges of personal experience) and "cultural memory" (the canonical narratives that emerge over the course of three generations and rely entirely on mediated communication).
3 On the entanglement of remembering and forgetting, see Passerini 2003; Ricœur 2006;Connerton 2008; Stoler 2011; Assmann 2016.
4 Epitomized by Jane Austen in *Northanger Abbey* as that "dull" history involving only "the quarrels of popes and kings, with wars and pestilences, in every page" (Austen 1923: 5: 108). On the cultural imaginary of battles, see also Runia (1995). As Seaton (1999) shows, the import of Waterloo was enhanced through occlusion of related battles on the previous days at nearby locations, which were

arguably also part of the final defeat of Napoleon. This sidelining of peripheral events so as to enhance the import of a central site of memory reflects the logic of scarcity governing cultural memory (Rigney 2005).

5 Imagination is a still underresearched topic in memory studies, though Huyssen (2000) refers to cultural memory as an "imagined past" and Keightley and Pickering to the "mnemonic imagination" (2012).

6 This part of the chapter has been informed by a rich array of studies relating to the mnemonic affordances of particular media, how they engage individual subjects while shaping shared recollections: photography (Hirsch 1997), film (Landsberg 2004), oral testimonies (Felman and Laub 1992), literature (Rigney 2012), memorials (Young 1993), performances (Taylor 2003), tourism (Sturken 2007), reenactments (McCalman and Pickering 2010), domestic interiors (Samuel 1994).

7 A comparable balancing act has also been signaled in narratology, with reference to the fine balance between immersion in a story-world and awareness of the use of media to depict that world; see Ryan (2001). While Bolter and Grusin developed their theory of remediation with reference to contemporary media, their account of the interplay between hypermediacy and immediacy echoes the Formalist understanding of aesthetics in terms of a 'slowing down of perception' that leads to a fresh look on the world (see Shklovsky 1964 [1925]); see also Attridge (2004) for a more recent version of this aesthetics.

8 For comments by Waterloo re-enactors on their experiences and motivations, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4110194.stm.

9 "Jedoch der völligen Verlassenheit wie zum Trotz marschierte ein in napoleonische Kostüme gestecktes Trüppchen unter Trommel- un Pfeifenlärm durch die paar wenigen Gassen" (Sebald 1995: 156).

10 "Das also . . . ist die Kunst der Repräsentation der Geschichte. Sie beruht auf einer Fälschung der Perspektive. Wir, die Überlebenden, sehen alles von oben herunter, sehen alles zugleich und wissen dennoch nicht, wie es war. Ringsum dehnt sich das öde Feld, auf dem einmal fünfzigtausend Soldaten und zehntausend Pferde im Verlauf von wenigen Stunden zugrunde gegangen sind. In der Nacht nach der Schlacht muss hier ein vielstimmiges Röcheln und Stöhnen zu hören gewesen sein" (Sebald 1995: 158).

11 "Erst als ich die Augen schloss, sah ich, daran erinnere ich mich genau, eine Kanonenkugel, die auf schräger Bahn eine Reihe van Pappeln durchquere, dass die grünen Zweige zerfetzt durch die Luft flogen. Und dann sah ich noch Fabrizio, den jungen Helden Stendhals, blass und mit glühenden Augen in der Schlacht herumirren und einen van Pferd gestürzten Obristen, wie er sich gerade wieder aufrafft und zu seinem Sergeanten sagt: Ich spüre nichts als nur die alte Wunde in meiner rechten Hand" (Sebald 1995: 159).

12 "Am anderen Ende der Stube sass eine bucklige Rentnerin in dem trüben, durch die belgischen Butzenscheiben einfallenden Licht. Sie trug eine wollene Haube, einen Wintermantel aus dickem Noppenstoff und fingerlose Handschuhe. Die Bedienerin brachte ihr einen Teller met einem grossen Stück Fleisch. Die Alte schaute es eine Weile an, dann holte sie aus ihrer Handtasche ein scharfes Messerchen mit einem Holzgriff und begann, es aufzuschneiden. Ihr Geburtsdaum, so denke ich mir jetzt, mochte in etwa übereinstimmen mit dem Zeitpunkt der Fertigstellung der Kongo-Bahn" (Sebald 1995: 159–160).

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7 Of arks and dragons

The power of entertainment in creationist historicity

James S. Bielo

> If history is, as it may be, a tyranny over the souls of the dead – and so the imaginations of the living – where lies our greatest well of inspiration, our greatest hope of freedom (since the future is totally blank, if not black) we should guard it doubly from the interlopers.
>
> – William Carlos Williams (1925)

In their introduction to this volume, Stewart and Palmié name the following as an organizing theme for a comparative inquiry into the varieties of historical experience: "the experiences people *in a given present* undergo in order to relate to the past as a significant and often affectively charged aspect of their current lives". Because relating to the past entails complex material and ideological work, we must analyze the processes of cultural production that generate such affectively charged bonds. As the editors observe, practices of "scripting, engineering, and staging" are revelatory as "techniques that produce, induce or otherwise conduce to the feeling of 'being in touch' with the past". In this chapter, I explore these processes by analyzing the creative labor of fundamentalist Protestants and how the relation to the past they produce seeks to undermine the authority of mainstream science.

The central ethnographic example comes from the creationist movement in the United States, namely the ministry Answers in Genesis (AiG) that is based in the state of Kentucky. AiG is certainly among the most influential creationist organizations globally and has successfully launched two fundamentalist attractions: the $30 million Creation Museum in 2007 and the $92 million Ark Encounter in 2016.[1] These sites of religious tourism, which AiG frames respectively as a "museum" and a "theme park", operate as forms of religious publicity. I borrow this term from anthropologist Matthew Engelke (2013) to mean the creative and strategic process through which religious actors seek to establish a presence in public life.

The religious publicity of creationists is a case study in historicity, a contested and contingent social process in which "versions of the past . . . assume present form" and are subject to social ratification and contestation (Hirsch and Stewart 2005: 262). Historicity is a dialogic field of practice

through which claims about the past are produced and invested with cosmological, political, and moral significance. Ultimately, I argue that the relation to the past produced through creationist publicity is best understood as a heterodox past pitched against the orthodoxy of mainstream science and performed through the register of entertainment. "Entertainment" holds a particular meaning in this analysis. Borrowing from anthropologist Peter Stromberg (2009), I understand entertainment as a particular species of play: a practice that allows consumers to become physically and affectively "caught up" in activities that transport them away from everyday reality (pp. 2–3). By staking their bid for authority in the strategies and imperatives of entertainment, creationist publicity seeks to persuade audiences to adopt their version of the past by appealing to experiential legitimacy as much or more than logical argumentation.

The case of creationist publicity highlights an enduring fact in the comparative study of historicity: the past is contestable and the defining of history a contentious process. This is the spirit of the opening epigraph from the poet William Carlos Williams. As social actors seek to claim legitimacy and authority for their version of the past and undermine the legitimacy and authority of competing versions, they work to "guard [history] doubly from [their] interlopers". The ambition of ministries like Answers in Genesis is power laden, always seeking to win the trust of multiple publics, garnering support for the creationist past over and against the scientific past. As the historian Raphael Samuel wrote: "History is not the prerogative of the historian, nor even, as postmodernism contends, a historian's 'invention.' It is, rather, a social form of knowledge; the work, in any given instance, of a thousand different hands" (1994: 8). Those thousand hands do not work in concert, which means the present hosts multiple historical narratives vying for dominance. Our anthropological remit is to understand whose hands are doing what and the sociopolitical stakes of the warring contest to elevate and undermine competing relations to the past. The creationist past may be untenable and dangerous from multiple standpoints (scientific, theological, ethical), but this does not keep the creationist publicity machine from churning. As anthropologists, we must understand how the creationist past is produced and how it figures in the broader fundamentalist project of seeking to win public loyalties.

The creationist past

Given the theological emphasis for many evangelical and fundamentalist Protestants on eternal salvation and the expectation of messianic return, this expression of Christianity is often described as a future-oriented religion. While futurity is not irrelevant for creationists, they are largely distinguishable by their persistent emphasis on the past; namely, a literalist reading of the Book of Genesis and a rewiring of geological and biological time to fit this literalist version of history.

The creationist past is one in which the age of the earth is roughly 6,000 years old, not the roughly 4.5 billion years observed by modern science. The Garden of Eden was an actual place. Adam and Eve were the first humans, a special creation of God and not the result of evolutionary processes. All animals, including dinosaurs, coexisted with humans in the Garden. A universal flood killed everyone on Earth except eight people, saved by an actual ark whose building was led by a man named Noah and his family. These passengers are the direct genetic ancestors for all modern humans. The biodiversity of today's land-dwelling animals is the result of microevolution from the limited number of animal pairs brought on board the ark, including dinosaurs. And preflood human lifespans were dramatically longer than today, Noah living to the ripe old age of 950. All remaining physical evidence from the past – from archaeological artifacts to writing systems – must then be placed within the roughly 4,400-year period following the flood.

This creationist account of the past has persisted in mostly uninterrupted fashion since the birth of the modern creationist movement in 1961 with the publication of *The Genesis Flood: The Biblical Record and Its Scientific Implications* (Whitcomb and Morris 1961). It circulated through publications, conferences, sermons, Bible study materials, and fundamentalist curricula, growing the movement's cache among conservative Protestants. Henry Morris, one of the book's authors and a hydraulic engineer with a doctorate from the University of Minnesota, cofounded the Institute for Creation Research (ICR) in 1972 near San Diego, California. The ICR served as an institutional hub for creationists, a center of cultural production organized around the moniker of "creation science" and the ambition of wresting authority away from mainstream science.

Creationist publicity

In 1994, three ICR employees set out to begin a new creationist ministry, Answers in Genesis. Their ambition was to build a more "populist" ministry, one that communicates more broadly, beyond the narrow register of scientific expertise. A primary goal with AiG's founding was to build a "museum" that would materialize the creationist worldview for a mass tourist public. In 2000, AiG purchased a 47-acre plot of land in northern Kentucky 20 miles southwest of Cincinnati, Ohio. The Creation Museum – featuring 75,000 square feet of facility space accompanied by an outdoor area with botanical gardens and petting zoo – opened seven years later. In its opening year, the museum attracted roughly 400,000 visitors and in its first ten years attracted roughly 2 million visitors (Trollinger and Trollinger 2016).

With the museum as its epicenter, AiG functions like other influential fundamentalist organizations – as an empire of cultural production (Harding 2000). They publish books and periodicals, coordinate a "creation

science" journal, produce films and radio programs, curate an extensive online library of resources, design Christian homeschooling curricula, host summer Bible camp retreats for kids, and organize creation science teaching tours on Alaskan cruises and Grand Canyon expeditions. The ministry's most recognizable face, Ken Ham, travels extensively to speak at churches and conferences, maintains an active weblog, hosts a daily online radio program, and is often asked to speak as a representative voice for creationists on major media outlets.

The religious publicity of AiG is defined by several interlaced ambitions. First, they seek to educate the public about creationism. This is essentially about circulating distinctive creationist claims grounded in a strict fundamentalist literalism, such as the historical coexistence of humans and dinosaurs. This basic ambition props up two further aims: to sow doubt about the authority of evolutionary science and to simultaneously bolster the legitimacy of creationism. This double-edged strategy of detracting and producing authority supports other political efforts of fundamentalism, such as changing public school science curricula and advocating against equal marital rights for LGBTQ citizens. AiG also hopes to create consumption spaces – both brick-and-mortar and digital – for pedagogy, devotion, and entertainment that provide an alternative to both mainstream science and nonfundamentalist Christianity. The Creation Museum, for example, provides a safe haven for committed creationists who are suspicious of evolution-based science and natural history museums. Finally, the religious publicity of the ministry is evangelistic. They seek to proclaim a fundamentalist Protestant message, hoping that nonfundamentalists will (immediately or eventually) experience a conversion to fundamentalist theology and politics.

Creative creationists

When the Creation Museum opened in 2007, it was not the first of its kind. More than 20 creation "museums" were already extant (mostly in the United States but also in Canada, England, and Northern Ireland). However, with its size, cost, mix of technology in exhibits, and professional design, Kentucky's Creation Museum established a new experiential benchmark in the creationist project of claiming cultural legitimacy. While Ken Ham has always provided the ministry's public persona, and certainly thousands of employees and volunteers have contributed to the ministry's efforts, the museum's design originated with the creative labor of a four-person team.

Throughout my fieldwork with the design team, colleagues, family, friends, students, and strangers asked me whether or not the artists themselves are creationists. They are, but this question is still instructive. Asking it implies an underlying question as to whether a creationist tourist attraction could be dreamed up only by true believers or if any hired hand could do the job. All AiG employees and volunteers are required to sign a "Statement of

Faith", which combines fundamentalist theology and Religious Right culture wars. The 29-point statement includes items such as: "The 66 books of the Bible are the written Word of God. . . . Its authority is not limited to spiritual, religious, or redemptive themes but includes its assertions in such fields as history and science"; "The only legitimate marriage sanctioned by God is the joining of one man and one woman in a single, exclusive union, as delineated in Scripture"; and, "Scripture teaches a recent origin for man and the whole creation, spanning approximately 4,000 years from creation to Christ".[2]

The design team – Patrick, Jon, Kristen, and Travis – signed this statement and are all committed creationists, but their biographies are not merely duplicates of one another. Patrick is the creative director. He joined AiG in 2001 to lead the production of the Creation Museum after working for several years as a theme park designer in Tokyo. Before Japan, his resume includes working on the 1984 Summer Olympics, the 1986 Statue of Liberty refurbishing, and Universal Studios' *Jaws* and *King Kong* attractions. As the creative director, his primary task was to manage the overall vision of projects, ensuring that every detail (e.g., landscaping, music, lighting) proceeded according to plan and fit into the whole. He has also been a primary "script writer", meaning he authors content for publicity materials, fundraising texts, and exhibit signage.

Jon was one of the first artists hired by Patrick when the production of the Creation Museum commenced. He is the team's lead illustrator, producing "concept art" that bridges the team's initial brainstorming and finalized exhibits. He grew up in Sao Paulo, Brazil, the child of missionaries, returning to the United States at age 18 to attend a Christian college. Before coming to AiG, he illustrated for a Christian educational book company and a non-Christian studio firm that contracted with major entertainment corporations like Milton Bradley and Fisher Price. After finishing the Creation Museum, he took a two-year hiatus from AiG to teach art at a fundamentalist college in Florida.

Kristen was hired in 2005, two years before the opening of the Creation Museum. She had returned to Ohio after completing a master's degree in theater design from the California Institute of the Arts, the private university founded by Walt Disney in 1961. Patrick hired her specifically for her expertise in spatial, building, and set design.

Patrick also hired Travis in 2005. He was 18 at the time and had just completed his homeschool education in Michigan. In lieu of pursuing a college art degree, he decided to remain with AiG. When Ark Encounter opened in 2016, he was 30 years old, his resume featuring the title of "lead production designer" on two major projects without any formal art training. His expertise is in sculpture and costume design. He is also the team's unofficial historian, most interested in compiling bibliographic references for depicting "ancient cultures".

When I first met the design team in October 2011, they had worked together for six years and developed a familiar, integrated dynamic. They did not spend much time together outside of work; all, for example, lived in different areas of the greater Cincinnati area, and none are members of the same church. Their working intimacy as a team emerges from their significant investments of time in AiG's projects. Routinely, they work cubicle-by-cubicle five days a week, eight to ten hours a day. During deadline-looming stretches, the hours are more grueling. In the months preceding the Creation Museum's opening, Jon recalled that they worked 17-hour days, often sleeping overnight at the studio.

In my interviews with the individual artists, each expressed deep admiration for the talents of their fellow team members. They spoke of themselves as being differently "gifted" and have learned to view their individual acumen as a "blessed" mix. Usually with a smile and a short anecdote, Jon, Kristen, and Travis would laud their complementary dynamic. Jon and Kristen see themselves as oriented more toward fantasy-inspired world making and pushing the imaginative envelope – being "out there" as Kristen once described it. Travis is also a fantasy genre fan, but he has more realist fidelities that owe to his interest in history. He is more conservative in his artistic imaginings than Jon and Kristen, more devoted to recreating how things *were* than how things *could* have been. This tension helps define their creative process and is one they understand to not be accidental. As Kristen phrased it during an interview: "I think that's why God put [Travis] with us. [God] planned for that, to have that balance".

Ark Encounter

With the success of the Creation Museum, AiG relied upon this four-member team to lead the conceptualization and design of the ministry's next major tourist attraction: Ark Encounter. Opened to the public in July 2016, Ark Encounter is a creationist "theme park" set on 800 acres of Kentucky rolling hills, 40 miles south of Cincinnati, 45 miles north of Lexington, and directly off Interstate 75. The park's centerpiece is a timber-framed rerecreation of Noah's Ark, built to creationist specification from Genesis 6–9. The ark contains nearly 4 million board feet of timber, stands 80 feet wide, 51 feet tall, 510 feet long, and features more than 100,000 square feet of themed exhibit space. Visitors progress through three decks onboard the ark filled with a mix of sculpted animals, Noah and his family in animatronic and static form, mural art, signage, interactive displays, multimedia exhibits, food vendors, restrooms, and children's play areas.

Ark Encounter's choreographed space elicits and encourages a fundamentalist gaze, a way of seeing that reifies creationist claims about the past and recreates the movement's ideology. Like other religious gazes, it "opens up the possibility of seeing what non-participants will miss or fail to recognize.

Belief is a disposition to see, hear, feel, or intuit a felt-order to the world" (Morgan 2012: 69–70). Walking the decks of Ark Encounter affords an embodied fundamentalist gaze, a material register of belief performed through aesthetically diverse media.

This fundamentalist gaze mirrors what anthropologist Susan Harding calls a "poetics of faith". She argues that the authority accrued and displayed by Religious Right leaders (namely, Jerry Falwell) is not merely a product of individual charisma, the power of the role being occupied, or something passively granted by devoted adherents. Authority, trust, and commitment are actively produced in an ongoing dialogical exchange between movement leaders and their religious public. Just as Falwell relied on a diffuse public to "close [his] gaps" (Harding 2000: 88), Ark Encounter relies on a visiting public to get caught up in the fundamentalist gaze. At the park, we see a walking poetics of faith in action. As creationist audiences move through the park, they are asked to participate in the experiential choreography, fill the intertextual gaps between literal scriptural history and the creative team's artistic imagination, and reconcile what critics dismiss as irrevocable scientific problems.[3]

Ark Encounter's central promise is that it provides a "life-like" window into a creationist-themed biblical past. Come and see the "full-size" ark, the "ingenious" systems onboard for housing and caretaking the animals, and the rooms for the passengers' liminal life during the storm: library, blacksmith workspace, woodworking space. Come and see how Noah and his family lived. The exhibit that pursues this promise most elaborately is *The Living Quarters* on Deck Three.

Several placards hanging next to the exhibit entrance explain what awaits inside, including an introduction to the eight characters. Consistent with the teaching style throughout the ark, these signs pose questions to aid visitors' imagining and present answers in the register of plausibility:

> Why are the living quarters so nice? Illustrations of Noah's Ark rarely give any consideration to the living arrangements for Noah and his family. What might their rooms have been like? Would they be simple, housing only the bare necessities, or would they have taken great care in building their rooms, just like they did with the rest of the Ark? There are many reasons to think their living quarters were quite nice. As far as we know, the Lord did not inform Noah how long they would be on the Ark, so the family would probably have prepared for an extended time inside the Ark. Also, they worked hard caring for the animals every day. Having a comfortable place to relax and refresh would be extremely beneficial for keeping up morale and energy for all the hard labor they faced.

Entering the *Living Quarters*, you walk by four rooms, one each for the four couples: Japheth and Rayneh, Shem and Ar'yel, Ham and Kezia, and

Noah and Emzara. The rooms are flush with minute details, from beds and cushions to replications of tools and mementos to busy, lived-in workspaces. They look cozy, a sufficient mix of necessities and creature comforts. For example, the first room features Japheth and Rayneh.

The details of each room pair with the imagined biographies. Rayneh, the sign explains, is "artistic" and "enjoys making crafts and adding some flair to their surroundings, such as painting intricate designs on pottery". A still, life-size figure sits on the floor, enacting the scene described on the sign, surrounded by artistic accoutrement. Her character portrayal opens further intertextual gaps, which visitors can close with their own imaginings:

> Rescued by Noah from a life-threatening situation when she was a little girl, Rayneh grew up around his family. She helped Japheth with his farming responsibilities, and the two eventually became husband and wife. She put her seamstress skills to good use during the Ark's construction, creating many of the clothes and tapestries seen on board.

The room also features numerous plant drawings and small potted plants, which mark Japheth's acumen. He stands in the corner playing a flute: perhaps delighting, perhaps annoying Rayneh with a tune. Overhead, flute music plays. The description imagines his talents and a character that is not one-dimensional:

> Japheth inherited Noah's adventurous spirit, although it is not very compatible with his agricultural work. Growing up around the Ark site has not afforded him the opportunity to explore, but he longs to set out once the Flood ends and has composed songs about these dreams. The oldest and tallest of the sons, Japheth excels in farming, just like his grandfather, Lamech. Because of this, Noah charged him with growing, preparing, and storing the food for the Ark. The plants in the room, the indoor garden, and the vast stores of grain, seeds, and nuts throughout the Ark provide evidence of his success in this area.

Just beyond the first two passengers' rooms are a series of common areas linked by the theme of food: garden, kitchen, storage, and dining. They look well stocked and appealing, brimming with brightly colored produce (all artificial) and ample supplements like streams of hanging garlic (also artificial). Display signs explain that Noah and his family were sustained by a vegetarian diet while onboard. One placard shifts registers twice, from a literalist proof-text to immersive detail and then to plausibility:

> The Lord said all foods that are eaten were to be gathered (Genesis 6:21). Noah and his family probably received most of their sustenance from foods that could have been stored for the many months aboard the Ark: grains, root vegetables, legumes, and nuts. Fresh fruit was likely

> not on the menu, but dried and preserved fruits may have been. Conditions during the flood blocked large amounts of sunlight, but the Ark's third deck would have still received some natural light. The large window would allow the family to grow a variety of vegetables and herbs throughout the top floor to supplement their diet.

Across from the garden display are the kitchen and dining room. In each, passengers are present to create an embodied feel for the space. Standing in the kitchen, Ar'yel "uses a mortar and pestle to grind tea leaves". As you stand by the exhibit, you hear Ar'yel at work. The orchestration streams down from overhead: she hums peacefully, even delightedly, while a knife chops vegetables methodically and scrapes them to the side. It is the sound of contended work. Meanwhile, Ham and Kezia work in the dining room to prepare beans for a meal. Signage explains:

> The table and benches in the dining room provide the perfect place for Noah's family to eat their meals. The family also gathers here for prayer, meetings, and games. Here we see Ham delivering a basket of vegetables as his wife, Kezia, shucks them in preparation for a meal.

Two subtle details aid the immersive play in the creationist past. First, all of the signage is written in present tense. Ham is "delivering" a basket; not he would have delivered, used to deliver, or any other such past or conditional formulation. Second, because we see Ar'yel, Ham, and Kezia here, we do not see them in their rooms. The eight characters appear only once on each of the three decks; after all, they could not have been in two places at the same time.

Exhibits affording visitors the chance to play in the creationist past are complemented by exhibits designed for playing in the creationist present. More precisely, visitors are invited to play in the creationist worldview, complete with their "enchantment of science" (Robbins 2012: 46) and assertion of a morally and spiritually threatening "secular evolutionist" conspiracy (Butler 2010). One of the more affectively charged exhibits to invoke the creationist present is the *Fairy Tale Ark* on Deck Two.

Approaching the exhibit, your visual field is immediately drawn upward to a series of animals lining the top of the entrance. They are certainly cartoon-ish, but they somehow exceed that description. In initial field notes, I described them as "zany, even slightly imbalanced or crazed", signified by the design of their eyes, facial expressions, and jumbled arrangement. The longer I stared at them, the more an unsettled, suspicious affect became possible.

Unlike some other exhibits, where a wooden rail bars visitors from entering the space, you must step into *Fairy Tale Ark*. Once inside the small room, there are two dominating features. The smaller of the two, positioned on the wall to your left, is a sign encircled by a bright red snake with a

dragon-like head. It reads ominously, dialogically voiced as Satan himself: "If I can convince you that the Flood was not real then I can convince you that Heaven and Hell are not real".

The primary display is positioned directly ahead, covering the entire wall. It is a collection of nearly 100 of Noah's Ark-themed books for children. Most are in English, though a few are written in Spanish and French. They are arranged neatly on six rows, interspersed with other ark-themed kids' toys and games, housed directly behind panes of glass. Two textual annotations frame visitors' reading of the collection.

First, three rows up from the bottom, a series of small books are lined side by side across. The design of their book form suggest an antique collection of fables, and they present the "7 D's of Deception". For example, "Destructive for All Ages" explains:

> The cute fairy tale arks are not only marketed to children, thousands of items featuring whimsical arks have been made for adults too. The abundance of these fanciful objects attacks the truthfulness of Scripture.

At the center of the display is a larger, again fable-looking book that is voiced in a rhyming, fairy tale register. It begins:

> Once Upon a Time, there was an old man of god. His name was Noah and his task was quite odd. One day, the Lord said to build a little boat, "Make it nice and cute, but who cares if it will float".

The cartoonish, fable-ish, and simultaneously playful-ominous aesthetic teaches a singular lesson. A literalist reading of Genesis – complete with an actual Flood, actual ark, and eight actual passengers – is lampooned every day by the ubiquitous circulation of "fairy tale" arks. This lampooning is no accident, but who is to blame? The snake-encircled sign suggests devilish agency. The bounds of responsibility widen in the text of "Discrediting the Truth", which identifies "many atheists and other skeptics" as directly culpable. The "abundance" of unrealistic ark representations targets children, impacts everyone, and is an orchestrated effort to undermine the authority and historical plausibility of literalist scripture. It is, in short, conspiracy. Here, a familiar fundamentalist refrain appears as a materialized effort to expose a core creationist claim: "the Bible is under attack". The assembly of childhood artifacts performs a creationist critical discourse analysis, coaching visitors how to decode the secular antagonism to fundamentalism that circulates throughout public life.

As with the *Living Quarters*, the experiential choreography of *Fairy Tale Ark* includes an auditory shift. When you enter the exhibit, the upbeat soundtrack from the hallway shifts to a different tune (playing on a two-minute loop). It reminded me of a dream sequence in a film, perhaps an animated film, where something terrible is about to happen. Interspersed

throughout the dreamy instrumental is the sporadic sound of children laughing. The volume of their voices steadily increases, and they transform from young children playfully giggling to teenagers laughing in mockery. The exhibit's ominous message of a secular conspiracy is enhanced by this eerily disturbing auditory annotation.

Immersion

Ark Encounter is, among other things, a $92 million testimony. It is missionization, massively materialized, performed in the key of biblical literalism. But the creative team understood their task as much more complicated than merely presenting the creationist message. First, they needed to address the historical plausibility of this biblical story and demonstrate that Noah could have built the ark described in the Book of Genesis. Using the exact dimensions detailed in Genesis and using only building materials that would have been available to Noah (timber, iron) were vital. Exhibits at the park illustrate building tools and techniques likely used by Noah, but the project's publicity materials repeatedly explain that contemporary construction technology (e.g., cranes) was unavoidable (e.g., to complete construction within the timeframe required by building permits, to be compliant with American Disability Act codes, etc.). This plausibility imperative captures a key cultural fact about creationists: they affirm and practice a literalist scriptural hermeneutic, which they must defend in light of historical challenges from both Darwinian science and biblical textual criticism.

However, for the creative team, plausibility alone was not sufficient. Noah's story cannot merely be told; it must be felt. Their goal is to create an affective consumer experience, one that works via the sensory channels of visitors (cf. Agnew, this volume, on "gooseflesh"). What was it like to hear the fierce storm outside? The cacophony of animals? To live on the ark day after day? And what was it like when the dove did not return? To see the rainbow and be the center of God's saving grace? An immersive experience promises to bridge the gap between the plausibility and believability of a creationist past, and the logic of immersive entertainment is the primary engine of the team's creative labor.

Be it Ark Encounter or a Creation Museum exhibit, the design team endeavors to create immersive environments where visitors can physically interact with fundamentalist teachings. The version of immersion the team abides by is less about total sensory overload and more about mobilizing sensory experience to establish a play frame in which visitors can actively participate. During an interview with Kristen, I asked how she would describe her role in the creative process:

> My role on the team is, I, if you know what an imagineer is at Disney. That's what we do. . . . We dream up, conceptualize an experience where we're trying to either one, tell the story, or two, teach something.

> Where we're concerned, we are wanting people to understand the Word of God in a simple and fun way so that it's not overwhelming or it's not something that they sort of turn away from because they can't understand it. Do you know what I mean? So, here, we're trying to create fun atmospheres. You start with an idea, a concept, a script and then you sort of flesh it out.

Creationist imagineers: this is the disposition the AiG creative team brings to their work of producing the creationist past. In doing so, they are appealing to the power of entertainment to stake their bid for cultural legitimacy and authority. Echoing scholars and pundits who have asserted that a demand for fun pervades modern life, Stromberg argues that our shared culture of entertainment has become "the most influential ideological system on the planet" (2009: 3). Understood as immersive activity, entertainment is indeed pervasive in late modern life. Its power is evident in the effects it exerts on our bodies and habits, such as what forms of activity we find compelling, preferable, enjoyable, and viscerally memorable. But the power of entertainment also extends to its colonizing effect on other institutions. It is not just dominant compared to other cultural forms; its techniques and values have infused other cultural forms. "As Darwin argued for the survival of the fittest, we now have survival of the most entertaining. . . . The entertaining politician gets elected, the entertaining class gets the enrollment, the entertaining car is the one that sells, and over time a competition emerges to enhance entertainment value wherever possible" (p. 8).

This echoes what Bryman (1999) called the "disneyization of society", in which Disney-style entertainment and leisure imperatives colonize other forms of consumer experience. Similarly, religious studies scholar David Chidester (2005) observes how Disney's influence has created a widespread imperative to "create imaginary worlds that evoke a thematic coherence through architecture, landscaping, costuming, and other theatrical effects to establish a focused, integrated experience" (p. 146). The Creation Museum and Ark Encounter exemplify how religious actors are not exempt from this new Darwinian contest. They have, in fact, embraced it as enthusiastically as any other cultural producer.

Dragon legends

Ark Encounter was first announced to the public in December 2010, with a planned opening date of summer 2014. However, fund-raising proceeded much more slowly than the ministry predicted. By late 2012, a little less than $10 million of the $24.5 million needed to begin construction had been raised, and the opening was postponed indefinitely. While waiting for Ark funding to materialize, the team worked on various smaller projects.

When the Creation Museum opened in 2007, a trademarked AiG teaching mnemonic filled the portico: "The 7 C's of History: Creation, Corruption,

Catastrophe, Confusion, Christ, Cross, Consummation". This alliterative theological shorthand condenses the past into seven pivotal events in creationist cosmology. Confusion to Christ moves from the Tower of Babel (Genesis 11:1–9) to the New Testament Gospels. Cross to Consummation elides the Acts of the Apostles and all of the Epistles. And, of course, closing with Consummation removes nearly 2,000 years (and counting) of human activity. These temporal jumps may seem jarring, but it works for creationists because of the literalist orientation toward the past.

The 7 C's remain an AiG trademark, but in the winter of 2012 the team explained to me that the ministry wanted a new portico exhibit to open the summer 2013 tourist season. The portico is a curving walkway, circa 90 paces, that guides visitors to the Main Hall. Its spatial position is significant. It is the first area that visitors consume at the Creation Museum, and it is free to consume since it is walkable without purchasing an entry ticket. The team was determined, as Jon phrased it to me one day, to "up the cool factor" while still establishing an interpretive frame for visitors entering the attraction.

The Creation Museum unveiled its newest addition over Memorial Day weekend 2013. Publicity materials for *Dragon Legends* used this teaser:

> Regale yourself with delightful artwork and other beautiful adornments as you stroll beneath extraordinary Chinese dragons in the museum's portico. Learn about fabulous encounters with these incredible beasts from China to Africa, Europe to the Americas, and Australia to the Middle East. Discover what ancient historians have written about these creatures, and examine armaments that may have been used by valiant dragon slayers. Why are there so many *Dragon Legends* from cultures around the globe? Why do descriptions of these magnificent animals often sound similar to what we call dinosaurs? How could our ancestors carve, paint, or write about these creatures if they have truly been extinct for millions of years? Evolutionists struggle to explain the intriguing evidence that people lived at the same time as dinosaurs. God's Word indicates that dinosaurs and man were created on the same day, so biblical creationists are not surprised to uncover clues that ancient man had indeed seen these beasts.

The critique of evolution is both subtle ("our ancestors") and overt ("Evolutionists struggle"), and the creationist blending of entertainment ("delightful artwork", "fabulous encounters"), scientific ("explain the intriguing evidence", "uncover clues"), and religious ("God's Word", "biblical creationists") registers is diligent and savvy.

How do creationists "explain the intriguing evidence?" Why do "dragon legends" demonstrate the plausibility of humans and dinosaurs coexisting? Their argument goes as follows. Specific dragon legends have varying degrees of truth, but all were inspired by real events. At some point in the

past, humans interacted with animals resembling the dragons of lore, which then became more fantastical over time through storytelling. The most likely candidates for that interaction are the animals we now call dinosaurs.

Creationists cite several biblical texts as historical evidence for this argument. They begin in Genesis 1 and 2, when all animals, land and sea, were created alongside humans. The literalist reading is that every animal we have any fossil evidence for must have coexisted with humans, including dinosaurs. From here, they go to the Book of Job 40–41. As God reprimands Job, chastising him for forgetting the vast gulf that separates human fallibility and divine glory, God describes two beasts. First:

> Look at Behemoth, which I made along with you and which feeds on grass like an ox. What strength it has in its loins, what power in the muscles of its belly! Its tail sways like a cedar; the sinews of its thighs are close-knit. Its bones are tubes of bronze, its limbs like rods of iron.
>
> (Job 40:15–18, NIV)

Then, there is Leviathan:

> Its snorting throws out flashes of light; its eyes are like the rays of dawn. Flames stream from its mouth; sparks of fire shoot out. Smoke pours from its nostrils as from a boiling pot over burning reeds. Its breath sets coals ablaze, and flames dart from its mouth.
>
> (Job 41:18–21, NIV)

Creationists interpret these texts to mean that these biblical beasts were both what we now call dinosaurs. They are examples of the creatures that humans saw, told stories about, and eventually became the stuff of elaborate legends.

This dragons-as-dinosaurs argument reproduces a lengthy tradition of creationist cryptozoology. For example, the legend of Mokele Mbembe, a dinosaur alleged to have existed in the African Congo as late as the mid-twentieth century, has been told and retold by creationist explorers (Loxton and Prothero 2013). *Dragon Legends* features a world map that highlights Mokele Mbembe alongside other cryptids, articulating the argument in a geographic register and reasserting its global relevance (Figure 7.1).

The dragons-as-dinosaurs argument marks a narrative shift that has occurred within the creationist movement. Creationists have transitioned from denying the existence of dinosaurs, waging that early fossil discoveries were evolutionist forgeries, to recognizing dinosaurs as preflood creatures to including them as animals that were included on Noah's Ark (Numbers and Willey 2015).

The dragons-as-dinosaurs argument has become a staple of creationist historicity. A version of this argument appears throughout creationist literature and in most creation museums.[4] Just west of Akron, Ohio, the Akron



Figure 7.1 Dragon Legends map at the Creation Museum.
Note: Photo by author.

Fossils and Science Center opened in 2005 after two years of construction. Family owned, this 4,500-square foot attraction features three rooms filled with exhibits. The second room includes a four-shelf bookcase, "Evidence of Dinosaurs and Humans Living Together", which presents examples like Mokele Mbembe as "evidence". Northeast of San Diego, California, is the

Creation and Earth History Museum. This attraction originally opened in 1992 as part of the Institute for Creation Research but was purchased by a fundamentalist couple in 2008 when ICR relocated to Dallas, Texas. The dragons-as-dinosaurs arguments appears in several exhibits throughout this attraction. A walkway connecting the entryway gift shop to the main "museum" entrance showcases several archaeological replicas, including demonstrated hoaxes such as the so-called Peruvian Ica Stones. Signage farther into the main exhibits reads as reminiscent of AiG publicity materials and invokes a logic of myth analysis that is more Joseph Campbell than Claude Lévi-Strauss:

> Almost every culture around the world has legends of dragon-like beasts. These legends are told as sober history, and seem to have some basis in fact. Descriptions of dragons remind us of modern-day reconstructions of dinosaur fossils. Anthropologists have noted the presence of similar myths in separate cultures demonstrates: 1) a similar experience; 2) a common origin for the cultures; or 3) both. Scripture tells us that all cultures, modern or ancient, have descended from those on the Ark.

Dragon Legends is the AiG creative team's imagineered version of the dragons-as-dinosaurs argument, conjuring a mosaic past through eight display cases stretched throughout the length of the portico, each separated by about 30 feet. The team's spatial design of *Dragon Legends* was intended to give visitors some experiential choice: one can choose to studiously examine all eight cases, leisurely inspect them, or quickly glance at only a select few. The cases mix explanatory text with material culture replicas, crafted by Travis, and colorful images, illustrated by Jon. The first four cases are dedicated to dragon stories recorded across historical space and time, claimed depictions of dragons in the archaeological record, and four eyewitness accounts (John of Damascus, Marco Polo, Athanasius Kircher, and Herodotus). The second four cases profile famous legends of dragons being slain by humans: ancient Romans, St. George, Beowulf, and frontier cowboys in the American West.

The imagineered nature of the team's aesthetic is most notable in the *St. George and the Dragon* display (see Figure 7.2). Here, the dragon is mammoth, towering over St. George and his horse. The narrative hero is thrusting his spear upward, piercing the belly of the imposing beast. Anyone familiar with typical artistic representations of this tale will be struck by the contrast. Depictions of St. George slaying the dragon are ubiquitous throughout particular places, such as the city of Bethlehem in the West Bank and in Ethiopian Orthodox churches. Invariably, the mounted hero sits above the creature, stabbing downward to pin the struggling animal to the ground (Figure 7.3). This dramatic contrast highlights the team's reliance on entertainment strategies for producing the creationist past.

Figure 7.2 One of four *Dragon Slayer* displays.

Note: Photo by author.



Figure 7.3 A typical, nonimagineered, representation of St. George. This example is from an engraved processional cross used by an Ethiopian Orthodox Church.

Source: Photo by author of display at the Yale University Art Museum.

Given this overview of the exhibit we can now ask: what was the team's creative process and labor for producing *Dragon Legends*? Through two examples, Jon's illustrative work and Travis's replica work, we see how these creationist imagineers work to generate an experience for visitors that blurs distinctions between biblical, geological, and biological temporalities. In doing so, they marshal the power of entertainment to bridge the gap between plausibility and believability.

"Go stylized"

An interview with Jon early in the design process helped me understand how the team negotiates historical accuracy and creative license in their art. We talked in his office cubicle while he worked on prototypes for panel designs. He was quick to specify the truth value of their work on *Dragon Legends*: "We're not saying [legends] are proof [of dinosaurs]. It's more, we're asking 'could it be?'" This rhetorical device of "just asking" works in tandem with the ministry's broader ambition to disrupt the presumed authority of evolutionary science by introducing alternative versions of the past into the field of plausibility. Jon continued: "[*Dragon Legends*] is a more playful, fun thing; just a fun, expressive way to tell stories". He contrasted this with their work on Ark Encounter, which he described as "hyper-realism", offering fewer opportunities to "go stylized". Yet realism still matters for *Dragon Legends*. Eyewitness accounts, as a form of empirical evidence, are vital for the dragons-as-dinosaurs argument. To bolster this element, Jon chose to depict all four eyewitnesses with quill in hand. Writing and its materiality function indexically, collapsing the epistemic divide between "legend" and the recording of an actual past.

Jon continued: the team's initial aesthetic approach was to use "a more classic" style throughout *Dragon Legends*, which he illustrated by showing me an image on his computer (Figure 7.4).

The team decided against this approach because the artistic style was too realist. For Jon, an overly realist style for *Dragon Legends* would require visitors to work too hard in the experience to discern "what's real and what's not". Their goal is for the exhibit to explain the dragons-as-dinosaurs argument in a "playful . . . fun . . . expressive" way, not for visitors to spend too much time parsing truth from fiction. As an alternative, they chose a style "akin to *The Secret of Kells*", an animated feature film released in 2009 (Figure 7.5).

The film is an adventure story set in eighth century Ireland. It fictionalizes the making of *The Book of Kells*, a lavishly illustrated copy of the four Gospels (c. 800). *The Book of Kells* is a significant artifact in the national history of Ireland, the Christian biblical tradition, and the Anglo-Celtic Insular art movement of the Migration Period (Dodwell 1993: 85).

The decision of which intertextual inspiration was right for *Dragon Legends* is instructive for understanding the team's creative process. The team regularly uses contemporary film animation as a model for their original designs. During interviews, Jon and Kristen both named animation

Figure 7.4 An example of the team's initial intertextual inspiration, which they discarded.

Note: Photo by author.

companies and individual artists as important influences on their creative development. Around the office, art books from Hollywood, Disney, and DreamWorks films (e.g., *Jurassic Park*, *The Prince of Egypt*) were constantly on the move between bookshelves and cubicle desks. In this case, it was not just any animated film. It was a film that portrays a time period resonant with *Dragon Legends* and the making of biblical artistry. By naming *Secret of the Kells* as the center of creative gravity, the team casts themselves within a venerable Christian tradition that integrates art, faith, storytelling, and representations of the past. It is significant, too, that the same stylized animation is used for both eyewitness accounts and legends. Not only does this provide a consistent aesthetic throughout the exhibit, it advances the experiential goal of connecting plausibility and believability.

"You know it when you see it"

As Jon worked on the display panel art, Travis worked on the material culture replicas for each case. In December 2013, I sat with him as he finalized the preliminary exhibit budget of $86,000 for approval. Intending a lighthearted moment, I asked if duties like making budgets felt like drudgery compared to his more creative work. "No". In fact, helping to craft the budget allowed him to "stay grounded" and not "dream too big". This was a refrain throughout my fieldwork with the team: precise financial limits are a primary determinant for establishing the boundaries of design feasibility. At creationist attractions, much like evolutionary science museums, practicality governs the spark of creativity.



Figure 7.5 An example of *The Secret of Kells* artwork displayed in Jon's cubicle as intertextual inspiration while he worked.

Note: Photo by author.

In late January 2013, I spent most of the morning sitting with Travis in his cubicle as he searched potential materials for the St. George display. His searching process was patterned. He began by typing a search term into Google Images, then read the Wikipedia page of the search item. Sometimes he proceeded to several other Internet sources or his shelf full of history books (most published by Answers in Genesis, but a few secular university and popular press titles were also mixed in). In one instance, he puzzled for several minutes over which cross symbol would most likely have adorned St. George's shield. He searched "Chi Rho", assessed the Wikipedia entry, and determined this was probably not the right cross. He also compared different helmets. The display cases do not have enough room for full armor, but Travis was certain that "a helmet will give a good character to the period". Eventually, he concluded that he would need to sculpt the helmet by hand because all the affordable replicas were wrong by at least two centuries. Here, twin imperatives structure Travis' decision making about how to craft the exhibit: avoiding anachronism and using a replica to index an actual past.

Given Travis's reliance on Internet sources, I asked how he "vets the credibility of different websites". His response contained six points: the best source for researching *Dragon Legends* is a rare book that costs $600 but that exceeds the project's budget; he never uses dates from sites that sell replicas because there is too much danger of misinformation; he is cautious when there is a lack of specificity in period marking (e.g., when "Roman" is not qualified); he does not prioritize. edu sites; he does prioritize reenactor sites; and, lastly, "I can usually smell out the fishy stuff . . . you know it when you see it".

Consider three observations about Travis's creative process. First, as with generating the budget, practicality and affordability structure creative and artistic choice. Full body armor would be more engrossing for visitors, but the size of the display case allows for only a few selected items. This means that his decision about which material culture replicas to include must be strategic with respect to the desired experiential effect. Second, Travis's preference for reenactor sites over. edu sites is revealing. The vast majority of. edu sites will likely be from an evolutionary standpoint, which ignites suspicion for him about the source's reliability. Reenactor sites are more diverse but more important for Travis in that he believes reenactors are extremely careful historians. Trustworthiness derives from immersive pickiness.[5] Third, Travis's intuitive-driven closing is not happenstance. A common habit among all four team members when discussing their artistry, even Jon who was most adept at this due to his teaching experience, was to highlight a basic ineffability about the artistic process. Not every creative move requires an explicit how-to rationale. Some things were just "cool", "interesting", or "fun", and some were just not. Some historical replicas just smell fishy, some just do not. Like religious experience and the miraculous more generally, artistry cannot always be distilled into a ready explanation.

Conclusion

As a cultural process, historicity is a social and ideological accomplishment that is achieved through material projects, such as attractions of religious tourism. In this chapter, I have examined the religious publicity of Answers in Genesis – namely, Ark Encounter and the *Dragon Legends* exhibit at the Creation Museum – to address some organizing questions. How do creationist imagineers understand and represent the past? How do they use material culture of various media and the strategies and imperatives of modern entertainment to craft historical narratives? These questions mark the cultural work of producing the creationist past, and they remind us of a key tension that animates historicity. The past is gone yet always with us through constant remembering, forgetting, and rediscovering – forever and densely mediated by the production of histories. In turn, the anthropology of historicity must address some consequential questions: how are different relationships to the past cultivated? What strategies and resources are marshaled in the production of historicity? And what is ideologically and materially at stake as antagonistic social actors contentiously compete to define the past?

Hirsch and Stewart observed that, "all history is ethnohistory since it is composed according to cultural principles" (2005: 266). Yet not all pasts carry equal weight in pluralistic societies. Pasts can be celebrated, decried, accepted as fact, contested, dismissed, and ridiculed. So, then, why is the creationist past not simply just another ethnohistorical variation, akin to numerous indigenous histories that diverge from scientific accounts, another thread in a beautiful tapestry of cultural diversity?

The answer is power and authority. Other pasts may differ from science, but they do not seek to undermine the legitimacy of science in the public sphere. They do not openly vie for the loyalty of public audiences. They do not create a zero-sum game, in which legitimacy and authority are construed as hanging in the balance. In the broader context of U.S. society, creationism occupies a heterodox stance to the orthodox dominance of science: a socially real intrusion on the "universe of possible discourse" (Bourdieu 1977 [1972]: 169). Ministries like Answers in Genesis simultaneously work to establish their own legitimacy while disrupting the accepted legitimacy of evolutionary science. Religious publicity projects like the Creation Museum and Ark Encounter are elaborate strategies in this contention for authority. Such attractions are creationist safe havens for consuming their versions of the past. They are protected spheres of a shared heterodoxy that is incongruent with and intolerable within mainstream science. Travis articulated this very clearly in our first interview. When I asked him about his artistic influences for creating representations of the past, he answered:

> The secular world owns probably 99% of all the material out there. So, you have to like reinterpret most of it. And, you've got all these years

> you have to, in a sense, compact into 6,000 years because that's, you know, my biblical worldview.

AiG seeks to edify and they hope to enlarge the creationist 1%. The Creation Museum and Ark Encounter are sites where reinterpretation, secular-to-creationist translation, reading between the lines, and other heterodox practices become unnecessary. In this way, their religious publicity is thoroughly dialogical, always pitched against the presumed cultural authority of science. Survey the cars in the parking lot on any given visit to the Museum, and you will likely find a popular AiG bumper sticker: "We're Taking Dinosaurs Back!"

A primary concern of this chapter has been the ways in which the AiG creative team appeals to the strategies and imperatives of modern entertainment in their effort to "take dinosaurs back". By producing heterodox spaces of religious tourism, their imagineering complements the more long-standing creationist strategy of targeting public school science education. This strategy began in force in 1973 when Tennessee passed a state law requiring "equal time" for scientific and creationist curricula (which was overturned two years later). A watershed moment came in 1981, when 20 state legislatures introduced "equal time" bills. Two of the successful bills, in Arkansas and Louisiana, eventually reached state Supreme Courts (in 1982 and 1987 respectively), where the courts sided in favor of science education. The 1990s featured new tactics: Alabama and Oklahoma legislatures required that an "only a theory" disclaimer be placed in evolutionary science textbooks; Alabama and Idaho adopted a supplemental textbook advocating for "Intelligent Design"; and Kansas removed questions about the Big Bang from state standardized testing. In 2005, split state decisions marked a continuing social and ideological division. The Kansas school board revived the "only a theory" disclaimer for evolutionary textbooks, while a U.S. district court in Pennsylvania ruled that teaching "intelligent design" in public schools was unconstitutional.

In short, creationist policy makers, lobbyists, and constituencies have spent nearly 50 years seeking to legitimize the creationist past and undermine scientific authority in the legally binding context of state legislation. Public education is, without question, a site of power and social struggle. The cultural critic Andrew Ross wrote that, "In the absence of a national religion or shared cultural traditions, the public school has long been held up as the unique source of American national unity. It has ended up serving too many agendas as a result" (1997: 38). This powerful valence of public education helps explain why creationist attempts to introduce antievolution and/or pro-creationist material into K–12 curriculum are so vehemently contested.

This strategy continues for creationists, which is illustrated clearly by *The Revisionaries*, a 2012 documentary film profiling ongoing creationist challenges to public education in Texas. What we learn from the religious

publicity of Answers in Genesis is that creationists are extending their ambition to other contexts, namely sites of mass tourism. In doing so, the task of representing the creationist past shifts from official educational standards to the media, aesthetics, and values of entertainment. Not only does this borrow from the broad appeal of Disney-style imagineering, it resonates with a wider pattern of deriving symbolic capital from immersive techniques. We see this in cases ranging from urban planning (Hannigan 1998) to restaurant dining (Grazian 2008), historical reenactment (Agnew and Rigney, this volume), heritage tourism (Magelssen 2014), participation in digital worlds, such as Second Life and virtual reality, and even global humanitarian consciousness raising.[6]

Immersive entertainment has proven especially influential for the field of museum education (Wallace 1996). A prominent example is the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C. (Linenthal 1995), which thoroughly enacts an immersive imperative. The museum's designers insisted that the architecture, not only the teaching exhibits, contribute to a particular affective experience. "It would have to communicate through raw materials and organization of space the feel of inexorable, forced movement: disruption, alienation, constriction, observation, selection" (p. 88). Numerous spatial and sensory strategies were choreographed toward this end: the use of "closed, blind windows"; objects historically associated with the Holocaust, such as canisters of Zyklon B; "intentionally ugly, dark-gray metal elevators"; narrow and crowded spaces; and distribution of a biographical card when visitors first enter the museum to transform the Holocaust from a mass, anonymous event to an individual, intimate experience (pp. 102, 116, 167, 171, 189).

Museums have not, however, uncritically adopted entertainment strategies and imperatives. In his book *Stuffed Animals and Pickled Heads* (2001), Stephen Asma goes behind the scenes at Chicago's Field Museum to ask how exhibit designers managed the dual imperatives of fun and learning and how they balanced the competing pressures of satisfying and educating consumers. He discovered a hesitant anxiety: "Many [curators, designers, and developers] were very concerned that the cost of some of this increase in entertainment might be a decrease in scientific content" (p. 15). This sentiment echoes a prescient worry voiced by Stephen Jay Gould (1993), one of the late twentieth century's most vocal and popular opponents of antievolution movements:

> Museums exist to display authentic objects of nature and culture – yes, they must teach; and yes, they may certainly include all manner of computer graphics and other virtual displays to aid in this worthy effort; but they must remain wed to authenticity. Theme parks are gala places of entertainment, committed to using the best displays and devices from the increasingly sophisticated arsenals of virtual reality to titillate, to scare, to thrill, even to teach. . . . If each institution respects the other's

> essence and place, this opposition poses no problem. But, theme parks represent the realm of commerce, museums the educational world – and the first is so much bigger than the second. Commerce will swallow museums if educators try to copy the norms of business for immediate financial reward.

While science museums closely police and worry over differentiating the categories of "museum" and "theme park", Answers in Genesis take a different tact. They meld these genres together in their religious publicity. The Creation "Museum" is full of theming, Ark Encounter is full of teaching exhibits, and visitors can purchase a discounted two-day pass to consume both attractions as a tandem experience. While science educators and museum professionals may implement the strategies and imperatives of entertainment with trepidation, creationists do so with gusto, bending the genres to perform their past and pursue their public ambitions.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Stephan Palmié and Charles Stewart for organizing The Varieties of Historical Experience conference in April 2014 and for their insightful readings of earlier drafts. Two anonymous reviewers also offered incisive feedback. At various points, Simon Coleman, Steve Watkins, Omri Elisha, Jeff Guhin, Joe Webster, and Jeb Card provided valuable readings of earlier drafts. Portions of this chapter are revised from a chapter published in a volume coedited by Card (*Lost City, Found Pyramid*, University of Alabama Press, 2016) and from my book, *Ark Encounter: The Making of a Creationist Theme Park* (New York University Press, 2018). My deepest debt is to the design team, who generously enabled my fieldwork and patiently endured my constant questions.

Notes

1 I use the term "creationist" as a shorthand to refer strictly to young earth creationism. This is a stylistic choice and is not meant to erase the variation that exists among historical and contemporary forms of creationism (Scott 1997). Over the course of 43 months (October 2011–June 2014), I tracked the creative labor of the design team in charge of conceptualizing and designing Ark Encounter. My primary forms of data collection were observing and interviewing the artists while they worked at their cubicles and recording team meetings. I also audio-recorded semistructured interviews with each team member and informal interviews with the artists as they worked. Because the offices were filled with concept art and other material culture items tied directly to their process of production, I relied heavily on fieldwork photography (with a cache of more than 750 jpeg images). However, I was not granted complete open access to the team's process of cultural production. Further, I arranged each fieldwork visit weeks ahead of time, and planned visits were canceled or rescheduled by the team on numerous occasions. Ultimately, I logged circa 125 hours at the design studio. The Ark Encounter

website was also a valuable data source, in particular the project blog that provided publicity-oriented updates on the team's progress and creationist arguments about the past. I supplemented this fieldwork and textual analysis with observations at the Creation Museum on numerous visits, observations at other Answers in Genesis events (e.g., the much-publicized Ken Ham–Bill Nye debate in February 2014), and observations at other sites of evangelical and fundamentalist religious tourism (e.g., the Holy Land Experience in Orlando, Florida).

2 Answers in Genesis, Statement of Faith, www.answersingenesis.org/about/faith/ (accessed July 10, 2018).

3 It is worth noting that evolution museums make a similar appeal. Stephen Asma writes in his history of science and natural history museums: "You must oscillate between knowing that it's a man-made construction and suspending your disbelief to enter into a play-along relationship with the display" (2001: 38).

4 The following examples are based on the author's field notes and photographs from visits in September 2014 (Akron) and April 2015 (San Diego), respectively.

5 The fact of social class position is also important here. Travis's affinity for reenactor sites over and against. edu sites inverts the class hierarchy in which elite professionals have more symbolic capital than popular performers. I thank Jeb Card for reminding me of this observation.

6 For this latter example, see cases such as crafting refugee simulations and *The Compassion Experience*, a touring immersive exhibit designed by Compassion International (Hillary Kaell, e-mail communication, November 2016).

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Hauntings

8 Bodies, artifacts, and ghosts

NAGPRA and the unsettling of settler colonialism

Cailín E. Murray

In the latter part of the twentieth century, Native American tribes and activists lobbying for the return of ancestral remains were provided a partial solution from the United States Congress with passage of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) of 1990. NAGPRA has been a battle fought on the larger fields of indigenous human rights and tribal sovereignty. It is an imperfect compromise for complicated issues that are in turn the product of historical entanglements. At its heart is the objective for institutions receiving federal funding to identify and return ancestral remains and associated objects to federally recognized tribes in the United States. In all, some 180,000 sets of human remains have been identified as subject to NAGPRA review. This number does not include human remains and associated artifacts held in the Smithsonian Institution (which repatriates under a different law), facilities beyond federal control, outside of the United States, or private collectors. After more than 20 years, about 27% of the eligible 180,000 individuals have been repatriated to tribes (O'Brien 2015: personal communication).

This chapter considers the ways in which NAGPRA intersects present-day concerns about ancestors, objects, spirits, and history. The desire to explore, disturb, and loot Indian graves dates back to the earliest periods of contact with Europeans and has continued throughout the history of the United States. At the same time, America's indigenous peoples have expressed concern for physical remains and the spiritual needs of the living and the dead from the time of contact. NAGPRA, in other words, is a recent story tucked within older narratives about encounters between indigenous America and other peoples of the world.

As an environmental ethnohistorian and indigenous studies scholar, I have participated in NAGRPA-related work with Coast Salish peoples in the Pacific Northwest and Algonquian peoples in the Great Lakes region. I will examine the impact of NAGPRA on how cultural differences surrounding the present and the past are negotiated and even "creatively misunderstood" as tribes and institutions "consult" with one another about NAGPRA. At the center of complicated efforts is the collision of distinct worldviews regarding what is at stake, why it is dangerous work, how

history remembers certain events, and who is responsible for the care of the dead. NAGPRA is a process that is ripe for the creation of a middle ground, and this is not unlike processes undertaken by indigenous peoples and Europeans in North America's past when faced with a mutual desire to operationalize shared goals in spite of cultural differences. Similarly, NAGPRA, as it is operationalized across the United States, is a modern-day example of the legal, social, and economic ceremonies in which Europeans and indigenous peoples engaged over the centuries in order to claim territory, resources, and authority, hammer out the details of their encounters, and bind one another to agreements.

From the beginning, both formal ceremonies and informal acts marked indigenous and European encounters. Spanish and French expeditions to the Americas began with what the historian Patricia Seed (1995) calls "ceremonies of possession". Through burying crosses, displaying royal standards, erecting pillars, piling stones, and making solemn speeches about possession and intent, the French, Spanish, and Dutch used rituals to legally state, mostly for one another's benefit, their right to occupy and acquire new territory. Rituals of possession were political and legal acts that enabled Europeans to occupy North American lands and acquire resources and objects for their use. The English took a different approach. Under English law, establishing dominion required them to build, occupy, and use permanent structures like houses, fences, and barns. Thus, to possess something in a tangible way, according to the English, was more or less to legally own it (Seed 1992: 190–192). Indigenous people, initially unaware of the deeper meanings Europeans assigned to their own actions, enacted rituals of their own whereby newcomers were often cautiously welcomed with gestures of hospitality and acts of curiosity like taking meals aboard foreign ships to learn more about newcomers.

Today, as tribes assert their sovereign claims to the bodies of ancestors and objects through the NAGPRA consultation process, they are engaging in "ceremonies of repossession", that are as politically significant for the future of their nations as those carried out by Europeans in the early modern period. Unlike early Europeans, however, tribes are working in accordance with federal laws and institutional partners to achieve their goals. The consultation process itself better resembles Richard White's (1991) middle ground. Just as seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europeans and indigenous trading partners in the Great Lakes relied on novel forms of diplomacy and ceremony to facilitate their cross-cultural economic relationships, institutions and tribes create new cultural forms to accommodate each other's understanding of what is at stake.

In the twenty-first century, the seeds of different European ideas about ownership, possession, and intent remain mitigating factors for NAGPRA. While the law clarified issues like the difference between institutional "control" (having legal interest with or without actual possession) and "possession" (having physical custody but no legal interest), it did not address

the deeper questions about why museums and universities came to believe they controlled collections of Native American human remains and objects. Why did they, for decades, determine how remains were stored, interpreted, viewed, handled, and used for scientific research? NAGPRA challenges these assumptions by stating that federally recognized tribes, Native Hawaiian organizations, and lineal descendants have rights to ownership, control, and/or possession of objects and remains to which they can prove cultural or family affiliation.

Demonstrating tribal cultural affiliation is a complex process, particularly with regard to collections initially deemed "culturally unaffiliated" and thus not included on early NAGPRA inventories. In 2010 the U.S. Congress expanded the law to include "culturally unidentified individuals" (CUIs) and "associated funerary objects" (AFOs). Tribal representatives with whom the Ball State University NAGPRA team was already working clarified that it was inappropriate to refer to these as "unidentified" or "unaffiliated" since most had never been subject to the formal NAGPRA consultation process. It is through this process of review, consultation, and identification that tribe's assert possible sovereign claims to bodies and artifacts. Within this process, consultation with tribes is the first step.

For institutions to invite tribes to consult requires several preliminary steps. These include educating gatekeepers in the institution about NAGPRA, competing for NAGPRA consultation grants to pay for the process, assigning personnel and allocating time, identifying all known collections subject to the law, and, if necessary, preparing them for viewing by tribal consultants. In the case of Ball State University, these preliminary steps kept faculty and staff busy for the first year. When we began holding consultations, we learned it was best to have tribal delegations take the lead. We enabled examination of remains and other cultural activities within the storage facility, chatted with tribal visitors around conference tables or in local restaurants, met their requirements for "respectful" storage of remains, accepted invitations to visit their communities and meet with leaders in Oklahoma, and began educating new generations of students about NAGPRA. These actions have become links in a chain that affirms tribal repossession of artifacts and bodies, along with the power to assert alter*native* visions and versions of the past.

Between the two regions where I have worked on NAGPRA claims, there are significant historical and cultural differences. What I learned in the Pacific Northwest, for instance, where settler colonialism arrived comparatively late and where small tribes occupy reserved lands located in or near their original homelands had little bearing on the lower Great Lakes. Here thousands of indigenous people were removed from their homelands and marched to Oklahoma and Kansas in the mid-nineteenth century. In the Great Lakes region alone, dozens of recognized tribes are located across several states, and each has possible claims to the CUIs and AFOs held by institutions like Ball State. It is possible that tribes will facilitate repatriation

of unidentifiable remains by developing intergovernmental agreements with one another. This has occurred elsewhere where affiliation of remains and objects to a single tribe is not possible.

So the realities wrought by the presence of artifacts and bodies held in storage facilities across America speak to broader questions that NAGPRA raises about indigenous human rights, the development of scientific praxis, the application of professional ethics, the nature of religious freedom, the meaning of history for all Americans, and the twin specters of racism and settler colonialism. The messy reality of NAGPRA is entangled with America's long and unresolved history. It is not surprising that this fulcrum of events continues to produce, for new generations, stories of disturbed burial grounds and spectral Indians. These are stories that haunt communities across America, from rural towns and reservations to large urban centers and from museums to the halls of the academy (Bergland 2000; Tucker 2007; Thrush 2007; Boyd and Thrush 2011; Landrum 2011).

Feeding these contrasting points of view is North America's troubled settler colonial history. Thus Trouillot's (1995: 4) insight about the disjuncture between "what happened" and "that which is said to have happened" suggests in twenty-first-century America, there remain versions of history that affirm rather than critique the triumph of progressive settler colonialism and the inevitability of the "modern" nation state. "Minority reports" pose legitimate alternate versions of America's history but may not reach majority audiences due to the numerical disadvantage of Native Americans and Alaska Natives, who comprise around 4% of the population (U.S. Census 2010). Even when indigenous accounts are heard, they remain in danger of being dismissed for their lack of documentary evidence or their departure from more orthodox interpretations. Many Americans remain unaware of the consequences that European curiosity and study brought to bear on Native Americans.

Beginning in the early modern era, exploration of the planet "inundated Europe with fauna and flora from around the world and . . . tales of people never before seen" (Bieder 2000: 19). By the Victorian era, collections of artifacts along with indigenous human remains, had found their way to private homes, cabinets of curiosity, public museums, and universities in the United States and abroad. The documented removal of these remains from their graves to museum displays, storerooms, boxes, and drawers enabled a new kind of necrogeographic site. First defined in 1967, necrogeography is a term used to describe "spatial and cultural dimensions of mortuary landscapes" (Matero and Peters 2003: 38). The term is used in the context of in situ preservation and research within historical cemeteries. At the same time, the systematically collected soil samples, mortuary artifacts, and human remains that are then labeled and separated into bags and boxes in a secular ritual familiar to anthropologists, along with the reams of associated paperwork detailing excavations and even institutional storage facilities themselves, are also necrogeographic sites. These are pieces of cultural

landscapes removed from their original context and redefined as "specimens" and "artifacts". Often located within subterranean spaces, many storage facilities are filled with the dead. It is telling that few Americans are aware these collections exist beneath their feet. While glossed as repositories of scientific knowledge and cultural history, these are also sites of interment. Even as these collections affirm the depth and breadth of Native North America, their presence in these particular contexts also reveals a primary goal of settler colonialism. That is to remove evidence of indigeneity from the American cultural landscape.

Thomas Laqueur (2015: 82) posits, "The philosophical, historical and anthropological record shows [humans] to be a species that not only lives with its dead but also is acutely aware . . . of their continued foundational importance". The power of the dead is both constructive and destructive. Generally left to dwell for eternity in places deemed proper and respectful, the dead serve as immortal reminders of familial, community, and cultural histories. Entire histories begin with the premise that ancestors remain interred in specific locales. On the other hand, to disrupt the dead by removing them from their graves is, in Laqueur's words, "the work of unmaking" (2015: 102–103). There is a long history in Europe of vandalizing and violating graves as an act of punishment against targeted populations. During the Spanish Inquisition, for example, to unbury and then publicly burn the remains of its victims was not simply a demoralizing act of violence, it was intended to annihilate claims to place, culture, and ultimately personhood. The removal of the dead at the scale this has occurred in North America is read by those who experience the severing of such tender ties to family, land, and history as an act of conquest or a declaration of war, no matter how well wrapped such actions may be in the cloth of objective scientific investigation.

By the nineteenth century, social theorists were using human remains as the foundation for a new science of race that inscribed inferiority on non-Western peoples, who were viewed as living fossils of earlier stages in human development. Despite the legal and moral claims indigenous peoples asserted concerning the security of their dead, even humane and forward-thinking ethnologists like Franz Boas used trickery to abscond with skeletons from a burial on Vancouver Island. "It is most unpleasant work to steal bones from a grave", he wrote with regret in 1888, "but . . . someone has to do it" (Thomas 2000: 59). By the twentieth century, thousands of remains had been collected and deposited in museums and university facilities across North America.

Historic narratives of mass murder, landgrabs, Indian removal, and stolen cultural patrimony belong to the structure of settler colonialism (Wolfe 2006), so the consequences of past actions and events retain powerful meanings for living tribal descendants. Unfortunately, the enchanting nature of this structure lies in its ability to render indigenous lives and histories as vanished and the consequences of colonialism mostly invisible to settler descendants. The American public is not well educated about Native American

history. The tangible links between the past and present are reduced to sad stories of defeated and vanishing tribes. This is all too often a pedagogy that presents Native North America only in the past tense, even though twenty-first-century American Indian populations are actually growing at a faster rate than the United States population as a whole (U.S. Census 2010). The tendency by lawmakers, educators, the cultural elite, and the general public to dismiss Native American cultures and history as "interesting but not very important" (Hoxie 2008: 1154) remains a concern. Yet even the least engaged individual has likely stumbled on one of the great ironies of invisible tribal histories – the ubiquitous trope of the Indian revenant. Few places in North America do not possess a story or two of haunted Indian burial grounds and the lingering spirits of vengeful chiefs.

Toni Morrison (1988: 11) states that "invisible things are not necessarily not-there". The ghosts of the past linger in the imaginations, stories, and memories of people. They have power even in their apparent absence to become "seething presences" (Gordon 1997: 17–18). The site of Wounded Knee on the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota, for instance, is a deeply haunted landscape for Lakota people. Reports of visions of the victims of the 1890 massacre are not uncommon (Landrum 2011). Indeed, traumatic stories of angry Indian ghosts work to reclaim places and the past. They offer potential alter*native* histories with the power to threaten the scaffolding of settler colonialism. From novels to television shows, Hollywood films, and Internet content, Americans are desperately haunted it seems by the returning dead of indigenous America (Boyd and Thrush 2011). That the descendants of settlers often share these "motifs of dispossession" with great relish and drama suggests that disinterred Indian ancestral remains and the ghost stories associated with them also serve as a form of entertainment that is devoid of critical engagement. Whether non–Native Americans seek to absolve themselves or reify the goals of manifest destiny by transforming "horror into glory", indigenous revenants can never fully be disentangled from the history of U.S. imperialism or settler colonialism (Bergland 2000: 22).

Besides those stories long associated with historic sites, there are also narratives about restless spirits wandering the halls and storage facilities of universities and museums – spaces of modernity charged with the primary responsibility of representing and interpreting America's past. Because NAGPRA is caught at the crossroads of the material and the sacred, it is a legislative process haunted by what is seen and not-seen, there and not-there. The differing and conflicting ways scientists, administrators, and tribal representatives understand that the "presence of absence" will influence the consultation process. It would surprise few tribal NAGPRA consultants, for instance, that museum guards of the Smithsonian Institution report being followed by disembodied footsteps at night while they make their rounds through collections of the dead (Landrum 2011).

While it is not necessary for institutional employees to embrace the ghostly realm as "real", it is important they accept that their worldview is also not the default position informing the process. One remedy is for collaborators to embrace the idea they are building something new together so that they can arrive at a mutual if not unsettling understanding of multiple viewpoints informing the process. Understanding how NAGPRA challenges rather than affirms the inevitable victory of settler colonialism with its roots in a historical narrative of righteous progress, should be considered. This cannot occur if collaborators rely on "the Master's tools to dismantle the Master's house" (Lorde 2007 [1984]: 110–113). New solutions born of sincere intercultural dialogues and collaborations means learning to speak of things seen and unseen, there and not-there, known and not-known. It is agreeing to work toward the goal of unsettlement by accepting how American Indian human and funerary remains came to inhabit museum and university storage facilities in such vast numbers. It is the acknowledgment of *how* and *why* artifacts and bodies came to be redefined as objects of scholarly study and the collective cultural property of the American people.

The removal of indigenous bodies from their graves was a common feature of European contact and colonialism that long predated nineteenth- and twentieth-century American science. As early as 1620, English settlers at Plymouth recorded the plundering of Native graves, along with the remarks of the sachem Passonagessit, who told of a ghostly visit from his dead mother. According to Passonagessit, she threatened to "not rest quiet" if these "thievish peoples" were not banished (Bergland 2000: 1–4). As Cherokee people were forced from homes and fields in the 1830s to be marched to barracks and then on to Oklahoma, a "lawless rabble" followed the soldiers tasked with removal. Almost immediately, "systematic hunts were made by the same men for Indian graves, to rob them of the silver pendants and other valuables deposited with the dead" (James Mooney in Wolfe 2006: 392). Along the banks of the Stilliguamish River in 1850s Washington Territory, American settlers, claiming lands that were ceded through hastily negotiated treaties, removed Coast Salish corpses interred in trees and tossed them into the river for disposal (Schiach and Averill 1906). Is it any wonder Boas chose to empty graves in the name of science, even though he found this personally distasteful? By the late Victorian era, there was nothing new about this practice.

Under the auspices of settler colonialism, Western constructions of history and racial difference, influenced by scientific modernity's disenchanted turn, conflated and then dominated how indigenous bodies as scientific, historical, and cultural artifacts were *re*presented for public consumption. In North America, the early science of racial difference included Samuel Morton's *Crania Americana* (1839), the compilation of a life spent sorting, analyzing, and comparing the cranial features of Native Americans with those of other "races".

Turning the pages of Morton's lifework, I come across Plate 30, a simple sketch of a human cranium that "belonged" to a Miami chief, "Captain Jim" of the Eel River village in Indiana (1839: 182). Dr. J.W. Davis of nearby Thorntown donated the cranium to Morton, including with it information about its provenance. Captain Jim was 45 years old when he died. He lived in "beautiful country" on the Thorntown Reserve along a tributary of the Wabash River. Captain Jim received his English name from white settlers who knew him for his courage and his success as a hunter, as well as "his uncompromising hostility to the *white faces*" (emphasis in text). He opposed the sale of Miami land to the whites. Captain Jim died in a knife fight with another tribal leader over the transaction. He and his adversary were buried side by side "with a pole bearing a flag placed between them". It was likely Dr. Davis dislocated Captain Jim's skull from his skeleton. What follows Davis's brief account are detailed measurements of the exterior and interior of Captain Jim's skull (1839: 183). It is unclear if the looting of his grave was further punishment for his efforts to prevent the sale of ancestral lands to white newcomers. Perhaps it was because, as Morton observed, many Miami people in the 1830s remained "uncompromising pagans" (1839: 181). It is likely Captain Jim's story of resistance joined the larger record of settler justifications for the removal of Miami people from the lower Great Lakes region in the 1840s.

During the nineteenth century, human remains were used to serve scientific research and training. Although the bodies of the elite found their way to dissecting tables, it was more common for the poor, the disabled, convicts, the Irish, and people of color, including American Indians, to become medical cadavers (Sappol 2002). For example, the Victorian era ethnologist and Indian agent, James Swan, who became the U.S. government's first salaried collector on the Northwest Coast, amassed a large collection of cultural objects. He also raided graves, following the directives of Smithsonian curators, who informed him of their need for human remains for comparative collections documenting "different stocks of the American race". Smithsonian officials warned Swan that Native peoples carefully guarded the remains of community members and encouraged him instead to collect from the graves of extinct or relocated tribes, war victims, and tribal slaves (Erikson et al. 2002: 45–46).

Following the American Civil War, the ethnologist Lewis Henry Morgan published *Ancient Society* (1877), in which he outlined his theory of cultural progress and social evolution. His theory related configurations of artifacts and cultural behaviors, like subsistence practices, to a three-part scheme of savagery, barbarism, and civilization. Morgan's views were among those that informed public policy and early scholarship of America's indigenous populations: that these were vanishing and primitive populations soon to be little more than memory (Thomas 2000: 36–49). Of course, "primitives" had ever only existed as imaginative speculations of earlier generations of Europeans and their American counterparts. Western "primitivism", as it

came to be depicted and debated by artists and intellectuals, pitted the "ills of modern society" against idealized forms of the barbarous and "'noble savage". Primitivism was a powerful trope "against whose specter embattled Victorian society reinforced itself" (Barkan and Bush 1995: 2). In the United States, nationalist zeal for American progress drove amateur collectors, scholars, artists, authors, and agents of government to "claim cultural ownership" of the American past embedded in its landscape (Buss 2011). Museums and universities quickly filled with collections of artifacts and human remains (Mihesuah 2000).

In time, passage of the American Antiquities Act of 1906, the National Park Service Organic Act of 1916, the National Environmental Protection Act of 1970, and the Archaeological Resources Act of 1979 were among legislation that formalized the federal government's obligations to the proper preservation of cultural, historical, and natural resources. However, in doing so, federal laws defined and continued to reify that American Indian human remains and material culture were "archaeological objects" to be excavated, studied, and stored for "permanent preservation in public museums" (American Antiquities Act of 1906). Not surprisingly, the emphasis placed on the role of archaeology "also encouraged generations . . . to view the archaeological record of America as their exclusive intellectual property" (Thomas 2000: 142).

The practice of disinterring indigenous bodies from their graves further diminished the claims of living tribal citizens to place and history by erasing signs of their previous ownership and occupancy. The lack of concern when Americans viewed displays of indigenous human remains in public museums, suggests a kind of historical amnesia and national desensitization to these practices. Furthermore, museums and universities held the power to speak about these remains. Unveiling the secrets of human anatomy and pathology positioned scientists as the "minds" best suited for the task of interpreting meaning from deceased individuals. The dead, on the other hand, were the "bodies", or the "medium through which meanings were generated" (Sappol 2002: 2). Settler colonialism, by appropriating indigenous land, artifacts and bodies, also claimed the power to define their meanings, replacing indigenous interpretations with their own.

At the same time, rather than dissipate, motifs of haunted burial grounds and Indian revenants entwined uncanny narratives of possession with colonial acts of dispossession. Indian removal was physically achieved through the relocation of the living to the margins of the "frontier". At the same time, it was intellectually promoted through the creation and distribution of national literatures like poems, fictional narratives, plays, scholarly essays, and historical treatises aimed at explaining and affirming the eventual extinction of indigenous peoples, their replacement by immigrants, and sometimes their lingering presence in the form of unearthly spirits (Bergland 2000; Buss 2011). Euro-American constructs of the Noble Savage included the disturbing figure of the angry or mournful Indian ghost, a trope that has

permeated American print culture from its inception and into the present. The disembodied spirits of the indigenous dead serve as the official mourners of the passing of their own age, even as their monstrous forms document the excesses of settler colonialism.

Settler colonial nations, however imagined they may be (Anderson 1991), are as real as the land, dirt, and water required for human survival and cannot be ignored. Yet, the violence inherent to settler colonialism, defined by Patrick Wolf (2006) as "structural genocide", is rarely fully or fairly recalled in official accounts of history. When I teach about settler colonialism in the United States, I am accustomed to teaching American students who have few opportunities to engage the grammar of "racial elimination" on which their country was formed. At best, most arrive with an uneasy sense that the past was unfair to some more so than others. Conversely, students struggle to see how the past links to structural privileges that grant unearned social, cultural, and economic assets to white America now (McIntosh 1988). It is critical for them to come to the awareness that this lacuna of knowledge is itself a product of settler colonialism.

Students I teach who are descended from Midwest settlers generally do not share or likely possess family stories that dwell on detailed accounts of how their ancestors either wrested wealth and property from indigenous control or received it at low cost following the removal of indigenous peoples by federal troops. Their stories of the past revolve around idealized accounts of the hard work and dangers involved with subduing a frontier "wilderness". Renee Bergland (2000: 7) argues "that modern nations were constructed in opposition to the darkness of a ghostly Other conceived within an imaginary geography of race, class and gender". In large cities and small towns, in museums, in historical societies and universities, and even in private homes, American citizens grew accustomed to the spectacle of dead Indians and anachronistic artifacts on display, often as the first stage in a visual sequence that culminated in their own familiar settler past. Viewing the remains of what came before them was a social ritual that affirmed American national growth and progress well into the twentieth century, a series of "before" and "after" cultural snapshots meant to instill pride specifically in settler colonial populations.

So, between the interstices of indigenous memory and the cleansing of official state histories, the dead linger as haunting memories in search of justice. Regaining control of human remains lost to unspeakable past events is part of the work accomplished in the larger process of twenty-first-century indigenous nation building. NAGPRA is one example of efforts to confront the past, restore dignity to the dead, acknowledge both the human rights and sovereign authority of indigenous nations, and, as a result, unsettle America's relationship to its past. On this new ground, the descendants of settlers and tribes come together to create something neither has quite seen before.

Performing diplomacy and the law in twenty-first-century North America

Performance in the "geohistorical matrix" of North America has been at the heart of encounter since the sixteenth century. Joseph Roach (1996: xi), in his elegant study of the circum-Atlantic world, states that to perform "means to bring forth, to make manifest, and to transmit. [It] also means, though often more secretly, to reinvent". Interactions between European and indigenous peoples were often defined through elaborate and reinvented rituals that commemorated new commercial, political, and social relations and transformed strangers into family or at least acceptable trading partners. In time, this middle ground invited hybrid performances, satisfying to all who contributed. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, on the middle ground of the *pays 'd'en haut* (upper country) or Great Lakes region, Europeans and indigenous peoples, with a fairly even amount of power between them, forged new beliefs and attendant rituals to facilitate diplomacy and trade in the wake of encounters. Because neither side dominated the other, they created an effective third space where they "depended on the inability of both sides to gain their ends through force" (White 1991: 52–53). In order to succeed, Algonquians and Europeans had to try to understand each other's perspective and "justify their own actions in terms of what they perceived to be their partner's cultural premises". It mattered less that these were often "creative misunderstandings" at best. What mattered more was that each side was willing to find the other's perceptions acceptable.

Western-trained museum and university personnel and tribal representatives are learning, as did fur traders of all nations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to define, cohabit, and perform within a similar third space to which each contributes but neither is entirely at home. Even though tribes have sovereign and legal authority to reclaim ancestors and objects, they must do so following laws of the U.S. federal government. Institutional personnel are required to collaborate with tribes but can use bureaucratic inertia to resist that process. So a middle ground or third space provides opportunities for something new and a site where each side asserts its understanding of one another, even in ways that may be inaccurate. What matters more is the willingness of both to accept each other's perceptions as valid and work together to bridge the gap between U.S. settler colonial society and sovereign indigenous North America. Questions about the power of the dead illustrate an example of how "creative misunderstandings" can help open dialogue. How do archaeological scientists understand indigenous perceptions about unsettled spirits inhabiting professional settings? How do tribal citizens perceive the secularity of science?

In this middle ground born of late twentieth-century lawmaking and diplomatic efforts, tribal citizens must come to grips with the fact that most of their institutional collaborators have not personally experienced spirits and do not allow that belief system to guide their decision-making. Many

also often assume that archaeologists and curators do not respect the dead, which may be true of some but certainly not all. However, what archaeologists or other scientists consider "respectful" may not be as evident to tribal collaborators and requires further explanation. During the first year BSU addressed NAGPRA issues, students, lab staff, and faculty worked tirelessly to locate, document, and rehabilitate collections.

Chip Colwell (2015), an archaeologist and an authority on collaborative research with tribes including repatriation issues, has written about complicated problems concerning secrecy in the consultation process. NAGPRA efforts can reveal uncomfortable truths about institutional practices. As a result of the practices in previous decades at Ball State, some remains and artifacts on the original NAGPRA inventory had never been formally curated in our facility or could not be located. At the same time, remains were also found in collections where they were not supposed to be present, requiring us to amend the original inventory. The NAGPRA team's solution was to search through every collection in order to document remains before relocating them into new acid-free boxes. Team members were completely transparent with the tribes, regardless of what this revealed about previous institutional practices. Explaining the problems we encountered and how we have resolved them has become a standard part of formal meetings with tribal representatives.

It is important for the NAGPRA team that tribal collaborators understand that, while they are in our care, current faculty, staff, and students are doing all we can, within our professional parameters, to treat ancestral remains and objects with respect. However, we have also worked with tribes to integrate their concepts of "respectful" storage with our own. One tribe, for example, asked that we drape the boxes in red cotton cloth as a form of spiritual protection. NAGPRA permits the use of funds for these kinds of purchases, and those boxes are now always draped with the red cloth. We also routinely alert female employees of childbearing age that some tribal citizens have instructed us to share that the work of handling human remains and associated funerary objects is considered dangerous to their well-being. While this has not resulted in any female employees opting out of their work assignments, we would accommodate any such requests and find other ways for them to contribute to the project.

For the most part, scientists and administrators, many of whom create barriers between personal religious beliefs and their work, must adjust worldviews to consider claims that the spirits of the dead inhabit museum exhibits, university corridors, and storage facilities. They misunderstand how their own ability to erect barriers between belief and science in no way lessens the danger angry spirits present for the people for whom this matters. However, even the well-meaning must acknowledge how the simplest acts of solidarity with the dead can be disrupted. In public institutions like Ball State, for example, rules are in place that interfere with ceremonial activities like the burning of sage sticks or tobacco to "smudge" or create smoke to

carry the prayers of the living into the various spaces where human remains and objects are stored. Smudging with tobacco, cedar, or wild sage is a ceremony shared by indigenous peoples throughout North America. Native North Americans typically use a bundle of dried plants that are tied together with twine. The smudging "stick" or bundle is ignited and contained within an abalone shell. The result is a smoldering ember that creates a plume of smoke. Sometimes smudging occurs with only one dried leaf of the sage plant and creates only a tiny bit of smoke. Prayers and songs specific to cultural traditions and individuals accompany smudging ceremonies.

BSU requested that I share a cell phone video demonstrating what smudging looks like, including how much fire and smoke are typically created, so they could make informed decisions. This created an ethical dilemma for me, as a professional and as someone who was married into a Native American family for 20 years. However, I reasoned it was for a just cause and made the short video so permission could be granted. Even though smudging has minimal impact, the facilities personnel still require the Department of Anthropology to post a staff member with a fire extinguisher outside the room where tribal representatives examine remains and sometimes conduct smudging ceremonies.

Compromises like these alter the smudging ceremony by providing newly invented roles for university personnel, in this instance to serve as facility gatekeepers. These roles held by university personnel did not previously exist in contexts where tribes are fully in control. Without our willingness to educate other university personnel or guard the doorway, the ritual of smudging could not occur on university grounds. It is not important that BSU personnel do not fully understand such rituals. It only matters that tribal collaborators and university personnel agree there is now a cultural congruence that enables collaboration to proceed. Like the middle ground diplomacy created out of necessity by seventeenth-century European and Algonquian traders, NAGPRA is producing new rituals and practices that do not completely belong to any one party. At Ball State, scientists and tribal citizens creatively partake in new ways to respectfully curate the remains of the dead even as they occupy a university storage facility and include archaeologists wielding fire extinguishers to enable indigenous smudging rituals. In both examples, NAGPRA has created a kind ambiguous and not always well understood third space born out of necessity that nevertheless evokes intercultural dialogues about spirits of the dead.

Conclusion: twenty-first-century spirits and the unsettling of settler colonialism

The postmodern and postcolonial critique of binary oppositions provides a theoretical alternative to embracing dichotomies of what is true or false, modern or traditional and past or present. In this sense, modernity is a series of complex negotiations that often "erodes simple oppositions between

science and religion [and] religion and rationality" (Saler 2012: 10–11). NAGPRA invites such boundary erosions. If it is too much to accept that spirits are haunting universities, storage facilities, labs, and indigenous communities, perhaps scholars and administrators tasked with NAGPRA consultations could use the metaphor of the middle ground to construct an imagined space for themselves where other experiences of the world retain significance and meaning. By imagining indigenous experiences of spirits as forms of indigenous historical consciousness, they create space for alternative beliefs that they may not share. The ability to imagine well is a kind of power. Imagining yields actual results.

Jill Grady has argued in the context of Coast Salish studies that anthropologists and ethnohistorians are often "situated between two domains. One is the non-Western domain of multiple realisms . . . existing outside of Western science, and the other is the domain of the Western black-and-white belief system of empirical truths". Furthermore, as she wisely notes, ghosts are confounding for everyone. Neither she nor the Stillaguamish elders with whom she consulted on NAGPRA claims were able to "adequately explain the appearance of ghosts" (Grady 2011: 291–293). This was also the case in 2005 when I collected similar stories from Klallam people conducting archaeological excavations at a historic village site on the Port Angeles, Washington, waterfront. And it remains true in the lower Great Lakes where tribal collaborators warn about the dangers spirits present for students, faculty, and staff of Ball State University. What can be done? Perhaps nothing. It is telling, however, that confounding experiences have not prevented descendants of settlers from uniting with Native Americans in activities aimed at quieting the dead – by joining prayer circles held at a historic Klallam village site to draping red cloth over acid-free boxes where Algonquian ancestors are interred. NAGPRA reveals unexpected doorways to new ways of thinking about the past and cause participants to "rethink our respective cultures' understandings of the situation" (Grady 2011: 293).

Spirits of the dead existed in indigenous landscapes long before the advent of intrusive and violent colonial encounters. They continue to do important work in the twenty-first century. Bringing them home for reburial helps to harness their power for restoring communities through the process of remembering the dead. But ancestors can also be dangerous when provoked, even when intentions are well-meaning. Thus, settler descendants must accept the assistance of tribal collaborators to accomplish shared goals. Participating in tribally approved interventions or by simply acknowledging their power in formal university meetings is an important way settler colonials can learn to honor and care for the indigenous dead. Doing so offers more than respect for tribes or opportunities for atonement. We do well to remember that learning the language of spirits "is an act of cultural survival" and, as such, represents a primary goal of our shared objectives (Grady 2011: 294). It is also true that some tribes are unable to safely repatriate remains due to the spiritual contamination the disturbed dead pose.

This is the case at Zuni, where the dead were "removed from a very sacred place that was never meant to be violated" (Lawson 2015). Others do not have adequate resources to rebury ancestors. If history begins with bodies and artifacts, then some ancestral stories are caught indefinitely between multiple historical and present-day realities. Even if they have been repossessed through the rituals and prayers in the twenty-first century, they will remain physically interred in storage facilities. Their presence will continue to unsettle those who occupy spaces haunted by the lingering consequences of settler colonialism.

NAGPRA occupies that slippery area of Trouillot spaces between "what happened" and "that which is said to have happened". It also is the hinge between scientific "facts" and indigenous counter narratives of "unspeakable things unspoken" (Morrison 1988). Is it any wonder, then, that NAGPRA collaborations so often lead to reports of spectral encounters or to concerns about unsettled spirits that require religious interventions? Even though stories of spirits sometimes invite deceptively simple comparisons like myth versus truth or belief versus fact, nothing is as it seems. NAGPRA, even as it seeks to redress past wrongs, does little to banish ghosts. If anything, it raises the possibility of specters in new ways. Stories of community hauntings and rituals performed to quiet the dead in unexpected spaces like museum and university basements are a part of twenty-first-century NAGPRA collaborations.

In 2011, Coll Thrush and I argued that North American ethnohistorians should "look past the narrative and discursive practices of colonialism, which have so often dominated the literature, to examine the praxis of resettlement: the everyday technologies, elite and vernacular, that make colonialism work, such as mapping, the law, violence and ecology" (Boyd and Thrush 2011: xi). "Everyday technologies" like federal law enabled both the excavation and relocation of human remains and objects of cultural patrimony for study and display, as well as the removal, relocation, and dispossession of indigenous peoples themselves. The related violence of these acts has often remained obscure for most Americans. While the powerful alliances among government, science, and industry is another fact of settler colonialism that indigenous people have been forced to absorb.

Ironically, twenty-first-century science, scholarship, and technologies are now facilitating the restoration of landscapes and the repatriation of objects and ancestral remains back to indigenous communities. Science and technology still exist, however, alongside the disquieted ancestral spirits that are also associated with institutional "sites of horror". Thus, the dismantling of empires is no less capable of raising spirits. Indeed, it is, in very real terms, a part of twenty-first-century colonial "unsettlement". There are tangible and uncanny links to be found between cemeteries, laboratories, and natural history museums (Edelson 2012: 76). The relocation of the skeletal remains of colonized subjects, along with objects from grave sites across North America, to institutions provided settler societies the technological

and scientific imperatives to label these as deviant and other by reclassifying them as scientific exhibits or curated property of the American people to be permanently stored as "collections". In these contexts, bodies and artifacts were transformed into "evidence" used to further locate indigenous peoples outside the stream of modernity. American history began, it was determined, with the arrival of Europeans. Everything prior to that was labeled "prehistory", a term still used primarily by archaeologists. Not only does the idea of "pre"-history distort the complexity of indigenous histories, it also suggests there is a clear boundary separating ancient bodies and artifacts from living indigenous peoples and communities. Until recently, this boundary was established, defined, and patrolled by mostly non-Native scientists and historians.

NAGPRA, as well as native and scholarly activists who question who produces and controls information about the past, challenges this normative praxis and effectively collapses the boundary between Native American "prehistory" and the United States present. As universities obtain consultation grants to deal with repatriation issues, students learn more about tribal sovereignty and the role of tribes in research, collections management, and public education. Students at Ball State, for example, work with staff and faculty on NAGPRA grants and interact directly with tribal collaborators. Students from BSU have joined faculty and staff for visits to the Miami Tribe's headquarters in Miami, Oklahoma. There they met with tribal leaders and citizens and with NAGPRA participants from other Midwest universities. For students studying Midwest archaeology, this was an excellent opportunity to learn more about living indigenous cultures. These students will be less likely to speak of Native Americans in the past tense as they enter their professional careers.

As constructive as intercultural dialogue is, NAGPRA underscores the diminished relationships that exist *within* tribal communities between bodies and artifacts and indigenous constructions of space, place, and the past as a result of the removal of human remains (Crawford 2000: 212). Museum and university personnel cannot address such dislocations. Deceased indigenous bodies, funerary objects, and the geographic spaces in which they rest serve as a source of identity by connecting the community to the ancestors and shared history. Even in cultures with strong prohibitions against the dead, ancestral remains are an important source of knowledge for the community as they delineate the boundaries between spiritually "safe" and "dangerous" spaces (Tuan 1979: 116). Therefore, the removal of human remains and objects deny subsequent generations of indigenous people access to critical sources of contextualized knowledge that is foundational to cultural and historical identity within living communities. At the same time, tribes involved in the NAGPRA process often express sincere concern for all humans in contact with the disinterred remains of their ancestors, viewing these as spiritually potent and dangerous materials.

Native American nations in the twenty-first century must sense the goals of anthropology and archaeology, past and present, work they often view as dangerous, even as they establish historic preservation offices, hire anthropologists, or encourage their citizens to earn formal degrees. Scientists, on the other hand, bear the burden of explaining the increasingly indefensible goals of settler colonialism that in retrospect often seem unbearably cruel and destructive. Native Americans do not and never did require Western scientists or scholars to reveal their history and culture to them. While fruitful collaborations between anthropologists, archaeologists, and descendent communities are becoming more common and should be pursued (cf. Colwell-Chanthaponh and Ferguson 2007), it is also the case that "Indians know the past because it is [already] spiritually and ritually part of their daily existence" (Crawford 2000: 214). Furthermore, "when archaeologists [suggest that] the Native American past is gone, extinct or lost unless archaeologists can find it, they send a strong message that Native Americans are extinct" (Zimmerman in Crawford 2000: 214). One obvious point is that many of the indigenous human remains collected have been curated for decades by museums and universities but never analyzed, calling into question the settler colonial logic and the ethics of their removal in the first place. Like spirits of the dead, the lingering legacies of historic contact zones underscore the slippery spaces between past and present, Natives and non-Natives, scientists and laypeople, and the living and the dead; their haunting presence endures.

In her recent book, *Ghost-Watching American Modernity: Haunting, Landscape and the Hemispheric Imagination* (2012), Maria Del Pilar Blanco challenges the view that ghostly hauntings are simply "past conundrums in search of closure". Instead she "champions a perception of these phenomena in literature and film as experiments in a prolonged evocation of future anxieties and extended disquiet in multiple locations of the Americas" (2012: 7). NAGPRA, as a political and legal reality, evokes this idea as it demarcates disquieting questions and anxieties about the future of ancestral remains, sacred objects, scholarship, and indigenous sovereignty, even as it aims to redress wrongs that have sprung from America's past. So discussions among collaborators about NAGPRA rarely remain grounded in past events or places. Inevitably, collaborators evoke present-day anxieties and fear regarding the future of tribal sovereignty, the control and dissemination of knowledge, the uncertainty of science and technology, the sustainability of settler colonialism, and the meaning of history itself. Each of these provides fertile grounds for the telling of stories. In all of this, perhaps paradoxically, ghostly hauntings remain "central to these struggles, even if they exist at the margins of legitimate political debate" (Boyd and Thrush 2011: xi–xii). Cross-cultural efforts in the Pacific Northwest (see Boyd 2011, 2009) and in the lower Great Lakes to interpret and enact complex federal laws "on

the ground" are also informed by emergent and ghostly figures from the disinterred past, which must, as Del Pilar Blanco insists, "be read in their specificity" (2012: 7–8).

The difficulties posed when indigenous remains are "out of place" have permeated my career for more than 20 years. Stories of spirits have followed me in the wake of doing social science research on the Olympic Peninsula and in the Great Lakes region. In 2005, I jotted down the words of a Coast Salish elder as he spoke at a healing ceremony conducted on the site of the Tse-whit-zen village (see also Valadez and Watson-Charles 2014). In speaking of the site, the elder stated that "archaeologists say the Klallam people *believe* [this] is a sacred site – not that it just *is*" (Boyd 2009: 714). His words paralleled the crux of folklorist David Hufford's (1982: 47) concept he calls "traditions of disbelief", or, "What *I* know, I know, what you know you only *believe*". The chasm between these differing positions on truth and knowledge summarized concisely by a Coast Salish elder is at the heart of my interest in NAGPRA and the haunting legacies of contact and conquest. Stories of the returning dead frame intercultural dialogues about the disruption of tribal communities through the excesses of settler colonialism. Invariably, indigenous narratives of the past include descriptions of atrocities against the living and desecrations of the dead. I attempt to understand their complexities and share what I have learned because these are the stories that haunt *me*.

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9 Competing roadways, contesting bloodlines

Registers of biopower at a lynching reenactment and a Confederate flag rally

Mark Auslander

July 25, 2015, saw two competing events on the roads of northeast Georgia. Civil rights activists marked the 69th anniversary of the Moore's Ford lynching, the killing of four young African Americans near Monroe, Georgia, on July 25, 1946. As they have every year since 2005, a multiracial group of performers staged a reenactment of the massacre and the events that preceded it, through a motorcade stopping at sites of memory, culminating at the small bridge where the victims were beaten and shot to death. Simultaneously, about 350 pickup trucks, cars, and motorcycles, most of them sporting the Confederate battle flag, participated in a Confederate Flag Rally, along the highways of Walton, Newton, and Rockdale counties. Both events started at 10:00 a.m. and began and ended at sites in Monroe about a mile away from each other. These parallel events help illuminate the racially charged politics of roads, motor vehicles, and flags in the era of #BlackLivesMatter, especially in the aftermath of the June 17, 2015, massacre in Charleston's Emmanuel AME Church. More broadly, they cast light on the deeply contested "biopolitics", in Foucault's sense of the term, of historical remembrance in the contemporary U.S. South.

One specific mise-en-scéne at the 2015 lynching reenactment encapsulates the linked, if contrasting, formations of "biopower" at stake in these overlapping events. At the conclusion of the reenactment, scores of attendees crowded around a horrific assemblage. The "lynched" bodies of four reenactors. drenched in red dye signifying blood, lay on a meadow, beside a black doll representing a fetus believed by the community to have cut out of the body of a pregnant lynch victim by Klansmen. Behind this assemblage, the "Klansmen" placed on a tree a large Confederate flag that reenactors had purchased that morning from a white supporter of the pro–Confederate flag rally. Many photographers worked hard to capture the bodies, doll, and flag in the same image. In this chapter, I unpack the many historical and ideological layers embedded in this potent montage, which emerge out of a paradoxically shared preoccupation in the American South, across the lines of race, over sexuality, sexual violence, and lines of cultural and biogenetic descent.

Historical background: race and roadways in the U.S. South

Long racially contested spaces, Southern roadways in the antebellum era were traversed by those escaping slavery and by slave patrols. From 1865 to 1871, white night riders, associated with the first Ku Klux Klan, rode on horseback intimidating African Americans, disrupting local Republican Party and Loyal League activities, preventing voting, and sometimes leaving the bodies of murdered African Americans along the sides of roads. In turn, anti-Klan activity during Reconstruction often protected streets and neighborhoods. Armed African American groups in Bennettsville, South Carolina, for example, organized protective street patrols (Foner 1988). In the decades following Reconstruction, white terrorists left lynching victims hanging by roads and railroad tracks. The national emergence in the 1910s and 1920s of the second Klan, structured as a national fraternal organization, coincided with the growing consumer availability of automobiles; mass public Klan processions featured Klansmen in cars, as well as on foot and horseback. A 1924 Klan motorcade in Denver even saw the state's Grand Wizard escorted by the city's police officers (Lay 1992: 56).

Car ownership represented enormous pride and expanded opportunity for many African Americans, but roads remained associated with racist danger from law enforcement and vigilante groups (Auslander 2014a). The Moore's Ford 1946 massacre involved an ambush by some 15 armed white men of two African American couples being transported by a white farmer in his automobile. The white mob dragged the four victims from the car, beat them, then shot them to death on a dirt road near a bridge crossing the Apalachee River. Following the killings, a motorcade of 50 vehicles, organized by civil rights leader Rev. William Holmes Border of the Wheat Street Baptist Church, traveled from Atlanta to Monroe to protest the lynchings and demand prosecution of the perpetrators. The case remains officially unsolved.

With the emergence of the third Klan, from about 1950, armed whites frequently drove through African American neighborhoods, at times firing shots. A July 1951 Klan-organized Mammoth Motorcade protested African Americans moving into the Carver Village apartment complex in Miami. Whites threw rocks from cars and shot an African American man (Lenox 1990: 41). A 1957 Klan motorcade in Monroe, North Carolina, attacking the residence of NAACP leader Albert E. Perry, met successful resistance by armed African American defenders, many of them veterans, through "disciplined gunfire" (Williams 1962: xiv). In July 1965, gunfire from the Deacons for Defense and Justice dispersed a Klan motorcade firing shots at African American homes in Bogalusa, Louisiana (Strain 1997: 43).

Roadways remained dangerous spaces throughout the civil rights movement. An 80-car Klan motorcade harassed the 1965 Selma-Montgomery voting rights march. A four-man United Klans of America (UKA) motorized unit assassinated white activist Viola Liuzzo in her automobile as she drove an African American volunteer back from Montgomery along U.S.

Highway 80 (Cunningham 2005: 75). Klan, Nazi, and white supremacist organizations used motorcades across the ensuing decades. In November 1979, an armed Klan and Nazi motorcade attacked a Death to the Klan rally in Greensboro, North Carolina, leading to the shooting deaths of four protest leaders.

It is important to emphasize that these struggles over Southern roads were highly gendered as well as racialized. The proximate inspiration of the second Ku Klux Klan in 1915 was the release of D.W. Griffith's *Birth of a Nation*, which famously depicted robed Klansmen riding to the rescue of an imperiled white woman, threatened by a black male ravisher. In November 1915, the Knights of Mary Phagan (including many perpetrators of the lynching of Leo Frank in August of that year) gathered atop Stone Mountain, Georgia, about 30 miles due west of Monroe, to burn crosses and inaugurate the new Klan. Klan motorcades, which often featured armed Klansman riding on vehicles' motorboards, often emulated the famous Griffith scene of rescue and presented themselves as safeguarding the virtue of white Southern womanhood against ostensible black male rapists. At the same time, it should be noted that, in African American memory, Southern roads are highly associated with accounts of sexual assault of African American women by white men, including law enforcement personnel.

The Moore's Ford lynching reenactment

Mindful of this historical context, as civil rights organizers associated with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and the Georgia Association of Black Elected Officials (GABEO) planned the first Moore's Ford lynching reenactment in 2005, they insisted on a motorcade. Following a commemorative meeting at First African Baptist Church in downtown Monroe, a caravan of vehicles toured sites in the county associated with the massacre: the farm where 12 days before the lynching the principal victim, Roger Malcom, had allegedly stabbed a white man, the jail where Malcom had been confined and then bailed out, the riverside ambush location, a roadside plaque commemorating the lynching – erected in 1999 and believed to be the first such commemorative plaque in the United States (Auslander 2010) – and finally back to "First A.B". for a fellowship supper.

At the time, organizers noted that the motorcade offered protection through potentially hostile territory (including the farm in Hestertown where relatives of the stabbed white farmer still lived). Nick, a local organizer, added, "Well, the Klan just loves their motorcades, hooting and hollering and brandishing their guns and their rebel flags. So we'll have a caravan too, telling everybody we're not afraid anymore. These highways and byways belong to us too. Nobody's going to stop us!" "Seems only right that we drive out there with our own cars", said Simone, another organizer, "and take these roads back, after these many years". Georgia state representative Tyrone Brooks helped arrange for state police and county sheriff escorts.

I once asked Nick, a longtime SCLC activist who helped organized the reenactment, why the ceremony had to involve driving for several hours across Walton and Morgan counties. Why couldn't we simply gather at the river's edge for the reenactment of the ambush and massacre? He explained:

> We need everyone to understand how our people truly suffered, what they really endured, all across this county. Can't do that in just one place. You need to be moving, back and forth, across all this land, all this history. So we stop, we drive on, we stop, and each time we stop, you see another part of the story, another stage in what unfolded here. That's why we need to drive together in the motorcade, together, following this story, all the way from its start, right to its finish. We're traveling together, through our history.

The next ten annual reenactments largely followed the original motorcade route. Through 2007, performers enacted the knife fight along the side of the road at the Hestertown site, as cars slowly drove by and some passengers got out to look around. Organizers decided this was too dangerous, since white residents might take violent action against what they might view as a provocative "invasion". A skit of the stabbing was moved inside First African Baptist for the audience to experience before the caravan tour. In 2015, the motorcade visited the three local cemeteries, burial sites for the Moore's Ford victims: Zion Hills (Mae Murray), Chestnut Grove (Roger Malcom), and Mount Perry (George and Dorothy Dorsey, brother and sister).

The 2015 reenactment included a new feature: an early morning motorcade with a church van and five cars proceeding from Wheat Street Baptist Church (on Atlanta's Auburn Avenue) to Monroe, reenacting the 1946 motorcade organized by Rev. William Holmes Border. As the vehicles in 2015 approached Monroe, they passed a roadside stand selling Confederate battle flags, for those attending the Confederate flag rally later that morning.

Confederate Flag Rallies since the Charleston shootings

Confederate battle flags (otherwise known as the flag of the Army of Northern Virginia or the St. Andrew's Cross) have been closely associated with automobiles since the flag's mass revival in the 1950s. As John Coski (2005: 126) notes, the first Southern 500 race in Darlington, South Carolina, in 1950 featured a Confederate flag logo, and the flag has been painted on innumerable stock car racing vehicles ever since. Small rebel flags have flown from car aerials and larger flags from pickup trucks throughout the nation for decades. In some instances, the flag has become an informal emblem of working-class white identity, often detached from specific, regional referents. It has flown as the backdrop for rock bands. The flag features prominently

in Klan, Neo-Nazi, and white supremacist activities and is flown by many whites who claim to disavow racist positions.

The tenor of the national flag debate dramatically shifted following the June 17, 2015, shootings of nine African Americans at AME Emmanuel Church in Charleston. That the alleged killer had extensively associated himself with the battle flag and white supremacist paraphernalia led to a long overdue consensus in the all but all-white Republican Party that publicly sanctioned displays of the flag should stop. South Carolina and Alabama removed the flag from state capitol grounds. Amazon, Walmart, and eBay restricted or ended sales of the flag and items bearing its image.

The weeks following the Charleston shootings also witnessed defiant private displays of the Confederate flag, from the back of pickup trucks and front yard masts. On July 18, the North Carolina–based Loyal White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan held a pro-flag rally at the South Carolina state capitol in Columbia. A July 12 rally in Octala, Florida, in turn, was "organized to support the Marion County Commission's decision Tuesday to return the Confederate flag to a historical display in front of the McPherson Governmental Complex", following the flag's removal after the June 17 Charleston massacre. About 2,000 persons participated in the 17-mile motorcade loop, which was led by a replica of the General Lee, the Confederate flag–emblazoned vehicle featured in the 1979–1985 *Dukes of Hazzard* television show.

On August 1, 2015, one week after the Monroe Confederate flag motorcade, many participants drove, proudly flying rebel flags, to Stone Mountain Park for a statewide pro-flag rally of about 1,000 people. There, many carried their flags to the top of the mountain. In so doing, many African American observers noted, the marchers reenacted, unconsciously or otherwise, the actions of the founders of the second Klan precisely 100 years earlier, at the summit of Stone Mountain.

In most cases, flag rally organizers deny that they are Klan or hate group affiliated, insisting that they are simply promoting "Southern Heritage" and "respect for our Confederate ancestors". Opponents of the flag, to be sure, regard it as a deeply racist emblem, akin to a Nazi swastika. There are many reports in the press and on social media of flag opponents and supporters getting into vociferous arguments. In a number of cases, passersby and activists have removed Confederate flags from pickup trucks or from masts.

The July 25, 2015, Confederate rally: Monroe, Georgia

In Facebook and other social media postings, the organizer of the July 25, 2015, flag rally denies any effort to interfere or coincide with the reenactment, a claim dismissed by supporters of the lynching reenactment, who interpreted the rally as "Klan-organized" attempt to intimidate civil rights observances. That year, the reenactment commemoration was scheduled to

begin at 10:00 a.m. in First African Baptist Church with presentations by law students working with Syracuse University's Cold Case Justice Initiative, reporting on their investigations into unsolved civil rights era murders, including the Moore's Ford massacre. The antilynching motorcade was scheduled to leave the church at 1:00 p.m., heading south along Route 11 toward the cemeteries. The pro-flag rally was also scheduled to begin at 10:00 a.m. sharp, at Fuzions, a bar and restaurant near the church; its motorcade was scheduled to leave the restaurant at 12:30 p.m., proceed just past First African Baptist Church and then down Route 11 (near the cemeteries, as it happened, where the victims of the lynching are interred). They completed a large circle through the region, heading west on Interstate 20 to Conyers, then cutting back along Highway 138 through Chestnut Grove and finally back to Monroe, where they gathered to celebrate at the restaurant. Most vehicles sported Confederate flags, at times paired with the U.S. flag or the "Don't Tread on Me" flag. Organizers claim that the pro-flag caravan stretched over 11 miles. State and local police provided escorts and blocked major intersections to ease the motorcade's passage. Of the approximately 500 participants, it appears that all were white, except for one African American man who terms himself a "black rebel". White supporters cheered the motorcade from front yards and waved rebel flags in support. Nearly all local African American residents stayed indoors as the motorcade roared by.

Organizers said they were raising money for the Barnesville Blues, the Georgia affiliate of the Sons of Confederate Veterans; a few Confederate reenactors dressed in gray uniforms showed up at the rally. An armed militia group, which calls itself "The Georgia Security Force III%" (GSFIII%), participated in the motorcade, providing "security", reportedly brandishing automatic weapons at times. It would appear that the Roman numeral "III" in the militia's title refers to the two amendments of the U.S. Constitution that they believe themselves to be upholding: the First Amendment (I)'s protection of freedom of speech and the Second Amendment (II)'s protection of the right to bear arms.

Rally organizers claimed they were celebrating "Heritage, not Hate". Nonetheless, the circuit taken by the motorcade echoed the racialized history of twentieth-century Georgia. African American residents recall multiple armed Klan motorcades on the roadway linking the towns of Walton and Social Circle, along the very route traveled by the 2015 motorcade on Highway 11. In June 1911, as is collectively remembered among the local black population, a mob of 300 whites removed the African American man Tom Allen from the Atlanta-Monroe train at the Social Circle depot and lynched him. Many recalled as well that in 1982 an African American man, Army Specialist Lynn McKinley Jackson, was found hanging from a tree in Social Circle; his death, although officially ruled a suicide, was widely regarded in the civil rights community as a modern lynching. (Indeed the 2015 reenactment motorcade specifically visited his grave, at Chestnut Grove cemetery.)

Soon after Specialist Jackson's death, an antilynching march, walking the 11 miles along Highway 11 from Monroe to Social Circle, was confronted by a robed Klan contingent in downtown Social Circle, under the town's lone stop light.

In turn, the stretch eastward from Covington to Porterdale and Salem saw dramatic Klan rallies and burning crosses through the mid-century period. In September 1941, for example, a Klan motorcade of 150 vehicles, led by robed Klansman on horseback, drove from Porterdale to Covington and Oxford, before returning to burn crosses in the Porterdale baseball field. Pamela, a relative of one of the Moore's Ford lynching victims, remarked on the 2015 flag motorcade:

> You know that they are just doing this to intimidate us black folks, making everyone stay indoors and off the streets. That was the whole point of the lynching back then in '46. The police came by that night of the lynching and ordered all the colored people off the streets. That's just what they are doing now. That, and trying to start a race war.

Others noted that as the motorcade proceeded from Covington to Conyers, it was precisely tracing, in reverse, an important segment of Sherman's March to the Sea in November 1864. As one African American man in Oxford put it, "Seems like they just want to keep running the clock backwards".

The 2015 lynching reenactment

As they prepared for the 2015 Moore's Ford lynching reenactment, participants stated repeatedly that "everything has changed, but nothing has changed". The recent string of deaths of African Americans at the hands of white police officers and white racists weighed heavily on everyone's minds. Many spoke of dedicating the reenactment to the memory of the "Charleston 9". When black and white reenactors entered the church sanctuary before embarking on the motorcade, they wore signs proclaiming their identity with the recent victims; "I am Michael Brown". "I am Trayvon Martin". Frequent mention was made of Sandra Bland's arrest and beating by a white police officer in Texas and her subsequent mysterious death in custody. Participants spoke of driving out to Monroe as a form of "time travel" that emphasized the painful synchronicity of past and present atrocities.

Two days before the reenactment, I heard a striking funeral eulogy by Rev. Hezekiah Benton of Covington's Bethlehem Baptist Church, an institution with close connections to the family of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and with many links to the organizers of the lynching reenactment. Taking as his text John: 21–25 – on the predicament of "Doubting Thomas", who had not seen Jesus's return with his own eyes and thus doubted the truth of the resurrection – Rev. Benton spoke of the martyred "Sister Bland". We are, he

said, all depending on the dashboard camera, but that is an insufficient form of witnessing. Real witnessing can only occur by human beings, joined in a united group, responsible to one another, just as the united Apostles (constituting the first church) were able to transmit to Thomas, within a locked room, the capacity to witness that which he had not seen. We are all obligated to look out upon the road ourselves, not just relying on the dashboard cam, to witness on behalf of Sister Bland and all our brothers and sisters. As congregants later explained to me, this was an admonition from the pulpit to join in the "witnessing" of the upcoming reenactment, to see with our own eyes the crimes committed upon the roadway.

Two days later, on the morning of the reenactment, drivers from Atlanta along Highway 138, including those reenacting the Wheat Street Baptist Church motorcade, saw an impromptu roadside stand selling Confederate battle flags. "So glad to see they are making us so welcome", one African American woman wryly remarked. "That's real Southern hospitality", her friend laughed. Two reenactors (one a Jewish man who has played a Klansman in most of the reenactments and an African American SCLC leader who was playing a beaten witness) decided to park and talk with the white flag seller. They chatted amiably with him about fishing, then, thinking the reenactment might want to make use of a rebel flag, they purchased one. A few hours later, the group decided to incorporate the flag in the reenacted racist speech by Gov. Eugene Talmadge, and then at the killing site itself, to drape it on a tree above the prone bodies of the four lynch victims. (It is highly unlikely the rebel flag was used in this way in 1946, but it was certainly an effective piece of agit-prop theater in 2015, pointedly linking past and present.)

During the two-hour program inside the church sanctuary prior to the motorcade, the reenactment organizers referred to the adjacent white gathering as a "Klan rally". Former state representative Tyrone Brooks, a lifelong SCLC activist, joked that he might just go up to them and "see if they need a speaker". Some attendees posted photographs of the flag-bearing trucks in an adjacent gas station on social media; if nothing else, the profusion of rebel flags and the heavily armed militia members, several people told me with a tight smile, added a sense of verisimilitude to the reenactment. For all the jokes, though, there was a distinct sense of anxiety in the air. Even with the presence of sheriff's deputies inside and outside the church, speakers noted that shots might ring out at any time. One urged former state representative Brooks and others to write down the details about the lynching investigation: "You could be gunned down by the Klan today and all your knowledge would perish with you". As we walked out of the sanctuary toward our cars to begin the motorcade, an older African American women chatted with me about the competing Klan motorcade and its armed militia. She held my hand and by way of encouragement, smiled and quietly quoted Psalm 23, "Yea, though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil: for thou art with me".

As it happened, the afternoon passed without incident. In 2015, the reenactment motorcade was led by a hearse belonging to the Young-Leavitt Funeral Home, a prominent African American firm owned by the granddaughter of Dan Young, the mortician and civil rights activist who had overseen the internment of the four victims in 1946, and who, over the years, kept alive the story of the lynching (Wexler 2003). As the roughly 60-car caravan wound its way forward, taillights blinking, it appeared to onlookers as a funeral procession. Some residents took their hats off, and many cars passing in the other direction pulled over in a sign of respect. In contrast to previous years, local whites shouted no racial epithets or threats.

At the end of the day, walking near the Moore's Ford Bridge, I chatted with Janet, an older African American woman. I mentioned that it seemed a little strange to have been part of mock funeral procession, 69 years after the killings themselves, driving along the roads where so much had happened so long ago. "But don't you see, 'she said gently,' "it wasn't just a reenactment, now, this time around. It really was a funeral procession, for all of them. For Trayvon, for Eric Garner, for the Emmanuel church-people. For Sandra. We're here today for all of them". Her young friend Alice concurred, "That's why we had to go to the cemeteries this year, to remember them all". Janet was quiet for a moment, then said softly:

> I didn't think I could take it, coming here today, especially now. But I'm glad we did it. Didn't let the Klan scare us off. People say nothing's changed, but it has, you know. We're here today, on this here road, together. They can't stop that, hard as they might try.

The pro-flag rally ended back at Fuzions restaurant, where there was a great deal of celebratory revelry, picture taking, and a raffle drawing. The reenactment group had been scheduled to go to a different restaurant, the next street over from Fuzions. But at the end of the day, hardly anyone felt like eating; many stayed at the memorial plaque along the side of Highway 78, talking quietly, sharing memories. Where would the road lead next at this moment of loss and of possibility?

Circuits of martyrdom: the fetus doll

Let us now return to the reenactment closing scene's juxtaposition of the "dead bodies", fetus-doll, and Confederate flag. I begin with the doll itself, which since the mid-2000s, has been the most controversial aspect of the Moore's Ford annual reenactment.

As I have noted elsewhere (Auslander 2010, 2013, 2014b), many local African Americans are convinced that one of the murdered women, Dorothy Dorsey (also known as Dorothy Malcom) was seven months pregnant, and that a Klansman carved the fetus out of her uterus and held it aloft before smashing it to death. Many historians have queried whether Dorothy

was in fact pregnant at the time of her death, and some have suggested that the narrative was derived from the 1918 lynching of Mary Turner in Valdosta, Georgia, in which, according to some accounts, a fetus was ripped from the murdered women. In any event, many African American activists campaigned in the early years of the reenactment for the fetus story to be included in the drama.

At the 2007 reenactment, a Klansman ripped out a doll, covered in red paint or barbecue sauce to simulate blood, and held it up. As the doll was held aloft, I heard an African American audience member cry out in anguish, "White man the devil". Another commented, "Worse 'n the devil". White feminist reenactors and organizers have repeatedly critiqued the use of this doll, in part because they fear that excessive focus on the fetus plays into local antiabortion politics, and the climactic position of this episode implies that the death of a fetus is a greater crime than the murder of adult women and men.

During 2008 rehearsals, the white woman director of the reenactment insisted that the doll be eliminated from the performance. Yet the night before the reenactment, Jane, the African American woman playing Dorothy, felt called upon to restore the doll in secret. She went to a RiteAid with her best friend Sarah and purchased materials to make a pantyhose doll, which she hid under her chemise, unbeknownst to nearly all her white coperformers. Immediately after the victims were "shot" and doused in fake blood, Annette, a white woman playing a Klansman, who was the only white performer to know of the doll's existence, felt moved to rip out the doll from under Jane's blouse and hold it aloft, for a frozen extended period, to cries of shock from the assembled crowd.

The episode was enormously painful for most of the white organizers and participants, who felt betrayed by the deception, and a number, including the 2006–2008 director, disassociated themselves from subsequent reenactments. At the same time, many African American participants found enormous significance and value in the fact that Jane had been moved to make the doll secretly and that Annette had, at just the right moment, felt called upon to enact the violent excision of the doll, in the face of condemnation by white participants. In Peter's words:

> OK. I'm sorry our white sisters felt betrayed. But part of me, just can't understand this. Maybe I'm just tired, you know? Why are we always having to apologize to white people for telling the truth? And this thing was true. So true, so big, that Jane felt called that night to make that doll, in spite of all the intimidation, all that pressure from white folks. This thing is just bigger than any of us, I'm saying. And even Annette, something moved right inside of her, made her do that thing that wasn't in the script, but which, God is my witness, the old folks tell us really happened. She's a white woman, and even she felt this thing, and had to do it right then.

For her part, Jane explains that the doll of the fetus is closely associated with her own late son, killed years ago in an urban gang-related shooting, and with other lost children across the generations. She has kept the bloody shirt in which he died and framed it to educate other young men of color of the horrors of violence within the community.

She notes:

> Each time I carry the doll – I call him "Justice", you know, I remember carrying my son, I remember giving birth to him, and nursing him, and bringing him up. And I remember when I lost him. I can't ever forget that. But when I'm standing there in front of that firing squad, it's strange, I feel other children inside of me. Like I'm Dorothy standing there, thinking on her baby. And other mothers before her, all the way back to slavery time. . . . All of us, all us strong black women, we're all standing there, with our babies, staring down that gun barrel.
>
> (Auslander 2013)

She insists, as do most of the African American witnesses to whom I have spoken over the years, that the single most important moment in the entire reenactment is the ripping out of the fetus and its triumphant display by a Klansman. In Cherise's words,

> In that one moment, you can see the true suffering of our people, across all the generations. That's why it has to happen, it can't be stopped, even when everyone agrees beforehand it isn't going to happen. Something has to intervene, so things will happen the way they're supposed to be.

Other black women involved in the reenactment noted that the fetus doll was especially poignant given the ambiguous parentage of the child. It is widely believed that Dorothy had been sexually involved (either consensually or nonconsensually) with the white farmer knifed by Dorothy's common law husband Roger Malcom. As Anna, an African American woman reenactor noted, "Just tells you how crazy those Klansmen could be; one of them could be killing his own flesh and blood, out of race hatred". Jane concurred, "That's the thing, one horror after another, everything we've endured, rape and murder and killing babies. That's why we need this moment, that's what the doll shows us, when Miriam [playing the Klansman] holds it up for everyone to see".

In subsequent years, this initially improvised gesture – the Klansman raising the bloody doll like a trophy – has been sedimented into the performance. In the 2015 reenactment, a plastic doll was encased in a plastic bag, representing the placental sac, and carried by Dorothy under her blouse. After the victims had been shot twice by the firing squad, the Klan Grand Dragon commanded, "Open that belly". A Klansman ripped open the bag in

front of a shocked audience and, holding up the bloodied doll, said, "How's this boss?" He then threw down the fetus in front of the prone bodies of the dead. The Grand Dragon praised him, "That's good, Johnny Joe. That's real good". Another Klansman exulted, "That's one less one".

The torn-out fetus can be read as a figuration of interrupted reproduction, poignantly evoking the centuries of sexual and reproductive violence inflicted on women of color from the Middle Passage onward. The triumphant line spoken by the Klansman, "That's one less one", exemplifies this genocidal imagery: violent white supremacy strikes at the very heart of the reproduction and continuity of African America. The doll's elevation in front of the crowd is a searing tableau vivant of terror and subjection, which for many participants and spectators sums up the entire collective horror of white racism. Lineage itself is undercut, again and again.

At the same time, the annual reenactment performance functions as a ritual practice that restores, at a mythopoetic level, the possibility of restored lineal continuity. The week before the 2008 reenactment, Tyrone Brooks, the reenactment's principal organizer, reported a repeating dream in which he heard a voice, which he believed came from the Lord, telling him that the unborn "Malcom baby boy" needed a name. "And that name, I was told, was Justice. Justice Malcom". He passed along this story to the print media and on radio and sermonized about it at the First African Baptist Church in Monroe on the day of the reenactment. "We now name this baby Justice, denied Justice in death, he is accorded Justice in the hereafter". Sarah and Jane were deeply moved by this dream-vision, which they explained help motivate their subsequent improvisatory elaboration of the doll during the afternoon's reenactment. The baby has been repeatedly referred to as "Justice" in subsequent reenactments.

In a broader sense, the reenactment occasions the restoration of a different kind of lineal continuity, the carrying on across the generations of a truth continually imperiled by white denial. In the words of William, a major organizer:

> That's why we're doing this, so our children, our children's children, will see how our people truly suffered. . . . The Klan, you see, doesn't just want to kill our bodies. They want to kill memory itself. We're witnesses here, keeping the story going, across the generations. Gotta keep on going.

Significantly, the doll itself is at times retasked in the interest of continuity and the intergenerational transmission of knowledge. At the conclusion of the 2010 reenactment, with hardly anyone watching, Jane quietly placed the doll on the front seat of the car, facing forward, so that photographers could have ready access to it. Significantly, she did not place it on the back seat, where the lynching victims had sat during the ambush, but up front, oriented toward a new future. The car and the doll, so deeply associated

with unbearable histories of pain, thus offered at the day' s close a way forward beyond the static position of timeless trauma, beyond abject victimhood toward redemption and rebirth. The car, historically a site of terror, is reconfigured as a nurturing incubator or womb. The polysemic doll, in turn, seems to encompass both the tragic figure of Christ on the Cross as well as the boundless promise of Baby Jesus.

As I have noted elsewhere (Auslander 2010, 2014a,b), the Moore's Ford reenactment is consistent with the imagery of the medieval mystery play, in which participants traveled across a sacred landscape centered on the mystery of Christ's death on the cross and His resurrection. The multistop motorcade of the reenactment recalls the classic pilgrim's journey along the Stations of the Cross, culminating in the climactic scene at Calvary. During the York mystery play cycle of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, in turn, performances spanned the entirety of Creation from Genesis to Doomsday. Participants traveled on specially outfitted wagons, periodically stopping to perform plays at designated sites. (The term used for these performance sites, "stages", was the origin of the theatrical term "stage".) The car in the lynching reenactment similarly functions as a mobile "stage", taking the living through a landscape that is simultaneously proximate and mythic, unfolding in sequence a cosmic drama of martyrdom and promise. This modern symbolism is consistent with a long-term analogy between lynching and Christ's crucifixion in African American sermons, arts, and letters; in Gwendolyn Brooks's classic couplet, "The lariat lynch-wish I deplored/The loveliest lynchee was our Lord" (Brooks 1960).

The Confederate flag

The Cross of St. Andrew in the Confederate battle flag similarly recalls the core Christian mystery of bloodshed and redemption; this symbolism was intensified during the post-Reconstruction "Redemption" era in the states of the former Confederacy, as the flag was used to mark the graves of the Confederate war dead. For its supporters, the flag's history is imbued with the noble "lost causes" of Scottish and Southern separatism, with the gallant struggle against overwhelming odds and repressive state authority, consistent with classic Christian themes of suffering in this world and everlasting triumph in the hereafter. In this sense, the day's deeply opposed circuits – the reenactment and the pro-flag motorcades – drew upon a common Christian iconography that is deeply resonant throughout the South.

In *Blood Sacrifice and the Nation*, Marvin and Ingle (1999) argue the American flag symbolizes, in a largely unconscious register, the apotheosized bodies of U.S. military personnel who have died in war. Material or symbolic assaults on the U.S. flag are therefore largely experienced as attacks on the sacralized bodies of the military war dead. In a similar vein, it would appear that, for its supporters, the Confederate battle flag functions as a mythic embodiment of the bodies or souls of their honored ancestors,

even when those flying the flag may not know their precise genealogical connections, if any, to members of the Confederate armed forces. During summer 2015, the decision to remove the battle flag from the South Carolina and Alabama state capitols was widely decried by white Southern conservatives as an "assault on our ancestors". In an intimate, tangible sense, the Confederate flag for thousands of its supporters is to be treated with the reverence due the remains of a fallen ancestor. Participants in the Monroe pro-flag rally insisted that they sought to bind together past and future. As one driver explained, "We are doing this for our kids, and our kids' kids. So they can stay proud of their heritage, and remember where they came from". Another noted, "That's what our kids are learning in school, that they should be ashamed to be white, ashamed to be Southern. We're trying to give them something to carry on, so they can hold their heads high".

The unexpected bricolage of the closing 2015 reenactment scene – integrating doll, spilled blood, and Confederate flag – thus suggests underlying commonalities across political aesthetics of the current so-called Heritage Wars in the contemporary U.S. South, across lines of race and manifest political allegiance. For diverse actors across the political spectrum, biogenetic lineage and cultural continuity are experienced as deeply imperiled. This sense of collective vulnerability is dramatized in the lynching reenactment by the fetus doll, cruelly ripped from its mother's womb and held aloft by the Klansman, and in the pro-flag motorcade by the flying flags, which, as the rally participants noted, are likely to be ripped off pickup trucks by flag opponents. Each side, in a manner reminiscent of Gregory Bateson's concept of schismogenesis, seems to need the other in order to reaffirm its own sense of deep and persistent persecution. How haunting, then, that as the two groups struggled for symbolic claims over the history-laden landscape of north-central Georgia, the most cherished symbol of white Southern martyrdom, the Confederate battle flag, was reappropriated into the reenactment's rendition of collective suffering by communities of color. These signifiers, so long at war with one another, thus simultaneously produce the tragic conditions of their origin and of their potential transcendence, producing both dreams and nightmares of lineal continuity through the valley of the shadow of death.

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Media

10 Iterative interactions

Old and new media inflections of the historical imagination

Ivan Ross

Unmediated access to past historical experience may be impossible, but perhaps nothing spurs fanciful thoughts of recuperating the irrecuperable quite like visual media, with their intriguing inscriptive processes and their capacity to prompt unanswerable questions about other points of view, other consequences, other actions taking place just outside the frame, just beyond a plane of focus, just below a film stock's exposure threshold, or just above a sketch artist's capacity to translate sensorial overload into coherent depiction. The reigning new media objects of each successive era have long provided historians a concise way to encapsulate just how reasonable they deem the task of historical representation to be. Here, I seek only to impress upon our own historical imaginations the key role visual media play in accenting these developments of historical thought. The word "iterative" in my title, then, doesn't really refer to the algorithmic substrates of digital media. Rather, I'm using the word "iterative" to suggest that popular media technologies do something to the historical imagination, and they do it over and over again, time after time. These media technologies, after all, foreground that tantalizing and ever present gap between having an experience and being able to relive and remediate that experience.

At the outset of *Narration and Knowledge*'s chapter on "narrative sentences", Arthur Danto extrapolates wildly from something Charles Peirce writes on the nature of time and lived temporality. He takes a statement from Peirce's "Letters to Lady Welby" – "Our idea of the past is precisely the idea of that which is absolutely determinate, fixed, *fait accompli*, and dead, as against the future which is living, plastic, and determinable" – and uses it to catalyze his own analysis of history's temporal conundrums. He writes:

> Consider the wild fantasy of the whole course of history going suddenly into reverse, like a film strip running backwards. After a time would come the sound "thgil eb ereht teL" and darkness would once again settle upon the face of the waters. The future would then be the exact mirror-image of the past, and there would be a rule by means of which an exactly corresponding sentence about the future could be found for

> every true sentence about the past. In such a case the future would be on an exact footing with the past in point of determinateness.
>
> (Danto 1985: 143)

Danto's cinematic flight of fancy here leads him to conclude that the past is no more fixed than the future. "We are always revising our beliefs about the past", he writes, "and to suppose them 'fixed' would be unfaithful to the spirit of historical inquiry" (p. 145). Having direct, eyewitness, unmediated access to the past is an insufficient and impossible aim of the historian, Danto contends. As Paul Ricœur similarly puts it in his own account of Danto's argument: "To talk about the whole of history is to compose a complete picture of the past and the future. . . . But there is no history of the future due to the nature of narrative sentences, which describe past events in light of subsequent ones unknown to the actors themselves" (Ricœur 1984: 144). Moreover, seeking to erase historical distance is antithetical to or even an outright obstacle to, the pursuit of historical knowledge. To know the past in any regard is to presuppose temporal distance from it, as the past cannot be adequately emplotted before the future reveals its consequences. Frank Ankersmit says this with the help of his own cinematic metaphor:

> Our most naive narrative realist intuition is that the narratio [that is, the story as a whole] should be seen as the verbalization of all the individual images of a film made of the past. Each individual image is, in this conception, the analogue of a statement and the whole film that of the narratio. . . . We forget, however, that the film-producer has very distinct ideas on what should and what should not be filmed. So what is filmed does not correspond to the actual past – as this variant of narrative realism suggests – but to a selection of the past.
>
> (Ankersmit 1983: 79)

Temporal distance between the historian and the event he or she seeks to depict, in other words, permits that historian a finely honed narrative. This narrative resembles not merely a ledger of unconnected events but, as Ankersmit puts it, a "picture of the past", such that every detail contributes to the overall picture.

More often than not, media technologies assume the role of predicate in these metaphors for historical knowledge. That is, they become the thing put in service of a subject in order to create a more vivid mental picture of that subject – in this case, history. Each era's respective new media provide historians the predicates of their metaphors: history is photographic, history is cinematic, history is panoramic, history is phantasmagoric. The stereoscope, for instance, has remained a common predicate for media metaphors from its invention to the present day. What many call "postmodern history" – a concern both for narrating the past and narrating the act of narrating the past – Stephen Bann characterizes as a sort of "stereoscopic double vision"

(Bann 1995: 195–211). He says postmodern historical vision presents "a condition in which two states of focus are achieved simultaneously" (p. 199). Furthermore, he says this double vision does not result in a blurred image of history. Rather, it results in a quite clear composite image, one that encompasses our current era's "historicalmindedness" at large, questions the shortcomings of the discipline, and engages in the discipline at one and the same time. The historian Tara McPherson similarly appeals to the lenticular lens to mobilize her conception of the "racial economy of visibility" (McPherson 2003: 26). For all intents and purposes, Bann's "double vision" is the same thing as R.G. Collingwood's "second dimension" of historical thought, or the realization that historians and their histories likewise have histories (Collingwood 1993: 231–249). In his 1935 essay "The Historical Imagination", Collingwood claims that historical thought is somewhat like perception itself. The historian conceives of the historical event as a unified thing, just as we perceive a room as a room, or the furry lump sitting in my lap as a cat. In both cases, a compendium of disparate evidence gives rise to a unified composite image in the imagination. The "unified thing" demands ever greater descriptive specificity (the room is painted Behr Stonewashed, and the cat is a polydactyl Maine Coon named Dilsey).

What the historian produces is at root "the product of his own a priori imagination" (p. 245) – like, as Bann might put it, the give-and-take between our ocular physiology and the flat images on a stereographic card. Collingwood assures us that he is not producing an argument for outright historical skepticism in establishing this fundamental discrepancy between original perception and historical construction. Rather, he is only opening us up to contemplation of a "second dimension" of historical thought: "the history of history", or the realization that historians are as much objects of inquiry as the evidence from which they sculpt their narrative (p. 248). In the realm of historical thinking, mediation abounds – not just in two degrees but in three or four or infinite numbers. No work of history is ever complete or ever "done once for all" (pp. 248–249), because its ultimate end is to prompt reassessment from future historians. Fundamentally, there exists no stable referent – no unified, coherent past time as witnessed from a bird's-eye point of view – against which to compare the written, spoken, filmed, and photographed results of the historical imagination. The common denominator among philosophers of history has long been that history not only abounds in mediation but in fact cannot exist *without* mediation. As Ankersmit provocatively puts it, "No representation, no past" (Ankersmit 2006: 328). It would behoove us, then, to scrutinize any and all intersections between the world of media – those objects and experiences that better represent "mediation" than anything else – and the world of historical theory.

We are as cognizant as ever of the inevitable gaps between the past, firsthand depictions of the past, and historical narratives of the past. As Bann puts it, we see the past and our act of narrating the past in one metaphorically

composite, stereographic image. His is an apt but also oddly, even if intriguingly antiquated metaphor. Our own era's historical imagination would seem to be most heavily inflected not by the stereograph but by the archival capacities of new media technologies and by the seeming incapacity of historical narratives to do justice to the archive's overwhelming surfeit of source material. We might consider stereography to be the nineteenth century's corresponding medium, as it, too, somewhat like computer technologies today, pairs overwhelming archival capacities with fatalistic reminders of our perceptual and mnemonic capacities' comparative fallibility. The stereoscope was one of the first such media to throw into disarray the relationship between embodied temporality and historical time and, as such, helped prefigure something like postmodern historiography *avant la lettre*.

The popular media technologies of an era might go so far as to determine the very bounds of that era's reflections on what history is. That media are so often turned into predicates in these media metaphors, however, defies the very nature of metaphor, which is built on mutual growth between the elements at play, where one element's comparison with the other transforms the reader's conception of both elements at one and the same time. What those philosophers of history who turn to media metaphors have consistently neglected is that the actual producers of these media objects – these panoramas, photographs, stereographs, films, and the like – develop their own sophisticated historical discourse along the way, at once reacting and contributing to the evolving and interrelated historical imagination and visual literacy of their spectators. Over the last few decades, though, philosophers of history *have* begun paying attention to the type of histories produced in visual and auditory media. This is not to say that they have ceased using media metaphors to describe their own conceptions of the limits of representation; they have not. Rather, I mean that they have begun to take note of how media actually inflect the historical imagination rather than merely providing a means of metaphorizing it. Indeed, as Stephen Bann has written, "[T]here is a type of historical consciousness that can be created specifically by images" (Bann 1984: 247). The visual metaphors that run so rampant in historical writing – "we like to speak of 'images of the past', of the 'point of view' from which the historian 'looks' at the past, of the 'distortions' of historical reality which an incorrect 'viewpoint' is liable to create" – demand what the Frank Ankersmit calls "a strong argument in favor of the pictorial interpretation of the study of history" (Ankersmit 1995: 212–240). Martin Jay has urged us to "become more aware of how mediated our visual experiences are by the discursive contexts in which they appear" (Jay 2002: 87–92), and it seems just as productive to consider the inverse: how our discursive contexts are mediated by the changing contours of visual experience. In the age of digital photography, we reassess celluloid photography, just as in the age of celluloid photography we reassessed paintings and prints. Running parallel to these reassessments is always a corresponding reassessment of the myriad ways to view history.

History's innumerable traces and the incapacity of historical investigation to recuperate those traces in their isomorphic totality thus bear greater similarity to the dense syntax of pictures than to the differentiated syntax of writing. Ankersmit and others appeal to visual images, foregrounding historical texts' paradoxical aims both to provide objectivity and promote empathy, both to encapsulate something grand in one sublime glance and to immerse the reader in a flood of sensuous details, both to tell a story and to overwhelm with details so numerous as to make the story all but illegible. Hayden White intimates this himself, as he writes that all historical accounts are "artistic in some way", that historical discourse is "not a mirror image" of its object, and that all historical representations are negotiations between the "micro-level" of "congeries of physico-chemical impulses" and the "macro-level" of the "tidal rhythms of the rise and fall of whole civilizations" (White 1975: 48–67). And likewise, over the last few decades, scholars of history films have theorized cinema's potential to shape popular perceptions of history, to convey the complexity of history, to replace concerns over accuracy with concerns over empathic connection, to reflect on the nature of history's representability itself, to posit something besides monolithic and teleological views of history, to break down borders between fact and fiction, and to demonstrate that historical works reflect their own period (Rosenstone 1995; Landy 1996; Rosen 2001; Davis 2002; Hughes-Warrington 2007; Burgoyne 2010). This scholarship seeks to overturn historians' conventionally negative verdicts on popular media's historiographical promise. The literary and film historian Alison Landsberg argues that display technologies have afforded their users "prosthetic memories" of events through which they did not actually live and that such technologies therefore encourage empathic connection to the past (Landsberg 2004). Hayden White has argued that the twentieth century's traumatic events can neither be forgotten nor adequately accounted for, represented, or remembered and that only modern media have the capacity to depict these events in both a requisitely fragmented and empathy-affording fashion (White 1996). In line with White's evolution from literary to pictorial models of history, I myself am ultimately interested not in critiquing written historical texts but rather in scrutinizing the actual images that we deem to be historical representations.

I'm gleaning my case studies here from the U.S. Civil War – in large part because the mediascape's obsession with the Civil War runs from 1861 all the way up to the present day. Media producers' obsession with the Civil War coincided with the beginning of the conflict in 1861 and has persisted – from the recent Sesquicentennial (marked by everything from a Ridley Scott–produced documentary about the Battle of Gettysburg to an animatronic theater show at Conner Prairie Interactive History Park in Indiana to a film called *Abraham Lincoln: Vampire Hunter*), to the Centennial (marked in the 1960s by a slew of trading cards, comic books, board games, Westerns, and ViewMaster slides), to the Semi-Centennial (marked in the 1910s by the

hundreds of Civil War films produced during a key transitional time in the evolution of silent film's narrative discourse and industrialization), to the Vigintennial (marked in the 1880s by countless painted panoramas, magic lantern slides, and stereographic cards), to the very outbreak of the war (marked by a flood of photographs and lithographs and illustrated newspapers and history books). This mediascape provides us a singular means of unearthing a corresponding archive of interrelated developments in the philosophy of history and in critical theory's assessment of media technologies' contextual import. Popular culture still produces plentiful new representations of the Civil War in the twenty-first century, and these contemporary representations bear an analogous relation to other representations of the war in other media throughout the war's 150-year aftermath. The technical roots of each medium may derive from a different evolutionary course, but each medium nevertheless shares the function of permitting successive generations to cope with a particularly untotalizable, irrecuperable, and yet densely represented historical event. Furthermore, the fact that the war is still reevaluated and represented so profusely even today makes it a good source of case studies for understanding how popular media affect and reflect popular conceptions of historicity itself and for understanding popular media's relationship to shifting philosophies of history.

At the risk of engineering a too-perfect symmetry, I'll suggest that the twenty-first century's media metaphors comprise a mere continuation of the media metaphors that have cropped up persistently since the mid-nineteenth century. The questions are the same now as then, and the media metaphors assume the same format now as then; all that has changed is the inflection of the technological substrates themselves. All told, I'm seeking here what the contemporary German media theorist Wolfgang Ernst has called a "precise media archaeology of the historical imagination" (Ernst 2005: 583). I'm hoping to help release new media from their strictly metaphorical status in these figurative conceptualizations of history. I'm hoping to ask more minutely how the experiences afforded by media technologies seep into the historical imagination, how they give us a singular means of addressing the logical limits of visual and historical representation.

Adobe Flash 2011, lithography, and pencil 1861

Those logical limits of visual representation, especially in the realm of historical representation, revolve around the interrelated issues of scale, narrative, and the figurative role optical devices play in negotiations between the two. "History", Paul Ricœur writes in his last book, "functions in turn as an eyepiece, a microscope, or a telescope. . . . When we change scale, what becomes visible are not the same interconnections but rather connections that remained unperceived at the microhistorical scale" (Ricœur 2006: 211). Michel Foucault likewise opens *The Archaeology of Knowledge* with a distinction between microscopic and macroscopic scales of history. A single

event assumes different scales of import depending on the intentions of the historian: "On each of the two levels", Foucault writes, "a different history is being written" (Foucault 2005: 5). Macrohistorical approaches peer through a wide-angle lens, while microhistories zoom in optically to a longer focal length. The longer that focal length becomes, the greater the number of details for which to account. As the temporal scale shortens, the spatial scale, or the number of details to convey, grows in inverse proportion. History thus becomes an exercise in increasing the detail with which one writes while unearthing ever more details for which to account. Going back even to a turn-of-the-twentieth-century writer, William James has written that those who aim for a wide-angle, all-encompassing view of history "deliberately prefer . . . to see things *en gros* and out of focus, rather than minutely" (James 1956: 259). In the present day, Frank Ankersmit has put it this way: when "looking through a microscope or through binoculars, to focus on one spot inevitably leads to a blurred view elsewhere" (Ankersmit 1996: 144). And on what Arthur Danto refers to as "microscopic inspection", the timeline of history's events will be "riddled with breaks" – with inconsistencies, discontinuities, and overlapping consequences (Danto 1985: 166). A single tableau never suffices as a representation of any given moment, as every historical moment harks back to innumerable past moments and forward to innumerable future consequences. In other words, zooming in from a "bird's-eye" vision of history to what I'll call, after John Kasson, a "mole's-eye" vision of history reveals ever more subtle and minute details (Kasson 1990: 70–111).

Consider, to begin, a web-based, interactive map of Civil War battles and casualties, first published on *The Washington Post*'s website on the 150th anniversary of the firing on Fort Sumter. Google Maps and Adobe Flash Actionscript code drive this relatively simple animated graphic. Press play and a progression of dots plays out on your monitor. This is bird's-eye history, coalescing the surfeit of nitty-gritty, ground-level details into vector-based circles with precisely scaled radii representing the number of casualties for each successive battle. The code is precise, but the information conveyed is vague. We feel an overwhelming urge to zoom in on the Google Map to reveal a detailed satellite view – something in which the battles themselves play out before our very eyes as if from the perspective of a hot air balloon. Taking a very similar tack is an animated video piece called "The Civil War in Four Minutes", commissioned by the Abraham Lincoln Presidential Museum in the early 2000s. Here, a map of what Civil War contemporaries would have called "the seat of war" undergoes a constant shifting of colors and borders to account for every city won and lost and to tally the war's every fatality as the individual days of the conflict tick by. One week of the war equals one second of the video.

The same sort of tug of war between macro and micro plays out in an 1861–1862 series of lithographic prints. These seven prints – the Library of

Congress calls them maps and has reproduced them digitally using JPEG2000 compression technology – feature different regions of the Southern United States and the significant war sites therein. The artist, John Bachmann, dubs each in this series of prints a "Panorama of the Seat of War". The Battle of Seven Pines in 1862 gives rise to Bachmann's most detailed image and the one most densely populated with human figures (Figure 10.1).

A single landscape depicts different days of the conflict – multiple climactic moments from multiple battles, all taking place around the James and Chickahominy Rivers near Richmond. The scene, drawn from an imaginary perspective high above the Chickahominy looking west toward Richmond, shows both disorderly skirmishes and precisely proportioned battle lines. Silhouetted ranks of soldiers march toward the fray, where horses go leaping with all four legs flung wide. The faint shape of a rearing horse and a sword-wielding officer in mid-fall against the backdrop of gray smoke signify just one anonymous death among many. Richmond, still years away from its fall, lies out of harm's way in the background, with friendly black smoke rising from the ironworks along the James River and with a circus tent occupying the fairgrounds on the outskirts of the city proper. Between Richmond and the battlefield lie a number of black triangles – Confederate encampments with their countless tents. Silhouetted medical officers carry

Figure 10.1 John Bachmann, "Birds Eye View of the Seat of War Around Richmond Showing the Battle of Chickahominy River, 29 June 1862".

Source: Library of Congress, www.loc.gov/item/99448489/

a wounded man toward those tents on a stretcher. In the immediate foreground on the right side of the image, a soldier shields his face from a cannon whose fuse he just lit and whose blast must be imminent (Figure 10.2).

In the middle foreground, an officer draws his revolver on a soldier who has his bayonet fixed but not, it appears, at the ready. Two officers on horseback peer over their men as they fire a volley into the enemy ranks. In the lower left-hand corner, a man drives his startled cattle out of harm's way. To the north: Mechanicsville and Gaine's Mill. To the South: Savage's Station (labeled "Battlefield Sunday 29") and White Oak Swamp. Just north of Savage's Station and White Oak Swamp: Fair Oak Station (labeled by Bachmann "Battlefield May 31") (Figures 10.3 and 10.4).

Other skirmishes go unlabeled yet drawn in detail by Bachmann. The takeaway: onto a single bird's-eye map, Bachmann has imposed a week's worth of conflict. May 29's Savage's Station skirmish is separated from May 31's Battle of Seven Pines not by time but by geography. Within a still image the artist has implied temporal movement. Like Marey with his chronophotographs, Bachmann has imposed multiple instants onto a single still image.

An October 11, 1861, *New York Times* article describes Bachmann's project in these terms: "The 'seat of war' does not seem to be a standing one. It changes its location almost daily. But the publishers of the maps follow it up faithfully". As the war progresses, in other words, so too does the artist's canvas pile detail upon detail, and once-bare maps become crowded with puffs of smoke signifying battles. Bachmann's 1860s prints and *The Washington Post*'s 2011 interactive map implicate historical representation in a



Figure 10.2 John Bachmann, Detail of "Birds Eye View of the Seat of War Around Richmond Showing the Battle of Chickahominy River, 29 June 1862".

Source: Library of Congress, www.loc.gov/item/99448489/

Figure 10.3 John Bachmann, Detail of "Birds Eye View of the Seat of War Around Richmond Showing the Battle of Chickahominy River, 29 June 1862".

Source: Library of Congress, www.loc.gov/item/99448489/



Figure 10.4 John Bachmann, Detail of "Birds Eye View of the Seat of War Around Richmond Showing the Battle of Chickahominy River, 29 June 1862".

Source: Library of Congress, www.loc.gov/item/99448489/

negotiation between diachronic narrative encompassment and synchronic indexicality. Embedded within these single pictures is a sense of both bird's-eye totality and mole's-eye inconstancy – both the extended timeline of events and the fleeting split second. These objects impose a comprehensive narrative of events but also leave open-ended the individual actions that

contribute to or even comprise the comprehensive event isomorphically. The mid-twentieth-century philosopher of history A.R. Louch has written that historical narratives are like maps or portraits: they aspire to as clear and stable a picture as possible of an object that is subject to the whims of micro-temporal change. History is a relativistic practice, Louch says, in that the image of the past it produces "is only acquired through long exposure" and can only asymptotically approach its ideal (Louch 1969: 47–70). He has put the historian's task this way:

> Imagine a game in which the identity of a thing, person, or episode, is guessed from the successive addition of lines on a sheet of paper. It takes only a few lines to see something emerging, yet with a few more lines the early guess is dropped in favor of a new one. Sooner or later a point must come at which further strokes with the pen add only detail; nothing will change our view of what it is.
>
> (p. 68)

This is the game the historian plays, Louch says. Composing history cannot consist solely of adding line after line to a preexisting drawing. If that were the case, the picture would become "a meaningless jumble of detail". If surpassed, this point of diminishing returns would yield illegibility rather than cohesiveness. Therefore, the historian must subtract certain lines, add other lines, adjust the tonality of this line or that line, all for the ultimate purpose of negotiating a cogent middle ground between an impossibly stable, bird's-eye totality and an excessively dense, illegible "jumble" of mole's-eye details. An excess of ground-level details ultimately yields blindness.

At issue here is the distillation of bird's-eye narrative comprehensiveness from mole's-eye detail. John Bachmann tasks himself with gleaning that bird's-eye cohesion from several days' worth of hectic events. Compare his goal to that of the Civil War's sketch artists – like Alfred R. Waud, who was present at the same events of 1862 depicted in Bachmann's view of the "seat of war around Richmond". Sketch artists witnessed the war's engagements at ground level with their own eyes yet admitted an incapacity to adequately represent their eyes' every last impression (Figure 10.5).

Their publishers charged them with the task of providing authentic, reliable, firsthand accounts, but producing such accounts required a high degree of calculated composition. As the historian distilled an excess of evidential traces into a comprehensible narrative, so too did the sketch artist, on a much smaller temporal and spatial scale, condense an excess of sensory data into a comprehensible picture. If cameras' exposure times prohibited photographic documentation of a battle, then so too did these sketch artists consider their own senses inadequate to the excess of impressions being thrown their way. They made no pretense of recording these impressions in

Figure 10.5 Alfred Waud, "Wounded Taken from Out the Fire – Left of Kennesaw".
Source: Library of Congress, www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2004660010/

instantaneous and unfailing fashion. Rather, they created composite images based on multiple perspectives and careful calculation. Contrary to the near instantaneity of later photographic techniques, the period of time during which these composite images evolved into their final published form was considerable (Figure 10.6).

The demands on the historical imagination – demands for minute authenticity and comprehensive totality at one and the same time – outpaced the capacities of pictures. As such, the historical imagination inflected visual literacy and pictorial technique, just as visual literacy and pictorial technique inflected the evolution of the historical imagination.

Consider the height of the sketch artist's task, as exemplified by these firsthand descriptions from soldiers and others on the front line. Adequately conveying such stark, trauma-inducing perceptions in any visual medium, photographic or cinematic or otherwise, would prove a tall task:

> Men and artillery flying, the horses galloping like mad, . . . bullets flying, shells bursting, the rattle of musketry and roar of artillery, every thing enveloped in smoke, . . . the din and confusion like

Figure 10.6 Alfred Waud, "After Gaines Mill Sunday June 29th 1862".
Source: Library of Congress, www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2004660316/

> pandemonium, such as we might picture to ourselves hell in the day of Judgment.
>
> (Post 1865: 152)

> I have witnessed an engagement between two mighty armies, and God spare me another such sight! . . . [I]magination cannot depict or pen portray a truthful picture!
>
> (Post 1865: 167)

> This was a great and glorious day in our life's history, mind can not picture nor pen portray our feelings this day.
>
> (Jones 1907: 164)

> [T]he splash of bursting shrapnel . . . made a picture terribly grand and sublime, but which my pen utterly fails to describe.
>
> (Lyon 1907: 274)

> [S]uch a scene of carnage I never imagined. Carnage himself could not paint the picture.
>
> (Hays 1919: 708)

> [L]anguage is all too tame to convey the horror and meaning of it all.
>
> (Dean 1997: 57)

As these contemporaries of the war have lent the historical record written approximations of their distressful firsthand perceptions, so too have sketch artists supplemented their artworks with written clarifications and caveats. One of the best sketch artists in the business, for instance, a correspondent named Theodore R. Davis, reflects on his process in an essay called "How a Battle Is Sketched" (Davis 1889: 661–668). What he describes is a complex composite of distanced views, which permit him a comprehensible bird's-eye image, and ground-level views, which permit him something akin to the harrowing images that soldiers described as sublime and altogether unrepresentable and untranslatable. To begin, Davis dismisses the fanciful notion that sketch artists always stayed at a safe remove from the fray and managed to complete their picture from a single, encompassing point of view:

> The method of sketching a battle by "our special artist on the spot" is not known to most persons, and droll questions about such work are asked me by all sorts of people. Most of them seem to have an idea that all battlefields have some elevated spot upon which the general is located, and that from this spot the commander can see his troops, direct all their maneuvers and courteously furnish special artists an opportunity of sketching the scene. This would, of course, be convenient, but it very seldom happens to be the case; for a large army usually covers a wide extent of country, – wider in fact than could possibly be seen, even with the best field-glass, from any situation less elevated than a balloon high in air.
>
> (p. 661)

This artist contends that no single, accessible, bird's-eye perspective could possibly afford an all-inclusive view of the battlefield. Consequently, the artist must descend from his high perch and capture as best he can the turbulence of the innumerable points of view below:

> Now, the artist must see the scene, or object, which he is to sketch, and so, during the battle, is obliged to visit every accessible point which seems likely to be an important one, and there make a sufficient memorandum, or gain such information as will enable him to decide at the close of the action precisely what were its most interesting features.
>
> (p. 661)

What Davis describes, then, is a process of generating a single composite image from a number of different vantage points – as many, in fact, as time

will permit. He laments the excess of details for which his final published image would be responsible, questioning his wherewithal to register every detail as his eyes dart from the battlefield to the sketchpad:

> Infantry, cavalry, and artillery soldiers, each had their particular uniform, and besides these, their equipments, such as belts, swords, guns, cartridge-boxes, and many other things, were different. Their tactics and maneuvers were not alike, and some distinguishing point in each uniform designated the corporals, sergeants, lieutenants, captains, majors, colonels, and generals. As many as ten different saddles were in use, and of the army homes – tents – there was a great variety. The harness for artillery horses was peculiar, as was that of the mules which drew the army wagons and ambulances. Now, these are only some of the things, – a few of them, – but sufficient to show the necessity for a special sketch-book, in which to make, whenever I found an opportunity, memorandum sketches of every new thing. . . . The memorandum sketch of that action shows a general view of the field, indicated with reasonable distinctness – even if "corn f" does stand for a field of corn!
>
> (p. 667)

Narrativizing history by foregrounding mole's-eye details over a bird's-eye summation changes not just the tenor of the depiction but its very structure. It changes the very story, not just the way the story is told. And, in fact, it changes our conception of just what a historical narrative is. It changes our conception of what the macroscopic stories that historians piece together with microscopic details can actually accomplish – whether, for instance, they can logically be judged as true or false or are better judged by the emotion and empathy to which they give rise. From whatever vantage point the historian works, the composite narrative he or she creates necessarily falls short in one regard or another: it misses the forest for the trees, or the trees for the forest, or pays undue attention to one tree while altogether ignoring another one, or imposes connections between two different trees without adequately accounting for all the trees in between (Figure 10.7).

Never mind that the lifespan of *The Washington Post*'s 2011 map fell short of four years, as the following message now occupies an otherwise blank URL: "Note: Google no longer supports the technology that powers this map. Some features may not work".

Ken Burns, Ridley Scott, *Drunk History*

Ken Burns opens *The Civil War* (1990) with an unassuming arrangement of sound and image that's pretty well representative of the melancholic and ruminative tone of the entire nine-part series. On the image track, specks of dust accompany a low-angle, stationary long shot of a cannon, aimed at and silhouetted against the tail end of a sunset, with slow-moving purple

Figure 10.7 Alfred Waud, "Bayonet Charge of the 2nd Reg. Col. Hall. Excelsior Brigade. Fair Oaks June 1862".

Source: Library of Congress, www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2004660250/

clouds graduating into the sun's orange haze. The most prevalent movement within the frame, aside from the slight jitteriness of the entire frame itself, comes from a chain that dangles from the underside of the cannon's carriage and shudders in the wind. On the soundtrack, whistling wind accompanies a medley of quotations culled from two different Memorial Day speeches by Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. – read but not really acted by the actor Paul Roebling: "We have shared the incommunicable experience of war. We have felt, we still feel, the passion of life to its top. In our youths our hearts were touched with fire".

This first episode closes with the same actor reading from a letter that Union Major Sullivan Ballou wrote to his wife shortly before suffering mortal wounds at the first major battle of the war, the First Battle of Bull Run. It's the same voice, with the same inflection, accompanied by a montage of different angles of the same cannon. We progress from long to medium to close-up portraits, ending with a composition that centers on the shuddering chain, now accompanied by silhouetted blades of grass likewise shivering in the wind. Speaking over the somber arrangement of fiddles and guitars of the film's unofficial theme song and with some textual rearrangement and replacement, Roebling reads, "If the dead can come back to this earth and flit unseen around those they love, I shall always be with you, in the

brightest day and the darkest night – always, always. And when the soft breeze fans your cheek, it shall be my breath; or the cool air at your throbbing temple, it shall be my spirit passing by".

These two sequences bookend the first episode of the series symmetrically. The visual indices of wind at the end recall the sounds of wind at the beginning, and Sullivan Ballou's breath upon his wife's cheek recalls the fire that touched Oliver Wendell Holmes's heart. Nature's elemental components and the unpredictability and intangibility thereof merge with the comparatively slight actions of humans. Likewise, the microscopic components of historical events merge with the aims of historical narratives – to distill macroscopic significance from those microscopic components. These bookends elucidate for us how narratives, particularly narratives conveyed via the dense syntax of visual media, can prompt us to contemplate the difference between swimming through an overwhelming excess of details and flying over a symmetrical, succinct, and selective encapsulation of those details.

Of all the sound and image components Ken Burns's *The Civil War* contains – filmed photographs and paintings, landscape shots of battle sites, expert interviews, readings from diaries and letters and the like, titles, maps, diagrams, sound effects that represent battles – the most conspicuous absence is that of present-day footage of Civil War reenactments. By contrast, the made-for-television documentary *Gettysburg* – directed by Adrian Moat and produced by Ridley Scott and others for broadcast on the History Channel in 2011 – lays claim to that component as its primary armature. In its monstrational tactics, *Gettysburg* substitutes urgent voiceover narration, hectic mise-en-scéne, and split-second shot duration for *The Civil War*'s slower-paced tone – its indifferent and stalwart voiceover narration, its immersion not into the first-person points of view but into mysterious photographs that remind us how difficult it is to assume a historical subject's point of view in the present day. *Gettysburg*'s mise-en-scéne and editing do imply the irrecuperability of horrific battlefield experiences, yet its voiceover narration insists on the definitiveness of the film's overall story: infinite numbers of these fragmented, irrecuperable battlefield experiences have given rise, in historical hindsight, to a story wholly suitable for an easily digestible two-hour, as opposed to Burns's eleven-hour, television broadcast. Neither film – nor, for that matter, any film or any history – can adopt a narrational strategy that is utterly devoid of systematization or of what Burns has called, in a lecture at the University of Southern California, the "process of horsetrading called editing".

Burns tries his best, though. Only shyly and reluctantly does he assume the role of after-the-fact narrator. Hence his ruminative tone, his impossible effort to have his film "embody the discovery or exploration process involved in its making", as the film critic Brian Henderson has put it (Henderson 1991: 8). Taking up once again the many macroscopic/microscopic metaphors for historical vision that philosophers like Paul Ricœur and Arthur Danto have used, we can further differentiate between the Burns

and Scott productions. Ridley Scott's production only superficially nods toward the fact that history changes depending on the scale on which the historian concentrates. For Scott, the fact that the microscopic timeline is "riddled with breaks", to use Danto's figuration, does not necessarily strip the macroscopic narrative of its integrity or cohesiveness. Burns takes a different approach. The camera that zooms in on and otherwise scans the over 10,000 photographs in his film assumes a sort of Sisyphean role – coming back to the same photographs, looking again and again at the same photographs in different ways, looking in vain for evidence of macroscopic cohesion within the microscopic density of each surviving trace. Filming a photograph intimates a second degree of mediation, at once getting us closer to and farther away from the historical subject at hand – like a historiographical Vertigo Effect. If recognizing the existence of an evolving historical imagination entails recognizing the historical emplacement of historians, then Burns's camera pronounces quite strongly the minute, impossible-to-harness, impossible-to-account-for ebbs and flows of the historical imagination. Scripted as the camera's push-in on one photograph or scan of another photograph may be, the inevitable hesitancy of the movement suggests a processual approach to narrating the film. The film's exploration of photographs is slow yet inevitably time bound, recalling the contingency inherent in long-exposure photographs like those of the Civil War era. What Walter Benjamin has said of the people photographed by long-exposure photographs can likewise be applied to the people who watch Ken Burns's cinematic remediation of those photographs: "During the long duration of these shots they grew as it were into the picture" (Benjamin 1972: 17). The pictures become less about indexing a moment or motivating the progression of a story. Rather, they subvert the relentlessness of narrative progression and grow to exceed mere representations of objects – somewhat like the sort of cinematic description that Seymour Chatman has called "*temps mort*" (Chatman 1990: 54–55). This invokes not the embalming of time but the opening up of time – what D.N. Rodowick has called, after Gilles Deleuze, a " 'primitive' time-image, a kind of open window on accumulating duration" (Rodowick 1997: 8). This "open window" on duration precludes the separation of historical subject from historical object and necessarily binds the two together as one ongoing process. Hence the "deeply ambivalent relationship" that photographs have to time – their simultaneous capacity to suspend duration and precipitate contemplation of duration's flow (Hunt and Schwartz 2010: 259). The Burns and Scott productions imply the consequences of this in very different ways. In contrast to *The Civil War*, *Gettysburg* presumes the moving image's ability both to convey war's dynamism and to wrangle that dynamism into narrative submission.

This is not to say the Ridley Scott production fails to intimate the horrors of war and the incapacity of historical representation to recuperate those horrors. Intense footage of battlefield reenactments occupies the majority of the movie's image track. In these sequences, the duration of a single shot

rarely exceeds one second, and rarely does the focal distance or depth of field or speed of motion of any one of those shots remain constant for more than a tiny portion of that second. Following the titles, the movie begins with a computer-generated helicopter shot soaring first through a cloud and then over an empty battlefield landscape. Synthesized dramatic music accompanies a whistling wind effect and the voice of the film's narrator, Sam Rockwell. The helicopter hangs a sharp left, and the film cuts to an extreme close-up of a goateed soldier as Rockwell says of the first action at Gettysburg, "The fight escalates out of control". Smoke and whizzing bullet sounds and other such indices of mayhem fill the image and sound tracks. The constant and agitated reframings of the handheld camera manage to mask cuts as swing pans and vice versa. Each shot's depth of field is extremely shallow, with its main subject ducking into and out of focus in uncoordinated collaboration with the frantic camera. Speed of motion varies both from one shot to the next and within a single shot, revving up and down with no rhyme or reason. Rufus Dawes is the narration's object of interest. He's leading his Union troops on a chase against the retreating Confederates. Both the camera and the subjects it films move constantly from left to right across the frame. Comparatively smooth dolly and crane shots begin to accompany the handheld camera. Low angles abut on high angles as soldiers jump into a trench. Light flares and underexposures also creep into the compositions. A few hundredths of a second of an action seem to repeat themselves in succeeding shots. One cut yields two very similar framings of the same face, differentiated by only a few degrees of camera placement. Rockwell informs us that "it will cost Dawes one man for every yard they advance", which prompts a sequence focusing on the regimental flag and the ten men who are said to have died carrying it within a few minutes' time. As a bullet passes through the first of those flag bearers, all sounds cease except for the heightened tension of the nondiegetic music and the drawn-out firing of that one bullet and its digging through flesh. Six different shots convey the anticipation of impact and the collapse of the soldier. A second soldier enters the frame to keep the flag upright at the tail end of that sixth shot. Another bullet strikes this soldier almost immediately, and another four shots convey the action, the last of which assumes an extreme low angle, almost fish-eyed in perspective, and ends with a glob of blood splattering onto the lens – at once undoing the illusion of the spectator's narrative mastery and emphasizing something like a documentary aesthetic. A third soldier enters the frame and grabs the flag. Dirt rains down on both him and a fourth soldier who grabs hold of the flag as that third soldier falls. Four shots convey the fourth soldier's death, the final of which lasts just one second but manages to capture a fifth flag bearer's being shot as well. As the last soldier falls out of the frame, a slight pull focus reveals Dawes himself in the background, on one knee with revolver drawn. Hand-to-hand combat follows, and with it even more frantic juxtapositions and enframed images. The longest shot of the sequence brings us to its denouement: a

Union soldier exacts revenge on a Confederate who has just shot his friend, staring madly at his fallen enemy as the camera pushes in on his face in slow motion. The only shot of sustained duration and speed of motion and predictable camera movement still manages to intimate sensorial uproar, as the camera tries in vain to convey something deeper within the demented soldier's bulging eyes.

Gettysburg's handheld camera, along with the "intensified continuity" of *Gettysburg*'s editing, represents history's triumphant but limited capacity to mold narrative cohesion out of disparate and traumatic events (Bordwell 2002). Ken Burns's camera, on the other hand, thoughtfully meandering the surface of photographs and looking for depths of meaning that no degree of remediation can make apparent to us, encapsulates those below-the-threshold details that compose historical experience in constant dynamism. *Gettysburg*'s free-ranging camera intimates something that comes across to me as an insincere nod to the mayhem from which is culled a carefully mapped narrative: the more hectic and unpredictable the film's narrator system seems to be on the surface, the less contrived the structuring narrative appears. Burns's camera attacks the issues of scale and narrative from a different angle: his narrative as a whole, especially as spurred by McCullough's voiceover narration, assumes a probing, uncertain, unfolding-in-real-time tone, yet the individual components of his narrator system assume what appears on the surface to be a rigidly controlled and mapped-out composition. It seems intuitive that shot durations of split seconds and unpredictable juxtapositions of angles, distances, and depths of field would strike the viewer as the more open-ended, less absolute vision of history, but in this case our intuition would be wrong. As it scans over and pushes in on photograph after photograph, Burns's careful, investigative camera intimates history's open-endedness and its necessary subjection to the evolution of the historical imagination.

What can close textual analysis of film compositions and film sequences of this sort ultimately afford us? In moving from contextual analysis to formal cinematic analysis, we graduate from the mere unearthing of media objects to a more nuanced scrutiny of what we can call their nondiscursive components. As media adapt and grow and die off and are reborn in ever new remediations, they embed something of their own history into their very technicity. They index not just the symbols we instruct them to but also physically real impressions and signals. These physical impressions and signals intimate a fundamental capacity or incapacity to recuperate and remember historical traces. They amount to what we might call noise – the noise of the channel, the excess traces inherent in media technologies that renders them illegible at some fundamental level (Parikka 2011). It's not just that media technologies possess their own historical discourse. No, their very substrata, the stuff that composes them before people ever lay eyes on the screens and monitors and other such discursive surfaces that house them, tell their own history. The chemical inconsistencies of this photograph

or the grain structures of that film determine at some unconscious level the bounds of the historical imagination. Wolfgang Ernst has dubbed this "non-discursive infrastructure" not media archaeology but rather media archaeo*graphy*. The media themselves can therefore become, as Ernst has put it, "active 'archaeologists' of knowledge" (Ernst 2011: 240). The microtemporal processes at work in moving image technologies especially – those processes that permit chemicals to transform a negative image into a positive one or that permit an electronic image to appear on a video monitor – stand in so effortlessly for the impossible combination of Ideal Chronicler and Maximal Detailer that Arthur Danto and others identify as the model for perfect historicist production.

No less applicable to this discussion of historical narration in moving images is the contemporary television show *Drunk History*. We'd be hard-pressed, in fact, to find a more unassuming, irreverent yet also keen model for scrutinizing what the moving image can contribute to a renegotiation of historical narration. I say this earnestly. The series, created by the comedians Derek Waters and Jeremy Konner, first appeared on HBO's *Funny or Die Presents*, won the 2010 Sundance Jury Prize in Short Filmmaking and earned its own Comedy Central time slot in 2013. Episode five, which tells a story about the relationship between Abraham Lincoln and Frederick Douglass, is salient here. The premise emphasizes, albeit in an absurd fashion, the way present circumstances shape a historian's construction of past events – in this case reducing those present circumstances to base corporeal levels of intoxication.

This is the scenario: Waters and Konner ask friends or colleagues to think of a moment in history that resonates with them personally and then to offer their own spoken narration and interpretation of that moment while imbibing excessive amounts of alcohol. In the case of the Abraham Lincoln and Frederick Douglass episode, narrator Jen Kirkman drinks two bottles of wine. "Today", she tells the camera while casually sitting on a couch and suppressing a hiccup, "we're gonna talk about Frederick Douglass". First, our narrator establishes the macro consequences before zooming in on the finer points of her story's timeline, as if cinema itself has imbued even the least cognizant historian with this structure: "The Union was falling apart", she slurs. "The South was seceding. It was a very young country". On the image track, the establishing shot comes in the form of a digital push-in, in implicit imitation of the Ken Burns effect, on a Kurz and Allison lithograph depicting the Battle of Chickamauga. A cross-dissolve brings us to a portrait of Frederick Douglas as Kirkman says in voiceover, "Frederick Douglass was an abolitionist, and he believed it was morally wrong to have slavery". The lithographic portrait of Douglass in turn cross-dissolves into an overwrought reenactment: Senator Pomeroy of Kansas (Derek Waters) offers Abraham Lincoln (Will Ferrell) a drink as he says, mouthing the voiceover narration from our host, "Hey Lincoln, this guy's talking a good game. You should meet with him". With her hiccups, her tangent about wanting to

continue drinking while also lying down, and her occasional lapses in referring to Frederick Douglass as Richard Dreyfus – "I knew it was something similar!" – and Abraham Lincoln as Bill Clinton, the narrator conveys, to a fault, the undue and sometimes brutal degree to which present circumstances reign over one's visions of the past.

Drunk History serves first and foremost – well, after making us laugh – to remind us that any film's voiceover narrator or extradiegetic narrator is through and through an integral part of the film's larger narrator. Even an extradiegetic narrator is firmly entrenched in the narrative discourse and the dialogic context of the film's production. *Drunk History* emphasizes just how great a capacity the narrator has in revealing or concealing a film's portrayal of history as either elastic or rigid in its claims, inseparable or separable from its historical context, and insistent or lax in its privileging of image or text. Via direct spoken language, narrators can acknowledge a film's intertextual dependencies, and in such cases the narrator's historiographical disclosure makes for compelling applications of narrational mood and voice. The narrator of *Drunk History* serves as the show's larger narrator/image maker/monstrator by bearing every ounce of responsibility for the incoherence and inanity of the plot, a plot that is actually determined just as much by the filmmaker's editing as by the narrator's ramblings. "There's a good two hours before it gets good", Waters admits. "You've told the story forty different times". Only after those two hours and 40 different iterations of the same story (and two bottles of wine) does the narrator reach a point where she gives herself over completely to circumstances beyond her control – the state of being drunk, of possessing whatever knowledge she intuitively has, of presenting that knowledge according to whatever standards of performativity her present faculties afford her, of being paired with absurd reenactments based after the fact on her narration, and of being subject to still further selective editing.

After poignantly conveying that Lincoln was more concerned with preserving the Union than insuring the rights of black people, and after fabricating a face-to-face exchange of Lincoln's walking stick between Mary Todd Lincoln (Zooey Deschanel) and Frederick Douglass (Don Cheadle), the narrator closes her story by asking, "Did I need to do a more story about them?" – a question that Ken Burns must have asked himself many times during the production of his own epic television series. Here is the point at which narrating by drunkenness and narrating by rote converge, expressing the self-doubt that Ridley Scott (and D.W. Griffith before him, for that matter) was not equipped to express. The mediascape and cinema in particular helped Collingwood, Danto, Ankersmit, Ricœur, and others metaphorize history's openness. And this idea in turn seeped into Derek Waters's historical imagination, which in turn might perhaps play some small role in inflecting historical imaginations yet to come.

One question that arises, then, is whether the increased availability of images of the past and the ease with which those images can be integrated

into coherent narratives have served to immunize viewers to what they actually represent – that is, the many atrocities that have comprised history. With his purple clouds and setting sun and silhouetted cannon and symmetrical structure, Ken Burns demonstrates how historical films can sometimes manage to impose narrative cohesion while simultaneously intimating the random, elemental nature of historical change. If nineteenth-century historians imagined a perfect, unadulterated, continuous, *panoramic* image of the past, then twentieth- and twenty-first-century historians have imagined what we might call an edited, highly mediated, *moving* image of the past – an image that at one and the same time immerses its viewers in the innumerable indices and details of the past, tells a complete and comprehensible story of that past, *and* hints at the paradoxes inherent in this dual aim of historians.

The painted panoramas of the nineteenth century set very similar bounds for the historical imagination – conceptual limits on the infinity of details and the cohesiveness of stories. A historian of the war in the late 1860s appealed to the panorama to assure his readers that "the utmost care has been exercised to bring before the reader the grand panorama of the military conflicts in which the troops of the nation have been engaged, in clear and consecutive order" (Kettell 1863: 5). Yet an officer at Gettysburg, whose account of the battle was published posthumously in 1898, appealed to the panorama for very different reasons – not to praise the inclusiveness of his historical representation but to lament its limits. He appeals to the panorama as a model of sensual incoherence and incongruity. I'll give him the last word:

> A full account of the battle as it was, will never, can never, be made. Who could sketch the changes, the constant shifting of the *bloody panorama*! It is not possible. . . . Of this battle, greater than Waterloo, a history, just, comprehensive, complete, will never be written. By and by, out of the chaos of trash and falsehood that the newspapers hold, out of the disjointed mass of reports, out of the traditions and tales that come down from the field, some eye that never saw the battle will select, and some pen will write, what will be named *the history*. With that the world will be, and if we are alive we must be, content.
>
> (Haskell 1964: 246)

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11 Sensors and sources

How a universal model of instrumentation affects our experiences of the past

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Instrumentation

Many of the instruments of the nineteenth century demonstrated that energy could be converted from one form to another, a disparate collection of processes that would later be grouped under the general heading of "transduction". Heat and motion were interconverted by fire pistons and steam engines. These technologies had been well-known since antiquity, if not generally exploited to do useful work. Motion was converted to electrostatic charge by frictional electric machines. Chemical reactions could result in electric current, as in the voltaic pile (ca. 1800), and a large assortment of devices were subsequently created to convert forces to and from electric currents. The work of Ørsted and Faraday showed that electrical and mechanical energy could be converted into each other. Thermoelectric effects were demonstrated in the 1820s and 1830s, generating electricity from heat and generating or absorbing heat by electric current. The newly developing technologies of photography provided further examples of energy conversion.

Researchers like Faraday and Helmholtz put their newly unified understanding of physical forces to work in both technological domains, such as telegraphy, and scientific ones, such as electrophysiology. Practically from the moment of its commercial introduction in the late 1830s, the telegraph was seen as a metaphor for the nervous system, and its use suggested experiments that could be done in vivo or with apparatus built from animal bodies or body parts (Morus 1998; Otis 2011). Humans and other animals would increasingly be seen as comprising and being comprised of networks of control and communication. At the same time, animal bodies exhibited "chemical action, electricity, magnetism, heat, light, and motion . . . not acting in one definite direction, but contributing in the most complex manner to sustain that result of combined action which we call life" (Grove 1869). Faraday did a series of experiments with an electric eel at the Adelaide Gallery in London, trying to determine how the animal converted nervous force into electricity and speculating that humans might eventually be able to convert electricity into nervous force (Turkel 2013).

Scientists developed this idea of interconvertibility most systematically in the field of thermodynamics, especially in one of its core tenets – the conservation of energy. In the two decades before 1850, at least a dozen natural philosophers proposed some version of the law of conservation of energy, the idea that energy can be neither created nor destroyed, only transformed. Thomas S. Kuhn (1959) argued that this was the most striking example of simultaneous discovery in the history of science. In some cases, the claim was framed in terms of the interchangeability of heat and work. Others posited a single, indestructible force or substance that could appear as heat, light, electricity, or movement. As Ludwig von Helmholtz, one of the pioneers of the new science, put it, "[T]he different forces of nature are forms of a single universal energy . . . that can be neither added to nor destroyed" (Rabinbach 1992). Examining these developments, Kuhn identified three elements that he believed led to the emergence of this new way of imagining the natural world: the availability of processes that converted energy from one form to another, involvement with the machines of the Industrial Revolution, and the continuing sway of *Naturphilosophie*, which held that the forces of nature could be transformed into one another.

On that basis, phenomena that cut across humans, machines, economic activity, and natural systems were theoretically interchangeable (Tresch 2012). Engines and bodies, mechanical and organic processes, even the cosmos could be treated under the same theoretical framework and, within limits, studied using similar tools. As Anson Rabinbach (1992) notes:

> [T]he working body was but an exemplar of that universal process by which energy was converted into mechanical work, a variant of the great engines and dynamos spawned by the industrial age. The protean force of nature, the productive power of industrial machines, and the body in motion were all instances of the same dynamic laws, subject to measurement.

In this context, machines of all kinds were seen as translating energy from one form to another and as mediating between philosophy and industrial culture.

Although transducers embodied the new principles of conservation of energy, the way they were used in instrumentation in the mid-nineteenth century continued an instrumental tradition based on inscription and self-registration that went back at least to seventeenth-century meteorological instruments like the self-registering clock. Some of these instruments left an inscription or trace of their activity on a cylinder of wax or smoked glass, on paper, or by some other means (Multhauf 1961). They eventually found wide use in meteorology, physiological experimentation, industrial process monitoring, and elsewhere. But one of their key features was that they transformed phenomena into permanent inscriptions, represented in a graphic form capable of mathematical analysis. Their development also

contributed to the emergence of a new kind of archive of machine-generated inscriptions, situated somewhere between the traditional and intentionally accumulated archives of anthropogenic writing in various media and the vast archive of material traces that comprised the source base for the historical sciences like cosmology, geology, and evolutionary biology (Turkel 2007; Daston 2012). As their early links to the clock suggested, these transduced inscriptions joined archaeological records and historical documents in furnishing data that made it possible to think about and represent phenomena like "climate" not only geographically but "historically" across time.

Thermodynamics provided a rich site where ideas about convertibility, inscription, and scientific representation coalesced around this graphic method, the representation of scientific information on a coordinate system using points or lines (Brain 2013). The indicator diagrams of early thermodynamics and steam engines provided one instance of this, tying together concepts of work in a way that provided the basis for Helmholtz's research in physiology and the later work of Etienne Jules Marey. Helmholtz had used an adaptation of the indicator diagram from efficiency studies of the steam engine to investigate muscle contraction (Brain and Wise 1999). Marey adopted this graphic focus to the more general study of movements of all sorts – heartbeats, pulses, flapping wings – in order to decompose them into discrete components (Rabinbach 1992; Brain and Wise 1999). Throughout his work in the 1860s and 1870s, he worked precisely under a thermodynamic view that focused on the economy of the body, and his complex instruments drew on both an older method of mechanical linkages and the new possibilities for transduction provided by electrical techniques.

Marey saw registration technologies as revealing things that would otherwise be hidden to the senses. Graphic methods were about deciphering and permanently representing the reality of evanescent phenomena in a way that language could not: "a graphic expression of the most fleeting, most delicate, and most complex movements that no language could ever express" (Rabinbach 1992). He saw himself building on a tradition that stretched back into the early part of the century in disciplines like economics, medical geography, and demography. Nor was mechanical inscription itself new, going back to eighteenth-century meteorology and to chronography in the early nineteenth century and more recent developments in self-registering instruments for physiology. Marey's initial inscription devices were mechanical, using air tubes, for instance, in an early cardiograph; his use of an electrical transducer – in an adapted myograph used to study nerves and muscles – simply allowed him to transmit the signal directly to the registering device and represent it graphically. As Rabinbach (1992) observes, this technology of registration formed a kind of automatic writing that "united the body's own signs (pulse, heart rate, gait, flapping of wings) with a language of technical representation". Marey's main achievement, according to Rabinbach, lay in this combining of the graphic approach with the technology of mechanical inscription (1992).

As Marey's interest in the graphic method suggests, the power of these graphs lay in their "optical consistency" (Latour 1986), which would become one of the defining features of modern scientific representation. Because of their format, the graphs could be presented, read, and combined with others like them. Like Western maps, their scale could be altered without changing their internal properties. But unlike the phenomena they represented, these records could be readily amassed and archived. Moreover, possibly their greatest advantage was that their representation on a coordinate system made them susceptible to measurement and mathematical analysis. And the mathematical analysis of the graphs could now stand in for the direct measurement and analysis of the phenomena themselves (Lynch 1985; Latour 1986; Knorr-Cetina and Amann 1990; Daston and Galison 2007). The graphs transformed natural specimens into visual and analyzable data. In doing so, they allowed data from one phenomenon to be recombined and superimposed with images and graphs from other phenomena in different fields, finding structures and patterns across areas of research.

On the largest scale, the manipulation of these kinds of records brought together disciplines as seemingly distant as economics and physics, as they had in the indicator diagram. They also created increasingly significant "archives" of data all capable of being analyzed using an increasingly standard set of mathematical techniques. The social physics that Marey himself pointed to as a precedent for his work was made possible by presenting social phenomena like deaths, births, and suicides in a graphic form that made them almost indistinguishable from periodic physical phenomena like waveforms. Although a scientific apparatus producing these graphs might have been specific to its own discipline, and the features of the graphs might have served the interests of a specific field, representing phenomena across these broad spheres on a standard coordinate system made them the object of increasingly universal practices of collection, compilation, and analysis.

Electrical standardization was one development that allowed the results of these instruments to travel. As technologies, transducers were not just scientific devices; they formed part of the world of politics and commerce, and enormous resources were devoted to making sure they worked properly. Developments in telegraphy, for example, placed electromagnetic transducers at the heart of the British Empire, particularly starting in the mid-1850s when the British set up a series of telegraphic systems linking them to India and set out to do the same with British North America by building a transatlantic cable from Valentia Island in the British Isles to Trinity Bay, Newfoundland. The cable was first laid in 1857. When it failed the following year, the government asked William Thomson, one of the key figures in the development of thermodynamics, to testify. Thomson argued that the cable had failed because of considerable variations in electrical conductivity over its length. The lines, he insisted, should be tested by comparison with absolute standards of resistance. The determination of the unit of resistance

became part of a political battle between German and British science and technology (Schaffer 1999).

British natural philosophers also interpreted the failure of the first cable as a statement about the proper social relations and material instruments needed to establish electrical standards (Schaffer 1999). The Cavendish Laboratory, created in 1871, helped create those relations and would dominate the determination of British electrical standards throughout the late nineteenth century. Maxwell, its director, was adamant about establishing strict social practices adopted from British industry – laboratory managers, division of labor, highly specialized tasks, and factory discipline. To overcome the industrial connotations, Maxwell framed its work in explicitly moral terms (Schaffer 1999). With work structures and moral imperatives in place, Cavendish would go on to become the premier electrical laboratory in the world and would certify electrical resistance boxes for the entire British cable industry. It helped spread an objective language of electrical currents, resistance, and potential differences, replacing an earlier subjective vocabulary based in part on the perceived intensity of electric shock.

The standardization of electrical units, in turn, underwrote the development of precision electronic instruments in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The measurement and visualization of electric current in particular had posed problems for instrument makers because the signals of interest were often miniscule, changed very rapidly, and disappeared quickly. This had changed by the end of the nineteenth century with the development of the oscillograph, which created records on moving paper or photographically (Borrell 1987). Oscillography was put to use in a wide variety of fields, including acoustics, physiology, seismology, and telegraphy, extending the graphic method to electrical instrumentation, displaying its information in the increasingly universal language of Cartesian coordinates. The fully electronic cathode ray oscilloscope would largely replace paper and film with a screen but would keep the Cartesian coordinate system that made those media so powerful. The coordinate system remains in use in today's digital oscilloscopes.

Electronics

The development of electronics provided a powerful continuation of the graphic tradition. Unlike electrical devices, which simply converted different forms of energy from or into electricity, electronics allowed scientists to directly manipulate electrical signals themselves. The groundwork for that development was set around the turn of the twentieth century, when electrical currents were demonstrated to consist of "electrons", negatively charged subatomic particles. These particles could be manipulated with the newly devised vacuum tube, which passed current in one direction only. In 1911, the tube was also shown to be able to amplify currents.

The word "electronics" came to be used to refer to devices that manipulated electron flow, usually specified either in terms of current (the number of electrons flowing past a single point per unit of time) or voltage (the potential difference between two points). The relation between voltage and current differed from one electronic device to the next. It might be linear or nonlinear. Devices that were sensitive to physical phenomena like light or sound often provided a resistance to current that varied with the magnitude of the stimulus. Electronic components could be combined to add, multiply, or divide voltages and to integrate and differentiate functions. The operational amplifier, a component that was originally constructed from vacuum tubes and later from transistors, was a general-purpose building block that could be configured to count events, compare voltages, take logarithms, and solve differential equations. In these circuits, voltage or current was used to represent some physical measurement, in other words, electricity was an analog of something else. Electronic circuits were thus capable of (analog) computation, even before the development of digital computing (Horowitz and Hill 1989).

With the rise of electronics, the manipulations that were initially performed on graphs could now be directed at the transduced phenomena instead. The early twentieth century increasingly saw the use of electronic components to help represent the phenomena directly and to manipulate them in place of and in addition to the manipulation of the final graphs. Like thermodynamics, the rise of the electromagnetic worldview created deep analogies between physical phenomena. Electrical metaphors provided a powerful framework for representing natural phenomena. But electronics would also cut in the opposite direction, allowing scientists to convert electronic signals into a wide range of other phenomena. The computer would provide a key development here.

Histories of computing have noted how the new machines took over the function of calculation from humans, first in military applications, then in scientific ones, and finally in broader commercial and personal applications. In doing so, they often reinforced or transformed work practices, labor and gender relations, and epistemic commitments (Galison 1997; Agar 2006). Scientists themselves often saw those transformations as revolutionary, allowing them to ask and answer questions that would otherwise have been impossible. On that view, the importance of the computer as a universal scientific tool far surpassed the contributions of traditional, discipline-specific instruments, like the telescope, microscope, seismographs, particle accelerators, and even differential calculus (Robertson 2003).

Statements like this, however, tend to underestimate the continuity of practices across the era before computers. As John Agar (2006) notes, "computerization, using electronic stored-program computers, has only been attempted in settings where there *already existed* material and theoretical computational practices and technologies". In the creation of botanical maps, government statistics, and X-ray crystallographs, computers took

over from preexisting computational techniques. Some of their applications in history and the humanities share that connection. The use of computers to create keyword in context (KWIC) listings and search engines for text is based on earlier practices of citing, concordancing, and indexing, for example (Schreibman, Siemens, and Unsworth 2016). Statements pitting the revolutionary impact of computers against other instruments also neglect the ways in which the two crucially functioned together with transducers at the intersection (Agar 2006).

Agar locates the techniques that preceded computerization in the late nineteenth century. Even early computational methods were based on an idea of encoding information in a way that allowed mathematical procedures to be performed on it. Generally, this involved storing data on punched cards, a technique that gradually gained adherents after Herman Hollerith used it for the U.S. Census in 1880.[1] As Agar again notes, "A punched card can be thought of as a grid, in which the information content is determined by the position on the grid and whether that position is un-punched or punched" (2006). Mechanical sorters separated cards based on the pattern of holes; tabulators generated running totals. In astronomy – the discipline that spawned the social physics that Marey held up as a model – punched cards were used in the 1930s to sequentially process a datum of information, since future operations often depended on the results of previous calculations (Ceruzzi 1998). Wallace Eckert at Columbia explained these techniques in his book *Punched Card Methods in Scientific Computation*. The instructions for how to process the cards and what actions should be performed with them were generally achieved by connecting and disconnecting wires and arranging switches to perform calculations. But this information could also be stored on the cards themselves, as Howard Aiken did at Harvard with the Mark I during the Second World War (Agar 2006).

The connections that Agar traces have a deeper history, though. The use of punched cards to control machinery went back to Joseph Marie Jacquard's encoding of weaving instructions for the automatic loom, but it was science and commerce that thought about seeing these records as analogs of the graphic method and subject to the same kinds of techniques – a universal form of representation that made mathematical transformations and computations much simpler and (this was different) capable of being both produced and read by machines. It furthered the kind of synthesis that the graphic method had made possible, and its use in government and the social sciences helped create the impression of the computer as a general-purpose machine (Agar 2003), with uses that extended its scientific role in collecting and juxtaposing data. The creation in the 1960s of new objects of the human sciences, like the "whole person concept" for instance, defined a "person" by combining perspectives from different statistical databases through computation (Agar 2006). Quantitative history, which had been the subject of sporadic discussion since around 1910, came to new prominence in the 1960s and peaked the following decade in the "cliometrics" boom,

drawing on statistical data to characterize historical populations (Parry 2013).

Like the use of transducers, the creation of records capable of computerized processing required standardization. Initially that standardization involved common work practices that abided by the requirements of punched cards. Early twentieth-century practices for compiling information on flora, for instance, were routinized intensely so that data could be recorded comprehensively and in a format where mechanical tabulation could be used (Agar 2006). Already subject to electrical standards, transducers took over many of these functions as they directly transformed physical phenomena into electrical quantities that could be sensed, encoded, and analyzed by the computer.

Those techniques were extended by later developments in data storage that would do away with paper and photographic records (to some extent, at least). During the Second World War, J. Presper Eckert and John Mauchly had designed and built the first general-purpose electronic computer – the ENIAC – to automate the calculation of firing tables for the U.S. Army. While working on this device, they conceived of a more universal machine, the UNIVAC, whose information flow through vacuum-tube circuits paralleled the way humans conducted traditional scientific calculations using mechanical calculators, books of tables, and pencil and paper (Ceruzzi 1998). Unlike mechanical calculators based on punch card devices for business, the UNIVAC could conduct a sequence of mathematical operations on a single piece of information and then move on to the next item stored in memory. This was the basis of the universal machine that would be useful not only to commercial but to scientific interests as well. The UNIVAC stored data on tape rather than on cards. But it still functioned according to the principle of creating records on which mathematical operations could be performed directly. This was embedded in the so-called Von Neumann architecture that characterized most digital computers from the UNIVAC until today – the separation of processing units from data storage units. With the development of core memory in applications like Whirlwind and SAGE, the computer could gather vast amounts of information from different sources, process it, and then present it as a text or graph (Ceruzzi 1998). It reiterated the division of labor represented by the graphic method and the mathematical techniques performed on its products. But more than anything, it created a universal machine that could take the input from a variety of transducers and digital-to-analog converters.

Over time, hundreds of physical stimuli would be converted into the universal currency of electric charge, current, or voltage and processed through various types of computers. These included ultrasonic waves; microwaves; radio and radar; visible, infrared, and ultraviolet light; heat and flame; liquid levels; inertial and gyroscopic forces; position, velocity, and acceleration; gravity; mass; force, strain and touch; vacuum, pressure, and pressure gradients; fluid flow; dust and smoke; humidity and moisture; ionizing radiation;

chemical concentration; viscosity; optical properties; surface roughness; still and moving images; and even, in our time, tastes and smells (Fraden 2010). The possibility of converting nearly any physical stimulus to an electronic analog meant that a scientific instrument (or, more generally, any measuring instrument) could be conceptualized as a special-purpose detector that transduced energy into an electrical signal that was then handled by general-purpose data processing devices that amplified, filtered, processed, visualized, recorded, and performed computations on that signal. This resulted in an instrument that was universal in many senses. It was based on a universal currency (electrons), constructed from many copies of a universal building block (the operational amplifier or op amp), instantiated a universal theory (conservation of energy), imagined sensing in universal terms (transduction), relied on a universal model of computation (differential equations), and visualized or audified its output in a universal mode (the time-varying waveform).

This move toward universalization changed the work of the instrument maker. Those who now build scientific apparatus still need to be able to design and fabricate mechanisms, establish a vacuum, limit temperature to a set range, shape glass, and devise optical systems, but a significant part of the job consists of choosing or building transducers, designing appropriate electronics to detect and process signals, and acquiring data in digital form for storage, communication, and computation (Moore, Davis, and Coplin 2009). In a sense, many scientific instruments now consist of a domain-specific front end that handles the transduction, and a universal, electronic back end that subsumes the graphic method and mathematical analysis that dominated science from the nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth.

The interpretation of instrumental output is still subject to an extensive division of labor, of course (Galison 1997; Turkel 2007). You want the person who interprets your chest X-ray to spend the bulk of his or her time specializing on that task and leave the interpretation of aerial photos of glaciers to someone else. But the computational techniques that are used to process X-rays are the same as those that are used for aerial photographs, photomicrographs, surveillance camera footage, selfies, sonograms, and every other kind of digital image in our world. The techniques of image processing and computer vision, in other words, are generally applicable rather than limited to particular kinds of image. General-purpose machine learners can also be trained using feedback from human interpreters and then turned loose to classify images without human supervision, and these techniques are applicable to digital images in general. They can be as useful to the work of the historian as to any other (Jones-Imhotep and Turkel 2018).

The universal conception of scientific instruments also changed the way that scientists and engineers thought about sensation and perception in living organisms and, more generally, about the similarities between transduction in physical systems and that occurring in biological, cognitive, and social systems. Amplification and oscillography allowed physiologists to

"watch" neurons modulate one another from one millisecond to the next, giving them a much better understanding of how the nervous systems of humans and other animals worked. Mid-twentieth-century sensory physiology drew on the conceptual apparatus of cybernetics and systems theory both to understand processes that happened within organisms and to situate them in wider contexts of communication and control (Hughes 2001; Turkel 2013).

Technologies based on electronics have undergone exponential growth for the past half century, resulting in the incorporation of electronic devices into every aspect of our lives. Scientific instruments are only one example of this larger trend. In 1965, a chemist named Gordon Moore (later one of the cofounders of Intel) observed that the number of transistors that could be put on one integrated circuit was doubling roughly every year. A transistor is basically a switch that can be controlled electronically. You can store and process information with groups of transistors, and the more you have, the more you can do with them. The regular doubling of transistors on integrated circuits is now known as Moore's Law and has continued ever since. We now manufacture about ten quintillion transistors per year. To put that number in perspective, it is approximately the same as the number of raindrops that fall in the continental United States in a given year (Turkel 2013). Moore is reputed to have later said that "if the auto industry advanced as rapidly as semiconductors, a Rolls Royce would now get half a million miles per gallon, and it would be cheaper to throw it away than to park it".[2]

The exponential growth in transistor production and density and the exponential decrease in cost are paralleled by similar explosions in computing power, the number of computers produced, the amount of storage capacity available, and the number of connections between networked devices and people. Needless to say, such untrammeled growth is rare. Although historians of technology tend not to subscribe to the idea of technological determinism, in the case of Moore's Law we have an example of a technological phenomenon that seems, at least over the past 50-plus years, to be almost "impervious to social, economic or political contexts" (Ceruzzi 2005).

Digital history

Moore's Law and transduction have also shaped our sense of the possibilities of perceiving, experiencing, interpreting, or remembering various pasts, whether real, recreated, or fabricated. We turn now to the impact of ubiquitous electronic devices on our historical consciousness. "Digital history" refers to the use of computers, computer programs, digital media, and other electronic technologies to teach, communicate, preserve, access, analyze, simulate, research, present, and publish interpretations of the past. As the sources that provide evidence for the human past are digitized – or, increasingly, are born digital – it becomes possible to subject them to the same kinds of processing as the output of any electronic sensor. In a sense,

the universal scientific instrument can now be focused on the human past. As we will suggest in this chapter, this takes us into territory that is contested by proponents of different academic paradigms and is not yet a part of standard historiography.

Human beings have used artifacts to record events and aid remembrance since the Pleistocene. By the early 2000s, the bulk of this technological memory was already digital; within a few years, more than 90% of it was (Hilbert and Lopez 2011). Globally, we now create and consume about a zettabyte (10^{21} B) of information each year. If we imagine a printed book to be an inch thick and contain 2.5 megabytes of information, a zettabyte worth of books would form a stack more than 6 billion miles high. As the late Roy Rosenzweig observed a number of years ago, with the digitization of the historical record, historians have moved from a culture of scarcity to one of abundance (2011).

One measure of this abundance is the wealth of digital books. Over the past decade, Google has digitized and made searchable more than 30 million books, a larger collection than that held by the U.S. Library of Congress or the British Library. Google's scientists estimate that there are about 130 million different books in the world, which means that almost a quarter of them are already available in digital form – at least where intellectual property regimes don't impede their use. Anyone with an Internet connection and a laptop, however, can download about 3 million public domain books from the Internet Archive, HathiTrust, Europeana, and other online repositories. Newly published books, too, are often born digital. For a number of years, Amazon has been selling more e-books than traditional books in the U.S. and British markets (Vinjamuri 2012). To these are added rapidly growing numbers of digitized films, video, audio, manuscripts, newspapers, journals, and, of course, born-digital sources, both familiar (word processor documents, e-mail, news, blogs, tweets, camera phone images) and exotic (just about everything output by the electronic measuring instruments previously described).

The field of digital history, whether one thinks of it as a separate subdiscipline or simply a collection of methods that will eventually be adopted by all working historians, attempts to deal with this incredible abundance. As Rosenzweig (2011) argued, we now have "to write history . . . faced by an essentially complete historical record". In 2006, Gregory Crane asked, "What do you do with a million books?" but in a way that is the wrong question. A million books is a heap, no matter how big. We are faced not with a heap but rather with an unceasing flow. The real question is what to do with a million books per year. Each year we have at least that many more at our disposal, not to mention information in other digital formats. The answer is that we have to use computation to do what computers do well and save human care and attention for the things that people do well: close reading, thinking, interpretation, and writing.

Most contemporary historians use at least some digital tools in their day-to-day practice: e-mail, word processors, search engines, and online

library catalogs. Working with a number of colleagues and students, we have built on this foundation to create an all-digital workflow that makes much more extensive use of computation. All of our sources are already digital or are digitized in use, and we have collected far more of them then we could read in a lifetime. We use web crawlers to find and automatically download sources. These are computer programs that extract information and hyperlinks from web pages, then follow those links in search of more information: it is the same technology that search engine companies use to build an index of the Internet, although, of course, we don't have the resources (or inclination) to work on the scale of the whole web. We can use a variation of web crawling to create bibliographies automatically by following the citations between books and articles. From each source, we extract topics, keywords in context, and so on. Each source goes into a custom search engine. Other techniques, like clustering and machine learning, let us highlight a name, footnote, phrase, or paragraph and find everything in our collection that is closely related to something we are looking at or have just written.[3]

In our most recent work (Elliott and Turkel 2018; Jones-Imhotep and Turkel 2018), we have been using techniques from image processing and computer vision for image mining (Szeliski 2010). In these projects, we start with a large collection of digitized sources, such as the entire published run of a journal, then automatically extract each of the images from the surrounding text, resulting in a collection of tens to hundreds of thousands of digital images. We analyze each of these in terms of individual pixels (for values such as hue or brightness), small groups of pixels (for image features like lines and boundaries), and statistical properties of the whole image (to extract things like shape or shading or to recognize entities like faces, people, or buildings). Using small sets of hand-labeled images, we then train machine learners to automatically sort all of the rest of the images into categories: photographs, diagrams, charts, maps, drawings, electronic schematics, advertisements, company logos, and so on. By visualizing the ways that vast numbers of these images change over time, we are able to investigate aspects of visual and material culture that would otherwise remain unnoticed.

Since this way of working is probably still unfamiliar to most historians, it is worth highlighting some of the ways that it differs from the methods of researching and writing that the two of us were taught in the 1990s. First, every historian of a certain age has an anecdote about losing track of where they saw a source that would later turn out to be perfect . . . if only they could find it. Since the computer "sees" every source we see and indexes it, it is much easier to go back and find these gems. And we often find that we misremembered the source in some telling detail: confabulation made it seem more apt than it really is. Second, since it is usually trivial to track a chain of footnotes backward through the sources, it becomes dishearteningly clear how many errors accumulate in the everyday process of citation.

Errors become much easier to catch and repair, though. Third, since we have curated the sources for a particular project to be relevant to that inquiry, almost every search turns up many items of interest. With a general-purpose search engine, one is often looking for needles in a haystack; with a system like this, serendipitous discoveries abound. Of course, we are conscious of the fact that there are limitations and shortcomings in doing work at this scale. No doubt many of these will be discovered by future historians.

The most significant consequences of digital history lie not in changing the practices of working historians but rather in the effect that machine-readable and writable sources have on everyone's historical consciousness. Take search engines. For decades historians were trained to consider carefully the biases inherent in any work, including finding aids. Now, Google alone serves more than a trillion queries a year, using algorithms that are understood in broad outline but secret in the details (Sullivan 2015). The vast majority of search engine users will choose something from the first page or two rather than looking deeper in the list of results; will try a different simple search if they don't see what they are looking for, instead of using advanced syntax options to refine their original search; and will assume that the information they want does not exist if they don't find it quickly. The rankings of results created by search engine algorithms are the most pervasive source of bias that has *ever* existed in the research process, and some of the world's largest companies spend a lot of money to prevent their competitors (and, by extension, everyone else) from figuring out exactly how they are determined (Pasquale 2015).

In addition to the secrecy of proprietary algorithms, search engines and other kinds of social media try to create a customized picture of the world that they think you personally want to see, the better to sell you things. Pariser (2011) calls this the "filter bubble". Whether you have explicitly logged in or not, companies like Google can use hundreds of different signals from your computer to "de-anonymize" you and provide the content and advertisements they think will most interest you. These signals include things like the version of browser that you are using, your hardware, your location, your language, your search history, your browser plugins, and, of course, any cookies, "supercookies", or "ubercookies" left on your machine (Eckersley 2010; Narayanan 2010). Whether or not you tend to see historical content in search results depends on whether you have consumed it in the past, and the kind of content that you see – and, for that matter, its veracity – is selected based on projections from your past online behavior. By the second decade of the millennium, the political consequences of such microtargeting (and of related strategies like using automated bots to fill social media with the apparent voices of consensus) have become distressingly clear.

The history that is most likely to be widely consumed is no longer vetted by the institutions that used to serve as cultural gatekeepers: the government, publishers, academia, learned societies, or heritage institutions.

Wikipedia provides the most striking example of the changing fortunes of scholarly authority. Written and edited by anonymous volunteers, ceaselessly updated, sprawling far beyond the scope of traditional encyclopedias (as of 2018, the English edition had more than 5 million entries and 3.5 billion words), Wikipedia is probably the first port of call for most historical inquiry – as history teachers well know. Wikipedia articles top the search results for anything history related, and that gives them an authority and reach that was never enjoyed by any textbook no matter how widely adopted. Anyone can edit a Wikipedia article, regardless of personal qualifications to do so; more to the point, qualifications are irrelevant (Rosenzweig 2011). Nevertheless, the community of Wikipedia contributors manages to keep most of its content well within usable bounds. Its coverage is catholic, and it responds instantly as the rest of the world changes. As a source for real-time public historical consciousness, it is unparalleled. Researchers have used it, for example, to show how unfolding events trigger the collective memory of earlier ones: during the 2011 nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima, Wikipedia page views for the Chernobyl disaster (1986) climbed from about 9,500 per day to more than half a million (Kanhabua, Nguyen, and Niederee 2014).

Early discussions of digital representation often focused on its plasticity, worrying about the consequences of being able to change files without leaving a trace. In the case of traditional material media, such changes are usually obvious (or at least detectable), but how can you be sure that any "0" didn't used to be a "1", or vice versa? A digital record of the human past seemed to be much less secure than one carved in stone or written on paper. The force of these critiques is greatly reduced by three factors that have not received nearly as much attention from humanists and other concerned commentators. First, technologies of error detection, error correction, and fault tolerance have been under active development by engineers since at least the 1940s (Turkel, Start, and Muhammedi 2014). Second, all digital representations *are* material, and forensic techniques can often be used to retrieve far more information from physical media than one might expect. Kirschenbaum (2012) gives the example of the German firm Convar using laser scanning to recover almost all of the contents of hard drives taken from the ruins of the World Trade Center after 9/11. Third, because digital representations are *sources*, they can be subject to traditional or philological source criticism, as well as to computational techniques that are specific to digital representation. As an example of the former, a digital photograph that purports to show something can be checked against the real world and against other images whose provenance may be more certain. The work of Dartmouth computer scientist Hany Farid provides many nice examples of the latter. He and his colleagues have shown, for example, that photo manipulation can be exposed using shading and shadows (Kee, O'Brien and Farid 2014), inconsistent reflections (O'Brien and Farid 2012), inconsistent lighting (Johnson and Farid 2005), duplicated regions (Popescu and Farid 2004), and many other clues (Farid 2009).

As our records of the human past progressively come to resemble the output of other kinds of instrumentation, the problematic boundary between C.P. Snow's "two cultures" (2012) seems to shift. Some texts written by people are now sorted by machines in ways that prevent others from ever seeing them – Dan Cohen (2006) gives the example of intentionally composing e-mail messages so they won't get caught in spam filters. At the same time, texts written by machine are increasingly difficult to distinguish from human-authored ones, especially in limited domains. Some business and sports reports from the Associated Press, Yahoo!, and *Forbes* are already automatically generated by software (Oremus 2014). Professions that depend heavily on the production of formulaic texts, such as the law, are already facing extensive mechanization (Manjoo 2011; McGinnis 2014).

The first research team that succeeded in basing historical accounts on massive amounts of digitized cultural sources was notable for the absence of professional historians and for its decision to distinguish itself from prior work by coining the term "culturomics" to describe its own efforts. In a *Science* article published online in December 2010, Jean-Baptiste Michel, Erez Lieberman Aiden, and colleagues described experiments with a corpus of more than 5 million English language books published between 1800 and 2000 (Michel et al. 2011). They used it to answer questions in a variety of disciplines. How many English words are there? How did English irregular verbs change over time? How interested were societies in talking about events of previous years? How long does it take someone to become famous or subsequently forgotten? And so on. One of their most compelling demonstrations was of censorship in Nazi Germany.

While generally enthusiastic about the culturomics paper, historians had some reservations. There was concern (of course) that what limited humanities funding there was would be diverted to scientists. Anthony Grafton, then president of the American Historical Association, wrote in an editorial that the omission of historians from the team was "striking", especially considering the fact that "Harvard's own history department employ[ed] distinguished specialists in the history of books and media, including two winners of MacArthur grants" (Grafton 2011). Lieberman and Baptiste (2011) responded wryly that, although the historians in question had served as valuable advisors to the project, "setting up day-to-day working collaborations with historians was much harder than we expected". Historians "didn't seem to have a good sense of how to wield quantitative data to answer questions, didn't have relevant computational skills, and didn't seem to have the time to dedicate to a big multi-author collaboration". "It's not their fault", they concluded, "these things don't appear to be taught or encouraged in history departments right now".

The publication of Guldi and Armitage's *History Manifesto* in 2014 brought the debates to the center of the discipline, however. In brief, they used large data sets to argue that historians in recent decades had turned away from writing large-scale, synoptic histories in favor of more delimited

ones. They concluded that historians should embrace "big data" and seek to engage wider audiences (see also Armitage and Guldi 2015). Critics (e.g., Cohen and Mandler 2015) used different data sets to dispute the historiographical claims. That much could be considered business as usual. What was novel in this debate was that *The History Manifesto* had been published in both traditional print and open, online forms. Subsequent revisions of the online version by the authors (flagged with revision notices) brought charges of academic dishonesty from their critics (Parry 2015). In 2006, Jeremy Boggs described history as a "perpetual beta". Whatever consensus historians eventually come to on this matter, there is no question that finding and comparing textual variants is much easier with digital texts and computational tools.

None of us can navigate our contemporary world without depending on the intelligence of machines, and advances in machine intelligence are happening more rapidly each year.[4] The techniques of image mining – and the attendant technologies of digital photography, image processing, computer vision, and machine learning on visual representations – have expanded very rapidly in the post-9/11 world. Research in computing with images is driven in part by consumer applications, in part by more exotic projects that may soon appeal to consumers (things like self-driving cars come to mind), and in part by less social or even antisocial goals. A camera built into an advertising display can track the eye movements of groups of people as they look at the ad (Lee 2013). Marketing firms use image mining on selfies to identify brand logos on clothing and to target potential consumers (MacMillan and Dwoskin 2014).

For security applications, machines are trained to analyze faces, facial expressions, gaze, gait, fingerprints, and many other biometric signals to identify people, to track them in real time, and to answer questions ranging from whether a person appears to be sick to whether someone has a bomb under his or her clothing. A wide range of cameras are deployed specifically for surveillance, in automated teller machines, on street corners and highways and ports, in satellites, in drones, and in a million other places. And to these we can add the possibility of surreptitiously hijacking cameras that are ubiquitously built into computers and smartphones (Gallagher and Greenwald 2014). Tens of thousands of surveillance drones, many small enough to be disguised as birds and insects, are predicted to be in domestic use in the United States by the end of the decade (Whitehead 2015). At the same time, the explosion of born-digital imagery gives us unprecedented insights into the creation of the archival record. Researchers have shown, for example, that the number of photos with titles, tags, or descriptions related to Hurricane Sandy and uploaded to the photo sharing site Flickr bore "a striking correlation to the atmospheric pressure in . . . New Jersey during this period" (Preis et al. 2013).

Many people are pessimistic about the likelihood that we will continue to experience exponential growth of GDP per capita for much longer. They predict that climate change, energy shortage, famine, epidemic disease, terrorism and warfare, or, most likely, an assortment of catastrophes will force

us to adopt "post-growth" economics globally. They say that Moore's law will eventually fail, the semiconductor industry will come to resemble the automobile industry, and people will stop throwing away perfectly good electronic devices every year or two (Shankland 2012). Some, however, suggest that things could easily go in the opposite direction as we offload more and more agency to intelligent machines. Pointing to the Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions, proponents of such a "singularity" note that a similar change in productivity now would result in a world economy that doubled in size every few weeks rather than every few decades (Bostrom 2014).

In 1965, I.J. Good, who had been chief statistician in Alan Turing's Second World War code breaking team at Bletchley Park, wrote that "the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that [humans] need ever make, provided that the machine is docile enough to tell us how to keep it under control" (quoted in Bostrom 2014). For many, that docility will probably seem like a pretty big "if". Ultraintelligent machines may be the last thing we invent, full stop. This, too, would have consequences for how the past is understood, if no longer by us. In *War in the Age of Intelligent Machines* (1991: 3), published just after bomber cameras stopped bringing the Gulf War to people's television sets daily, Manuel De Landa speculated on future "robot historians" who "would see humans as no more than pieces of a larger military-industrial machine: a war machine".

Digital history has inherited the flexible techniques and powerful material culture of the universal scientific machine. The desire to analyze massive amounts of historical information at large scales and over vast time spans is not new. It was held by proponents of the Annales School, among others, in the second half of the twentieth century. Their emphasis on large-scale social transformations over the individual events of history transformed historical research in France and abroad in the two decades after the Second World War. But the Annalistes focused their attention on periods where sources were still limited and the trends they contained could still be identified by individual scholars. Computers have pushed both the capability and the interest in extending those techniques and perspectives into periods awash in data. In the process, however, they have embraced only one-half of the tradition we have identified here. Although transducers form a crucial part of the document scanners and photographic devices that have become integral to digital history, most historians using digital techniques have not yet adopted the idea of purpose-designed instruments to broaden historical understandings in their own fields. In this sense, the transducers, rapid-prototyping, and digital fabrication tools that historians have begun to use in their work promises to more fully connect digital history with the practices and material cultures of the modern sciences, helping historians more fully acknowledge the full complexity of that legacy. And, in so doing, we stand to open up the field of digital history itself to the fuller significance of the varieties of historical experience we are working to render and recreate.

Notes

1 Punched cards seem to have begun their rise to prominence around the Second World War, peaked in the late 1960s and declined to Second World War levels by the early 1990s. See https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=punched+card&year_start=1800&year_end=2000&corpus=15&smoothing=3.
2 This remark is often attributed to Moore but difficult to find a good source for. The earliest citation that we've found to date is from a report of a speech by Mike Aymar of Intel in *PC Magazine* (September 24, 1996), p. 31.
3 There is a lot more methodological detail on Turkel's website at http://williamjturkel.net/how-to/.
4 One of the reviewers suggested that the word "intelligence" should not be used to describe machines. Here we merely note that people who work on artificial intelligence have long observed that "intelligent" is a moving target, usually defined as whatever people can currently do that machines cannot. At various times, this has included the abilities to make logical inferences, play chess, understand simple texts, translate from one language to another, identify faces, recognize photos, guide a vehicle, and so on.

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Futures

12 Toward a new historical condition

François Hartog

This title, however overly ambitious, serves to trace a hypothesis: might recent and unfolding transformations within the horizon of our historical experiences point toward a new historical condition, a condition on which history as a discipline has not yet secured a firm grasp? Let us understand historical experience, courtesy of Stephan Palmié and Charles Stewart, in the following terms: "the various ways in which people, on the horizon of their historically constituted social worlds go about imagining, mediating, and representing to themselves the past and its meaning for the present" (Palmié and Stewart 2014).

Let us, in turn, take as our point of departure an initial observation on which everyone, whether insider or outsider to the discipline of history, can readily agree. The past is increasingly harnessed in a multitude of ways: from the most official to the most playful, the most instrumentalized to the most disinterested. While this phenomenon is by no means unprecedented, the range of forms ready to hand has widened, and our ability to produce many pasts has been considerably diversified (Gruzinski 2015). Besides long established forms, such as the staged public speeches of the grand commemorations, so conspicuous during the year 2014 in Europe, there are the films, television series, and indeed video games that allow individuals, online or in their corner, to replay the great events of the past. We must not, of course, ignore all that which, at each instant, circulates on the Internet (the sites, forums, blogs, and tweets) or neglect those forms of media heretofore perceived as traditional, such as publishing. Then there are the school and the university, as an institutional place of learning, the transmission, and the production of new forms of knowledge, during a time in which we ceaselessly interrogate transmission, whether to signal shortcomings, identify obstacles, or indeed mourn its absence.

This brief descriptive inventory should suffice to indicate the extent to which the modes available for the apprehension of the past, which is to say the very material of our historical experiences, have changed and continue to change rapidly.[1] What should the historian do when confronted with such a proliferation of pasts, with such an increase in supply catering to an increasing diversity of demands, some of which incidentally are highly

unpalatable? Pretend to ignore these developments and proceed as if nothing had changed? The strategy of the ostrich rarely leads to victories. When faced with alternative histories, not to say alternatives to history (which set, for example, memory against history), to opt for the assumption of a position of authoritative speech, of the kind "I, History", make pronouncements on the reality of things ("how they really were", according the old Rankean motto) is to seek assurance in being inaudible outside of the small, self-concerned circle of those historians who do not need convincing. What other options are there? Should we deplore this disintegration of the public space and the disappearance of "common sites" – that is to say, the emergence of a profusion of incompatible memories in the wake of the receding of the horizon of a "shared past"? Or, on the contrary, should we congratulate ourselves on the marking out of new (insular) spaces or on the salvaging of ignored, forgotten, previously unarticulated historical experiences to which we may now give voice and recognition? For the moment, let us simply acknowledge this dilemma and begin by taking a step backward.

The modern concept of history and its shortcomings

History constitutes what might be called a "crossroads" name, indeed the arch concept around which belief has crystallized over the last two centuries (Hartog 2013a). With a capital H, it served as explanatory key while being exempt from explaining itself. With a small h, it encouraged the search for several explanations: the establishing of laws; the tracing of underlying long-term evolutions; the recognition of the more or less significant part of contingency in human affairs. Paul Valéry, a frequent critic of history, dispensed with the first, history with a capital H. "The word has two meanings: when it is written with a capital H, it spells out myth in menacing characters: 'History teaches us . . . History will judge. . .' all so many forms of bunkum". The second with a small h, Valéry lamented, constituted no more than a "collection of writings". Yet he did not for all that forbid it entry into the critical or reflexive age; far from it: he returns repeatedly to the question in his *Cahiers*. Whatever the position of Valéry himself, historians have progressively laid claim to the domain of history with a small h as their "territory" (Ladurie 1973)[2]: a limited one to be sure but expanding, with its "pioneer frontiers" and its depths to be sounded out, where, under diverse names and forms, the future remained on the horizon in more or less active or imperative form. During the course of the nineteenth and a good part of the twentieth centuries, historians negotiated incessantly with the modern regime of historicity, just as writers and in particular novelists had done in their own way, by fixing their gaze on the fault lines and discordances between temporalities: from Balzac to Sartre, passing by Tolstoy and Musil.

Then there was that history that the writer George Perec called in *W ou le souvenir d'enfance* history with its "great axe", one that Valéry, despite

his daily ruminations, neither saw coming nor recognized. " 'I do not have any memories of childhood', wrote Perec, 'I dispensed with them: another History, the Greater History with an axe, had already responded in my place: the war, the camps' " (Perec 1975: 17).[3] What could be said about such an experience? Is the history, with and without the capital h, which follows in its wake merely to regain its footing and continue the march forward (Hartog 2013a: 124, 133)? Lucien Febvre, who wanted to believe this possible, exhorted us as early as 1946 once more to brave the tides. The urgency, arising from the risk of finding oneself lost, he said, in the globalized world of tomorrow – of today, already – is thus not to look back at what has just taken place but to look forward and to advance. "Finished is the world of yesterday. Finished forever. If we, the French, are to have a chance of pulling through – it will be in understanding more quickly and better than others this manifest truth. In leaving the shipwreck. Into the water, I tell you, and swim steadily" (Febvre 1992: 40). We find here the attempt to process the experience of war in terms of a new impetus toward the future, to make of it a year zero or a new point of departure.

From a disciplinary perspective, it followed that new layers to the stratification of the concept have been added. The investigation was extended, giving way to structures: to Fernand Braudel's Mediterranean and the long duration. This left us with a paradox. On the one hand, there was the history of the historians, attentive to the slow pace of history, examining its long-term and faintly visible ruptures: a history, in other words, that was decelerating. On the other hand, there were the "Glorious Thirty years' and the German Miracle", years animated by an ever greater acceleration of progress and the race between East and West. Apparently moving in opposite directions, these two movements, although of neither equivalent power nor range, permitted the avoidance of the recent past. We looked far upstream and into the distance or concentrated on the urgent tasks of the present with our eye on the next future.

But with the passing years and generations, the fractures, breaks, and absences forced themselves upon our attention, and the illusions dissipated. The publication by Perec in 1975 of his extraordinary autobiography of a child who had no memories of childhood initiated the "*années-memoires*". The Austerlitz of W.G. Sebald, for whom time had stopped in 1939, constitutes a more recent echo (Sebald 2001). Such writings impose on us an insistent interrogation. How could the modern concept of history, fundamentally futurist, from within its own structure give way to this time bereft of all foundation: frozen, suspended in motion? To this past that we falsely believed consigned to the past? Forgotten, but according to a forgetfulness that cannot be forgotten? How could the "train of History" (a quite common metaphor in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) have led toward the Gulag Archipelago (and to its more recent avatars) and onto the ramp of Auschwitz? We now arrive at its 70th anniversary.

In the concluding pages of his book *Zakhor: Jewish History and Memory*, published in 1982, Yosef Yerushalmi's reflections led him onto this territory:

> I do not know if this vast enterprise which is historical research will prove durable for either the Jews or non-Jews. The ring of King Solomon, which was to make him happy when sad and sad when happy, was made by a jeweller who engraved on it the following words: "this also has its allotted span". A time will come perhaps when a new consciousness reigns, one which will express surprise that so many of us were plunged into history, if it is even sufficiently concerned to enquire into this fact.
>
> (Yerushalmi 1984: 199)

Is this time approaching? Should we already situate ourselves within it? Neither nostalgia, nor catastrophism, nor homespun prophecy are in order. What does impose itself on our attention is rather the registering of the indubitable transformation in our experience of time that has taken place over the course of the last 30 or 40 years. This is announced above all by the withdrawal of the future, not the future as such but the futurist future: the future pertaining to the modern regime of historicity, as the coal to the locomotive of History. We are facing here, in short, the "crisis of the future", of its closure, accompanied by the rise of a present that tends to become ever more expansive and pervasive.

New experiences of time

This transformation of our relation to time traces an unprecedented configuration, that of presentism (Hartog 2015). It is as if the present – of finance capitalism, the information revolution, the Internet, globalization, but also of the financial crisis in 2008 – has absorbed the (more or less obsolete) categories of the past and future. It is indeed as if the present has become its own horizon, has withdrawn into a perpetual present. What ensues is the rising to prominence within our public spaces of a set of watchwords, designating practices that translate into policies: memory, heritage, commemoration, identity, and so on. They are as so many ways of drawing the past into the present, of privileging the immediate relation, appealing to empathy and identification. We need only visit the memorials and other museums of history, inaugurated in great number all around over the last few years to convince ourselves of this. In addition, this presentist present surrounds itself with a cortege of more or less detemporalized notions and concepts – modernity and postmodernity – but also globalization and even crisis. What is in effect a "systemic" crisis if not a crisis that endures, no longer thereby the decisive moment captured by the probing eye of the doctor since the days of Hippocratic medicine? With this systemic crisis, do we not find ourselves in what amounts to a permanent present, that precisely

of the crisis of the system? We have passed from Hippocrates to Sisyphus ceaselessly rolling his boulder.

Are these displacements and upheavals the signs of a durable or transitory phenomenon? No one is in a position to say for sure, even if the balance is tilted somewhat towards durability. The calls for a "recovery" and the end of "short-termism" are of the nature of an incantation. For the philosopher Marcel Gauchet, at work here is a "change in our relation to history":

> It has taken the form of a crisis of the future, a crisis in which the exhaustion of the revolutionary idea was only the most conspicuous symptom. Along with the possibility of envisaging the future, what is fundamentally undermined is our capacity via reflection on history to render intelligible the nature of our societies on the basis of the analysis of their becoming, and the capacity to supply them with guides for self-transformative action by means of predictions and projects.
>
> (Gauchet 2005: 523)

This change of relation is precisely what the (modern) concept of History is unable or no longer able to apprehend correctly. As fundamentally futurist, it is no longer sufficiently operational to capture the becoming of societies that, absorbed exclusively in the present, are no longer capable of managing their relations with a future perceived ever more habitually, in Europe at least, under the guise of a menace, not to say catastrophe, on its way.

This future is no longer conceived as indefinitely open; on the contrary, as progressively more constrained if not closed, due in particular to the irreversibility generated by a long series of our actions: global warming, nuclear waste, genetic modification spring immediately to mind. We discover in an ever accelerated and precise way that not only does the future stretch further and further ahead of us but that what we do or do not do today has implications for a future so distant that it is entirely intangible on the scale of human life. Conversely, going upstream, we have learned that the past comes from afar, indeed ever further (the period of the appearance of the first hominids does not stop receding nearly every month, while the age of our neighboring universe we now measure at 14 billion years). Confronted with a loss of bearings, we are tempted to say stop and to advocate a step backward in order to relocate the lost paradise. The leisure industry immediately took hold of all that it could draw from the paradisiacal islands and other virgin territories, where holiday makers purchase fine-tuned experiences of programmed deceleration. Grafted onto the anxieties and fears nourished by such loss, meanwhile, is a new form of "terror" of history that reminds us, although shaped by new conditions, of the "terror" that drove the work of Mircea Eliade, known for his associations with the extreme right during the 1940s (Eliade 1949). Radical or fundamentalist ecologism likewise tends in this direction. As far as the historical past is concerned,

we tend to confine its treatment or 'management' to precise places (courts) and to specific actions (political memorials) – either in the present or for the present and under the authority of memory (Koposov 2018).

The temporalities of the concept of history

Insofar as time was placed under its charge, the concept of history was to serve as a single receptacle for a number of different temporal strata, or, to use another image, history was woven from several temporalities. The oldest stratum is that which goes from the past toward the present, corresponding to what one might call the *ancien régime* of historicity. It determined for centuries the register of the *historia magistra vitae*. If the advent of modern temporality deprived it of its preeminence, it did not, for all that, disappear. The ancient topos of the lessons of history remained intact waiting to be reactivated and has indeed been reactivated frequently up to the present time, with ever greater insistence within the framework of the great public commemorations. It is the register of the example, of the imitation of being, of what should be (or shouldn't be). The extent to which we can still rely on its ability to take hold of reality is a question that imposes itself ever more insistently, even though the concept of history, by opening toward a modern futurist time, had taken its distance from this ancient and powerful standard. This temporality became the driving force behind the modern concept of history, the locomotive ever picking up speed despite the stops, breakdowns, and derailings. As long as Marxism or the revolution remained "the impassable horizon", as we were wont to say, History and history were rendered homologous. History was the science of the real and experience made sense. We were decisively turned toward the future, a future the advent of which was to be accelerated to the maximum but beyond which we could not project ourselves or authorize ourselves to think. What would follow would be the entirely other time of the apocalypse: the long awaited arrival of the communist new heaven and earth. For some decades, the USSR had been, for the communists the world over, the sign of the arrival of this new era.

Between historical situations and the concept of history, there has always been tension: either the concept is in phase or out of phase with a conjuncture. When in phase, it buoys whoever is at the helm with the sensation that he correctly understands the situation and that he can make or at least practice history. When out of phase, it is because the concept allocates too much to the past or, inversely, to the future. The helmsman has, for example, remained too attached to an obsolete past or pushed too rapidly toward a future that does not yet exist. He has merely activated one of the heterogeneous yet equally constitutive temporalities in the apprehension of the new situation. If the discrepancy is too great, the attempt to grasp hold of history will be unsuccessful and the result out of focus, like a blurred photograph.

Either the present is seen through the lens of the past, in which case the risk would be to "enter the future walking backwards" to refer once more to Valéry, or through the lens of the future proceeding as if the day decreed for the new era had already arrived. The enemy is not the discrepancy in itself but an excessive discrepancy. Between reality and its concept, between the real and the hold that the concept has over it, there will always be a distance, *a fortiori* when faced with the composite reality of a historical situation. It is this distance indeed that allows for the possibility of reworking the concept and of refining our apprehension of the situation: of seeing more and better the present in light of the past and future, which is to say in the case of the modern concept of history, with regard to the light that the future projects on the past to render it intelligible.

History is ultimately this name come from afar, chosen to gather and bind the three categories of past, present, and future: to probe that which unites and separates them, to explore the range of combinations of those agents working on them (individual, group, institutions, state), to begin from the present situation in order to act upon it either directly or indirectly (for example, through school or commemorations). Since it was coined by Herodotus, the name has been claimed and reclaimed, corrected and modified, simplified, borrowed, lauded, mocked, denigrated, refuted, and so on. However handled, it has always remained in place, available and at the ready. Today, however, Mnêmosunê has supplanted Clio, at least within public space.

Memory and absence

In *Memory, History and Forgetting*, Paul Ricœur sought to leave behind the sterile encounter between history and memory, along with their cortege of zealots and detractors, all the while rejecting the subordination of the latter to the former. He aimed to formulate a history accessed through a memory that has not itself been reduced to the status of an "object of history". He insists that, through its "power to attest" that a past took place, memory must always be understood as the matrix of history. From this follows the impossibility on "the gnoseological level" of coming to a firm decision in the "competition between the vow to fidelity of memory and the search for truth via history" (Ricœur 2000: 502). The decision returns to the reader, which is to say to the citizen who, once enlightened and conscious of being indebted with regard to his predecessors, will weigh up "history and memory", which is why there is necessarily a "disquieting familiarity" to history. It is, in addition, the reason why Ricœur can, via recourse to Plato, present it as this *pharmakon*, both remedy and poison, since the suspicion cannot be shaken that history is fundamentally a "nuisance for memory" (ibid: 179). Michel de Certeau for his part recognized what could be designated as the "disquieting familiarity" of history. With absence for its raison d'être, it

takes the place of that which is no longer. As Michelet understands it, history buries the dead to make way for the living, to the extent that "a society gives itself a present thanks to historical writing" (Certeau 1975: 119), a present no longer closed in on itself but opened toward the future: already informed by it and capable of projecting into it.

The michelettian model of history, the historian as visitor in the land of the dead, is still compatible with the modern regime of historicity, still animated by the breath of the Revolution and guided by the forward march of the People. But once death has become an industry, once the traces of the dead have been erased as meticulously as possible, once time has stopped, once we have begun gradually to take consciousness of the fact that the past is no longer passing away, what becomes of the modern concept of history, and how can the practice of history adjust itself to this reality? How to bury the dead who have fallen victim, as it were, to this double absence? Or how to "give way to the living" if the distance between field of experience and horizon of expectation has widened to the extent of producing a quasi-rupture or, worse, if the horizon of expectation is formed in the image of catastrophe? If not a double catastrophe: from that which is on its way to that which has already taken place in the past, both joined in the same present. In Europe, it has taken us some time to be able to address such questions. The last half century has moved slowly and painfully toward this interrogation. Writers, artists, philosophers, historians, politicians, and institutions have on occasion confronted it and faced up to its inevitability or, sometimes, attempted to avoid it.

Memory, commemoration, heritage, and identity became little by little the keywords of the end of the twentieth century, while History, the major divinity of Europe since the nineteenth century, lost its grandeur, as much on its native ground as in all those regions that were to be "converted" by its missionaries, merchants, soldiers, administrators, and experts to its historical mode of life. The slide from history toward memory during the course of the 1980s is accordingly symptomatic of a transition from one era to another, insofar as it is was motivated by desire to return to the "shipwreck" that Febvre exhorted us to abandon in 1946, ultimately to find it drifting midwater. Heritage, a notion for a time of crisis, is equally an expression of such a transition. It is after we have lost our ability to orientate ourselves in time, a disorientation accentuated by its acceleration, that we look to preserve places, objects, actions in order to render habitable a present in which we can no longer find our bearings. Commemoration is the public recovery of the memorial phenomenon. It gives way to memory or memorial politics (at the European level), indeed to a set of "memorial laws". Identity serves for its part as the locus for the assembling together of such notions and is a carrier of disquietude in a double sense: in relation to the past (what is in truth France's past?) and to the future (on what basis might a common future be forged?). Might Europe perhaps (yet) be the bearer of hope, and what form might this hope take?

Experience of catastrophes

The angel of history of Walter Benjamin, as he describes it in his ninth thesis on history, is situated between apocalypse and catastrophe (Benjamin 2001: 71–77). In its use of the figure of the angel and its synoptic vision of history, Benjamin's text clearly remains within an apocalyptic framework. Yet carried by the wind of progress, the angel "is turned toward the past", which he sees as "one single catastrophe that keeps piling ruin upon ruin and hurls it in front of his feet". A change in register is under way in which we are presented with the reversal of the modern regime of historicity. In effect, history is no longer characterized by progress; rather, or simultaneously, it continues to march in uninterrupted fashion toward catastrophe. It is not, as we know, the last word of Benjamin on the matter, since the objective of these theses was to reopen the possibility of a messianic time and therefore of revolutionary action and emancipation.

"Catastrophe" was for a long time a term that belonged exclusively to the domain of literature, relating to the fatal dénouement of a dramatic poem. It is only during the modern era, specifically from the nineteenth century onward, remarks Pierre Larousse, that it took on the narrow sense of "singular misfortune". Unlike an apocalypse that is, if I dare say it, a one-shot rifle, a catastrophe is capable of repetition. Many would indeed readily accept that we have entered into an "era of catastrophes" (whether climatic, sanitary, nuclear, or other), which has imposed itself as the horizon of our historical experience.[4] In other words, all these catastrophes are connected, the linking factor being what we have done or are doing or, alternatively, what we defer or refuse to do. Following on this growing awareness of what we are beginning to perceive as a new historical condition, there are some who contend that we must fundamentally reappraise the course of modern History as a whole. It is no longer to be viewed, for the latter, as the history of progress punctuated by successive industrial revolutions, rather as a new era. This geohistory was quickly named Anthropocene, following the proposal made in 2000 by the chemist Paul Crutzen and the biologist Eugen F. Stoermer.[5] When does it begin? In 1783, with James Watt's steam engine, which marks the point at which the impact of human action on Earth systems began to spike and, above all, tend toward irreversibility? Some hold that it dates to 1945 and what has been called "the great acceleration", while others situate it significantly earlier, in the aftermath of the conquest of America, or even in the Neolithic period with the origin of agriculture. Whatever the case may be, the pivotal moment is the recognition that "humankind has become a global geological force in its own right" (Chakrabarty 2018: 8). Since then, the challenge has been to articulate earth history and world history. If you take world history, some authors would have you believe that we find ourselves in the unprecedented situation of having begun a new messianic era: a negative messianic era, that is, with a potential apocalypse on the horizon that we must do everything to

decelerate, divert, and, if possible, avert. Such an imperative in turn presents us with the task of going against the grain of all the history understood as modern, rewriting it thoroughly.

Prominent among those who sounded the alarm is Günther Anders, who was one of the first to question our "blindness before the apocalypse" despite the fact that through the atomic bomb we had become the "lords of the apocalypse". While he meditated on the consequences of the emergence of the bomb, however, he could not have predicted the unprecedented problem that the treatment of nuclear waste would represent. Hans Jonas for his part, without hesitating to mobilize fear, formulated the "responsibility imperative". Jean-Pierre Dupuy (2002, 2008), a reader of Anders and Jonas (Jonas 1990; Anders 2002), elaborated his theory of "informed catastrophism" (*catastrophisme éclairé*). To view them as the apocalypticians of today would be erroneous. All in all, they are rather more like prophets, announcing what will take place, unless. . . . Yet our aging European societies, undermined by the crisis, vaccinated against all forms of futurism, shackled to presentism, are preoccupied with the immediate and are tempted to fold in on themselves. Capitalism, meanwhile, cannot put off until tomorrow the profit of today and cannot but maximize the profit of today.

History and globalization

The decline of belief in History: is it a local (French), regional (which is to say European), or indeed global phenomenon? A France that has taken its leave from history or a Europe looking out from its windows at a history that is taking place elsewhere: we read such narratives and tire of repeating them. Yet to go beyond such impressionistic formulations in our response to this question would require a vast inquiry, the likes of which neither I nor, to my knowledge, anyone else has carried out. Knowing where to start would be difficult enough in itself: how do we measure belief or lack of belief? What, above all, do we really mean today when we invoke the word "history", whether we seek to harness it or, alternatively, to express our preference for memory in relation to it? How are we ever to come to a firm position when there are so many ways (above all through the image) of appealing to the past and of forging different forms of the past? Serge Gruzinski gives us an inventory of the latter in his most recent book.[6] How are we to respond despite all of these difficulties? Perhaps in the following fashion: there was, on the one hand, History, in which Europe believed, which it theorized and which it imposed by making it into a standard and *telos* for all other forms of history. History in this sense was by and large indexed to progress, marching toward a future that fueled its momentum and gave meaning to historical experience. While this notion of History is no longer at the helm, neither has it entirely lost its symbolic charge. It has periodically inspired diverse attempts at reformulation that span from

wide-ranging acceptance to categorical rejection and that include a number of more or less crude instrumentalizations. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries produced a wide range of such responses while the discipline of history, itself aspiring to the status of science, was tasked with putting them to the music of national scores around the world.

There is, on the other hand, contemporary presentism, that of the instantaneous and simultaneous, which fashions our new "digital condition" (Fogel and Pattino 2013). It is the very motor of globalization, following the example of the futurism of the History of the past. Like History (with a capital H), Globalization (with a capital G) presents itself from now on as self-evident[7]: "there is no alternative" is its motto. It is both future and past, since, for those who take a closer look, globalization has more or less always been there. There was globalization from the moment that there were exchanges, networks, connections, of variable reach and intensity, bringing the local and the global into communication, or, more precisely, one locality into communication with another locality, producing a dynamic that exceeds the horizon of both. So to adopt the perspective of the global is to opt for the most finely adjusted scale, the most suitable point of view.

Having abandoned evolutionism and the providential teleologies relating to nationality and class, history as it is practiced today concerns the space-world. It steadies its gaze on the very contemporariness of the contemporary and is engaged in the construction of symmetry. Globalization might accordingly prove to be the new concept of history or the very name of History, provided that it has fully renounced the faded assurances of Eurocentrism and adopted polyphony. The name that has stepped up to assume the mantle of an exhausted concept: Globalization or History, that is to say, global history, or the true history. It is tasked with carrying out an indispensable operation of substitution (and first of all repair) and with cultivating greater lucidity. When on the cusp of a new world and a new historical experience, a new history of yesterday and today is required, precisely for the sake of coming to a better understanding of today.

If not false, this general view is, nevertheless, too schematic: this becomes clear as soon as we enter into the concrete details of the negotiations that have taken place over the last 20 years between a history aspiring to the global and a historical discipline, functioning as an institution. Are we dealing with a new history or a new specialty to be welcomed under the larger umbrella of history? It is in terms of the latter model that it at first sought the recognition and legitimation of its status: as a new approach and a new problematic. All the more so in that the first "global" historians were autodidacts or converts, beginning life as historians within other domains. In 2000, on the occasion of the International Congress of the Historical Sciences in Oslo, its organizers observed that the field of global history was "still in its infancy" and "the practitioners relatively few". Indeed, its terminology had not yet completely stabilized, adopting alternately the appellations "universal history", "world history", and "global history" (Sogner

2001: 11, 15–33). For Sanjay Subrahmanyam, holder of the chair of the global history of the early modern period recently established at the Collège de France, the matter is beyond dispute. The emergence of global history amounts to the addition of a new "variety" of history, which should be called on to bear all that it can and no more:

> There is an interest in and increasing curiosity for this type of history. Yet it is not destined – and this is my deeply held conviction – to replace history practiced on a regional, national or continental scale, rather to supplement it. I am also convinced that we may even discover new possibilities for synergy by sheltering these different varieties of history under the same roof.
>
> (Subrahmanyam 2014: 28)

In his recent excellent overview, *What Is Global History?* (2016), Sebastian Conrad makes the case for it as an "approach" that, he asserts, allows one to see things not previously visible yet that may also cause other things to disappear from view by overprivileging the study of connectivities, mobilities, and flux. He adds that in addition to being an approach, it is also, for the moment, "a slogan that is necessary for reshaping the landscapes of knowledge and for revamping institutions of knowledge production" (Conrad 2016: 234).

Once we have left the terrain of disciplinary compromise, however, might we ask whether it has a vocation to exceed this remit? We may ask, that is, whether it is called upon to adopt a holistic change in perspective by asserting itself as the concept of history, which, finding itself in phase with the world of today, enables us to engage in comprehensive revision: to rewrite that which has already been written as well as to write that which has not yet been written, while giving meaning to contemporary historical experience. Nothing has yet been set in stone, even if over the 15 or so intervening years, global history has secured for itself a disciplinary footing under a stable appellation. In a discipline fond of turning points, we can, at least, register a global turn in history. Is the discipline in phase, lagging behind or running too far ahead of historical experience? Might global history become the carrier of a new belief in history? Does it entertain such an ambition? Can its concept bear such a load? A number of fundamental questions remain open.

Past, present, future

In what I call the *ancien régime* of historicity (which prevailed up to 1789, to take a symbolic date), the actors may have had their present and lived in this present, sought to understand and to master it (Hartog 2015). Yet in order to find their bearings within in it and give sense to their historical experience, they turned toward the past as source of intelligibility, a past of examples and lessons. History thus became the inventory of these examples

and the narrative of these lessons. In the futurist, or modern, regime, the reverse was true: we looked toward the future, a future that explained the present and the past and toward which we were to speed as fast as possible. It orientated our historical experiences and through it history was rendered teleological: the goal indicated what had already been accomplished and what remained to be accomplished. All national modern histories followed this model.

The singularity of the presentist regime resides in the fact that there is no longer anything but the present. Each one of us experiences this constriction within the context of our everyday personal and professional lives. Under such a regime, we no longer know what to do with the past since we no longer see it, and we no longer know what to do with the future because it has become just as obscure. We are left with no more than events that succeed one another and indeed collapse into one another, events to which we must "react" with urgency in step with the incessant rhythm of the production of new headlines and "Breaking News". Meanwhile, the Internet has imposed real time, the simultaneity of everything with everything else, and continuity. Everything occurs on the same plane in a present that is as extended as the network itself. In this new "digital condition", which is also a historical condition, articulating the past, present, and future becomes all the more problematic and yet appears all the more necessary against the background of a globalization that would appear to withdraw the possibility of a common narrative: to each his memory, site, or blog according to an incessant and decentered proliferation. But if history, local as well as global, is to secure a firmer grasp on the contemporary world, it must take account of these new experiences of time by teasing out from the apparent contemporaneity of everything with everything else and of the ensemble with each singularity, the "simultaneity of the non-simultaneous" at the very core of that which presents itself as a self-enclosed and uniform present.

Lately, we hear calls, commands even, to extricate ourselves from this pervasive short-termism. For politicians this means being able to propose, once again, a vision (or, in a soft version, a dream), while for historians it means endeavoring to reopen history. Is that enough? Surely not, but it is an indication and a start. One does not leave presentism as one goes from winter to summer time, but that is no reason, either, to continue living on in the well-known mode of "there is no alternative". What does it mean to break out of presentism? Reopening the future, yes, but what future? Not that of the modern regime of historicity, which, if I may say so, has already proved itself. It also means reopening the past but, again, which one? As long as light came from the future, the past was illuminated too. The historian knew what to remember and what to forget about the past. History (of the victors) was written easily, if not cheerfully. But when this light disappeared, the past also darkened. It made room for memory and the history of those forgotten – minorities, the vanquished.

Another route, marked out by Walter Benjamin and, even more so, by Paul Ricœur (often united despite what separates them) is an invitation to reopen the future starting from the past. This reopening proceeds by liberating the possibilities of the past that could not take place. The past is not (just) the past; it is the uncompleted future of the past that nurtures the future and that, in connecting past and future in this way, may allow effective transmission and meaningful action. We are far from the modern future (for which the French Revolution was long the central pillar) if we begin by turning to the past to identify its "potentialities". Obviously, it is not a question of reactivating the old model of *historia magistra*, where it was the past that was the model. Several recent books that clearly take this perspective have at least some indicative value (Deluermoz and Singaravelou 2016; Wagner 2016). One could almost speak of a prophetic type of approach to the past; of a past deciphered as an announcement or prefiguration, but one must be careful; these are simply possible pasts, insofar as no Revelation comes to give an unambiguous meaning to this "Old Testament" for rediscovering what the past is. These are all just so many attempts to break out of presentism by restoring an effective circulation between past, present, and future. Because a society (in order to "make society") needs a three-stroke engine (*moteur à trois temps*).

Notes

1 For the situation of the historian, see François Hartog (2014: 203–219).
2 See Revel (2006: 18–20).
3 Perec plays on the fact that, in French, the pronunciation of the word "*axe*" and the letter "h" is the same.
4 See, for example, *Esprit* March–April 2008, "Le temps des catastrophes", in particular, Jean-Louis Schlegel, "L'eschatologie et l'apocalypse dans l'histoire: un bilan contrasté".
5 Bruno Latour is a strong advocate of the Anthropocene. In an expanding bibliography, see Christophe Bonneuil and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (2016 [2013]).
6 Cf. Jonas (1990).
7 For a dubitative position, see Sanjay Subrahmanyam (2014: 24).

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